

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP



CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN THE COFFEE-
GROWING REGIONS OF MBAIKI AND BERBERATI**

Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER)

**OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT
(OPEV)**

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CURRENCIES, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit	Appraisal (Oct. 82)	PCR (Dec. 94)	PPER (Feb. 99)
UA 1	= CFA.F 342.198	CFA.F 774.997	CFA.F 778.176

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 metric ton (t)	=	1000 kilograms (kg)	=	2204 pounds (lbs)
1 kilometre (km)	=	1000 metres (m)	=	0.62 miles (mi)
1 hectare (ha)	=	100 acres (a)	=	2.47 acres

FISCAL YEAR

1st January- 31st December

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACADOP	=	Agence centrafricaine de développement de l'Ouham-Pende
	=	Agence de développement de la zone cafeiere
ADB	=	African Development Bank
BCAD	=	Banque de crédit agricole et de développement
CAISTAB	=	Caisse de stabilisation et de péréquation des produits agricoles
DRDA	=	Direction régionale de l'agriculture
ADF	=	African Development Fund
CFAF	=	African Financial Community
EDF	=	European Development Fund
IFAD	=	International Fund for Agricultural Development
GIR	=	Groupements d'intérêts ruraux (Rural Cooperatives)
ICRA	=	Institut centrafricain de recherche agricole Central African Agricultural Research Institute)
MINAGRI	=	Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock)
ONF	=	Office national de forêts (National Forestry Office)
ONCPA	=	Office national de la commercialisation des produits Agricoles (National Agricultural products Marketing Board)
ORCCPA	=	Office de réglementation, de la commercialisation et du conditionnement des produits agricoles (Office for regulation, marketing , handling and packing farm products)
PDSV	=	Projet de développement des savanes vivrières (Savanna food crops development project)
GDP	=	Gross Domestic Product
SOCADA	=	Société centrafricaine de développement agricole (Central African Agricultural Development Company)
EIRR	=	Economic Internal Rate of Return
UA	=	Unit of Account

PREFACE

1. This project performance evaluation report (PPER) concerns the rural development project in the regions of Mbaiki and Berberati in the Central African Republic, (CAR) in respect of which the Bank granted a loan of UA 9.73 million in 1983 . The project fit in with the national integrated rural development policy objectives aimed at improving the welfare of the rural population. This loan which represents 81% of investments, made it possible to build the capacity of existing cooperatives, improve the health conditions of rural people by putting in place health centers and wells and to improve agricultural production systems. However, concerning physical infrastructures (roads, earth roads and buildings), the results are far below expectations owing to a poor assessment of the works to be carried out, which proved to be heavier than expected, a bad choice of mechanized equipment and the failure of certain contractors awarded building contracts. The project was completed in 1994 but disbursements continued until 1995. The completion report was prepared by the Bank following a mission to the country in 1994.

2. The project's implementation which spread over a period of about eight years instead of four initially projected, was subject of considerable modifications on the initial project design as well as changes to the organization structure of the Executing Agency. These modifications made with the agreement of the Bank made it possible to rectify certain omissions and to facilitate the smooth functioning of the project. Despite a capital cost overrun of nearly 15% compared to the estimates, the physical outputs were mitigated (28% for feeder roads) as well as those relating to food crops (37%).

3. The overall project performance is unsatisfactory. The project is facing serious institutional problems due to the failure of ADECAF in charge of all the project activities, especially the outreach and extension activities, credit, agricultural research etc., of CAISTAB and the total inability of GIR to function owing to lack of means. From the economic viewpoint, the results have been very poor due to the fall in agricultural yields, poor marketing organization and the deterioration of world prices of exported agricultural products.

4. This project performance evaluation report (PPER) which was prepared following a Bank mission to CAR in November 1998 makes reference to the appraisal and completion reports as well as to the relevant Bank policy documents. The finalization of the PPER was differed to take into account additional information and social data on the Berberati region which were provided to the Bank subsequently. The PPER completes the findings and the conclusions of the project completion report (PCR) , and contains an evaluation of performances, the results and the sustainability of the project's impacts. It draws lessons and conclusions thereof and makes recommendations to the Borrower and the Bank for consolidating the project benefits and adopting a better approach to similar operations in future.

5. The PPER took into account the comments received from the Borrower and the Departments.

BASIC PROJECT DATA

A. PRELIMINARY DATA

1. Country : Central African Republic
2. Project : Rural Development Project in the Coffee-growing Regions of Mbaiki and Berberati
3. Loan Number : FAD/CS/RCA/AGRI/83/9
4. Borrower : Government of Central African Republic
5. Beneficiary : Ministry of Agriculture
6. Executing Agency : Agence de développement de la zone caféière ADECAF

B. BASIC LOAN DATA

	Appraisal Estimate	Actual	Gap
1. Request	1982	-	
2. Amount (UA million)	9.73	9.66	0.07
3. Service Charge	0.75%	0.75%	0
4. Repayment Period	14 years		
5. Grace Period	22/6/83		
6. Negotiation Date	1982	-	-
7. Approval Date	25/08/83	-	-
8. Signature Date	20/01/84	-	-
9. Effectiveness Date	1983	31 Dec. 1984	2 years
9 Implementation Date	23/02/84		

C. PROJECT DATA

	Appraisal Estimate	Actual	Gap
1. Total Cost (in UA million)	11.16	10.84	1.28
2. Implementation Duration	5 years	8 years	3 years
3. Financing Plan			

Source	At Appraisal			Actual		
	F.E	L.C	Total	F.E	L.C	Total
ADF	9.73	-	9.73	9.66	-	9.66
Government		1.43	1.43		1.20	1.20
TOTAL	9.73	1.43	11.16	9.66	1.20	10.86

	Appraisal Estimate	Actual	Gap
4. Deadline for first disbursement	31/12/1984	03/09/1985	9 months
5. Deadline for commencement of implementation	October 1985	1985	0
6. Date of Commencement of Works	1989	1995	8 years
7. Deadline for last disbursement	31 Dec. 1989	31/12/94	5 years

D. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

1. Cost Overrun	:	None
2. Unspent balance	:	0.07
3. Nb. Of extensions of deadline for last disbursement	:	5
4. Implementation status	:	Completed
5. Overall project performance	:	Unsatisfactory
6. Implementation performance	:	Unsatisfactory
7. Bank performance	:	Unsatisfactory

	At Appraisal	On Completion	At Post-eval
Economic Internal Rate of Return	27%	0.22%	Negative

E. MISSIONS

Type	Date	N° persons	Composition	M/weeks
Identification	1979	Min. Agri	N/D	
Preparation	July 1982	FAO	N/D	
Appraisal	March 1983	2	Agronomist/Agro-economist	6
Follow-up/Launching Supervision	Jan. 1985	1	Loan Officer	1
	Feb. 1985	1	Agronomist	1
	June 1986	1	Agronomist	1.5
	Feb. 1987	1	Agronomist	1.5
	Oct. 1987	1	Agronomist	1.5
	March 1988	2	Agro/Civil Engineer	4
	June 1988	1	Finance Officer	1.2
	February 1989	1	Many	1
	May 1989	1	Loan Officer	1.2
	March 1990	3	Agro/ Financial Agro-eco.	6
	Dec 1992	1	Finance Officer	1.2
Completion (PCR)	Sept/Oct 1994	3	Civil Engineer/Agronomist/Agro-economist	6
PPER	Nov/Dec 1998	2	Agro-eco/Environ.	4

F. DISBURSEMENTS (UA million)

1.	Total disbursed	:9.73	9.66
2.	Amount Cancelled	:_	0.07
3.	Undisbursed balance	:-	0

5.	Annual Disbursements	Estimates	Actual
	1984	4.9	-
	1985	2.20	1.89
	1986	1.76	2.978
	1987	1.38	0.951
	1988	-	1.951
	1989	-	0.942
	1990	-	0.710
	1991	-	0.335
	1992	-	0.380
	1993	-	0.217
	1994	-	0.010
	Total	-	9.663

G. BANK OPERATIONS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

The table below gives a list of projects financed by the Bank in the agricultural sector and their status of implementation.

Bank Operations in the agricultural sector.

PROJECTS	Amount (in UA million)	% Disbursed	Status
Bossongo Oil Palm I	4.61	100	Completed / PCR made
Agricultural Production Development	2.95	100	Completed / PCR made
Bossongo Oil Palm II	4.17	100	Completed / PCR made
Mbaiki/Berberati Rural Development	9.76	99	Completed / PCR made
Line of Credit to BCAD	4.61	13	Balance (3.97) cancelled
Agricultural Master Plan Study	0.69	0	In progress
TOTAL	30.96		

Source : 1998 Portfolio Review. 1995 PCR

I. EVALUATION SUMMARY

Objectives and Scope

1.1 This project financed by the Bank to the tune of UA 9.89 million will help to achieve food self-sufficiency. The specific goal of the project is to increase agricultural production and the farmers' income through the control of land irrigation which had previously been subject of dry farming, and through land development and farmers modernization.

