

**AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP**



**MAURITANIA**

**INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING PROJECT  
CONCERNING THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF  
ADJUSTMENT II**

**Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER)**

**OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT  
(OPEV)**

**8 June 2001**

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This report has been prepared by Messrs. D. KOUASSI, Principal Evaluation Officer, and L. MBONG MBONG, Consultant, following the mission conducted in Mauritania from 29 August to 11 September 2000. Additional information may be obtained from Mr. G.M.B. KARIISA, Director OPEV, Extension 4052, and the Principal Evaluator, extension 4514.

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

ADB	: African Development Bank
ADF	: African Development Fund
CDHLPI	: Commission, for Human Rights, poverty reduction and integration
DPL	: Development Policy Letter
EBC	: Consumption-budget survey
EFRP	: Economic and Financial Rehabilitation Programme
EPCV	: Permanent survey on household living conditions
EPFD	: Economic Policy Framework Document
FAO	: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FUA	: African Development Fund Unit of Account
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GSHDI	: Gender-specific Human Development Indicator
HDI	: Human Development Indicator
HPI	: Human Poverty indicator
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
KFW	: German Finance Agency
LDC	: Least Developed countries
MAED	: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development
MCS	: Social Accounting Matrix
MEGC	: Model of calculable general balance
MEMAU	: Model of the Mauritanian Economy
NGO	: Non-governmental Organization
ONS	: National Statistics Office
PCR	: consolidation and revival Programme
PCR	: Project Completion Report
PESAP	: Public Enterprises Structural Adjustment Programme
PPER	: Project Performance Evaluation Report
PRGP	: Public Resources Management Programme
PVCT	: Food-for-work Programme
SDA	: Social Dimensions of Adjustment
SHDPL	: Sustainable Human Development Policy Letter
SNIM	: Société nationale industrielle et minière
TAF	: Technical Assistance Fund
UA	: African Development Bank Unit of Account
UCDB	: Grassroots Development Coordination Unit
UNDP	: United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	: United Nations Children's Fund
WHO	: World Health Organization
WPI	: Women's participation Indicator

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

**Currency Units : Ouguiya (UM)**

At Appraisal (November 1990)	At Project Completion (December 1995)	PCR (July 1998)	PPER (September 2000)
100 UM = 1.2704 US\$	100 UM = 0.7285 US\$	100 UM = 0.5572 \$ US	100 UM = 0.4017 US\$
1 UA = 109.61 UM	1 UA = 204.048 UM	1 UA = 238.949 UM	1 UA = 324.825 UM
1 UA = 1.3925 US\$	1 UA = 1.4865 US\$	1 UA = 1.3315 US\$	1 UA = 1.3048 US\$
1 UA = 1 STD	1 UA = 1 STD	1 UA = 1 STD	1 UA = 1 STD

## FISCAL YEAR

1 January - 31 December

## WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

## EVALUATION RESULTS

Evaluation Criteria		PCR	PPER
1.	Relevance	Not available (N.A.)	Satisfactory
2.	Efficiency (attaining objectives)	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
3.	Effectiveness	N.A.	Satisfactory
4.	Impact on institutional development	Satisfactory <sup>1</sup>	Satisfactory
5.	Sustainability	Satisfactory <sup>2</sup>	Satisfactory
6.	Overall Performance Indicator	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
7.	Borrower's Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
8.	Bank's Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

<sup>1</sup> The probability of attaining project objectives was rated 2.5 over 3 in the PCR.

<sup>2</sup> The probability of maintaining the benefits beyond the project investment phase was rated 2 over 3 in the PCR.

## PREFACE

1. The present project performance evaluation report (PPER) concerns the project for institutional strengthening concerning the social dimensions of adjustment, which was financed by a TAF grant of UA 0.7 million and the contributions of the governments of Federal Republic of Germany and Mauritania, amounting to UA 1.96 et 0.16 million respectively. The TAF grant was approved in 1991. The project was completed in 1995, two years behind schedule.
2. The aim of the project was to attenuate the negative social effects of the structural adjustment programme. The approach adopted involved increasing the administration's design capacity for integration of concerns relating to the social dimensions in the formulation of socio-economic development strategies, including socio-economic studies and surveys on household living conditions that could enlighten decision makers formulating a poverty control policy and plan. The project further sought to assist the urban communities affected by repeated drought.
3. This PPER follows the project completion report (PCR) prepared in 1998 and considered overall satisfactory, and pursues analysis of some aspects of the latter report, such as institutional development and sustainability of the positive effects of the project. The PPER is based on discussions with Bank staff involved in the project and a mission to Mauritania during which discussions were held with the project partners and beneficiaries.
4. The Information gathering through the above-mentioned interviews and from the appropriate documents available within the Bank and in the country, aimed to address the core concerns noted in the discussion guide, namely, the relevance, efficiency in terms of realization of the objectives stated at the appraisal stage, effectiveness in terms of net gains, considering the resources committed, sustainability, the Bank's performance and that of Mauritania with regard to SDA-type project implementation, and the impact of the project regarding development of the institutional capacity.
5. The final version of the PPER takes into account the comments and observations of the Mauritanian Government, the Central Operations Department, and the North Region Country Department.

### BASIC PROJECT DATA SHEET

1.	Country	:	Islamic Republic of Mauritania
2.	Title of Project	:	Project for Strengthening of Institutional Capacity concerning the Social Dimensions of Adjustment
2.	Grant Number	:	F/MAU/DN/-RI/91/2
3.	Borrower	:	Islamic Republic of Mauritania
4.	Guarantor	:	Not applicable (N.A.)
5.	Beneficiary	:	Islamic Republic of Mauritania
6.	Executing agency	:	SDA Project Follow-up Committee assisted by a permanent secretariat within the Ministry of Planning

#### A. GRANT

			Estimate at Appraisal	Actual
1.	Amount (UA thousand)	:	700	702.94 <sup>3</sup>
2.	Date of approval	:	N.A.	18/03/1991
3.	Date of signature	:	N.A.	09/05/1991
4.	Date of entry into force	:	N.A.	05/06/1991

#### B. PROJECT DATA

1. Financing Plan (UA thousand)									
Estimate at appraisal					Actual <sup>4</sup>				
Source	F.E.	L.C.	Total	%	F.E.	L.C.	Total	%	
ADF/TAF	543	157	700	25.0	543	157	700	25.0	
GVT	-	157	157	5.6	-	157	157	5.6	
KFW	1372	571	1943	69.4	1372	571	1943	69.4	
Total	1916	884	2800	100.0	1916	884	2800	100.0	
(%)	68.4	31.6	100.0		68.4	31.6	100.0		

			Estimate at Appraisal	Actual
2.	Date of first disbursement	:	N.A.	17/11/1991
3.	Date of last disbursement	:	31/12/1993	23/09/1996

<sup>3</sup> Gap due to currency fluctuation between the disbursement and confirmation dates.

<sup>4</sup> Excluding currency fluctuation.

### C. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS – IMPLEMENTATION

			Estimate at appraisal	Actual
1.	Overrun/ Balance (%)	:	0.0	+0.4
2.	Schedule shift (in months)	:	0.0	24.0
2.a	Entry into force	:	0.0	0.0
2.b	First disbursement	:	0.0	0.0
2.c	Completion Date	:	0.0	24.0
2.c	Last disbursement	:	0.0	33.0
3.	Nbr of extensions of the deadline for last disbursement			02 (31/12/94; 31/12/95)
4.	Project Status of implementation			Completed

### D. MISSIONS

Missions			Period	Number of Persons	Person/days
No	Type	Number			
1.	Identification	0	-	0	0
2.	Preparation	0	-	0	0
3.	Appraisal	01	27/10-10/11/90	02	30
4.	Launching	0	-	0	0
5.	Supervision	01	11-21/07/95	01	11
6.	Monitoring	0	-	0	0
7.	Mid-term review	0	-	0	0
8.	Completion	01	09-22/07/98	01	15
9.	Post- evaluation	01	29/08-12/09/00	01	15

### E. DISBURSEMENT (UA thousand)

Years	Amount envisaged	Actual amount	Rate (%)
1991	396	136.23	19.5
1992	330	47.48	26.2
1993		226.89	58.7
1994		105.91	73.8
1995		129.68	92.3
1996		56.75	100.4
Total	<b>700</b>	<b>702.94</b>	

**F. OTHER PROJECTS FINANCED BY THE BANK IN THE SECTOR, FROM  
14/12/1972 TO 25/02/1991**

(Amount in UA thousand)

Sector		Inst.	Operations		Status of projects			
No	Heading		Nber	Amount	Completed		Ongoing	
				Nber	Amount	Nber	Amount	
A.	Agriculture and Development	PL	6	31897.7	6	31897.7	-	-
		PC	2	4919.9	2	4919.9	-	-
B.	Industries, mines and quarry	PL	4	67008.4	3	62008.4	1	5000.0
C.	Environment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
D.	Transport	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
E.	Water and Sanitation	PL	4	18367.0	3	10593.3	1	7773.7
F.	Energy	PL	1	14841.3	1	14841.3	-	-
G.	Communication	PL	2	1650.0	2	1650.0	-	-
H.	Finance	LC	1	3474.5	1	3474.5	-	-
I.	Social	PL	3	17397.1	3	17397.1	-	-
		PC	1	1221.3	1	1221.3	-	-
J.	Urban Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
K.	Multi-sector	SA	1	13815.8	1	13815.8	-	-
	Total		25	174593.0	23	161819.3	2	12773.7

**Lending Instruments Used**

- SA : Structural Adjustment (policy-based loan)  
TA : Provision of Technical Assistance  
PC : Project Cycle  
PL : Project Loans  
LC : Line of Credit

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **1. Project**

1.1 The implementation of the successive structural adjustment programmes launched by Mauritania with the support of the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the Economic and Financial Rehabilitation Programme (EFRP) 1985-1988 and the Consolidation and Recovery Programme (PCR) 1989-1991, had negative social effects such as loss of purchasing power, job loss with, freeze on public service recruitment, which created social tension that could annihilate all the efforts to correct the structural malfunctioning of the economy.

1.2 In the absence of a design capacity for SDA integration, Mauritania requested the Bank to finance the project for institutional strengthening concerning the social dimensions of adjustment.

1.3 The project has resulted from the Government's desire to participate in the regional SDA programme launched by UNDP, the World Bank and ADB, with the main aim of enabling African governments to integrate the social dimensions into their structural adjustment programmes and development plans. Following the joint appraisal of the project in October 1990 by an ADB mission and World Bank mission, it was approved on 08 March 1991 and the protocol agreement signed on 18 April 1991.

1.4 The aim of the project was to attenuate the negative social effects of the structural adjustment programme. Specifically, the project sought to increase the administration's design capacity with regard to integrating social dimensions into the formulation of its macro-economic and sector policies. It had four components: (a) institutional strengthening, (b) formulation of a poverty reduction policy and plan of action, (c) collection of socio-economic data, and (d) support to underprivileged communities. .

1.5 Estimated at a cost of UA 2.8 million, the project was co-financed by ADB using the TAF (0.7 million), the German financing agency (UA 1.94 million) and Mauritania (0.16 million), over the 1991 to 1995 period. It was implemented by the Monitoring Committee, with the permanent secretariat within the Ministry of Planning as the secular arm.

### **2. Evaluation**

2.1 The logical framework retrospective matrix prepared for the purposes of this PPER (See Annex 2) presents (a) a new hierarchy of objectives including attenuation of the negative social costs of the SAP» as an overall objective and increasing the Government capacities to take account of the SDA as a specific objective; (b) the objectives, the activities and outputs expected; and (c) the indicators making it possible to assess the degree of attainment of the objectives and the expected results.

2.2 Scheduled to span 26 months, from November 1990 to December 1992, the project fell two years behind schedule, however the financing plan drawn up at appraisal was followed. The delay was due to the reprogramming of the SDA surveys, the time taken by the executing

agency to become familiar with the procedures for procurement of goods and service, the rather long period the executing agency took to release funds to ONS, and certain external factors, such as difficult telephone connections with the country's interior that have hampered the conduct of SDA surveys. The protocol agreement clauses and conditions were complied with, with the exception of 2.02.1 requiring the transmission within a period of three months of the curricula vitae of the officials of various ministries or executing agencies, identified and selected to undergo training. Procurement of goods and services has been in accordance with the Bank rules and procedures.

2.3 The shortcomings noted relate to the executing agency's lack of compliance with the periods for preparation of the implementation report and the very limited number of site supervision missions conducted by the Bank.

### 3. **Conclusions Concerning the Evaluation and Rating**

#### a) **Relevance of aims and Objectives**

3.1 The aims and objectives of the project at appraisal, geared towards breaking the tradition of SAP with purely macro-economic objectives, were relevant, to the extent that they fell well within the scope of priorities and bases of the socio-economic situation of this country, which had undertaken to support poor and vulnerable populations, hard hit by the adverse effects of the SAP.

3.2 The country's preoccupations clearly fit into the scope of operations under ADF VI, which made poverty reduction a sector and inter-sector priority.

#### b) **Attainment of project objectives and outputs: Efficiency**

3.3 Concerning the **policy objectives**, the project introduced a new conceptual approach involving policies of development with a human face, that, while seeking to correct the main global economic imbalances, take account of the consequences of adjustment on the households' living conditions as well as social aspects.

3.4 From the **institutional standpoint**, in addition to the national SDA capacity of ONS and the 18 staff trained, and in order to meet the needs of the grassroots communities, a grassroots development coordination unit resulting from the merger of the SDA project and the Government-NGO coordination unit was set up within the Ministry of Planning. In addition, the project made a decisive contribution to a new piloting framework for poverty reduction, namely the Commission for Human Rights, poverty reduction and integration.

3.5 From the **social standpoint**, the project made it possible to prepare a poverty reduction strategy.

3.6 **Outputs.** The project outputs include: (a) A series of socio-economic studies (see annex 9), (b) a coherent and consensual poverty reduction strategy, (c) the first poverty profile, (d) a socio-economic database, and (e) the basic socio-economic infrastructure comprising 44 classrooms, 54 health units and 8 fence walls in underprivileged areas in the environs of Nouakchott.