1.2 The Bank loan seeks above all, to support irrigated schemes activities and those involving agricultural development, all of which are in keeping with the major thrusts of Northern Waters Master Plan (PDEN).

Implementation Performance

1.3 Project performance in terms of the implementation of its activities was deemed satisfactory although the implementation schedule was not respected and the investment cost was reduced by more than 55%. Hydraulic and sanitation infrastructures put in place in accordance with detailed engineering designs made it possible to protect thousands of hectares of hydromorphic land. Land reform enabled the rational utilization of the irrigation system and better occupation of land.

1.4 Institutional Performance

The institutional performance is considered satisfactory overall. The services of the executing agency were efficient in the realization and maintenance of the project's infrastructures. Rural cooperatives (GRI) created under the project to ensure better distribution of water inputs in the plots grouped together developed to such an extent that agricultural officers encouraged them to gradually take over the maintenance of the secondary irrigation system and the repair of light equipment.

Project Impact

1.5 The project impact is strongly felt from the economic, social and environmental viewpoint. Indeed, the project contributed to the achievement of self-sufficiency in milk, ahead of the projected date, which is a highly consumed product in Tunisia. Developed land had their value multiplied by ten and the revenue of supervised farmers increased four times. In the project area, 200 permanent jobs (including 120 to 150 for women) and 5000 casual jobs were created.

1.6 On the social front, a particularly important impact on women was observed as they gained access to landed property and occupied nearly 3000 temporary jobs, or over 60% of the total workforce on the Galaat Andalous perimeter and 75% in other areas.

1.7 With regard to the environment, the objectives were partially achieved. Although hydraulic structures helped to considerably reduce the overexploitation of surface water and the ground water table, the salinity problem of the irrigation water remains intact with the salt content ranging from 2.5 to 3/1 in the summer. It should be pointed out however that the quality of water is regularly monitored by the services of SOCADENORD which take the necessary steps to guarantee the yields of the developed areas.

Sustainability

1.8 The prospects of sustainability of project outcomes are good because hydraulic and irrigation infrastructures are stable and regularly maintained by the beneficiaries themselves. Nevertheless, from the point of view of operation, the project is facing serious problems owing to the salinity of water. To this end, from the environmental viewpoint, technical and financial provisions have been made to limit the harmful effects of the project and to ensure that water of good quality is available for domestic purposes and for irrigation..

Conclusion

1.9 Given the economic, financial, social and environmental results, the performance of the project is considered satisfactory. However, despite these achievements sustainable measures must be found to ensure the supply of good quality water for irrigation as well as for domestic needs since the productivity of farms depends on it.

Feedback

a) Lessons

1.10 The main lessons to be drawn from the project evaluation mainly concern :
 i) the need for the borrower to be involved in the project from the start of its preparation in order to determine and state his macro-economic and sectoral policy. To this end, it should be pointed out that this project was a first experience in the area of pressure irrigation and consequently, all the impacts of such technique were not quantifiable ; ii) detailed engineering studies to be carried out prior to the appraisal of the project ; iii) strengthening of the Studies Unit of the CDRC ; iv) continuation of the activities connected with agrarian reform ; v) improvement and generalization of a suitable and inciting water billing system ; vii) the role that may be played by the Bank's private sector in the dynamic of downstream project activities, especially in the industrial development of milk.

b) Recommendations

1.11 It is recommended :

For the Borrower to :

- (i) be more involved in the preparation of the project so that its project development and management policy is sufficiently taken into account ; to this end, the beneficiaries participative approach method should be applied systematically in future projects ;
- (ii) strengthen CRDA's Studies Unit in personnel and management tools to ensure a better monitoring-evaluation and a thorough analysis of economic and financial results, draw pertinent lessons to improve the quality of future projects in the same sector ;
- (iii) pursue as rapidly as possible the consolidation policy, notably in the Tobias area , so as to increase the land intensification and occupation rate at the same levels as those projected in the appraisal report :
- (iv) continue with the programme for monitoring the water and soil salt content as well as that of the sheet and drainage waters ; these measures being aimed at reducing , as quickly as possible , the salinity in irrigation waters ;
- (v) pursue the plot equipment effort (in the field of GUI ,spraying and micro-irrigation), as well as the installation and the training of the AIC to make them more involved , and as quickly as possible , in maintenance works ;
- (vi) improve and generalize the effective application of the "water billing" programme on all the areas and apply the binominal tariff in PPI to increase the utilization rate :
- (vii) assess the downstream and upstream water count system (SOCADENORD) to improve the efficiency of waters and prevent its waste , so as to arrive at the recording of all the water supplied to the farmers ;
- (viii) encourage the change of AIC into Agricultural development Associations, with women's active participation ;
- (ix) strengthen and pursue incentive mechanisms for industrialists in order to promote milk processing with the objective of not discouraging upstream production .

For the Bank

It is recommended that the Bank :

- (i) appraise similar projects after the completion of detailed engineering designs with a view to achieving a better control of implementation costs ;
- (ii) increase the number of project monitoring and supervision missions . These missions should ensure that the project is implemented in accordance with the provisions made at the time the project was prepared ;
- (iii) assist the CRDA in training and putting in place AIC's management tools and monitoring-evaluation units ;
- (iv) involve further the private sector in the financing of activities relating to project induced impacts .

1.12 Follow-up Actions

The follow up actions concerning the above-mentioned recommendations are summarized in Annex 1 .

2. **BACKGROUND**

2.1 Country Economic Context

2.1.1 A landlocked country in the central part of Africa, the Central African Republic (CAR) covers an area of 623,000 sq.km, with a population estimated at 2.69 million. It is bordered on the North by Chad, Cameroon on the West, Sudan on the East and the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo on the South and South-West. The nearest ports being used presently for the transit of imported and exported merchandises are those of Douala (Cameroon) at 1400 km and Pointe Noire (Republic of Congo) at 1800 km. The landlocked nature of the country represents a severe economic handicap which hampers the competitiveness of exports and the high cost of imports. A further handicap not less constraining to development is the high dispersion of the population which sets a limit on the size of the internal market and makes the establishment and maintenance of basic infrastructure costly (roads, feeder roads, drinking water supply, energy, banking network, etc.).

2.1.2 In spite of vast natural resources, the Central African Republic is among the least developed countries of the world (LDC). In 1997, GDP per capita was estimated at approximately US\$ 280 which puts the CAR among the poorest countries in the world. The national economy, primarily based on agriculture which employs 80% of the population and provides nearly 50% of export revenues recorded a series of growing internal and external imbalances since the beginning of the 1980s. The debt burden represented 98% of GDP at the end of 1997 while external debt service accounted for 68% of GDP for the same period. Overall budget deficit (excluding grants) represented 6.6% of GDP in 1997, whereas internal arrears stood at CFAF 93 billion. To put an end to this deterioration of the economic situation, the Government introduced reform programmes that focussed on restoring fiscal balance. These programmes never yielded tangible and satisfactory results as the GDP registered a very low average growth rate of 0.4% per year. Given a population growth rate of around 2.2% per year, per capita GDP registered a marked decrease. As a result, new productive investments were significantly curtailed and the agricultural sector, the backbone of the economy, registered a marked deterioration over this period, leading to a severe economic and social crisis.

2.1.3 The 1990s were particularly marked by socio-political conflicts that practically paralyzed the State between 1990 and 1994. This was followed, in 1995 by a slowdown in economic activity and a weakening of public finance which led to an accumulation of arrears. In spite of the CFAF devaluation of 1994, that occurred concomitantly with a rise in basic commodity prices on the world market, the country's economic situation did not register a significant improvement owing to its crushing debt burden, both internal and external and its inability to sustain the balance of payments. The growth of GDP estimated at 7.3% in 1994, declined to a 3% level in 1995.

2.1.4 The social unrest that prevailed in mid-1996 delayed the conclusion of a medium-term economic policy programme supported by an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) scheduled for June 1996, covering the period 1996-1998. The immediate effect of these events was the 50% reduction in the productive

capacity of the modern sector, which is concentrated in the capital and the deterioration of the already precarious public finance, together with the social situation. To remedy this situation, the Government approved, from August 1996, an emergency programme aimed at restoring peace and stimulating economic recovery. The formation of a Government of national unity and the setting up of an Inter-African peace-keeping force (MISAB)] made it possible to appease the political climate and meet the conditions for negotiations, in 1998, of the medium-term economic programme, capable of inducing sustainable growth with the assistance of the Bretton-Woods institutions.

2.1.5 The various economic reform programmes of the 1990s succeeded in giving an impetus to the agricultural sector, whose contribution to GDP rose from 45% in 1994 to 51% in 1995. This increase which is also linked to a favorable trend in the world commodity prices was above all the result of export of cash crops (coffee, cotton) whose sales have significantly raised export receipts. On the institutional front, a marked improvement was registered in the development of these crops as a result of the restructuring of the coffee and cotton sub-sectors and the donors' contributions for the rehabilitation of feeder roads and the financing of inputs. As for the food crops, even though contributing more than 60% to the value-added of the agricultural sector, they are still carried out in a traditional empirical manner by the rural population with a long tradition of fruit picking in forest zone and of shifting cultivation in the Savannah area.

2.1.6 Food self-sufficiency is a major concern of the Government of CAR. Thus, in the early 1980s, the Government revised its agricultural policy with the view to incorporate the development of export crops in vast development programmes aimed at improving the standard of living of the population and reducing poverty. It is within this integrated approach that fit the rural development project in the MBaïki and Berberati coffee-growing regions, with the view, on the one hand to improve export receipts through coffee development and, on the other hand to fight against poverty through the improvement of access to basic social services and the reduction of the people's dependency on imported food.

2.2 History of Bank Group's Operations in the Agricultural Sector

Since 1972, the first year of its operation in CAR, the Bank Group has approved the financing of 23 operations for the country, including 18 projects, 3 studies and 2 structural adjustment programmes. The agricultural sector accounts for seven (7) operations, including five (5) projects, one (1) line of credit and one (1) study, the total of which amounts to UA 30.96 million. The line of credit was cancelled owing to low mobilization capacity and the study is on-going. Overall, the implementation performance of these operations is unsatisfactory, due to internal administrative bottlenecks and the re-emergence of sanctions. Table in Section G of the basic data gives a summary of the status of the Bank Group's operations in this sector.

2.3 Project Formulation

2.3.1 The process of project preparation, from design to appraisal was dealt with properly in the PCR (cfr. para. 2.1 ; 2.2 & 2.3). The design of the project was based on

the Government's agricultural policy aimed at an integrated rural development with the view to increasing agricultural production and farmers' income, achieving food self-sufficiency and reducing poverty. Initiated by the EDF in 1979 at the Government's request, the project which was meant to cover the three zones of the coffee region (East, Central and West), took into account only the Eastern region due to budgetary constraints at the time. Given the policy objective of a balanced regional development, the Government requested ADF assistance in 1982 with a view to continuing the EDF project activities in the other two regions (West and Center) whose main towns are Mbaiki and Berberati respectively. The preparation of the project was entrusted in 1982 to the FAO Investment Center within the framework of the ADF/FAO protocols and the appraisal was carried out in March 1983 by a Bank mission comprising an agronomist and an agro-economist.

2.3.2 The Bank appraisal mission, not comprised of an environmentalist nor a socio-economist did not make an exhaustive assessment of the environmental impact of the project, nor did it make reference to cross sectoral issues such as women participation in development and the participation of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, at the time of the project appraisal (1983), the Bank operational procedures did not incorporate the preparation of the matrix of activities. As a result of the lack of a matrix, the appraisal mission could not clearly bring out in its report the pertinent performance indicators and all the expected results, except those related to coffee, nor the risks and assumptions underlying the project implementation. The economic analysis during the appraisal as well as at project completion did not take into account the cost of mitigating the negative effects of the project on the environment and the project achievements, particularly with regard to agricultural productions. Overall, the quality of portfolio project at the pipeline stage had drawbacks in spite of its relevance to the country's agricultural policy and the Bank own policy aimed at food self sufficiency and poverty reduction.

2.3.3 The project, as conceived in the Bank appraisal report, did not take into account a number of concerns which today appear as shortcomings to be addressed for an optimal use of irrigated areas. These shortcomings can be summarized as follows : (i) the absence of a detailed feasibility study before the preparation of the appraisal report, which did not make it possible to identify the costs of social infrastructure; (ii) the absence of an environmental assessment study whose conclusions would have made it possible to recommend appropriate mechanisms for the exploitation of firewood resources, particularly those of the Mbaiki forest region; (iii) the absence of performance indicators for the social aspects and poverty reduction, (vi) the lack of involvement on the part of farmers in the design and programming of the project priorities; (v) the absence of mechanisms for the management and maintenance of the economic infrastructure by the beneficiaries. These shortcomings are currently the subject of a diagnostic study through the country's agricultural master plan study .

2.4 Project Rationale

2.4.1 The implementation of the project meets, therefore the Government concern for a balanced regional development through an integrated approach to actions

simultaneously aimed at the promotion of cash crops to improve export receipts, the increase in rural incomes, the development of social infrastructure and the professional organization of farmers. The project whose objective was the promotion of food and cash crop productions, faced several constraints, among which the major ones are: (i) inadequate logistical means for agricultural extension services, (ii) the weak propensity on the part of farmers to modernize their production systems due to the culture of fruit picking which compete with agriculture, (la cueillette qui concurrence l'agriculture) as a means of subsistence and a source of income, (iii) the lack of organization of the marketing for food products, (iv) the bad shape of the road infrastructure, and (v) the absence of a well organized and efficient system for research and agricultural credit.

2.4.2 The implementation of the project made it possible to lay the grounds for a rational structuring of the rural setting through the creation of associations and cooperatives for the marketing and processing of unshelled coffee, to introduce modern techniques for the regeneration of old plantations (régénération de vieilles plantations) and the use of selected high yield seeds. Unfortunately, financial difficulties and the inefficient credit system did not allow for the sustainability of these technological innovations.

2.5 Objectives and Scope at Appraisal (Logical Framework)

2.5.1 The project objective was to improve the standard of living of the rural population and contribute to the country's food self sufficiency thanks to actions for the agricultural and pastoral development . The project specific objective was to increase the agricultural production, export receipts and farmers' income through the modernization of agricultural production and credit systems and the professional organization of farmers.

2.5.2 The above objectives which are in conformity with the integrated development policy of the 1980s and tally with the CSP (1999/2001), are undeniably pertinent. Thus, they are capable of providing answers to macroeconomic issues, notably the trade deficits and of agricultural sector as well as the beneficiaries' expectations.

2.5.3 The expected results relate to food self sufficiency, rise in income as well as the improvement of access to basic social services which were meant to contribute to both the socio-economic development and poverty reduction. Performance indicators are provided in the retrospective matrix of the reconstituted logical framework (Annex 2).

2.6 Financing Arrangements (the Bank and others)

2.6.1 The lenders for the project were the ADF, the Fund for Price Stabilization and Subsidies for Agricultural Products (Caisse de stabilisation et de péréquation des prix des produits agricoles- CAISTAB) and the CAR Government. The ADF financing covered the entire foreign exchange costs of the project and 34% of the costs in local currency, or 96% of the total cost of the project. Thus, the ADF met its commitments on a regular basis in accordance with the relevant provisions of the loan agreement, while the Government contribution was irregular starting from 1991, year when the country's financial crisis reached its peak. As for CAISTAB, it was not able to meet its

commitments owing to its financial and liquidity problems. Its contribution to the project was implicitly covered by the ADF and the Government based on a sharing formula not well defined. The Table below shows the financing plan as per the project completion report:

Table 2.1
Financing Plan
(UA million)

Source	Appraisal			Actual		
	F.E.	L.C	Total	F.E.	L.C	Total
ADF	9.73	-	9.73	9.66	-	9.66
CAISTAB	-	0.80	0.80	-	-	-
Government	-	1.43	1.43	-	1.20	1.20
TOTAL	9.73	2.24	11.96	9.66	1.20	10.86

Source : The Bank Appraisal and Completion Reports.

2.7 Evaluation Methodology and Approach

2.7.1 The methodology used for in post evaluation consisted in comparing the results of the objectives and analyzing the trends up to the date of the retrospective evaluation with the view to assess the relevance of the project and its performance.

2.7.2 In the absence of a logical framework matrix, the post-evaluation mission had thus to reconstitute such a matrix on the basis of information contained in the appraisal report. This approach of the logical framework give a systematic view of the project makes it possible to assess the conditions of the project implementation, to identify each party's responsibility and to determine conditions to be fulfilled for an efficient implementation of the project.

3 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

3.1 Loan Effectiveness

The entry into force of the ADF loan became effective only one month following its signature. This particularly shorter time delay was attributed to the fact that all the conditions prior to the first disbursement were merely commitments without deadlines. Unfortunately, this rather simplistic approach did not facilitate the effective start of the project which encountered a delay of nearly nine month from the date scheduled at appraisal. Loan conditions (vi) and (vii), limited to the submission of procurement documents to the Bank would have been more relevant if they addressed a specific issue to be resolved.