3.7 Other significant outputs concern: (a) the sustained increase in the budgetary allocations earmarked for the social sectors, (b) improvement of the gross enrolment rate for basic education (46.8% in 1990/91 and 53.4 in 1991/92 and 77.9% in 1994/95 and 86.2% in 1997/98), (c) improvement of the gross enrolment rate for girls (40.7% in 1990/91, 76.4% in 1995/96 and 83.2% in 1997/98).

3.8 In the project area, 50% of the class space shortage has been remedied and the enrolment rate raised to over 90%, while education is being extended to include girls in a more sustained manner, since they now represent 51.85% of enrolments as compared to under 30% at the start of the project.

**c) Efficiency**

3.9 The benefits drawn from the project are beyond the expectations, considering the standard costs of activities such as statistical surveys of households and also those relating to the SDA. The cost/effectiveness ratio is by far higher by unit, which shows that the project inputs have made it possible to generate positive value-added.

**d) Sustainability**

3.10 The determinative factor for the project's sustainability is the adhesion of all the segments of the society to the SDA approach. Next are: (a) implementation of the new national poverty alleviation strategy for 2000-2015, (c) the autonomy developed by ONS with regard to household surveys, and (d) the country's commitment in the efforts to ensure good governance, given the involvement of municipal offices, the civil society, especially NGOs, and the women's associations and youth groups that are targeted by the poverty reduction programmes.

**e) Performance**

3.11 The overall project performance is satisfactory, again with a rating of 3 for the performances of the Borrower and of the Bank.

## **4. Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations**

**a) Conclusions**

4.1 The project has attained its specific objectives. The SDA reflex is now a reality in the central administration of Mauritania.

4.2 The project outputs are used in mounting poverty reduction projects and implementation of the national poverty reduction strategy.

4.3 In the absence of any real political will on the part of this country to adapt and implement socio-economic development programmes that can lead to lasting growth, the SDA outputs, particularly the improved knowledge concerning the phenomenon of poverty, could only have a limited impact. In internalizing the SDA programme, the country is required to mobilize

sufficient resources to generate and sustain economic growth and channel part of the financing towards the sectors of activity that are likely to increase employment for the poor.

## **b) Lessons**

4.4 Without this project, whose relevance has been recognized by all the segments of the Mauritanian society and the development partners, the country would never have obtained reliable scientific tools for identification of: (i) the poor and vulnerable segments such as women and the youth, and (ii) areas of intervention for the purposes of the poverty reduction programme (paras 4.2. § and 4.2.11)

4.5 The objective of synergy, sought through the concerted action of donors with regard to poverty reduction, would be very uncertain without the project outputs, particularly the poverty profile. (§ 4.5.8)

4.6 The project can only be implemented in good time if: (i) The Bank improves its follow up activity in general and supervision in particular (§ 4.8.3), and (ii) The Borrower resolves the internal problem of slow administrative procedures, seen as a major constraint. (§ 4.7.1)

4.7 As long as the SDA institutional support does not reach the decentralized levels of the administration and the civil society, the participatory process required for formulation of poverty reduction projects will remain deficient. Therefore this support must be extended to the regional sections of the public administration and to all the development actors. (§ 4.4.4)

4.8 Concentrating the SDA design capacity in the central administration could compromise the establishment of good governance, firstly if no action is taken to back up the decentralization and de-concentration of the administration and also, if the other segments of the society (NGO, Civil society) do not get heavily involved as active partners. (§ 4.4.4)

4.9 Given the survey techniques applied, their use in targeting the lower levels, namely the moughataa (departments), the communes and districts, the results of the initial SDA surveys published in the wilaya (regions) were limited, if not non-existent. Closer targeting for formulation of projects and programmes in favor of the grassroot communities is only possible if, right from the SDA survey design stage, the need to publish detailed information at these lower geographical levels (departments, districts and communes) is taken into account. (§ 5.2.7)

4.10 The project brought to light needs relating to monitoring evaluation in most of the social sectors receiving increasingly substantial budgetary allocations, namely education, health, employment. The allocation and utilization of these resources requires definition of performance indicators to be followed up in a regular manner which calls for enhanced monitoring/evaluation capacities within the country (Government, civil society).

4.11 Only if there are indicators serving as measuring instruments will it be possible to gauge the impact of the socio-economic development policies and programmes and monitor the trends of monetary poverty and human poverty. (§4.2.23)

**c) Recommendations**

4.12 Given the above lessons, it is recommended:

**That the Government:**

4.13 Steadily pursues its efforts to consolidate the outputs of the institutional strengthening project at the level of the Mauritanian administration. In that regard, considering its commitment to introducing a programme of good governance, it should seek to extend the SDA design capacities of the regions and the civil society.

4.14 More than in the past, ensure transparency of the SDA integration process and the monitoring the performances of projects formulated for poverty reduction.

4.15 Bolster the poverty reduction mechanism through a poverty observatory, which will be a secular arm of the High Commission for Human Rights, poverty reduction and integration. The observatory is an integral part of any poverty reduction programme, and in fact the key component for monitoring/evaluation using output indicators that are set and monitored by a participatory process. Where appropriate, the observatory should be neutral and serve as a decision tool at the service of all the national and international parties working at poverty reduction, so as meet the need for transparency and greater visibility that inform the measures taken within the strategic poverty reduction framework.

**That the Bank:**

4.16 Ensure compliance with the projects schedule, by fixing a realistic schedule at appraisal, conducting regular follow-up of field activities involving periodic supervision missions in accordance with its own rules, and rapidly applying the necessary corrective measures;

4.17 Support Mauritania in the strategy for implementation of good governance, which requires among other efforts, institutional strengthening with regard to SDA at the regional level and in favor of the civil society;

4.18 Support the country in the evaluation and setting up of a poverty observatory designed as a neutral instrument to aid decisions relating to poverty control;

4.19 Ensure systematic formulation and effective utilization of socio-economic criteria as indicators of the performance of measures relating to poverty reduction and if appropriate, draw up a minimum list of such indicators to measure the country's progress and carry out a comparison amongst regional member countries.

## **1. PROJECT PRESENTATION**

### **1.1 Socio-economic Context**

1.1.1 In the early 80s, despite the sustained efforts with regard to investment, the Mauritanian economy recorded poor performances owing to a combination of several factors, notably: (i) the cycle of repetitive drought which seriously affected the production potential of the agro-pastoral sector whose contribution to the national wealth in 1983/84 hardly exceeded 29% as compared to 40% fourteen years earlier, (ii) the decline in mining activities further to the difficulties encountered in mining the Guelbs iron ore deposit (under 15% of GDP as against 33% in 1970), and (iii) the limitations of the industrial sector, characterized by limited integration.

1.1.2 In addition to decelerating economic growth, the country suffered substantial constraints linked with the heavy external debt, with assistance estimated at over 210% of GDP and a public debt service exceeding exports by 47%. The limited growth during the 80s, completely eroded by the population pressure (2.7% annual increase), at best brought about stagnation of per capita GDP which showed a decline in the order of 0.6% for certain years. In addition, the very worrying public financial deficit (4% of GDP in 1984 and 5.4% in 1990) and external payments (with a current account deficit estimated at 21.9% of GDP in 1980 and 9.1% in 1990) warranted urgent remedial measures.

1.1.3 To remedy this greatly deteriorated economic and financial situation, characterized by economic and financial imbalance, the Government in 1985, with the support of the Bretton Woods institutions, launched the Economic and Financial Rehabilitation programme for 1985/88. In line with the first generation SAP logic, the 1985-88 EFRP's sole objective was to lay sound bases for lasting economic growth, and restore the global deficits, especially that of the balance of payments and the budgetary deficit.

1.1.4 The encouraging results (4.2% GDP growth rate; 22.8% investment rate) obtained through the EFRP, most of whose macro-economic objectives were met, decided the Mauritanian Government to launch a new SAP, namely the Consolidation and Recovery Programme for 1989/91, whose major objective was to pursue and consolidate the reforms undertaken as part of the 1985/88 EFRP.

1.1.5 The results of the implementation of the PCR were checkered, owing to the decrease in the capital flow caused by the Gulf war, the limited performance of the primary sector, hard hit by drought in the early 90s, the decline in export earnings owing to decrease in fishery production and that of the price of iron ore. In all, aside from the contraction of the fiscal deficit excluding grants and that of the deficit of the current balance excluding grants, which under the PCR were brought to average levels of 7.2% and 17.2% of GDP, respectively, the target levels of the fundamental levels of the Mauritanian economy for the PCR were not attained. The performances fell below those recorded under the EFRP: the inflationary surge (8.4% against 5.6% under the EFRP), the decline in economic growth (1.9% against 4.2% during the EFRP) and the investment rate (14.9% against 22.8% during the previous SAP). These were significant departures from the macroeconomic objectives of the 1989-91 Economic and Financial Policy document which targeted (a) an economic growth rate of 3.5%, (b) reduction of the inflation rate to 4%, and (c) the decline in the current deficit to 3.6% of GDP.

1.1.6 These first generation SAPs, characterized by drastic budgetary restrictions, brought, among other negative social impacts, the loss of purchasing power and of jobs, experienced in varying degrees depending on the population categories and the dwelling areas. Mauritania was thus faced with social strife characterized by a trend towards pauperization of the rural and urban populations. Ultimately, this situation could erode the results of any stabilization and/or economic reform programme.

1.1.7 It is in this context that the Government adopted the 1992/95 medium-term economic policy programme, with the objective of (a) returning to 3.5% economic growth, (b) bringing inflation down to 3.6%, and (c) narrowing the deficit of the current balance (excluding official transfers) from 14.5% in 1991 to 6.6% in 1995.

1.1.8 In the development policy letter on Mauritania, addressed to the Bank, the Government underscored the social back-up action likely to reduce the negative effects of the remedial efforts of the macroeconomic and sector programmes. Basically, the government approach consisted in a prudent social policy that would not upset the budgetary balance, and hinging on: (a) coverage of the populations' food requirements (b) job creation through promotion of private enterprises with the aim of absorbing the growing unemployment of the youth, aggravated by the civil service recruitment freeze, (c) promotion of low-cost housing (d) promotion of more rapid expansion of primary education, upgrading the education system and adapting it to the real needs of the economy.

1.1.9 The need to take account of the social aspects of adjustment became the greatest constraint, in order to avoid undermining the results of the structural adjustment programmes. Unfortunately, besides the political will to attack poverty, as broadly outlined by the Government in the DPL, the country had no SDA design capacity, especially concerning the techniques for targeting poor and vulnerable populations and poor areas.

1.1.10 The project benefited from the institutional environment provided by the SDA project implemented by a monitoring committee set up on 18 February 1990, which was selected as the project executing agency with the permanent secretariat set up in the Ministry of planning as its secular arm.

1.1.11 Since 14 December 1972, date of its first operation in Mauritania, the Bank Group had financed, as at 25 February 1991, 25 projects for a total amount of UA 174.6 million, covering most sectors, as shown by the table below:

**Table 1: Loans Approved by Sector, 14/12/72 – 25/02/91**

Sector	Project			
	Name	Nber	UA Thousand	%
Agriculture and Rural Development		8	36.82	21.1
Industries, mines and Quarries		4	67.01	38.4
Water and Sanitation		4	18.37	10.5
Energy		1	14.84	8.5
Communications		2	1.65	0.9
Finance		1	3.47	2.0
Social		4	18.62	10.7
Multi-sector		1	13.82	7.9
Total		25	174.59	100.0

Source: PALMS Database

## 1.2 Project Formulation

1.2.1 The project identification and preparation phases were not conducted by ADB. This project came into existence as a result of the Government's desire to participate in the regional SDA project launched by UNDP, the World Bank and the ADB with the main aim of assisting the Government's of African countries in integrating the social dimensions in their structural adjustment programmes and their development plans.

1.2.2 Further to a request from the Mauritanian Government for the use of a TAF balance of UA 0.92 million, to finance the project for institutional strengthening concerning the Social Dimensions of Adjustment, a Bank mission visited Mauritania from 27 October to 10 November 1990, in order to jointly evaluate the project with the World Bank.

1.2.3 Though the Bank was not involved in the identification and preparation, its intervention has been found appropriate, since it provided the most adequate response that it could give to the request by this country, which, as the initiator of the project, was already fully involved at the time of appraisal through the government agencies responsible for steering the national DSA programme.

1.2.4 The aims and objectives and the activities decided at appraisal really met the concern for development of an SDA design capacity. However, the lack of a matrix of measures in the appraisal report had the effect of handicapping project monitoring. Moreover, the report did not identify the mechanisms for coordinating activities, especially among the different donors.

1.2.5 Based on the appraisal report, the project was submitted to the Board of Directors, which approved it on 08 May 1991. The Protocol agreement was signed on 18 April 1991. The project was completed in 1995, in other words two years behind schedule.

## 1.3 Objectives and Scope at Appraisal

1.3.1 The aim of the project was to reduce the negative effects of the structural adjustment programme. Specifically, the project aimed to improve the administration's design capacities for integration of the social dimensions into the formulation of its macro-economic and sector policies, so as to counter poverty. It had 4 components:

- (a) Institutional strengthening;
- (b) Formulation of the policy and plan of action for poverty control ;
- (c) Gathering of socio-economic data;
- (d) Support to poor urban communities.

1.3.2 The results listed below in the order of the components constitute a coherent set, in the case of the first three, and a case of concrete support for the poor and vulnerable populations, in the case of the fourth. The expected results were thus :

- (a) Result 1: SDA skills acquired and developed with a view to making the entire process endogenous;
- (b) Result 2 preparation of a coherent and consensual framework for poverty reduction;
- (c) Result 3: an updated and reliable socio-economic database available to appreciate the impact of structural reforms on the households' living standards and thereby allow for better identification of target groups;
- (d) Result 4: emergency aid in the form of facilities for access to basic socio-economic infrastructure provided to the poor populations in the outlying areas of Nouakchott who are victims of drought.