3.2 Change in Project Scope

The scope of the project was modified well after its approval by the Bank and after the signature of the Loan Agreement. The absence of detailed engineering designs of the project at the time of appraisal led the appraisal team to underestimate the works completion timeframe, thus leading to the establishment of a less realistic implementation schedule. Thus, the key modifications, essentially of a financial and institutional nature concerned the re-adjustment of the operational budget and the 1989 transfer of the monitoring-evaluation services to ADECAF which was initially under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI). This transfer which requested several times by the various Bank missions, was not effected until the end of the project implementation, thus preventing ADECAF from providing an efficient job of gathering and analyzing data.

3.3 Implementation Schedule

The status of the project, including its bottlenecks was well analyzed in paragraphs 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 of the PCR. It is worth noting that the lack of realism in the preparation of the implementation schedule was the ground for programming errors characterized by a very high concentration of works during the first semester of 1984 and for omissions such as logistical supports and audiovisual materials. Overall, the implementation schedule suffered from a time delay of several years compared to the initial estimate and this was mainly attributed to : i) lack of mastery of procurement procedures and above all a laxisme on the part of local authorities in handling public procurement; ii) the Government inability to pay its contribution to the project on a regular basis ; iii) several interruptions in the ADF funding as a result of repetitive sanctions applied on the country; (iv) social unrest starting in 1990 that led to general lack of motivation of workers and repetitive strikes that were harmful to the economy.

3.4 Reporting

The PCR dealt with this section (cfr. §3.4) in a sufficient manner. It is worth noting that instead of reports on the progress of works whose preparation was one of the loan conditions, the Borrower merely submitted several reports of all sorts in spite of several reminders by the Bank. The inefficiency of the Project Follow-up/Evaluation Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, together with the late establishment of technical assistance were the main causes. The annual audits were never carried out by the Borrower, surely for the same reasons. Against this background, the Bank had an external audit undertaken in 1992 covering the period 1986-91, the results of which brought to light major weaknesses at the level of ADECAF which was characterized by a very tight centralization of expenditures, the absence of cost accounting and a plethoric and less efficient personnel. In contrast, the completion report prepared by the Executing Agency in 1990 was considered to be of high quality and it has been used as an important reference in the preparation of the Bank's own PCR.

3.5 Procurement of Goods and Services

The PCR (cfr. paragraphs 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3) gave a satisfactory description of the procedures for the procurement of goods and services. The Bank rules and procedures in this respect were generally followed, except in the case of agricultural inputs, improvement works for bridges, renovation works for health centers for which the modes of procurement were modified to take into account changes that took place in the local markets for equipment and/or to avoid delays which could be detrimental to the project. From the viewpoint of the Central African Authorities, the Bank current rules and procedures for the procurement of goods and services are complex and strenuous (submission of documents before and after the call for tender as well as delays in the transmission of correspondences and the often slow decision of the Bank), tend to disrupt the project implementation and to compromise its success. These officials think that the removal of some phases (such as time required for the publication of for local shopping) would speed up project implementation.

3.6 Project Costs

3.6.1 The project costs are analyzed in a satisfactory manner in the PCR (cfr. Section 3.6). It should simply be noted that the project was implemented within the limits of the initial provisions.

3.6.2 The increase in cost observed at for the component on « infrastructure improvement » is largely due to an over-estimation of the costs related to works. The amount of CFAF 707 million initially provided for could only cover equipment and operating expenses related to a unique brigade, whereas two brigades were to be installed for the two regions of the project. Similarly, the unit cost for a well rose from CFAF 300 000 (initial estimate) to CFAF 5000 000 at implementation. This overall increase by 15% in the cost of this component was compensated for through a size of the significant provisioning made for contingencies equivalent to nearly 30% of the total cost of the project. Detailed engineering designs would enable a better cost control of infrastructure works.

3.7 Disbursements and Sources of Finance

3.7.1 The analysis of disbursements by sources of finance was well presented in the PCR (from paras. 3.7.1 to 3.7.5). Disbursements which were initially scheduled to take place from 1984 to 1987 were effectively carried out from 1985 to 1994, or 9 years after the start of the project. This time lag in the expenditures schedule is attributed, on the one hand to the lack of knowledge of the Bank procedures (non compliance with the procedures for the procurement of goods and services), and to long periods of budget crises and sanctions followed by socio-political unrests, on the other. A thorough analysis of the direct risks and those related to exogenous factors will make it possible to take appropriate measures of a political and institutional nature likely to hamper the execution of the project.

3.7.2 The ADF contribution was disbursed on a regular basis in accordance with the expenditure schedule drawn at appraisal. The Government and the ADF had to

readjust their respective contribution to close the gap in the financing plan, owing to failure by the CAISTAB to meet its commitments. CAISTAB financial strength as a co-financier should have been the subject of a careful assessment at appraisal, which would have prevented this unfortunate situation. The table below give a breakdown of expenditures by sources of finance and by component.

Expenditure Schedule by Sources of Finance and by Component

(million CFAF)

Component	ADF		CAISTAB		GOV	
	Estimated	Actual	Estimated	Actual	Estimated	Actual
Production	754	639	69	-	-	90
Infrastructure	1415	1664	129	-	-	257
Support to Farmers	1042	1075	-	-	499	528
Strengthening Coops	376	291	102	-	-	19
Monitoring/Evaluation	27	32	-	-	32	40
Total	3614	3701	300	-	531	934

Source : Completion Report/Disbursement vouchers

3.8 Compliance with Loan Conditions and Covenants

All loan conditions and other arrangements required for loan effectiveness were fulfilled by the Borrower in a record time(one month following loan agreement signature whose ratification by the President of the Republic was immediate and not conditional). In the current procedural framework where loan agreements have to be ratified by the Parliament, long delays should be expected as is the case for loans and/or grants provided from bilateral sources.

4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

4.1 Operational Performance

4.1.1 Even though the loan became effective very rapidly, the project was launched with a nine (9) month delay and was implemented over a period of nine (9) years as against the initial four (4) years forecast at appraisal. The non compliance with the Bank procurement procedures, the irregularity in the payment of the Government contribution and the sanctions applied by the Bank together with the socio-political

unrests, were the major causes. These different factors, even though they did not have a significant impact on the overall project cost, did however seriously affect its implementation. Project monitoring at the national level was rather poor. The Executing Agency did not prepare any quarterly progress report even though this requirement was part of its undertakings; the monitoring/evaluation being under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture was never operational, hence the absence of reliable data needed to undertake mid-term analyses with a view to correcting possible project implementation errors. External audit reports were not submitted to the Bank even though they were to be submitted on an annual basis. This overall unsatisfactory situation reflects a degree of laxism and inexperience on the part of the Implementation Unit staff. The technical assistance which was to strengthen this staff and help it improve its performance, was only set up very late owing to administrative bottlenecks in the procurement of goods and services in general. The project monitoring system also needs to be improved because supervision missions, even though many, were practically never followed up with concrete actions. The recommendations of the supervision missions were almost never implemented in the field. The existence of a formal operational mechanism of a strict follow-up on the application of recommendations from supervision missions would have made it possible to apply appropriate corrective measures that would have saved the project from serious implementation delays.

4.1.2 Nevertheless, operating results can be considered as generally satisfactory, despite weaknesses on the part of the rural cooperatives (GIR). The project made possible the regeneration of 70% of old plantations thanks to pruning actions, and covering nearly 68% of the coffee-growing areas under pest control and to fume approximately 87% with agro-chemical fertilizers. As for the crop improvement (root cutting), the production has exceeded the objectives of 250% thanks to the installation in the project zone of four well equipped support stations. It is worth noting that in parallel to the production of vegetal material, multilocal experimentation works in rural setting made it possible to confirm or readjust some agronomical standards relating to organic and mineral fermenting; which implicitly reassured farmers and created an excitement for the growing of coffee. Nevertheless, average yields obtained during peak seasons thanks to ADECAF guidance, unfortunately reached only 50% of the targets set at 1.4 tons/ha at appraisal for plantations cut back and at 2 tons/ha for new plantations.

4.1.3 The project socio-economic infrastructure (buildings, housings, offices, feeder roads, wells, etc.), were built in accordance with the programme forecast and the state of the art. However, the current status of most of them, in particular wells, feeder roads and roads, leaves a lot to be desired. Since the end of the disbursement in connection with the « Infrastructure » component (1988), feeder road and road maintenance works have come to a halt and some of the roads are being invaded by wide vegetations, while other roads are seriously eroded by runoff water. In most of the villages we visited, virtually all the installed wells no longer functioned, either as result of pump failure or because abandoned due to the bad quality of water which no longer conformed to the organoleptic requirements of the population. Health centers built under the project are in active operation and make it possible to provide medical treatment to the population against major ailments, notably malaria and parasite-related intestinal diseases. However, the evaluation of patients is a key problem of these centers which are

not in a position to repair the unique ambulance at their disposal, and/or are just simply lacking any means of transport.