1.3.3 The inputs that led to the major results were, aside from the project management, the following activities, which are reputed to be the inputs for the various products :

- (a) Training on SDA policies, for managers from the principal ministries involved in the formulation and implementation of sector and macro-economic policies (result 1);
- (b) Socio-economic studies, the survey on employment in the irrigated sector, the survey on laid-off staff and the poverty profile, itself an output of the SDA surveys) (result 2);
- (c) The priority, integral and community SDA surveys (result 3);
- (d) Construction of socio-economic infrastructure in the poor areas in the periphery of Nouakchott (result 4).

1.3.4 The risks at appraisal concerned compliance with the financing conditions, to ensure smooth implementation of activities, the implementation capacities of the national SME executing the works, the involvement of the beneficiaries of the basic infrastructure, but also the capacity of ONS to conduct the SDA surveys and analyze the results, the identification of candidates for training centers and the firm commitment on the part of the Mauritanian Government to accord high priority to poverty reduction.

1.3.5 The executing agency is the Monitoring committee, which includes the representatives of the major ministries, executing agencies and political bodies involved in socio-economic fields. It is responsible for management and supervision of project implementation. This committee is backed by a bureau, the permanent secretariat set up within the Ministry of Planning, headed by the national project coordinator. The supervision team also included a permanent secretary and a socio-economist.

1.3.6 The ADF financing by component proposed at appraisal was provided without any modification, for a total of 0.70 million, which is 32.9% for institutional strengthening, 46.1% for

formulation of the poverty reduction policy and plan of action and 21.0% for socio-economic data collection.

#### **1.4 Financial Provisions**

1.4.1 Estimated at UA 2.8 million, this project was co-financed by ADF using the TAF facility (0.7 million), the German financing agency (UA 1.94 million) and Mauritania (UA 0.16 million), over the period 1991 to 1995.

1.4.2 Since the protocol agreement had no clause concerning the scheduling of the project disbursements, this activity was very closely linked with the activity implementation plan proposed in the appraisal report.

1.4.3 The accounting audit reports for 1991 to 1996 were sent to ADB within the deadlines agreed and can be considered to be in accordance with the directives, since the Bank departments concerned have neither contested nor rejected them.

## **2. EVALUATION**

### **2.1 Evaluation Methodology and Approach**

2.1.1 The evaluation comprised four phases: (a) information gathering at ADB Headquarters; (b) Mission to Mauritania during which the socio-economic data was gathered – based on a discussion guide drawn up and adapted according to the party being interviewed - from (b<sub>1</sub>) the public administration units involved in varying degrees in the implementation, execution and monitoring of the project, (b<sub>2</sub>) from the civil society (APE- Parent teacher association and NGOs) and (b<sub>3</sub>) the development partners such as the World Bank and UNDP; (c ) the visit to the environs of Nouakchott that benefited from school infrastructure financed, and in respect of which the APE officials have submitted a status report assessing the project's impact on their area; (d) application and analysis of data collected for preparation of the PPER.

2.1.2 Several types of information were gathered: (a) qualitative information including the country's development objectives for the next decade, (b) socio-economic indicators concerning the total economy, the population, the poverty profile, the social sectors (education, health, employment), the situation of women, of children and the environment, etc.

2.1.3 Given the shortcomings of the country's statistics system, it was not possible to obtain all the information required, for example relating to all the areas in the peripheries of Nouakchott.

2.1.4 The information gathering sought to address the core preoccupations reviewed in the discussion guide, namely:

- (a) The relevance of the project, specifically the consistency of its objectives with Mauritania's socio-economic development strategy and the ADB strategy for assistance to this country;
- (b) The project's efficiency in terms of objectives set at appraisal;
- (c) The project's effectiveness, in terms of net benefits from the resources cancelled;
- (d) The sustainability of the project from the standpoint of the maintenance and strengthening of its positive effects, in the institutional, economic and socio-political contexts;

- (e) The performances of the African Development Bank and the Government of Mauritania with regard to implementation of SDA- type projects;
- (f) Th project's impact with regard to development of the institutional capacity of Mauritania, specifically concerning the formulation of socio-economic development programmes integrating the social dimensions and also concerning the broader area of poverty reduction, especially the knowledge of this phenomenon, monitoring/evaluation and poverty reduction strategy.

2.1.5 The approach used consisted in comparing the with-project situation to that which preceded it. It is within this purview that the socio-economic data gathered on the period 1987-2000 has been analyzed with a view to underlining all the value-added obtained from the project for institutional strengthening in relation to SDA. 1.

2.1.6 The lack of a logical framework matrix at appraisal resulted in: inadequate articulation between the activities, the expected results, the specific objective and the general objective, and (b) the non-existence of a list of performance indicators to serve as reference points for monitoring/evaluation of the project performances, at the supervision and mid-term review stages and for preparation of PCR and PPER. Similarly, the assumptions and risks linked with the project activities were not defined.

2.1.7 A logical framework was in included in the PCR. For the purposes of the post-evaluation analysis, it was found necessary to reconfigure the objectives of the activities and add the performance indicators so as to have a retrospective matrix of the logical framework (annex 2). This adjustment was in order to clearly distinguish between the objectives from the outputs and resources used to obtain these outputs.

2.1.8 To this end, (a) a new hierarchy of objectives was prepared, with the overall objective of «attenuating the negative social costs of the SAP» and the specific objective of «increasing the Government's capacity to take the SDA into account; (b) in addition to the objectives, the activities and expected outputs were stated; and (c) the indicators of the degree of realization of objectives and expected outputs were formulated.

2.1.9 By its very nature, this project is a key module for the SAP, which precedes the design of poverty reduction projects and programmes.

## **2.2 Performance Indicators**

2.2.1 The retrospective matrix of the logical framework comprises a range of objectively verifiable indicators relating to the overall objective of the project, the specific objective and the each expected output.

2.2.2 Given the magnitude of this design task and the manner in which the country is using it, the poverty profile and indicators are briefly set out in annex 8. It should however be stressed at this stage that the poverty profile is a very important tool for targeting underprivileged populations and areas, and that the indices calculated also make it possible to estimate the total minimum amount needed to eradicate poverty.

### **3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE**

#### **3.1 Project Effectiveness and Start-up**

3.1.1 *Entry into force.* Following the approval of the grant by the ADF Board of Directors on 18 March 1991, the protocol was signed on 09 May 1991 at ADB Headquarters, as No. F/MAU/DN-RI/91/2.

3.1.2 The Government easily met the “conditions precedent”, which also allowed the release of the first disbursement. This diligence reflected its firm determination to ensure the project’s successful outcome. After examining the supporting documents that the Government had sent it, the Bank declared the grant effective on 05 June.

3.1.3 *Compliance with conditions and the provisions of the Protocol agreement.* In addition to the conditions precedent to the effectiveness of the protocol, there were three other conditions. The Government as agreed, met the last two, by submitting to the Bank within the agreed time frames: (a) by mail, the terms of reference of the studies financed under the component « formulation of a poverty control policy», and (b) to the ADB mission of December 1993, the document on the poverty reduction policy and plan.

3.1.4 Condition 2.02.1, « submitting to ADF three months after the date of signature of the memorandum of understanding, the curricula vitae of all the senior staff of the different ministries or executing agencies who have been identified and selected for training within the regional SDA Training programme” was not fulfilled on schedule and in the form indicated. Indeed the list of curricula vitae of candidates was sent as and when the selections were made, and the last transmission was on 27 April 1992, which was 11 and a half months after the signing of the protocol memorandum.

3.1.5 This condition was constraining and somewhat less realistic than the last two. The regional SDA training programme was initially under great pressure with so many the requests coming from all the participant countries, and Mauritanian candidates could not automatically be guaranteed places in the different training centers. Moreover, the process of identification of the most appropriate candidates was to last three months. The retrospective matrix of the logical framework of the project also reveals the risks linked with selection of the senior staff and availability of places in the training centers.

3.1.6 Other conditions such as (a) provision of the contribution to the national budget and (b) non-utilization of grant funds for payment of duties and taxes on goods and services used by the project were also fulfilled.

3.1.7 The procurement of goods and services was in accordance with the provisions of article IV of the Protocol, concerning the nature, the origin and the mode of procurement of goods and services for the project.

3.1.8 *Actual outputs and modifications in the scope of the project.* The project outputs are on the whole as projected, i.e., (a) national human resources (18 senior staff trained) capable of contributing to SDA through formulation of the country’s socio-economic policies, (b) a coherent and consensual policy framework for poverty reduction efforts, (c) diagnosis, and better knowledge and monitoring of household living conditions, (d) socio-economic data base, (e)

improved access of the populations of the poorer parts of Nouakchott to the basic socio-economic infrastructure, especially educational and health-related.

3.1.9 The project implementation fell two years behind schedule, mainly owing to: (a) new programming of SDA surveys; (b) administrative procedures for procurement of goods and services, which, given the specific nature of the project activities, such as training and statistical surveys, the executing agency could only handle effectively after a certain period. (3.1.5 and 3.1.6); (c) the relatively long period the executing agency took to release the funds to the ONS, given the procedures referred to in (a); (c) certain exogenous factors such as difficulties with telephone communications in the country's interior, which sometimes hampered the SDA surveys, and (d) the very reduced number of examples of SDA surveys that could serve as references at the international level. These delays could have been avoided, or at the very least limited, if a project manual of procedures had been prepared, with adequate guidelines for implementation of each component, taking account of the project's complexity and innovative nature.

3.1.10 Lastly, the terms of execution of the activities of the component «support to poor urban communities», entirely financed under the German grant, were changed. When the tender of CVCT was considered prohibitive by the project monitoring committee and the Nouakchott municipal office, the works identified under that component were split into small lots and entrusted to highly labor-intensive national SME, selected by tendering. This way, the project made it possible to further several initiatives, such as cleaning cooperatives and the women's associations for clean and healthy conditions that worked for a fee, and whose services have been highly appreciated, given their positive impact on the preservation of the environment.

## 3.2 Compliance with regard to the Project Costs, Sources of Finance and Disbursement

3.2.1 *Compliance with Regard to the project costs, sources of financing.* The financing plan prepared at appraisal was maintained, with the result that the following contributions were made: UA 0.70 by ADF, UA 1.943 million by the Federal Republic of Germany, and UA 0.157 million by the Government.

3.2.2 For ADF, the total cost of the project at the time it was closed was UA 0.703 million, which is 0.4% over the estimate. The gap recorded is due to fluctuation of currencies between the date of disbursement and the date of confirmation. As envisaged at appraisal, 77.6% of the TAF grant was used in financing the foreign exchange costs, as shown in the table below.

**Table 2: TAF/ADF Financing by Component**  
(in UA thousand)

Components	Projections appraisal	at Outputs	Gap
Institutional strengthening	230.26	230.26	-
Formulation of a poverty reduction policy and plan	322.37	322.37	-
Gathering socio-economic data	147.37	147.37	-
Support to poor urban communities	-	-	-
Gap	-	2.94	2.94
Total	700.00	702.94	2.94

3.2.3 **Disbursements.** The number of disbursements was not stated in the protocol agreement. The disbursement rate was thus aligned with the schedule of expenditure in the appraisal report, which is UA 396 thousand in 1991 and UA 304 thousand in 1992.

3.2.4 The first disbursement was on 17 September 1991, followed by ten others during the project implementation period. As at 31 December 1993, the initial date of the last disbursement, the disbursement rate was 58,7%. It went from 73.8% as at 31 December 1994 to 92.3% as at 31 December 1995, date of the last disbursement. The last disbursement was actually on 23 June 1996, with a relatively acceptable delay of sixth months.

### **3.3 Management, Reporting, Monitoring/Evaluation**

3.3.1 As project executing agency, the technical committee, through the permanent secretariat set up at the Ministry of Planning, was in charge of management and monitoring/evaluation activities at the national level.

3.3.2 For improved efficiency, and given the difficulty it encountered in convening all the members of the Technical committee, this management body put in place a technical management group, overseen by the national coordinator. This committee met at least once a month.

3.3.3 The progress reports were not prepared in accordance with the provisions of article 5, section 5.04 of the Protocol agreement. Instead of quarterly reports, the Government prepared annual reports, which it sent to the Bank. This difficulty was not resolved during the operational period of the project. The Government presented a project completion report in March 1997, which is fifteen (15) months after the date of the last disbursement instead of six (06) months, as indicated in section 5.04, line b.

3.3.4 This shortcoming of the executing agency with regard to preparation of reports as required by the loan agreement, was aggravated by that of the Bank with regard to monitoring, since only one supervision mission was organized, long past the deadline for the last disbursement, which was extended twice, and the mid-term review did not take place.

3.3.5 The monitoring/evaluation activity was greatly handicapped by the absence of indicators previously identified at appraisal.

## **4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RATING**

### **4.1 Relevance of Goals and Objectives and Quality-at-entry**

4.1.1 The project aims and objectives are well within the scope of priorities and the bases for the socio-economic policies of Mauritania, as expressed in the DPL of January 1987. In fact, with the rising social tension, resulting from the necessary implementation of structural adjustment programmes with their range of negative effects, namely unemployment, inflation, continued loss of purchasing power, Mauritania undertook to support the economically weak segments, in other words, the poor and vulnerable populations.

4.1.2 The objectives attained were clearly defined and crucial for the country. The idea was to break with the tradition of SAP with purely macro-economic objectives. The aim of the formulation of a social policy linked with the PCR was to attenuate poverty amongst the underprivileged and vulnerable populations which are ever increasing, due to: job loss and the

public service recruitment freeze, (b) the youth being produced by the educational system and flooding the markets, (c) the exodus of rural populations affected by drought, and (d) the worrying deterioration of the living conditions of populations in the peri-urban areas of Nouakchott, where the problem regarding basic socio-economic infrastructure, especially in education and health, was acute.

4.1.3 Since this new strategy for development presupposes greater familiarity with the phenomenon of poverty in terms of scope, incidence acuteness and geographical location, the project made it possible through the first three components, to bridge the conceptual gap that Mauritania felt and that fully justified its request for Bank assistance, on the strength of the government's Policy Letter. The fourth project component made it possible to concretize the support to the underprivileged populations living in the peripheries of Nouakchott.

4.1.4 The country's concerns do fall in the scope of ADF VI operations, notably poverty reduction as a sector and inter-sector priority. The priority thus given to poverty reduction has been bolstered under ADF VII and VIII. The SDA technical assistance needs were also part of the TAF target activities.

4.1.5 The SDA programme itself was launched in 1987, on a joint initiative of ADB, UNDP and World Bank, which fostered and/or financed it throughout. The aim was to increase the African country's design and implementation capacities as concern SAPs covering the social dimensions.

4.1.6 In addition, as part of the programming in respect of the « economic prospects and country programmes », greater priority was given to SAPs and the social sector, with 30% and 20% respectively of the 1988-90 PEPP. The Bank's commitment to support poverty reduction is clearly affirmed in the various Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) including those for 1996-98 and 1999-2001.

4.1.7 Lastly, as seen from the retrospective matrix, despite the sound design, particularly in determining the objectives and outputs expected, the implementation of this project could have been seriously compromised at the national level, if the Government lessened its commitment to poverty reduction. External factors, such as unavailability of training centers could also limit the project's success. Once the project got underway, new concerns came to light relating to good governance and making it even more necessary to use the project outputs to ensure more transparent management of the national human resources and more equitable distribution of the fruits of the expected economic growth.

## **4.2 Attainment of Objectives and Project Outputs: Efficiency**

4.2.1 The specific nature of this project, most of whose components have been formulated through conceptualization, makes it difficult to inventory and assess outputs.

4.2.2 *Policy Objectives.* In seeking to redress the imbalances, the 1985-88 EFRP, which was part of the family of SAPs without SDA, brought about social tensions and was seen as a simple mechanical action with a series of measures seeking: a) stabilization aimed at reducing the overall demand and leading to consumer price escalation, job loss and declining incomes; and (b) revival of the overall supply, such as producer price escalation, restructuring and/or rehabilitation of enterprises and revival of small scale enterprises aimed ultimately at production increases and job creation.

4.2.3 The project provided a new conceptual approach to development policies, which, while making it possible to correct the main overall economic balances – balance of payment deficit, budget deficit, inflation, underemployment – which impede economic growth, takes account of the consequences of this adjustment on households' living conditions and integrates social aspects.

4.2.4 In response to the aspiration towards sustainable human development, the SDA approach sought to design socio-economic development hinging on a strategy of sustainable economic growth, based on poverty reduction, formulation of specific programmes for protection of the poor and/or their reintegration in the economic sphere. The SDA project underscored reinforcement of institutions responsible for analyzing statistical data, and production of socio-economic studies, with a view to appreciating the actual phenomenon of poverty, as a precedent for all strategies aimed against this pandemic.

4.2.5 Greater consideration of the needs of the poor and vulnerable was thus seen as a factor for easing the social situation. The social climate resulting from the project implementation was considered necessary to attract the private external investment that the country needed to fuel economic growth.

4.2.6 **Outputs.** Generally speaking, it can be affirmed that the objectives decided at appraisal have been attained. The outputs for each component constitute effective value-added that the project has provided on a conceptual plane.

4.2.7 With regard to institutional strengthening, through the training of the 18 managers initially selected and who have mostly remained in the original institutions, as well as the experience acquired by ONS, the project has afforded the Mauritanian administration an SDA design capacity. This capacity is now an integral part of the national capital that needs to develop in order to render the SDA process endogenous. .

4.2.8 All the surveys projected at appraisal (list in annex) have been conducted. They have provided for definition of the poverty reduction strategy and formulation of a poverty reduction plan. The poverty profile, which is one of the main outputs of this project, is used in targeting the poor populations and thereby, siting poverty control projects, including income generating activities and micro-credits, most of which are in favor of women and the youth.

4.2.9 The informal sector study has been used in defining the sector's fiscal strategy. After processing and analysis of the SDA data, ONS obtained a socio-economic database that should be monitored and updated to make it possible to assess the poverty phenomenon in Mauritania.

4.2.10 The outputs obtained in respect of « support to poor urban communities » comprise the construction of 44 classrooms, 54 health blocks and 8 fence walls in the poor periphery of Nouakchott. By promoting access to these types of infrastructure, the project made it possible to settle the populations of these neighborhoods by providing their children with basic training as an alternative to life in the streets. The first school built, Oum El Mouminine, with 25% participation by parents, served as a trailblazer and a starting point for other areas. This experiment has been repeated in other outlying areas, where the population pressure however remains very significant.

4.2.11 **Financial aims.** The project had no financial aim. However, as stated earlier, it indirectly contributed on account of the utilization of its proceeds, and even though this was not specified at appraisal, also to the targeting of the beneficiaries of the micro credits and the projects to support the poor and vulnerable populations.

4.2.12 ***Institutional Development Objectives.*** The executing agency was not assigned any institutional development strategy at appraisal. It was in response to the needs that emerged, notably within the grassroots communities that a grassroots development coordination unit was set up in the ministry of Planning as a result of the merger of the SDA project and the Government-NGO coordination unit. Headed by the project coordinator, its main mission was to implement the framework programme for poverty reduction and grassroots development. This unit laid the bases for concerted action by the Government and the civil society, especially the NGOs, and led to establishment of the Commission for Human Rights, poverty reduction and integration.

4.2.13 ***Social Aims and Objectives.*** The project made it possible to prepare a national plan and a strategy for poverty reduction. The framework programme for poverty reduction and grassroots development had two main thrusts: a social one seeking to improve the populations access to the basic social services and economic one, aimed at creating jobs and improving productivity.

4.2.14 In the social sector, emphasis was laid on: (a) education, with great priority to expansion and improvement of the quality of basic education, (b) improvement of the health cover and the nutritional status, (c) provision of water sources, (d) setting up a drainage system, especially in the major centers.

4.2.15 In the economic sphere, priority was accorded to job creation through promotion: (a) of the informal sector, for which an appropriate credit strategy was to be drawn up, (b) highly labour-intensive works, and (c) quasi-salaried jobs in the form of provision of small production resources and workpieces, and functional literacy and support for product distribution.

4.2.16 The « with and without » project analysis shows through the evolution of the social indicators, that there has been considerable improvement in the social conditions since the introduction of the SDA exercise into sector and macro-economic policies.

4.2.17 Though they may not be the fruit of a single project, the results noted are encouraging. In addition to the collective awareness of the phenomenon of poverty, the integration of the social aspects brought about a steady increase in budgetary allocations to the social sectors. For example the share of public education expenses in the State budget, which was always showed jagged progression prior to the project, recording 19.7% in 1991/92, showed a sustained increase in from the end of the project rising from 22.10% in 1994/95 to 27.49% in 1997/98.

4.2.18 The gross enrolment rate for basic education went from 46.8% in 1990/91 and 53.4 in 1991/92 to 77.9 in 1994/95 and 86.2% in 1997/98. The gross enrolment rate for girls went from 40.7% in 1990/91 to 76.4% in 1995/96 and 83.2% in 1997/98. This girls' enrolment rate has been constantly on the rise, attaining 77.5%, 87% and 92.7% of that of the boys within the same school years.

4.2.19 In the project area, the results obtained in education are very encouraging. Indeed, according to the APE report given to the post-evaluation mission team, the project made it possible to absorb 50% of the classroom deficits. The schooling rate exceeded 90%. Girls' schooling was sustained, since then represents 51.85% of the students, as compared to under 30% at the start of the project.

4.2.20 The life expectancy at birth increased from 47.4 years in 1988-90 (with 47 for men and 48 for women) to 52.5 years in 1995 (50.9 for men and 54.1 for women), and 53.9 years in 1998

(52.3 for men and 55.5 for women). The infant mortality rate dropped from 125 ‰ in 1988 to 118 ‰ in 1993.

4.2.21 The health sector allocations in the state operations budget have also shown a sustained increase, with a 16% variation between 1994 and 1995, the period in which the weight of the social sectors in the PIP represented about 17% of the total amount of investment projected.

4.2.22 Concerning the basic social services, it should be noted that since 1992, over 63% of the population had access to basic health services, compared to 40% in the period 1987-90. At the same time, about 66% of the population had access to safe water.

4.2.23 The results of the SDA surveys have shown a tendency towards a decrease in the incidence, the average intensity and the severity of poverty between 1990 and 1996. Between these two years, relative poverty went from 56.6% to 50.5%. P1 and P2 followed the same trend, with a decline from 28.2% to 18.5% for the former indicator and 18.1% to 5.1% for the latter. The incidence of poverty fell from 44.7% in 1990 to 32.6% in 1996.

**Box No 1**

*The indicators developed by Foster, Greer and Torbecke (1984) and referred to as the  $P_a$  family are often used to assess poverty.  $P_0$  makes it possible to measure the percentage of individuals living below the poverty line (known as the incidence of poverty or relative poverty).  $P_1$  measures the average intensity of poverty, while  $P_2$  takes account of the situation of the poorest of the poor (the disparity in incomes amongst the poor), in addition to the combined effect of the incidence and average intensity of poverty. The formula for these indicators are presented in annex 8*

4.2.24 With its HDI estimated at 0.451 in 1998, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was 147<sup>th</sup> out of 174 pays ranked worldwide, thus marking a constant improvement in its ranking (158<sup>th</sup> in 1992, 149<sup>th</sup> in 1995 and 1997). This improvement of the HDI is accompanied by that of the GSHDI which placed the country 122<sup>nd</sup> for 1997 and 1998 out of 143 countries, and 138<sup>th</sup> in 1995.

4.2.25 **Environmental Objectives.** The project also made it possible to finance the activities of a group of women volunteers who pioneered waste collection. Formerly considered repugnant, this sanitation activity has developed beyond the project areas and now concerns all the other parts of the city of Nouakchott, which now benefits from a permanent system of waste collection.

4.2.26 **Private Sector Development Objectives.** The project has given rise to private initiatives, the first of which is the voluntary women's group; starting with waste collection work financed under the component «support to underprivileged populations», it became an NGO named Association féminine pour la promotion de l'hygiène (AFPH), which subsequently became a formal company. Other waste collection initiatives followed AFPH, which was the pioneer in the city of Nouakchott, which is now covered by a group of private companies working in the respective neighborhoods.

### 4.3 Efficiency

4.3.1 The general opinion is that this project has made an appreciable contribution, considering the benefits currently derived from the application of its outputs, such as the poverty profile, which is used in targeting areas of intervention of poverty reduction projects. From all evidence, these benefits are beyond the expectations, considering the standard costs of operations such as the

statistical surveys of households on the one hand and those of the SDA surveys on the other. The standard budget of an SDA programme for 05 years, with a sample of 8000 households for the priority survey and 4000 households for the integral survey is about USD 2 million, which is about UA 1.6 million. The priority survey of the Mauritanian SDA programme conducted in 1992 concerned a sample of 6320 households, and the integral study of 1995 concerning a sample group of 3540 households. The cost/ratio is by far higher by unit, which shows that the project inputs made it positive to generate positive value- added.

4.3.2 From the financial standpoint, the project also benefited from the evolution of the exchange rate, in that the national currency underwent depreciation in comparison with the UA. These exchange gains were accentuated by the delay in conducting statistical surveys.

4.3.3 Though it fell two years behind schedule, the results obtained by the project were appreciable, since these included a methodological and documentary basis which is non-perishable and can be seen as an investment, the same as the software and the databases developed by the enterprises, and which the United Nations SCN 1993 national accounting system classified as gross fixed capital formation, fixed assets.

4.3.4 The schools constructed have a high number of students/pupils and have had a trigger effect on the environs, however, given the environment, the standards used (in terms of the numbers per classroom, the types of tables and chairs, the dimensions, etc.) for these first classrooms have served their purpose very well, to the point that some need to be replaced to attain the current standards developed by the MAED Education Project.

4.3.5 As regards design, there is need to capitalize on the experience of the senior staff trained by the project. They occupy positions of responsibility at several levels of the administration, and most work in the organizations involved in poverty control, namely the technical departments of the ministries, and the Commission for Human Rights, poverty reduction and integration. The resources put in thus have had a multiplier effect through these managers.

#### **4.4 Impact on Institutional Development**

4.4.1 From the institutional standpoint, the project has made a decisive contribution to the inception of a framework to steer the poverty control activities, which is the Commission for Human Rights, poverty reduction and integration, itself preceded by the grassroots development coordination unit, which was the spontaneous prolongation of the SDA project. IN actual fact, the new requirements with regard to poverty reduction, and the ever-increasing volume of work rendered the project coordination unit obsolete and unsuitable.

4.4.2 The reflex of concern for the social stakes that has been created in all the administrations and in the civil society has resulted in establishing or increasing accountability of the sector units that prepare socio-economic indicators required to monitor the poverty reduction activities. It is in this context that the Commission for Human Rights, poverty reduction and integration, as the national agency coordinating all the poverty reduction activities operates: (i) with ONS and the Ministries in charge of Health, Education, Employment, and (ii) the development partners involved in poverty reduction.

4.4.3 The acquisition of the SDA capacity and the project outputs are in fact inputs for the implementation of a programme of good governance in general, and improvement of economic management in particular. The human resources trained under the project have actually taken over

responsibilities of the technical assistants and some of these managers are international consultants in setting up SDA surveys.

4.4.4 Embraced as the country's new orientation, good governance, which is reputed to be the faithful ally of lasting human development, and whose main pillars are transparency, equity and integration/accountability of women and protection of the environment, requires institutional framework that is better suited to the participatory approach. Unfortunately, the institutional support has been limited to the central administration, and the present context of poverty reduction, lacks an observatory, which all the parties concerned have approved.