4.1.4 In the end, the project encountered severe problems related to its structural inability to ensure an efficient implementation of its activities. The credit system that was put in place with the view to stimulate agricultural production through the promotion of GIRs turned out to be somewhat inefficient, viz. The repayment rate in the best of cases turns around 50% on average. Very late payments by ADECAF for productions were, in the farmers' view the primary cause of this GIR inefficiency. The latter also failed in their responsibility to provide maintenance of social infrastructure (feeder roads, roads, wells). These institutions lack creativity and are slowly fading away (meurent à petit feu) because they were used to receiving everything from the State of which they are offsprings. In spite of sensitization actions and information campaigns directed at women and young people, the number of groupings has been low and non existent in some of the localities. Difficulties linked to land appropriation by these two categories of the population accounts for the lack of interest in forming cooperative groupings or associations.

4.2 Financial Performance

4.2.1 The evaluation of the project financial performance was treated very well in Section 6.1 of the PCR. The analysis of accounting documents of cooperatives still in operation such as the one at Boda (Mbaïki region) and discussions held with some farmers led to the confirmation that the financial situation of the beneficiaries has markedly deteriorated. On the basis of data collected from these GIRs, confirmed by data from ORCCPA, the producer price tumbled, declining from CFAF 190/kg to 110 before reaching a low of CFAF 40/kg and even lower, as a result of the deterioration in the world coffee prices which continues to these days (average export prices: US\$ 181.92 /kg in 1996 ; US\$ 177.54 /kg in 1997 ; US\$ 184.65 /kg in 1998) and the structure et of producer price which is always set at the farmer's disadvantage. The forecasts of an increase in farmers' income estimated between 20 and 43% for the Mbaïki region and between 74 and 177% in Haute Saha are, therefore far from the realities when considering that the prices of between CFAF 80/kg to CFAF 110/kg for unshelled coffee prevailing these past years are well below the floor price estimated at CFAF 140/kg considered to be a discouraging price.

4.2.2 Since the dismantling of the ADECAF in 1993 and the closure of some cooperatives for reasons of inefficiency, the classical marketing channels are no longer followed by the farmers who have to sell their produce directly to the various and unfortunately dubious traders, who roam around in the coffee-growing regions. It becomes, therefore hard and even impossible to gather data on productions and prices needed for reliable projections and a judicious analysis of the farmer's current income. Furthermore, it has been impossible to do a reconciliation with the "without the project" situation and make a fair assessment of the situation of farmers' incomes resulting from the project. Two main reasons account for this: the appraisal report did not define a typology of farms in the regions concerned, and the absence of data on productions due to the lack of a monitoring-evaluation system..

4.3 Economic Performance

4.3.1 The PCR, in its Section 6.2, covered the economic aspects of the project and brought out key factors that hampered the project economic performance, namely :(i) the overestimation of yields and coffee and food productions under the project; (ii) revenues for the first years of the project that were largely negative, contrary to forecast; (iii) the additional productions of food crops that were virtually null; (iv) drastic fall in producer prices leading farmers to abandon plantations, etc. The post evaluation approves this analysis as well as the assumptions used to compute the rate of return which stands at 0.22%. This rate could have been much lower and even negative if account is made of abatement costs for the negative impacts of the project on the environment, reflecting the failure of the project whose main justifications, namely the improvement of export receipts, the increase in farmers incomes, the contribution to food self-sufficiency, were never reached.

4.3.2 The situation of crops yields as well as that of farmers' cooperatives (GIR) deteriorated so much that, not only the rate of abandoning cash crops was rising, but also there was a generalized impoverishment of the rural populations, leading to a disquieting return to a subsistence farming. This was due mainly to the absence of credit and subsidies for agricultural inputs and the persistent disorganization of the marketing for agricultural products. Export volumes which had reached the level of 15 tons on average during the 1980s, dropped to 8 tons on average over the years 1990 to 1994 and remained constant until 1997/98. In the same way, the world price which in the 1980s stood at 5 US\$/kg, did not register any improvement during the 1990s as it varied between 1.2 and 1.6 US\$/kg over the period 1995 to 1999.

4.3.3 In the light of the generalized deterioration of economic factors, particularly worsened these last years due to socio-political unrests, it was considered useless to undertake the computation of a new economic rate of return, which by all account can only be negative. Overall, the economic performance was quite unsatisfactory.

4.4 Institutional and Social Performance

Organization and Management

4.4.1 The organization of the project centers essentially around the ADECAF as can be seen in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the PCR. It should be recalled that the ADECAF has been an institution that was intended as multi-purpose without providing it with adequate and functional structures and the necessary means for it to efficiently carry out its multiple tasks, notably the promotion and development of the coffee crop farming, the improvement of food crops, the establishment of pre-cooperative and cooperative groupings, the improvement of road and social infrastructure and agricultural credit, etc. In spite of its being restructured in 1987, thus leading to its decentralization into regional autonomous structures, the ADECAF has shown serious shortcomings in its operations due to its limited technical and management capacities and its wrong approach to the rural world.

4.4.2 The ADECAF personnel was particularly dense and even overstaffed at the technical management level. Despite the 1990 restructuring which led to the departure of more than half of the personnel, management personnel cost still remains relatively high (1 extension officer per 150 inhab). The technical staff even though in limited number in relation to the volume of tasks, were able to initiate major actions, whose results, from the standpoint of accomplishments, were quite satisfactory. However, they could have given a higher performance had they moved away from the idea of focussing on one sub-sector farming connected with their basic training in favour of a more systematic approach in view of the multi-purpose character of the various existing production systems. Another shortcoming of technical staff worth pointing out is that the majority of them, except for the director, were not given external training on issues related to project management or retraining sessions that would enable them to enhance their skills.

4.4.3 The technical assistance that was to strengthen the institutional capacity of the project was not put in place until late in 1995. If it has succeeded, from the technical viewpoint of plantation development, in improving the competence of the extension technicians through on-the-field training, it has in contrast provided a poor or even negative performance from the human relations standpoint. The recurrent conflicts between the technical assistance staff and the local staff of the project contributed somewhat in bringing the project to a standstill. Several experts have been fired by the management for serious misconducts.

4.4.4 The project has helped in the structuring the rural populations through the creation of some 462 GIRs with a total of 9 000 members, and the strengthening of four cooperatives (State-owned) by providing them with sufficient equipment and organizing sensitization and training sessions on a regular basis. These institutions that were meant to play an important role in the dissemination of technical themes, the distribution of inputs via a credit system and the picking of agricultural produce have, for the most disappeared for lack of means and real motivation; those are still in operation are reduced to simple mutual assistance activities.

4.4.5 In actual fact, GIRs, which were active and dynamic before have been limited to informal mutual assistance activities, without being able to ensure their financial autonomy and take initiatives in the areas of organization and bearing maintenance as well as operating costs of their farms and of the socio-economic infrastructure. Most of the activities initiated with the view to inducing development failed. This is the case for instance with self-managed markets, autonomous production of selected vegetal materials (as farmers have never been involved in this process) and for the system of credit recuperation which have been abandoned due to shortcomings of ADECAF services. At the level of the CAISTAB, this institutional weakness is reflected in its failure to organize efficiently the marketing of agricultural products; this led to the taking over by ORCCPA, responsible for, inter alia, the price stabilization as well as the control of the quality of coffee. This new institution in full development needs to be strengthened in order to give Central African coffee an international quality label. It needs, among other things, a computerization plan for its internal management in

accordance with the requisite rules of rigour and efficiency and to improve its efficiency in the field of satellite communication.

4.4.6 The project monitoring-evaluation is a important management instrument which was entrusted to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MINAGRI) which has never had the time to get involved in the life of the project, despite logistical and material means put at the disposal of a Unit set up to this end within the Ministry. In the light of this obvious inefficiency, the country's authorities proceeded, in 1989, to transfer the monitoring/evaluation unit of the MINIAGRI to the ADECAF. However, since this unit's operational budget had been exhausted and the logistic means practically non-existent, there were never real monitoring for the collection of reliable data and analysis until the end of the project completion. It is therefore obvious that in the absence of reliable socio-economic parameters, it is not possible to assess the effects and impact of the project.

Support Structures

4.4.7 The formal agricultural research, through specialized structures, came to a halt with the agrarian reform of 1977. The Central African Institute of Agronomic Research (ICRA) which was the main regional research structure geared to the promotion of great tropical cash crops (coffee, cocoa, palm oil, etc.) ceased its activities since this date with the departure of French technical assistants. In practice, each agricultural development project carries out its own programme for vegetal improvement in line with a model protocol. This led to different approaches at the national level for the same cash crop and a waste of resource. Within the project framework, agricultural research activities without which the production of efficient vegetal materials can not be done, were also the work of ADECAF which carried out cloning tests which were satisfactory in terms of quality and volume.