## **4.5 Project Sustainability**

4.5.1 The determinative factor of the project's sustainability is the adhesion of all the segments of the society to the SDA approach, in other words, to attack poverty frontally, with improved knowledge of the phenomenon. This adhesion is manifested at the Government level in the absolute priority accorded to the implementation of its poverty reduction strategy steered by the Commission for Human Rights, poverty reduction and integration.

4.5.2 Since the country has been accepted for the HIPC initiative, the requirement relating to better monitoring of performance in the social sector, in respect of which significant budgetary allocations are made, is an additional guarantee of sustainability of project outputs. The Government's commitment is total, to the extent that it has formulated a new national poverty reduction strategy for 2000-2015, with the following objectives: (a) speed up economic growth and strengthen economic competitiveness; improve poverty indicators, (c) promote balanced regional development and harmonious development of the territory and (d) promote equity and full participation of populations.

4.5.3 The target at the macro-economic level, in addition to budgetary surpluses, is an annual growth rate of approximately 5.5%, maintaining the current account deficit under 5% of GDP and the inflation rate at under 2.7%. The need to accelerate economic growth and anchor in the economic sectors directly benefiting the poor constitutes one of the priorities of the new poverty reduction strategy. The needs with regard to targeting the underprivileged and vulnerable areas and persons, which have become increasingly pressing, clearly justify the poverty profile updating work envisaged by the EPCV 2000.

4.5.4 At the conceptual level, the near-permanent character of the poverty profile updating, the autonomous capacity for household surveys developed by ONS, apart from vouching for effective takeover of the bulk of the work by nationals, is proof of the project's technical viability. In that regard, it should be stressed that ONS launched the EPCV 2000 survey using limited international expertise. ONS adapted the questionnaires of the first EPCV to take account of the needs emerging with regard to decentralization.

4.5.5 The country's commitment in the good governance exercise constitutes an additional guarantee of sustainability, given the involvement of mayors, the civil society, notably the NGOs, the women's associations and the youth groups targeted in the poverty reduction programmes.

4.5.6 The sustainability is also seen in the transparency including extension of the methodology and the outputs such as studies. As noted, the studies should be less part of a strategy to back up decisions and much more one to enable projects take root. The technical project funds, especially

methodological and documentary, constitute an element of the national heritage that must be allowed to progress.

4.5.7 Sustainability is further ensured through the projects mounted using the poverty profile, for example, the poverty reduction project financed by ADF for UA 3.23 million, and the AMINA project in which Mauritania is actively involved.

4.5.8 Another aspect to be emphasized is the need for reinforced coordination of donor intervention in poverty reduction, as a means of optimizing synergy in this area which is the core of their intervention strategy, based on a framework document for poverty reduction and growth.

4.5.9 Initially, the SDA project was designed as a stage beyond the SAPs. With time, since its results were used to mount and monitor these programmes, it became their motor. The financial institutions are increasingly based on poverty reduction documents. This explains the existence of: (i) the World Bank's framework documents for growth and poverty reduction and (ii) IMF Growth and Poverty Reduction Facility. All these documents require data and indicators provided by the SDA Project.

4.5.10 The beneficiaries continue to meet their commitments concerning the SDA project recurrent charges. This is how the government runs the CDHLPI, and has set aside resources for ONS to finance the EPCV 2000. The beneficiaries of the school and health infrastructure participate in their maintenance.

#### **4.6 Overall Performance Indicator**

The overall performance of the project is satisfactory with a rating of 3. 0This assessment concerns the attainment of objectives and the outputs, the impact on the institutional development and the sustainability, all rated satisfactory (3), however not as high as the rating of the relevance and quality at appraisal, which was deemed very satisfactory.

#### **4.7 Borrower's Performance**

4.7.1 Considered overall satisfactory, the borrower's performance is rated 3. The shortcomings noted related to the lack of quarterly reports, the delay in meeting condition 1 (3.1.6 and 3.1.7), and the slow administrative processes in setting up the management agency.

4.7.2 The country had taken all necessary institutional steps to aid the project implementation in accordance with the provisions of the protocol Agreement. The financing required for the different components was provided to beneficiaries, except there were delays in transmitting funds to the SDA unit of ONS, for the conduct SDA surveys. Generally speaking, apart from the time it took the executing agency to become fully familiar with the procedures, given the specific nature of the project, the procurement of goods and services was conducted without any major problems.

#### **4.8 Bank Group Performance**

4.8.1 The Bank Group's performance is deemed satisfactory and rated 3. Since it did not participate in the identification and preparation phases, this rating corresponds to the appraisal and supervision.

4.8.2 Given the other tasks assigned to it, such as participating in the second public expenditure review and preparation of the project for economic management and increasing institutional capacities, the supervision mission team should have been larger. The period was adequate, however the mission was scheduled late.

4.8.3 The shortcomings of the Bank mainly concern the supervision aspect, which was reduced to a single site mission and the monitoring/evaluation during implementation in general.

#### **4.9 Principal Factors likely to Affect the Implementation Performance and Outputs**

4.9.1 Apart from the pressure from the exodus of rural populations as a result of drought, there is no other factor that affected project implementation in any significant manner. The political will to internalize the SDA process and the participatory approach have had a positive impact in the implementation of this project.

4.9.2 The project was partly hampered by the limited Bank performance with regard to supervision. The slippage noted in the implementation of the first part of the PCR, at the macro-economic and sector levels, represent a major risk in that they could adversely affect the priority that the Government has given to this project. The same applies to site communication difficulties that hampered the SDA surveys.

4.9.3 The executing agency's delays in providing funds to the 'ONS partly affected the implementation, since this prolonged the project, in the same way as the hinterland communication problems and the shortcomings of the training schedule.

4.9.4 The depreciation of the national currency, all told, had a positive impact, because it afforded the borrower increased resources in the national currency, at the time when the measures were being taken to reduce inflation.

### **5. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.1 Conclusions**

5.1.1 The project has attained its specific objectives. The SDA reflex is now a reality in the central administration of Mauritania.

5.1.2 The project outputs are used in mounting poverty reduction projects and implementation of the national poverty reduction strategy.

5.1.3 In the absence of any real political will on the part of this country to adapt and implement socio-economic development programmes that can lead to lasting growth, the SDA outputs, particularly the improved knowledge of the phenomenon of poverty, could only have a limited impact. In internalizing the SDA programme, the country is required to mobilize sufficient resources to generate and sustain economic growth and channel part of the financing towards the sectors of activity that are likely to increase employment for the poor.

## 5.2 Lessons

5.2.1 Without this project, whose relevance has been recognized by all the segments of the Mauritanian society, and the development partners, the country would never have obtained reliable scientific tools for identification of: (i) the poor and vulnerable segments, such as women and the youth, and (ii) areas of intervention for the purposes of the poverty reduction programme (paras 4.2. § and 4.2.11)

5.2.2 The objective of synergy, sought through the concerted action of donors with regard to poverty reduction, would be greatly limited without the project outputs, particularly the poverty profile. (§ 4.5.8)

5.2.3 The project can only be implemented in good time if: (i) The Bank improves its follow up activity in general and supervision in particular (§ 4.8.3), and (ii) The Borrower resolves the internal problem of slow administrative procedures, seen as a major constraint. (§ 4.7.1)

5.2.4 As long as the SDA institutional support does not reach the decentralized levels of the administration and the civil society, the participatory process required for formulation of poverty reduction projects will remain deficient. Therefore this support must be extended to the regional sections of the public administration and to all the development actors. (§ 4.4.4)

5.2.5 Concentrating the SDA design capacity in the central administration could compromise the application of good governance, firstly, if no action were taken to back up the decentralization and de-concentration of the administration and also if the other segments of the society (NGO, Civil society) do not get heavily involved as active partners. (§ 4.4.4)

5.2.6 Given the survey techniques used, their use in targeting the lower levels, namely the moughataa (departments), the communes and districts, the results of the initial SDA surveys published in the wilaya (regions), were limited, if not nonexistent. Closer targeting for formulation of projects and programmes in favor of the grassroot communities is only possible if, right from the SDA design stage, the need to publish detailed information at these lower geographical levels (departments, districts and communes) is taken into account. (§ 5.2.7)

5.2.7 The project brought to light needs relating to monitoring/evaluation in most of the social sectors now receiving increasingly substantial budgetary allocations, namely education, health, and employment. The allocation and utilization of these resources requires definition of performance indicators to be followed up in a regular manner requiring enhanced monitoring/evaluation capacities within the country (Government, civil society).

5.2.8 Only if there are indicators serving as measuring instruments will it be possible to gauge the impact of the socio-economic development policies and programmes and monitor the trends of monetary poverty and human poverty. (§4.2.23)

### **5.3 Recommendations**

5.3.1 Given the above lessons, it is recommended:

#### **That the Government:**

5.3.2 Steadily pursues its efforts to consolidate the outputs of the institutional strengthening project at the level of the Mauritanian administration. In that regard, considering its commitment to introducing a programme of good governance, it should seek to extend the SDA design capacities of the regions and the civil society.

5.3.3 More than in the past, ensure transparency of the SDA integration process and the monitoring the performance of projects formulated for poverty reduction.

5.3.4 Bolster the poverty reduction mechanism through a poverty observatory, which will be a secular arm of the High Commission for Human Rights, poverty reduction and integration. The observatory is an integral part of any poverty reduction programme, and in fact the key component for monitoring/evaluation using output indicators that are set and monitored by a participatory process. Where appropriate, the observatory should be neutral and serve as a decision tool at the service of all the national and international parties working at poverty reduction, so as meet the need for transparency and greater visibility that inform the measures taken within the strategic poverty reduction framework.

#### **That the Bank:**

5.3.5 Ensure compliance with the projects schedule, by fixing a realistic schedule at appraisal, conducting regular follow-up of field activities involving periodic supervision missions in accordance with its own rules, and rapidly applying the necessary corrective measures;

5.3.6 Support Mauritania in the strategy for implementation of good governance, which requires among other efforts, institutional strengthening with regard to SDA at the regional level and in favor of the civil society;

5.3.7 Support the country in the evaluation and setting up of a poverty observatory designed as a neutral instrument to aid decisions relating to poverty control;

5.3.8 Ensure systematic formulation and effective utilization of socio-economic criteria as indicators of the performance of measures relating to poverty reduction and if appropriate, draw up a minimum list of such indicators to measure the country's progress and carry out a comparison among regional member countries.

**ANNEXES**

**MATRIX OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION**

PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS	MONITORING ACTION	PARTY RESPONSIBLE
<p><b>A. Formulation of SDA Project</b></p> <p>1. Inadequate articulation of activities, the results expected and, the specific objective of the project.</p> <p>2. The performance indicators have not been specified in the appraisal report.</p> <p>3. Lack of specific SDA manual of procedures contributed to prolonging project implementation.</p> <p>4. The appraisal report did not specify the coordination mechanisms for project activity, especially between donors.</p> <p><b>B. SDA Project Implementation</b></p> <p>5. Monitoring and evaluation guidelines affect performance evaluation.</p>	<p>1.1 Make the logical framework matrix systematic, with the objectives, the results expected and the activities decided, objectively verifiable indicators (OVI) and specific assumptions concerning risk.</p> <p>2.1 Systematic formulation and effective utilization of socio-economic indicators as performance indicators for poverty control projects.</p> <p>3.1 Draft the specific project manual of procedures for implementation of the different SDA project components, in light of the experience gained.</p> <p>4.1 Systematically state mechanisms for coordination between donors in the project appraisal report</p> <p>5.1 The project supervision (including mid-term review) missions should be conducted by the Bank, in accordance with its own relevant guidelines, notably the schedule to be prepared at project appraisal.</p>	<p>1.1.1 Prepare logical frameworks for SDA or poverty control projects that can be adapted to the needs of the RMC.</p> <p>2.1.1 Draw up minimum list of performance indicators to be used in appraisals of Bank-financed poverty control projects, and in the PCR and PPER</p> <p>3.1.1 Use the reports produced and involve the SDA training centers, in preparing this document, which will be a practical guide for RMCs.</p> <p>4.1.1 Include in the Bank Manual of Operations, guidelines for SDA project coordination, from identification through post-evaluation.</p> <p>5.1.1 Ensure that the schedule prepared during the supervision missions is followed.</p>	<p>Bank (Country Operations Departments, , CADI, OPEV, OCOD), regional SDA training institutes</p> <p>Bank (Country Operations Departments, OCOD, OPEV)</p> <p>Bank (CADI, OCOD, OCDN), regional SDA training institutes</p> <p>Bank (country operations departments, CADI, OCOD)</p> <p>Bank Departments (Country Operations Departments) and the Borrower</p>

**MATRIX OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION**

MAIN OBSERVATIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS	MONITORING ACTION	PARTY RESPONSIBLE
<p><b>C. Project Outputs</b></p> <p>6. Institutional Strengthening in relation to SDA is limited to the Central Administration. .</p> <p>7. The outputs of the SDA project, especially the poverty profile, published within the wilaya (administrative regions) and thus do not allow for appropriate targeting at lower levels (department, commune, district).</p> <p>8. The poverty reduction mechanism is functional but lacks a secular arm to serve as a decision aid.</p> <p>9. The outputs of the SDA project are the inputs of the good governance programme.</p>	<p>5.2 Executing Agency to submit quarterly reports</p> <p>6.1 Extend SDA institutional support to all the actors of the society.</p> <p>7.1 Improve the household survey method, making it more flexible and such as to provide the detailed data required for formulation of programmes and policies in favor of the grass root communities.</p> <p>8.1 Strengthen the poverty reduction mechanism with a reliable and neutral instrument at the service of all the national and international partners in poverty reduction in Mauritania.</p> <p>9.1 Prepare a methodology for application of outputs of the SDA Projects to aid good governance.</p>	<p>5.2.1 Ensure application of operational guidelines in the matter. State explicate in the appraisal report and loan agreement, the sanctions to be imposed on the borrower, if the reports are not submitted at the periods stated,</p> <p>6.1.1 Develop design and analysis capacities relating to SDA, at the regional level of Mauritanian administration and involve all the segments of the civil society in this exercise.</p> <p>7.1.1 Integrate variables allowing for data collection at the lower regional levels (department, commune, and district), into the SDA questionnaires and the EPCV questionnaires.</p> <p>8.1.1 Establish a poverty observatory that will serve as the secular arm of the Human Rights commission, in the efforts at poverty control and insertion.</p> <p>9.1.1 Draw up a list of indicators to monitor progress with regard to good governance, with emphasis on transparency, participation of women, equity and decentralization.</p>	<p>Bank Departments (Country operations departments) and the Borrower</p> <p>Mauritanian government and the Bank</p> <p>Mauritanian government, ONS</p> <p>Mauritanian Government and the Bank (OCDN).</p> <p>Government and development partners in Mauritania</p>

**RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF LOGICAL FRAMEWORK**

**COUNTRY: MAURITANIA**

**Name of Project: SDA Institution Building Project**

**Date of summary: September 2000**

**Design Team: Messrs. T.D. KOUASSI and L. MBONG MBONG**

Hierarchy of Objectives	Objectively Verifiable Indicators			Means of verification	Major assumptions/risks
	At Appraisal	On completion	At post-evaluation		
<p><b>I. Aim</b> 1.1 To reduce the negative social repercussions of the macro-economic and sector structural adjustment</p>	<p>5 (a)The growth rate of the economy is 3.5% higher; (b) the inflation rate is 3.6% lower, (c) the deficit of the current balance is down to 6.6% in 1995; (d) Indicators of the incidence of poverty (P0), of the average intensity of poverty (P1) and (P2) measuring the combined effect of the incidence, mean intensity, income disparity among the poor (e) The levels of HDI, HPI, WPI, GSHDI</p>		<p>(a) Action undertaken by the authorities of the country, with the support of development partners, as part of the poverty reduction programme, in favor of poor populations, especially women and the youth (targeting of poor segments, resettlement, poverty reduction projects, etc); (b) Economic Growth rate higher than 4.2% over the period 1996 to 99; (c) Po: 50.5% in 1996 against 56.6% in 1990; (d) the HDI: 0.451 in 1998 against 0.400 in 1990</p>	<p>(a) National Accounts; (B) Job statistics yearly records; (C) school statistics yearly records; (d) health statistics yearly compendia; (e) economic statistics yearly compendia (price); (f) Review of public investment programme (PIP) projects; (g) Public Expenditure Review; (h) Social Indicators; (i) Poverty map; (j) World Report on Human Development published by UNDP</p>	
<p><b>II. Project Objective</b> 2.1 Build up Government Capacities to take account the social dimensions of adjustment (SDA), in formulating its macro-economic and sector policies and programmes.</p>	<p>(a) the number of plans and programmes with SDA; (b) the number of PIP and BCI projects incorporating the SDA; (c) % of social expenditure in the national budget.</p>	<p>Integration of social concerns in the daily work, notably in project appraisal and recovery of primary health costs</p>	<p>Idem as for completion. However, with the new challenge of committing the country to implementation of a programme of good governance, the project outputs will only be an important phase that should be extended</p>	<p>(a) Headcount of officers trained and seminar reports; (b) Decrees concerning secondment of officers to government departments.</p>	<p>(a) The Mauritanian Government accords top priority to projects and programmes incorporating the social dimensions, in the PIP and BCI, and those it submits to donors; (b) The Government is effectively engaged in poverty reduction, whose steering it has entrusted to the CDHLPI</p>

### RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Hierarchy of Objectives	Objectively Verifiable Indicators			Means of verification	Major Risks/Assumption
	At Appraisal	On completion	At post-evaluation		
<b>III. Outputs</b> 3.1 Competence in SDA acquired and further developed to make the entire process endogenous	(a) The national organs dealing with the social sector are involved; (b) 18 officers from these set-ups trained; (c) Retention rate for trained officers higher than 80%; (d) SDA Training themes pertinent; (e) Analytical tools formulated (MCS, MEGC, macro-economic models, etc...)	Training and sensitization through seminars and courses	Training effectively carried out through: (a) a national workshop on SDA; (b) courses and study trips concerning SDA topics, for 18 officers; (c) a World Bank-supported workshop on tabulation of SDA survey data; (d) Day workshops to reflect on the elements of poverty reduction.	(a) ADB project completion report; (b) Government project completion report; (c) Annual completion reports by the implementation unit; (d) Supervision report.	(a) The best candidates identified; (b) Regional training centers have places for the 18 national officers, in accordance with the training plan drawn up; (c) Most women trained in the project are maintained within the national set-up
3.2 A coherent and consensual policy framework for poverty reduction formulated	(a) The socio-economic studies necessary to formulate the poverty control plan exist; (b) The strategic poverty control plan formulated.	16 socio-economic studies and a national poverty reduction plan for 1998-2001 drawn up	(a) Strategy and framework programme for grassroots development and poverty control (1994-1998); (b) 16 socio-economic studies and 1998-2001 poverty reduction plan; (c) National Poverty Control Strategy 2000-2015	(a) MAED reports; (b) CDHLPI reports; (c) Reports of the Inter-ministerial poverty control Committee.	Socio-economic development programmes give absolute priority to poverty control
3.3 Socio-economic data base up-to-date and reliable, and available to assess the impact of structural reforms on the living standards of households and thus facilitate identification of target groups ,	(a) SDA survey (priority, integral, community-level) conducted; (b) Socio-economic database set-up	1990 and 1996 poverty profile	(a) Idem as on completion; (b) EPCV Data base at ONS functional; (c) Launching of permanent survey on living conditions of EPCV 2000 households, which will among other aspects, allow for poverty profile updating.	(a) SDA implementation and survey analysis reports submitted by Office national de la statistique; (b) EPCV 2000 implementation and analysis reports.	ONS has the capacity to conduct surveys and analyze the data collected in good time.

**RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF LOGICAL FRAMEWORK**

Hierarchy of Objectives	Objectively Verifiable Indicators			Means of Verification	Major Risks/Assumptions
	At Appraisal	On completion	At post-evaluation		
3.4 Emergency aid in the form of facilities for access to basic socio-economic infrastructure provided to the populations of the outlying areas of Nouakchott, who are victims of drought	(a) number and type of basic socio-economic infrastructure constructed.	Completion of 44 classrooms, 4 fences, 54 Health blocks in the outlying areas and supply of certain school furniture and schooling equipment.	(a) Idem as on completion; (b) Part of the Oum El Mouminine school infrastructure destroyed in July 2000; (c) Reconstruction of 08 classrooms in this school nearing completion under the Education/Training project.	(a) Implementation Report on Nouakchott urban Commune; (b) Inspection on site; (c) Parent-teacher association report.	(a) Enterprises awarded contracts are capable of executing works; (b) The beneficiary communities take ownership of the basic infrastructure.
<b>IV. Activities</b> 4.1 <b>Institution Building:</b> 4.1.1 Project Management: (a) Staffing costs; (b) Other operating expenses; (c) Equipping	184.21	184.21	184.21	(a) Protocol Agreement for ADF grant No. F/MAU/DN-RI/91/2; (b) KFW financing agreement; (c) Origin (ledger) at ADB; (d) 1991 - 1996 PIP and BCI (1991 - 1996 implementation) concerning Mauritanian Government allocations.	Financing conditions fulfilled
4.1.2 Training of the 18 officers in "policies for social dimensions of Structural Adjustment", as well as the officers of the principal ministries and agencies involved formulation and implementation of socio-economic policies	211.84	211.84	211.84	idem 4.1	idem 4.1
4.2 <b>Procurement of Goods and Services</b>				Disbursement requests, supervision and audit reports.	Familiarity with rules and Procedures for procurement of goods and services
4.3 Formulation of a poverty reduction plan of action.	414.47	414.47	414.47	idem 4.1	idem 4.1
4.4 <b>Gathering socio-economic data using the SDA programme of surveys.</b> Survey of laid-off staff.	1805.26	1805.26	1805.26		
4.5 <b>Support to underprivileged urban communities</b>	184.21	184.21	184.21	idem 4.1	idem 4.1
<b>Finance Plan (in UA thousand)</b>	FAD/FAT : 700.00	FAD/FAT : 700.00	FAD/FAT : 700.00	idem 4.1	idem 4.1
	KFW : 1943.00	KFW : 1943.00	KFW : 1943.00		
	GVT : 157.00	GVT : 157.00	GVT : 157.00		
	2800.00	2800.00	2800.00		

## EVALUATION CRITERIA

No	Indicators	Rat	Observations
<b>1.</b>	<b>Relevance and quality at appraisal</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>(a) Need felt and expressed by country to the Bank: (b) adherence to Bank country programme and operations strategy</b>
1.i	Consistency with the country's overall development strategy.	4	In the climate of difficult social context caused by the adverse effects of the first generation SAP (FERP 1985/88, PCR 1989/91), entailing unemployment, inflation, continued erosion of purchasing power, the increased pauperization of the population), the Government undertook to set up a national SDA Programme, to give a human face to the previous SAP, in accordance with its DPL of 5/01/1987
1.ii	Consistency with the Bank's overall assistance strategy	4	(a) This project Is clearly within the scope defined by ADF V and VI and the 1988-90 PPER. (b) ADB godfathered the regional SDA Programme, at the same time as the World Bank and UNDP
1.iii	Macro-economic policy	4	Need to integrate the SDA in the country's macro-economic policy
1.iv	Sector Policy	4	The social aspects of the adjustment should be taken into account in the formulation of policies, programmes and sector projects
1.v	Public policy reform	4	Need to take account of SDA in public policy reform
1.vi	Poverty Reduction	4	The ultimate aim of the project was to give the country the institutional capacity for setting up the poverty reduction strategy.
1.vii	Social and gender equality	3	These should be taken into account in the national poverty reduction plan.
1.viii	Environmental concerns	3	Idem as 1.vii
1.ix	Human resources Development	4	The country lacked human resources capable of undertaking design, implementation and monitoring of SAP including SDA. The rate of retention of the senior staff hired is high. They are currently in charge of the administrative agencies involved in formulation, implementation and follow up of the poverty control strategy
1.x	Institutional development	4	The existing institutional framework should be strengthened to allow for the SDA exercise
1.xi	Private sector development	3	The project gave rise to SME that pioneered refuse collection activities.
1.xii	Regional economic integration	N.A.	
1.xiii	Quality from the start of portfolio (including requirements, complexity and risk, etc.)	3	The DSA project made it possible to refocus on the welfare of the population and poverty reduction as central concerns of the decision makers
<b>2.</b>	<b>Efficiency (Attainment of Objectives and outputs)</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>The objectives were attained and applied to good effect.</b>
2.i	Policy objectives	3	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Macro-economic stabilization</li> </ul>	4	The SAP objective of the macro-economic stabilization was only possible in a less tense social context.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public expenditure and investment</li> </ul>	4	The budgetary allocations in favour of social sectors have been strengthened and increased. They have become priorities
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Currency reforms</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Debt management</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regulation of the private sector and incentive measures</li> </ul>	3	The measures envisaged concern the strengthening of the private sector, particularly, the establishment of SME/SMI and encouragement to establish income-generating activities (IGA) given the freeze on civil service recruitment
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Banking sector Reform</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public service Reform</li> </ul>	3	The SDA approach made it possible to draw up a strategy for re-integration of vulnerable populations, especially the "new poor" who have been laid off by the public service and have been the object of a special survey.

## EVALUATION CRITERIA

No	Indicators	Rating	Observations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Price Efficiency</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sector regulations</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Labour legislation</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Procurement policy</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduce the negative effects</li> </ul>	4	This is a design-level approach to include the social concerns in the formulation of the SAP. The incidence of poverty went from 56.6 % in 1990 to 50.5% in 1996.
2.ii	Physical Objectives (outputs)	4	Almost all easily assimilated by the software, the products of this project constitute “ a package” aimed at developing an endogenous design capacity relating to SDA and poverty reduction
2.iii	Financial objectives	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financial Viability</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participation in costs</li> </ul>	3	The beneficiaries of the basic social infrastructure, especially the parents, contributed 25% to the investment costs.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Restructuring</li> </ul>	N.A.	
2.iv	Institutional development objectives	3	The human capital and the instruments for poverty reduction analysis and monitoring have been acquired. ONS now has a specialized survey section.
2.iv.1	National institutional capacity	2	The project has provided the country with human resources capable of formulating development plans and strategies taking account of SDA.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic Management</li> </ul>	3	The capacities for design, implementation and monitoring of conception, implementation and monitoring, developed in the project have been assimilated in an integral part of SAP na social policies.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public service Reform</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Governance</li> </ul>	2	The measures undertaken aim at good governance, while remaining at the central level.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poverty reduction</li> </ul>	4	The outputs, such as the poverty profile are used to target poor areas and persons.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financial intermediation</li> </ul>	3	The poverty profile is used to target the populations to be supported by micro-credits
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Judicial system</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Private sector support</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Environment and natural resources</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sector capacity</li> </ul>	4	ONS notably was able to develop a good capacity in terms of SDA.
2.iv.2	Executing Agency	3	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy/planning analysis</li> </ul>	3	Increased accountability of senior staff of the agency, at several levels of administration, especially within MAED, which has a macro-economic model. (MEMAU), and CDHLPI
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financial Management</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advancement of senior staff</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Personnel Management</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management of the information system</li> </ul>	3	The information gathered and collected and the results of the SDA surveys have made it possible to create a data base on households living conditions