4.4.8 Since the dismantling of the ADECAF, the production of selected seeds has come to a complete halt and farmers are obliged to use plants from all sources with yields difficult to control. With regard to food crops, it is worth to note that no research has really been carried out due to lack of trained human resources in the field and the necessary means. This led, for the project, to the inability to supply quality seeds to farmers; giving room for low and less encouraging yields for intensive farming. From all accounts, the absence of a structured research system has been a heavy handicap for the improvement and increase in agricultural production.

4.4.9 With regard to the credit system, the situation not been too good either, since the rate of arrears reached 50%. This unsatisfactory result shows both the inefficiency of ADECAF credit system and the inconsistency between ADECAF vocation to organize the rural population and extend technical innovations, and the credit function which requires specific motivations in a specialized and well structured environment. Short of structures meeting these requirements, such as banks, it would have been advisable to rely on NGOs for a more efficiency allocation of credit.

4.5 Impact on Women

4.5.1 The living conditions of women registered a marked improvement as a result of intensive farming of potatoes, the participation of some of them in the GIRs for collecting and marketing their produce. They benefitted from the same credit and technical support than men. Unfortunately, difficulties in having access to land ownership have limited and still limit significantly their propensity to intensive farming. The hydraulic component (wells and drinking water supply) and health infrastructure (health centers), installed within the rural communities, have for long greatly contributed to alleviating women daily life hardships and to facilitating their access to quality health care. The availability of drinking water seems to have significantly reduced the incidence of water related diseases(s maladies hydriques) on the most disadvantaged groups, namely children. It is regrettable, however to notice that for the hydraulic component, the bulk of the equipment is in a non operating state owing to lack of repair and maintenance.

4.5.2 In the Lobaye region (Mbaïki), for instance, labor is provided mainly by women as male workers are rather attracted to mining activities (gold, diamonds). The project contributed to the creation of approximately 3.000 temporary jobs in the field of coffee harvesting, entirely occupied by female workers.

4.6 Environmental Performance

4.6.1 The environmental impact assessment carried out at the end of project implementation in view of the financing for the second phase of the project concluded that the impact of the project (des réalisations du projet) was minimal. Nevertheless, during a site visit, soil erosion phenomena were observed on some trunk and feeder roads. Even more serious is the profound degradation of forests, owing both to an uncontrolled forest logging and probably to the intensive deforestation in favor of new coffee plantations (nearly 1800 ha), which has caused a serious shifts in the biological diversity. The dense forest between the towns of Mbaïki and Boda (nearly 80 km), has given way to a sort of wooded savannah, with some scattered growing tree species that can be developed. Based on testimonies from farmers and administrative officials in this area, it can be noted that in less than fifteen years, the fauna once flourishing and varied has sharply regressed, at the same time as a population of pygmies has disappeared. The absence of strategic policies in the field of forestry development clearly defining the conditions for forestry development and the responsibilities of the populations concerned proved to be a serious handicap in the control, rational management of natural forest resources and the preservation of the bio-diversity.

4.6.2 At the level of health centers, the various solid wastes, in particular used syringes and gloves, as well as liquid wastes are not burned but simply thrown away, thus polluting the environment and exposing the population to a risk of contamination through the use of expired instruments and medication A cement tank would have been sufficient to for the incineration of solid wastes; in the same way a septic tank would have prevented the spread of liquid wastes. These simple measures would have provided safe hygienic conditions around the health centers.

4.6.3 With regard to children, it should be mentioned that the project did not incorporate any scheme to ensure their integration into the development process. The project did not either provide for education development scheme; schools in the project areas lack learning equipment and materials. School buildings are in a dilapidated state and in insufficient number compared to local requirements. The difficulties in land acquisition and the fall in the prices of agricultural commodities push youngsters to opt for rural exodus or to shift to mining activities (digging for diamonds and gold) that are more lucrative in the Mbaiki region.

4.7 Performance of Consultants, Contractors, Suppliers, the Borrower and the Executing Agency

Consultants

4.7.1 According to the PCR, technical assistance provided to the project by the firms Africa Asien Bureau and AGRER, has completely missed its mission objective. The choice of this firm of consultants, which was controversial and the inability of its personnel to adapt to ADECAF's administrative requirements seem to have been the cause for the inefficiency of technical assistance.

Contractors and Suppliers

4.7.2 Except for the building sub-component where the contractors performed badly, contractors and suppliers generally performed their tasks in a satisfactory manner, in accordance with the terms of the signed contracts and the works were executed correctly in line with the state of the art. The low implementation rate for feeder roads (28%) is especially attributed to an under estimation of the extent of the works which proved to be heavier than forecast and the omission at appraisal of the operating costs for mechanized brigades.

Performance of the Borrower and the Executing Agency

4.7.3 In spite of the loan effectiveness and ratification of the related agreement within record time-frame, the performance of the Borrower is considered unsatisfactory, on the overall. The approval and transmission of activities reports by the Borrower to the Bank were marred by several delays and the disbursements on the counterpart financing of the project was irregular. Similarly, the Bank rules of procedures for the procurement of goods and services were not always complied with. The inability of the Borrower to honor its commitments to the Bank (settlement of arrears) was highly detrimental to the project whose implementation has been delayed for several years as a result of sanctions.

4.7.4 The performance of the Executing Agency(ADECADF) was overall satisfactory, even though the Bank's procurement procedures were not strictly complied with, thus leading to delays in the start-up of some contracts. Its particularly heavy

management led to administrative delays which hindered the smooth implementation of the project by making the supervision of activities difficult and inefficient. A light organizational structure strengthening support institutions specialized in development support would have been beneficial to the project.

4.8 Bank Performance

The PCR has quite well demonstrated in its Section 7.2 that the Bank performance in the project design and monitoring was mixed, despite a high frequency of technical supervision missions. It carried out two technical supervision missions on average per year between 1985 and 1990, which is considered satisfactory. Nevertheless, the composition of these missions was never adequate. Furthermore, these missions which needed to be rather multi-disciplinary, given the multisector nature of the project, were composed only with one expert each time, thus not enabling the Bank to capture all the major aspects of the project. This in fact was the case with the infrastructure sub-component for which the lack of expertise in the field during these missions did not make it possible to introduce the appropriate re-adjustments. The same applies to financial aspects : the absence of a financial analyst did not either make it possible to resolve the problems related to disbursements and procurement. Furthermore, there was no continuity in the follow-up (responsible project officers were constantly changed) and the follow-up on the recommendations of supervision missions was also a major bottleneck for the project implementation to the extent that they were hardly followed up with the required or expected Bank actions.

5. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY

5.1 The institutional gap resulting from the dismantling of the ADECAF in 1989 dealt a heavy blow to the project sustainability. All the structures required for the project success and sustainability with regard to the increase in agricultural production stopped working. The distribution of inputs and selected plant implements was no longer ensured, thus leading to the fall in yields and pushing some farmers to abandon intensive farming in favor of subsistence farming destined rather for own consumption. The marketing of agricultural and livestock production which remains less organized and the elimination of input subsidies at a time when agriculture lacks any other support, were factors that further greatly contributed to this result. The socio-economic infrastructure (feeder roads, drinking water places, health centers, etc.) whose maintenance was provided by ADECAF, were abandoned in a advanced state of ruins, requiring colossal means to make them operational.

5.2 In order for the various rural development actions (technical extension services, professional organization of farmers, agricultural credit, etc) to be reactivated and made sustainable, it will call for, among other requirements, a firm commitment on the part of Government Authorities to carry out institutional and land reforms, a stable

political and financial environment making it possible to efficiently provide a cover for recurrent charges on productive investments to be carried out particularly within the framework of a fight against poverty. A structure such as ADECAF should have been made to focus on actions intended to guide and sensitize farmers, thus leaving technical functions to specialized structures such as ICRA for agricultural research, the production of selected seeds, the Caisse mutuelle de crédit agricole (CMCA) for agricultural credit, and ORCCPA for the marketing of cash crops.

5.3 Despite the institutional vacuum and the economic weaknesses and the general deterioration of the production and marketing systems, there are quite considerable benefits that should be mentioned. Coffee farmers associations (GIR) continue to play an important role in the rural dynamic by coordinating village self-help actions, in the absence of adequate means and organization actually oriented toward full professionalism of members.

5.4 From the environmental viewpoint, there is no monitoring of the quality of drinking water and of the system of controlling the residual effects of chemical fertilisers and pest control products on the life of farmers. Similarly, the absence of an efficient system of forest and hunting exploitation leads to accelerated degradation of natural resources and biodiversity, reduction of soil fertility; this hinders the farmers work productivity and suitable measures are taken to guarantee the expected agricultural yields.

6 PERFORMANCE RATINGS

6.1 Tables in Annex 3 show details of implementation performance (IP1), Bank performance (BP 1) and project outcomes (PO 1). Overall, it emerges that the project's performance is unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, certain aspects connected with existing self-help associations and cooperatives are a not inconsiderable asset for the resumption of responsible and participative development in rural areas.