## EVALUATION CRITERIA

No	Indicators	Note	Observations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restructuring of the agency</li> </ul>	3	On conclusion of the project, a grassroots coordination unit has been set up (UCDB)
2.v	Social objectives and aims	3	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poverty reduction</li> </ul>	3	(a) formulation of a national poverty reduction plan and a poverty reduction strategy; (b) utilization of the poverty profile for targeting the underprivileged.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Protection of vulnerable groups</li> </ul>	3	Utilization of the poverty profile to identify and act in favour of the vulnerable groups.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduction of disparities in income</li> </ul>	3	Objective integrated in the poverty reduction plan
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development and community participation</li> </ul>	3	The SDA Project was extended by the UCDB within MAED, whose mission was to formulate a national grassroots community development strategy, steer and monitor the framework programme for development and the poverty reduction efforts and coordination and promotion of NGO development activities. The poverty reduction strategy lays emphasis on the participatory approach and the self-organization of the underprivileged populations.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gender equality</li> </ul>	3	Objective of the poverty reduction plan. This involves improving the poverty reduction plan, specifically it requires increasing the participation of women in the different socio-economic spheres, making them more accountable and responsible in their activities.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Access to quality services</li> </ul>	3	Objective of the poverty reduction plan
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food and security plan</li> </ul>	3	Objective of the poverty reduction plan
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Health improvements</li> </ul>	3	Objective of the poverty reduction plan
2.vi	Environmental objectives	3	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human resource management</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintenance of bio-diversity</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintenance of ground, air, water quality</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quality of urban environment; refuse collection</li> </ul>	3	Indirectly, the project has made it possible to organize refuse collection in the country's capital, with a considerable chain effect.
2.vii	Private sector development objectives	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legal framework for private sector</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restructuring/Privatization of public enterprises</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial sector development</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Private sector technical assistance</li> </ul>	N.A.	
<b>3.</b>	<b>Efficiency</b>	<b>3</b>	
3.i	Economic rate of return	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Estimate at appraisal..... %</li> </ul>		

### EVALUATION CRITERIA

No	Indicators	Note	Observations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New estimate on completion (PCR, PPER).....%</li> </ul>		
3.ii	Financial rate of return	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Estimate at appraisal.....%</li> <li>New estimate on completion (PCR, PPER) ...%</li> </ul>		
3.iii	Efficiency indicators	3	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cost/effectiveness ratio</li> </ul>	3	The results obtained are appreciable: SDA survey techniques and methodology, managers trained, targeting tools for conducting poverty reduction with improved visibility, etc. Considering these results that could not have been obtained without the project, whose cost is modest, the cost/effectiveness ratio is by far higher by the unit, especially with the chain effects
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Utilization of infrastructure</li> </ul>	3	The project beneficiaries, who were without decent education and health infrastructure are today experiencing deep social changes, with: (i) high primary school enrolment rates with an attendant decrease in the number of children in the streets, and (ii) improved health coverage of the poor and vulnerable populations
<b>4.</b>	<b>Impact on institutional development</b>	<b>3</b>	
4.i	National institutional capacity	3	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Economic Management</li> </ul>	4	With the national officials acquiring SDA capacities, the economic management is improved in terms of equity and transparency
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public service reform</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Governance</li> </ul>	3	The project outputs (consensual framework for poverty reduction, poverty profiles) are inputs for the formulation of a good governance programme.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poverty reduction</li> </ul>	3	The project has made possible an awareness of the poverty phenomenon at all levels, and thus made it the top priority of all government socio-economic development programmes. With this collective concern, the country has acquired an indigenous capacity for poverty diagnosis and analysis, and a reduction strategy.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial Intermediation</li> </ul>	3	As part of this poverty control strategy, micro-credit activities are envisaged in support of the integration of the poor in production. The country belongs to the AMINA network of the Bank
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Judicial System</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support to private sector</li> </ul>	N.A.	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Environment and Natural resources</li> </ul>	3	Refuse collection companies have been emerging in the wake of the project. AFPH notably, and the public authorities have been working to protect the environment and check desert encroachment
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sector capacity</li> </ul>	N.A.	
4.ii	Executing agency	3	The project permanent secretariat was a skeleton structure, but was able to carry through its mission.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy/Planning Analyses</li> </ul>	3	Good reflex acquired through the training modules
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Management control and audit</li> </ul>	3	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human resource development and training</li> </ul>	4	Most of the project –trained managers are in high positions of responsibility in the national decision making spheres.

## EVALUATION CRITERIA

No	Indicators	Note	Observations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Technology Transfer</li> </ul>	3	The high caliber of managers trained and acquisition of design techniques attest the transfer of skills. Today, certain operations such as EPCV 2000 require less input from international expertise than the first SDA surveys.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Personnel Management, including mobility)</li> </ul>	4	No problem reported
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information systems management</li> </ul>	4	The internal ONS capacity for processing, analysis and dissemination of data has greatly improved, thanks to the SDA project. The very nature of the outputs has been such that they created a high demand which prompted ONS to better organize itself in the area of information management
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial and budgetary system ; operations and maintenance system</li> </ul>	3	The absence of any fiscal or financial problem would indicate that the executing agency is fully familiar with the rules and procedures.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agency restructuring</li> </ul>	N.A.	
<b>5.</b>	<b>Sustainability</b>	<b>3</b>	
5.i	Technical viability (mechanisms for maintenance and availability of the counterpart funds, spare parts, facilities for workshops, etc., etc.)	3	
5.ii	Continued commitment of the Borrower	4	The national strategy for poverty reduction is now at the center of the country's development.
5.iii	Socio-political support, including the participation of the beneficiaries, protection of vulnerable groups, (political stability)	4	
5.iv	Economic viability	N.A.	
5.v	Financial Viability	3	
5.vi	Institutional provisions (organization and management)	3	
5.vii	Environmental viability	N.A.	
5.viii	Resistance to exogenous shocks	3	The difficulties encountered in identifying the training centers and the communication problems that arose during the SDA surveys have been resolved.
<b>6.</b>	<b>Overall performance indicator</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Satisfactory but the project outputs require some adaptation to back up good governance.</b>

## BORROWER'S PERFORMANCES

No	Indicators	Note	Observations
1.	Preparation	3	The project has been designed at the Government's initiative, as part of the SDA project. There were administrative delays in the effective setting up of the project executing agency. The beneficiaries of the educational and health infrastructure have contributed 25% to the investment costs.
1.i	Appropriation, participation of beneficiaries	4	Since not all the steps taken in favour of the underprivileged and poor populations were conclusive, given that there was as yet no adequate targeting technique and consistent framework for intervention, the Government set about developing an indigenous design capacity for identification and targeting of this population category. The monitoring committee set up under the SDA Project has participated in all the phases of design of the project. The beneficiaries of the infrastructure made a 25% contribution, a sign of their commitment to owning the project outputs.
1.ii	Government's Commitment	4	The institutional steps taken by the Government (monitoring committee, permanent secretariat, technical management group), and in other areas
1.iii	macro-economic and sector policies	3	More than just a requirement, the social aspect has become a priority for the formulation of sector and macro-economic programmes
1.iv	Institutional provisions (counterpart financing)	3	The administrative delays in the actual establishment of the executing agency greatly delayed the first disbursement. The national counterpart funding was provided under the PIP and released each budget year through the BCI
<b>2.</b>	<b>Implementation Quality</b>	<b>3</b>	
2.i	Assignment of key managers	4	The working managers assigned to the project were senior staff (in the design field). During the implementation phase, the rate of departure of project managerial staff was nil;
2.ii	Performance of management by the executing agency	3	As attested in the supervision report of 11 to 28 July 1995, accounts audits were regularly organized; satisfactory accounting and administrative rules of procedure and internal controls were also set up.
2.iii	Utilization of technical assistance	4	The project utilized the services of renowned international consultants and qualified and competent consultants
2.iv	Mid-term adjustments	2	The programming and reprogramming of SDA surveys brought about a 2-year delay. There were two requests for the last disbursement, the first on 1 April 1993, (letter No.319 of April 11/04/93 from the Ministry of Planning).
2.v	Keeping to schedule	2	24 month delay
2.vi	Keeping within cost estimates	3	The total UA amount of the expenditure was equal to the UA projections at appraisal, but in reality, the project benefited from exchange gains resulting from depreciation of the national currency in comparison to the UA. The slight overrun of 0.4% was due to the currency fluctuation between the dates of the disbursement and confirmation.
3.	Compliance with Protocol agreement conditions and provisions	3	The preconditions for entry into force (section 2.01) and the conditions 2 and 3 of section 2.02 have been fulfilled within the time limits. Condition 1 (section 2.02) was met in 11 months (instead of the 3 required) following the signing of the Protocol.
4.	Adequate monitoring/ evaluation as well as reporting	3	Auditing of accounts conducted. Quarterly report requirement not fulfilled.
5.	Satisfactory Operations	N.A.	
Overall Performance of the borrower		3	Overall Satisfactory

**THE BANK'S PERFORMANCES**

No	Indicators	Rating	Observations
<b>1.</b>	<b>At identification</b>	<b>N.A.</b>	The bank did not identify the project.
1.i	Consistency of project with Government development strategy.		
1.ii	Consistency of the project with the Bank's strategy concerning the country		
1.iii	Government involvement		
1.iv	Beneficiaries' involvement		
1.iv	Project innovation		
<b>2.</b>	<b>Project preparation</b>	<b>N.A.</b>	The Bank did not prepare the project.
2.i	Relevance of the Bank's project		
2.ii	Appropriateness of the Bank's support		
<b>3.</b>	<b><u>At appraisal</u></b>	<b>3</b>	The lack of a project logical framework matrix appears to have handicapped the concise chain of « activity-output-specific objective-overall objective ». Lack of performance indicators.
3.i	Quality of technical, economic, financial, institutional, social and environmental analyses	3	The analyses in the appraisal report were in conformity with that of the 1988-90 PEPP
3.ii	Relevance of conditions and commitments	4	The conditions laid down in the protocol agreement seek to avert any bottlenecks in the implementation of the project
3.iii	Appropriateness of financing instruments	4	The project was rightly financed under TAF, given its high intensity with regard to studies and training, all of which made it TAF eligible.
3.iv	Adequacy of financial cover	3	The financing was from the TAF balance as the Government requested. t
3.v	Quality of coordination with other partners/donors	4	Done jointly with the world Bank
3.vi	Plans for implementation and supervision (including performance indicators performance)	2	EPCV implementation plan existing in the appraisal report; lack of a supervision plan; absence of performance indicators
<b>4.</b>	<b>At supervision</b>	<b>3</b>	A single supervision mission in the entire period of implementation of the project is not sufficient.
4.i	Adequacy of Bank staff (staff, duration, continuity)	3	Given the other tasks assigned to the mission team, such as participating in the second public expenditure review, preparation of the second economic management project and capacity building, it should have been provided more staff. The duration was sufficient, however, the mission team was programmed late.
4.ii	Problem solving	3	To resolve the difficulties encountered in timely application of the survey results available and analysis of SDA taking account of SDA, the mission backed up the contacts of the executing agency with the center for studies and research on international development at Clermont-Ferrand in France. It was agreed with the Government to close the project as of 31/12/95 and that the country would prepare the project completion report during the first quarter of 1996.

### BANK'S PERFORMANCES

No	Indicators	Note	Observations
4.iii	Reactions to changes in conditions	2	
4.iv	Appropriateness of follow up following recommendations/decisions	2	Since the country did not comply with the reporting schedule, the Bank should have reinforced the pressure on the executing agency for realization of this activity.
4.v	Realist rating of PPPR/PPCR	3	The project was rated satisfactory, since it was given 2.4 in the portfolio review report No. ADF/BD/WP/96/39 of June 1996. It was also judged satisfactory in the August 1998 PCR with 2.5...
4.vi	Attention given to the probable impact on social development	3	
4.vii	Attention given to problems of sustainability	3	
<b>Overall rating of the Bank's performance</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>Satisfactory on the whole</b>

**FACTORS LIABLE TO AFFECT PERFORMANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTPUTS**

No	Factors	Nature <sup>5</sup>			N/A	Observations
		S	P	N		
<b>1.</b>	<b>Outside Government Control</b>					
1.1	World Rates				X	
1.2	Natural events	X				The exodus of the rural populations fleeing drought, towards the peripheries made it more urgent to set up a programme to support the vulnerable populations
1.3	Bank's Performance		X			The lack of Bank supervision in the field for 4 years is a shortcoming is a setback
1.4	Performance of contractors/consultants			X		The consultants selected in accordance with Bank rules were on the whole entirely satisfactory.
1.5	Civil War				X	
<b>2.</b>	<b>Under Government control</b>					
2.1	Macro-economic policies		X			The combined adverse effects of the SAP ongoing during the project implementation, and the slippage recorded by the first tranche of the PCR, could compromise the project.
2.2	Sector policies		X			The risk mentioned in 2.1 could come from any sector not involved in the SDA programme.
2.3	Government commitment	X				The Government commitment has been secured and irreversibly so.
2.4	Designation of key managerial level staff	X				The selection of key managerial staff was appropriate
2.5	Financial counterpart		X			The Government included the financial counterpart amount in the PIP and made it available through BCI
2.6	Administrative Capacity		X			
2.7	Telephone communication problems		X			This factor did not allow for sound coordination of the SDA survey activities.
<b>3.</b>	<b>Under the control of the Executing Agency</b>					
3.1	Management		X			Delay in providing funds to ONS
3.2	Staffing			X		Despite the limited staff strength of the coordination unit (5 managers and staff), the results obtained were satisfactory.
3.3	Utilization of technical assistance				X	
3.4	Monitoring/evaluation			X		The executing agency set up internal administrative and accounting procedures deemed satisfactory.
3.5	Participation of beneficiaries	X				

<sup>5</sup> The factors can affect the performance of implementation and the outputs substantially (S), partially (P) or to a negligible extent (N).