7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Overall Assessment

7.1.1 Although the project was relevant owing to the consistency of its objectives with national agricultural policies and strategies, it faced serious conceptual and institutional problems which hindered its success and sustainability. Its overall performance was considered unsatisfactory.

7.1.2 Despite the record time of loan effectiveness and the average implementation rate of the major components estimated at 74% (cf. PCR para. 8.1), the monitoring of project activities strongly fell short of expectations due to the absence of an efficient structure for that purpose. Operating results were encouraging on the whole (cf. Para. 4.1.2). However, the average yields of coffee plantations hardly reached 50% of the objectives and those of food crops have never exceeded the traditional level obtained owing to lack of appropriate inputs and selected seeds.

7.1.3 From the institutional viewpoint, the establishment of a large number of GIR was one of the beneficial actions of the project . Most of these institutions which had a significant role to play in the allocation of inputs and credit and in general mobilization of farmers are, unfortunately no longer in existence . Never having been truly involved on the running of socio-economic infrastructures or in the selected seeds production system, they were not in a position to take over the state structures after the breaking up of ADECAF.

7.2 Feedback and Recommendations

7.2.1 Lessons

The main lessons to be learnt from the PCR are : the need to make an accurate estimation of outputs at appraisal, ii) the importance of involving the population in bearing part of the costs of the realization and operation of socio-economic infrastructures, iii) the necessity of setting up a monitoring-evaluation unit within the project itself, iv) the risk of failure on the part of the executing agency which has to play both the role of supervision as well as that of recovery agent, v) the importance of proper supervision to ensure the project's success. In addition to these lessons, the following lessons can be drawn from project evaluation

- i) The quality of the project's preparation is linked, inter alia, to the degree of involvement of the borrower and of the beneficiaries in project design process (cf. paragraph 2.3.2);
- ii) The rural development project is so complex that it is necessary to make light the implementation structure whose role shall be limited to general coordination of the project, and to make the specialized support services responsible for specific tasks, notably credit, agricultural research, development and rehabilitation of infrastructures, etc. (cf. paragraphs 4.4.1 and 4.7.4);
- iii) Strengthening ICRA's services would enable the resumption of agricultural research and provide a sustainable basis for efficient plant equipment to ensure agricultural production. (cf. paragraph 4.4.7);
- iv) Actual involvement of GIR in the conception and formulation of project priorities makes it easier to for farmers to take charge of recurrent costs of basic socio-economic infrastructures during the project's operating phase (cf. paragraph 4.4.5);
- v) The introduction of an adequate land policy and facilities for land appropriation in rural areas facilitates the integration of women and youth in the agricultural development process (cf. paragraphs 4.5.1 and 4.6.3);

- vi) The stability of the executing agency and of its personnel is a guarantee of the project's success and sustainability ; (cf. paragraph 4.7.4);
- vii) The improvement of marketing channels is an inciting factor for increase in production ; (cf. paragraph 4.4.5);
- viii) Improvement of the quality of ORCCPA's services is an advantage and ensure the quality of the Central African coffee on the world market (cf. paragraph 4.4.5);
- ix) Lack of strategic natural resources management guidelines is a serious handicap to the protection and conservation of biodiversity (cf. paragraph 4.6.1).

7.2.2 Recommendations

For the Borrower

It is recommended to :

- (i) Agree to systematically apply the participative method to all the stages of project preparation in order to make the beneficiaries accountable ;
- (ii) Strengthen the capacity of farmers groups and associations (GIR) both in the management of their farms as well as in bearing the recurrent costs of certain project infrastructures and equipment;
- (iii) Set up a relatively light and stable implementation structure to focus on the areas concerning farmers sensitization, coordination and encouragement of local initiative in rural areas by relying on services specialized in rural development;
- (iv) Strengthen ICRA's services in personnel, equipment and logistic means to effectively ensure applied research work and provision of selected plant equipment ;
- (v) Increase the farmers' storage capacity and marketing channels to guarantee the sale of agricultural products in rural areas;
- (vi) Strengthen and improve the quality of ORCCPA's services to guarantee the lable of the Central African coffee on international market;
- (vii) Develop specific strategic strategies for sustainable natural resources management to ensure the protection and preservation of biodiversity.

For the Bank

It is recommended to :

- (i) appraise similar projects after the socio-economic and environmental impact studies have been carried out , so as to acquire a better knowledge of the milieu ;
- (ii) support the Government's efforts to implement agricultural rehabilitation programmes within the framework of the agricultural master plan which is being finalized with financing from the Bank's technical assistance fund ;
- (viii) envisage the organization of a seminar on loan administration to enhance local skills in the procurement of goods and services and in project management.

7.2.3 Follow-up Action

In order to boost agricultural production on objective and realistic bases to derive maximum benefits from the social and economic viewpoints and to guarantee the sustainability of achievements, the Bank and the Borrower must agree to implement the above recommendations especially the major ones. The main follow-up actions for these recommendations are summarized in a matrix in Annex 1.

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PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT PERFORMANCE RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP ACTION
MATRIX

MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS	FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS	RESPONSIBILITY
<p><u>1 Project formulation</u></p> <p>1.1 The project's formulation did not take into account social and environmental aspects and the risks were not thoroughly analysed.</p> <p>1.2 The fact that beneficiaries were not involved in the formulation of project priorities did not make it possible to determine their real concerns to give them more incentive.</p>	<p>1.1.1 Require socio-economic and environmental impact studies prior to envisaging projects appraisal.</p> <p>1.2.1 Involve beneficiaries in project identification and formulation phases.</p>	<p>1.1.2 Establish a checklist of required documents before sending appraisal missions on site.</p> <p>1.2.2 Adopt the participative approach from the project's formulation to its implementation.</p>	<p>1.1.3 ADB (OCDC)</p> <p>1.2.3 Govt. ADB (OCDC)</p>
<p><u>2- Project implementation</u></p> <p>Regular monitoring and control of project activities were inadequate due to the inefficiency of the monitoring-evaluation unit established outside the organisational structure of the project.</p>	<p>2.1.1 Establish within the project itself a monitoring-evaluation unit to regularly collect project data and make relevant recommendations so as to remedy the project's weaknesses.</p>	<p>2.1.2 Disseminate regularly the findings of monitoring-evaluation to the Bank as well as to project beneficiaries.</p>	<p>2.1.3 Govt.</p>
<p><u>3- Institutional Development</u></p> <p>3.1 The relative inefficiency in the provision of credit to farmers was partly a result of ADECAF's inability to ensure the management of in accordance with the requisite norms.</p> <p>3.2 The inefficiency of GIR lies in incurring the project's recurrent costs.</p>	<p>3.1.1 Entrust credit management to institutions that specialise in that field</p> <p>3.2.1 Envisage the revival of GIR and other village associations by means of a coherent programme of sensitisation, training and supervision based on accountability and the spirit of initiative.</p>	<p>3.1.2 Integrate the CMCA in the planning of all agricultural credit programmes.</p> <p>3.2.2 Associate all other village associations in taking charge of activities concerning production of selected seeds and maintenance of basic infrastructure.</p> <p>3.4.2 Build GIR's capacity to enable them to take</p>	<p>3.1.3 Govt.</p> <p>3.2.3 Govt.</p>

<p>3.4. Poor organisation of marketing led to the discouragement of farmers who do not derive substantial income from their coffee yields.</p>	<p>3.4.1 Increase the marketing channels of farm produce in general and of coffee in particular to ensure calm crop season for producers.</p>	<p>charge of marketing their own farm produce.</p>	<p>3.4.3 Govt.</p>
<p>4- Socio-economic Impact 4.1 An increase in land intensification and occupation rate requires an active re-allocation policy. 4.2 Efficient health and road and earth road maintenance services as well as access to drinking water affect the living conditions of farmers.</p>	<p>4.1.1 Generalise the regrouping of land in developed areas. 4.2.1 Improve health services and access to drinking water in rural areas to guarantee optimum development conditions.</p>	<p>4.1.2 Pursue the agrarian reform policy to promote the access of women and youth to land. 4.2.2 For any rural development project, prepare a rehabilitation programme for the roads and feeder roads network, wells and health centres.</p>	<p>4.1.3 Govt. 4.2.3 Govt</p>
<p>5- Project sustainability 5.1 The untimely break up of the project executing agency (ADECAF) was detrimental to the project's operating phase. 5.2 The sluggishness of ADECAF was one of the causes of its inefficiency in project management. 5.3 The external trade system of Central African coffee needs to be reinforced.</p>	<p>5.1.1 Ensure the stability of the implementation unit for a rational transition to efficient take over of the project by beneficiaries. 5.2.1 The complex nature of rural development projects requires a light implementation structure that relies on the relevant government services, the private sector, NGOs and motivated farmers associations. 5.3.1 strengthen RCCP's capacity for the control and packaging of coffee and establish an information and feedback mechanism with a view to developing a quality label for Central African coffee.</p>	<p>5.1.2 For all projects, prepare an institution building plan of the executing agency in case of default. 5.2.2 Build the implementation unit on the basis of a participative approach involving the various relevant government services, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries. 5.3.2 Prepare a plan for strengthening the human, technical and managerial capacities of ORCCPA for better development of Central African Coffee on the international market.</p>	<p>Govt. 5.2.3 Govt. 5.3.3 Govt.</p>