**FACTORS LIKELY TO AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION  
AND OUTPUTS**

No	Factors	Nature			N/A	Observations
		S	P	N		
4.	that could affect implementation					
4.1	Modifications of the scope, the scale, the design			X		The changes in the terms of implementation of the component «support to the underprivileged urban communities » did not have any negative impact. It rather made it possible to finance a larger number of national SMEs (in place of CVCT, which was automatically selected at appraisal), including the women's clean up cooperatives and the women cleaning volunteers.
4.2	Errors in estimates of physical inputs, base unit costs			X		Correct estimates
4.3	Inaccurate price and physical contingencies			X		Idem 4.2
4.4	Changes in exchange rates, financial and institutional provisions		X			The depreciation of the national currency in relation to the UA, during the project implementation period afforded the project coordination unit more resources in local currency.
4.5	Unrealistic schedule of implementation		X			The training schedule did not take account of the risks relating to selection of candidates, availability of places in the training centers.
4.6	Management quality, including financial management				X	The system for management of poverty information systems (including the poverty profile) set up through the project (including the poverty profile) is the only reliable one that the various parties use.
4.7	Delays in selecting managerial staff, consultants, contractors and receiving counterpart funds		X			This factor which was observed for training is justification of an extension of the project duration.
4.8	Inefficient procurement and disbursement procedures			X		The project activities have been little affected by this factor

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Indicators	1985-90*	1995-98*
<b>A. Population</b>		
Total population (in thousand of inhabitants) 1988 and 1988	1864.0	2493.2
Of which : Female population (in %)	50.4	50.3
Urban Population (in %)	41.0	55.3
Natural increase rate (%)	2.93	2.90
Life expectancy at birth (years)	47.4	52.5
Men's life expectancy at birth (years)	47.0	42.3
Women's life expectancy at birth (years)	48.0	55.5
<b>B. Health and Nutrition</b>		
Infant mortality rate (for thousand)	125	120
Infant under 5 mortality rate (/1000 live births)	210	183
Maternal mortality rate (for 100000 live births)	800	550
Population with access to health services (%)	45	75
Low birthweight (%)	10	11
One-year olds vaccinated against tuberculosis (in %)	84	69
One-years olds vaccinated against the measles	49	20
Rate of utilization of oral re-hydration therapies (ORT)	54	51
Number of inhabitants per doctor	16667	7849
Number of inhabitants per nurse	2273	1124
Population with access to potable water (%)	66	70
Daily calorie intake per capita (in calories)	2450	2622
Index of food production/inhabitant (base 100=1989-91)		103
<b>C. Education</b>		
Gross enrolment rate for basic education ( %)	46.8	86.2
Of which: Boys	52.5	89.3
Girls	40.7	83.2
Gross adult literacy (% population + 15 years)	35.0	41.2
Gross men's literacy rate (% population + 15 years)	48.0	51.7
Gross women's literacy rate (% population + 15years)	22.0	31.0
Share of education expenses in the State budget (%)	21.4	27.5
<b>D. National Accounts</b>		
Annual average GDP growth (%)	1.9	4.2
National savings (% du GDP)	11.4	7.9
Gross domestic investment (% of GDP)	28.6	14.9
<b>E. Price and Exchange rate</b>		
Average annual increase of the consumer price index (1990=100)	8.3	6.5
Real exchange rate UM / \$ EU (annual average)	78.1	130.0
Indicator of the exchange terms (1985=100)	98.9	92.6
<b>F. Public debt</b>		
Total External debt (% PIB)	213.2	243.3
Total external debt (% of goods and services)	394.6	458.5
Debt service ( % goods and service exports)	20.1	24.3
<b>G. Public Finance</b>		
Deficit (-) / Surplus (+) % of GDP	-7.3	-0.1
<b>H. Balance of payments</b>		
Balance of current account (% GDP)	-16.3	-3.4
<b>I. Level of development</b>		
Human development indicator (HDI) (150 <sup>th</sup> /174 in 1990, 147 <sup>th</sup> in 1998)	0.400	0.451
Gender-specific human development indicator: (GSHDI) 122th/143 in 1998		0.441
Human poverty indicator (HPI) (%): 77th/92 in 1998		49.7
Women's participation Indicator (WPI): 99th/102 in 1997		0.197
Population living below the poverty threshold (%)	56.6	50.5

Sources: Mauritania: ONS, MSAS, MEN.

ADB: African Development Report, 1999, PCR of Project for institutional support concerning SDA.

UNDP: World Report on Human Development, 1994 to 2000

World Bank: World Development Report 1990, 1991, 1997

\* Average over the period or available data for the most recent year.

## POVERTY PROFILE AND INDICATORS FOR MONITORING POVERTY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

### A. The poverty profile

1. Preparation of a poverty profile comprise several major phases, including: (i) definition of this multidimensional phenomenon, along two lines (monetary and human), (ii) methods of appreciating each aspect, (iii) estimates of poverty thresholds, (iv) calculation of all the basic information and indicators that can shed light on the incidence and average intensity of the phenomenon and on the disparities between the poor themselves. This profile also concerns the human aspect generally analyzed in terms of access and needs.

2. Concerning the monetary aspect, higher threshold (known as the poverty threshold) and a lower threshold (known as the absolute poverty threshold) are calculated using the following methods:

- **The cost of essential needs method (CBE) ;**
- **The energy from food energy methods (AEA) ;**
- **The method applying the higher poverty threshold to two-thirds of the population, with the lower level, or absolute poverty threshold corresponding to one third (1/3) of average income.** In the same order of ideas, certain countries have set the upper level to correspond to the expenditure of the third decile; the absolute poverty threshold thus corresponds to the expenditure of the first decile. Though considered arbitrary, this method has been largely used for African countries that pioneered poverty evaluations: Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, particularly.
- **Determination of the standard poverty reduction threshold at the international level, by country group, for the purposes of international comparison:** Calculated in function of consumption, the poverty threshold is estimated at 1USD in 1985 purchasing power parity (PPP) by person and by day. UNDP also uses the other thresholds (per person and per day): \$2 (1985 PPP) for Latin America and the Caribbean, \$4 (1990 PPP) for European countries and the East and the Community of independent states (CIS), and for the industrialized countries \$14.4 (1985 PPP) valid for the United States.

3. It should be noted that, to be relevant and useful for analysis and formulation of poverty reduction programmes, *the poverty reduction thresholds should be calculated at the national level and by region.*

4. The elementary poverty indicators developed by Sen (1976) and Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) are often used. These indicators are known as the  $P_\alpha$  family and derive from the general formula, whereby  $n$  designates the total population,  $q$  the underprivileged,  $z$  the poverty threshold, and  $y_i$  the allocation (income, expenditure) of the underprivileged  $i$ .

$$P_\alpha = (1/n) \sum_i [(z-y_i)/z]^\alpha \text{ with } i=1,..,q \text{ and } \alpha \geq 0.$$

- If  $\alpha=0$ ,  $P_0 = H = q/n$  which is relative poverty or the incidence of poverty.
- If  $\alpha=1$ ,  $P_1 = (1/n) \times \sum_i [(z-y_i)/z] = H \times I$ , with  $i=1,..,q$ .  $P_1$  measures the intensity of the phenomenon but does not take into account the disparity of the incomes of this category.
- If  $\alpha=2$ ,  $P_2 = (1/n) \sum_i [(z-y_i)/z]^2 = H \times [I + (1-I^2) \times C^2p]$ , with  $i=1,..,q$ . and  $C_p$  being the coefficient of the variation of incomes of the poor, which reflects the disparity of incomes. Thus  $P_2$  is an indicator that makes it possible to combine the elementary measures of poverty. Given its aptitude to convey the situation of the poorest of the poor,  $P_2$  is one of the best tools for targeting the populations of poor areas.

5. **Assessing human poverty is actually more complex** to the extent that the concept covers aspects such as « the absence of political liberty, lack of decision-making powers, personal insecurity, inability to participate in community life, threats weighing on long-term viability and on intergenerational equity<sup>6</sup> », and applies the notion of lack or non-access to basic social services. Human poverty is characterized by potential elementary deficits in elementary potential including a rather low life expectancy and mediocre conditions of health, housing, education, participation, personal security and environment.<sup>7</sup> »

<sup>6</sup> World Human Development Report for 1997, chap 1, page 10

<sup>7</sup> World Human Development Report for 1997, chap 1, page 30

## POVERTY PROFILE AND INDICATORS FOR MONITORING POVERTY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

### B. Some indicators for monitoring poverty and social development

6. The indicators are: (i) easy to calculate or estimate, (ii) very useful in assessing the impact of poverty control measures, and formulation of economic and social development policies. Most of these indicators cover all the social sectors contained in the Framework document for poverty reduction in particular and the total economy, health, education, employment, the situation of women, income, food security and the environment.

7. These indicators would thus include:

➤ Concerning *the total economy*:

✓ the principal aggregates of the national accounts, namely:

- Gross domestic product (GDP)
- Economic growth rate
- Implicit GDP index
- GDP per inhabitant in national currency, USD, PPP \$, and in PPP
- Sector GDP (primary, secondary, tertiary)
- Gross national product (GNP)
  - The GNP growth rate
  - National income available
  - Domestic demand and its components:
    - Final consumption<sup>8</sup> in value and as % of GDP
    - Investment<sup>9</sup> in value and as % du GDP
  - The national investment rate<sup>10</sup> and by economic sector<sup>11</sup>
  - National and regional inflation rates
  - Country's debt (domestic debt, debt amount and external debt as % of GDP) per capita
  - Debt service in value and as % of goods and services exports, as % of GDP, and per capita

➤ *Shares of budgetary expenditure* allocated to social sectors (education, health), and conservation of the environment.

➤ *Poverty profile* with at least

- The upper and lower poverty thresholds by geographical zone
- The  $P_{\alpha}$  family, particularly  $P_0$ ,  $P_1$  et  $P_2$  defined above
- contribution to regions, households classified according to the size or other criteria, socio-professional categories, poverty.
- Poverty by gender, socio-professional category, by region.
- Access to basic socio-economic infrastructure (health, education, etc.)

➤ **Monitoring/evaluation indicators**<sup>12</sup> concerning various sectors, such as:

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<sup>8</sup> The final consumption comprises the final consumption of households, public administrations and non-profit organizations and services

<sup>9</sup> Investment comprises gross formation of fixed capital (GFCF) and stock variation.

<sup>10</sup> Relations between GFCF and GDP

<sup>11</sup> Relations between GFCF and its value added

<sup>12</sup> Non-exhaustive list. Reference can be made to sector indicators developed by UNICEF (situation of women and children), ILO (unemployment, jobs), WHO (health)

## POVERTY PROFILE AND INDICATORS FOR MONITORING POVERTY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

- ✓ **health:**
  - life expectancy at birth by gender
  - infant and adult mortality rate
  - infant mortality rate
  - maternal mortality rate
  - number of inhabitants per doctor, midwife, nurse
  - number of births overseen by medical staff
  - follow-up of pregnancies
  - low birth weight (in %)
  - % of children of under one year vaccinated against the major diseases
  - seroprevalence
  - % of the population with access to health services, by neighborhood
  - % of the population with access to drinking water by neighborhood
  - % of the population with access to sanitation by neighborhood
  
- ✓ **education :**
  - current public expenditure by pupil and by education level
  - overall adult literacy, by gender, by area (rural/urban)
  - overall primary gross/net enrolment rate, by gender, and by area (rural/urban)
  - overall secondary gross/net enrolment rate, by gender, by area (rural/urban)
  - higher education gross/net enrolment
  - % girls in primary school, secondary school, higher education system
  - % students in scientific streams
  - repeater rate for each cycle
  - number of pupils by teacher, by classroom for each cycle.
  
- ✓ **employment:**
  - total working population and in % of the total population
  - working population by gender, sector, region
  - staff by gender and socio-professional category
  - unemployment rate
  - daily work time (number of hours)
  
- ✓ **The situation of women** (in addition to the above indicators calculated by gender)
  - Average number of children per woman
  - Average age for first marriage
  - Economic activity rate, women's unemployment rate
  - Women heads of households
  - ratio of women in decision-making bodies
  - workload (number of hours and minutes daily)
  - non-remunerated domestic work
  - relation of women's salary levels and that of men, by socio-professional category, area (urban/rural)
  
- ✓ **income**
  - sources of income
  - socio-professional category and area of residence

## **POVERTY PROFILE AND INDICATORS FOR MONITORING POVERTY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT**

✓ ***food security and nutrition***

- per capita food production index (grain,..) as % of imports total goods imports
- food aid (in tons)
- consumption in % of final consumption of households
- daily calorie intake per capita
- daily protein intake per capita
- daily lipid intake per capita

8. The UNDP composite indicators can be calculated at the national and regional level. These include: (i) the human development indicator (HDI), (ii) gender-specific indicator of human development (G-SHDI), (iii) indicator of women's participation (WPI), and (iv) human poverty indicator (HPI).

**LIST OF STUDIES FINANCED UNDER THE PROJECT**

01. Mauritania's Poverty profile: phase 1, February 1992  
phase 2, July 1993.
02. The informal sector's contribution to employment and the national product in Mauritania, November 1992.
03. Institutional framework as a constraint, incentive or regulator of development or appropriateness of the institutional framework in meeting poverty reduction needs. Final report, September 1993.
04. The framework programme for grassroots development and poverty reduction. May 1994: identification.  
Grassroots framework Programme: options for different components.
05. Components No.1 and No.2: Options for rural development.
06. Component No.3: options for development of secondary urban centers.
07. Component No.4: options for development of environs of Nouakchott.
08. Component No.5: Training.
09. Report on evaluation of poverty reduction programmes.
10. Plan of action for small-scale fisheries development. Final report, July 1993.
11. Additional study of the plan of action for development of small-scale fisheries, April 1993.
12. Situation of children out of school and unoccupied, June 1993.
13. Situation of women in Mauritania. Final Report, July 1993.
14. Programme to support the informal sector and prospects of an appropriate policy in the context of adjustment and change in Mauritania, May 1993.
15. Mauritania's poverty reduction strategy: Elements for a plan of action, 1993.
16. Living conditions of small-scale farmers of irrigated blocks, November 1993.