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RETROSPECTIVE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS		MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS/ RISKS
	AT APPRAISAL	AT EVALUATION		
1. Sectoral Objectives (formulated on completion). Improve the welfare of the population.	Increase if farmer's incomes: 20 to 177% for co-operatives; income increased five times for new coffee plantations.	Average fall in income of over 80% for all farmers.	-Five-year Plans. - ORCCPA's Report -PCR	
2. Project Objectives Increase agricultural production, export revenues and the farmer's income by modernising farms, professional training in farming, credit etc.	2.1 Additional production : - Coffee: 6638 t. - cassava : 6735 t - maize : 787 t - rice : 810 t - ground-nut : 962 t - potatoes : 170 t.	2.1 Additional Production : - Coffee: 2500 t. - cassava : 2600 t - maize : 250 t - rice : 320 t - peanut : 300 t - potatoes : 0 t.	-Appraisal report. -National statistics. - PCR	New techniques well understood.
3. Outcomes The project will make it possible to : 1. Rehabilitate old coffee plantations; 2. Extend new coffee plantations; 3. Improve social and road infrastructures,	1. Regenerated area : 8694 ha Yield (t/ha) : 1400 2. New plantations: 834 ha. Yield (t/ha) : 2000 3. Earth roads rehabilitated :1700 km - No. of structures overhauled s : 279 - No. of Health centres renovated : 17 - No. of wells constructed : 40 - No. springs developed : 70 - No. buildings : 13	1. 4 irrigation schemes : Yield (t/ha) : 600 2. New plantations: 200 ha. Yield (t/ha) : 800 3. Rehabilitated earth roads : 474 km - No. of structures overhauled : 112 - No. Health centres renovated : 14 - No. of wells constructed: 40 - No. of springs developed: 9 - No. of buildings : 16	CRDA's monthly report; ADECAF's annual reports - Appraisal Report - PCR	1. Works were carried out properly 2. The quality of soils and water controlled 3. No marketing problems 4. Farmers approve farming techniques;

4.Intensive subsistence farming of food crops.	4. Provision of 590 t. of fertilisers. Supply of cuttings: 1167600	4. Supply of 590 t. of fertilisers. Supply of cuttings : 1113000		5. Detailed studies were properly carried out.
4. <u>Activities</u> A. Development of agricultural production B. Improvement of infrastructures C. Strengthening support services D. Strengthening co-operatives E. Monitoring -evaluation Total	(IN CFAF MILLION) <u>ADF</u> <u>CAISTAB</u> <u>GVT</u> 754 69 - 1415 129 - 1042 - 499 376 102 27 32 3614 300 531	(IN CFAF MILLION) <u>ADF</u> <u>CAISTAB</u> <u>GVT</u> 639 0.00 90 1664 0.00 257 1075 0.00 528 291 0.00 19 32 0.00 40 3701 0.00 934	Project status report (ADECAP) « Summary ledger » of the Bank	The government's counterpart funds were irregular

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IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE

INDICATORS	RATING (1 to 4)	REMARKS
1. Adherence to Time Schedule	1	The implementation Schedule was not adhered to owing to non-compliance with Bank procedures, administrative delays, and socio-political crisis.
2. Adherence to Cost Schedule	3	There were no cost overruns.
3. Compliance with Loan Conditions	4	All the conditions were fulfilled and the entry into force of the Bank loan was effected in record time with the exception of that relating to land reform.
4. Adequacy of monitoring-evaluation and quarterly progress reports	1	Overall, the works were well carried out. However, periodic implementation monitoring well not regularly sent to the Bank. The few reports received by the Bank do not appear to follow the standard format.
Overall Assessment of implementation Performance	2.25	Satisfactory. However, non-compliance with Bank procedures had a negative impact on implementation performances.

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RAPPORT D'AUDIT DE PERFORMANCE DE PROJET

BANK PERFORMANCE

INDICATORS	RATING (1 to 4)	REMARKS
1. At Identification	N/A	The Bank did not take part in the project's identification.
2. At Preparation	2	Various sociological, environmental constraints were not taken into account at preparation and project risks were not analysed and taken into account in describing activities. There is still no clear cause/effect link between the objectives and the expected outputs. Serious institutional problems arose during the project's operation.
3. At Appraisal	2	The project's appraisal team determined irrigation problems to be resolved within the framework of CAR's sectoral policy. The objectives and the type of works were improved since the planning and the project's implementation schedule proved inadequate; in fact, detailed designs were not ready; co-ordination was not ensured by donors with respect to the approval of the KFW loan and the commencement of works; the beginning of earth roads works. The project's appraisal team determined the constraints; the period of the commencement of works. u
4. At Supervision	3	The number of supervision missions proved to be inadequate given project's implementation duration (a total of 3). Nevertheless, these missions made it possible to solve the problems encountered when they took place.
Overall Assessment of Implementation Performance	2.5	Satisfactory

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PROJECT OUTCOME

N°	Indicators	Rating (1 to 4)	Remarks
1	Relevance and Achievement of Objectives	1.71	Unsatisfactory
i)	Macro-economic Policy	3	The project falls within the scope of the macro-economic framework aimed at improving the welfare of the people
ii)	Sector Policy	3	The project's implementation is in line with the sectoral policy, which hinges on food self-sufficiency and regional balance on the one hand, and on the Bank's agricultural policy papers of the other.
iii)	Physical Achievements(including production)	2	The project was fully implemented in accordance with the engineering studies. The production objectives were achieved with respect to physical infrastructures; however, in the agricultural area, the situation is rather mitigated, especially concerning food crops where there is lack of innovations.
iv)	Financial Performance	1	The project's financial performances were catastrophic owing to the fall in agricultural outputs and in world prices.
v)	Poverty Reduction , social aspects and women in development	1	Prospects for poverty reduction are far from encouraging. The social aspects and the integration of women were not subject of any particular promotion effort. The measures envisaged within the scope of the agricultural sector master plan should improve the condition of women and the situation of poverty in general in future , if the socio-economic environment does not worsen.
vi)	Environment	1	The project did not well grasp the aspects connected with the environment, especially with regard to the protection of natural resources and biodiversity.
vii)	Private Sector Development	1	The role of the private sector is insignificant in the collecting and processing of farm produce. Efforts must be pursued to establish local small and medium -scale enterprises in the areas of maintenance , processing , and services.
2.	Institutional Development	1.5	Unsatisfactory
i)	Institutional Framework including restructuring	2	ADECAF enabled the full implementation of the project and the first results were somewhat encouraging. Unfortunately , its break up put an end to any hope of increasing the output
ii)	Financial and Management Systems including Audit Systems	1	The major weakness of ADECAF's management system stems from lack of computerisation and a monitoring-evaluation instrument.
iii)	Transfer of Technology	2	GIR's have master plantation maintenance techniques (dégourmandage and cutting back). Unfortunately, they were not involved in the preparation and in the care of nurseries. Concerning food crops, no particular intensive farming technology was introduced by the project.
iv)	Staffing by qualified persons (including training , turnover and counterpart)	1	ADECAF is overstaffed and the majority of personnel did not have appropriate training, particularly in project management. The Technical assistance did not provide significant contribution to enhancing the skills of project officers.
3.	Sustainability	1.25	Unsatisfactory
i)	Continued Borrower commitment	1	The Borrower did not meet his commitments in a satisfactory manner: disbursements were irregular and often late compared to the project's requirements; the break up of the executing agency (ADECAF) without any steps being taken to ensure the continuity of project activities.

ii)	Environmental Policy	1	The political situation was most unfavourable resulting in frequent social conflicts. The instability of the political system did not make it possible to achieve, in the long term, the development sectoral guidelines and policies.
iii)	Institutional Framework	2	ADECAF's institutional framework was not equipped with all the requisite capacity to efficiently carry out all the complex activities of the project, especially farming activities, social infrastructure, producer credit, professional organisation of the milieu, marketing , monitoring-evaluation etc.
iv)	Technical Viability and Staff development	2	Works implementation was satisfactory. However, lack of maintenance did not make it possible to ensure the sustainability of infrastructures. The project staff has adequate skills for agricultural works. Unfortunately , they were not given retraining courses to maintain their knowledge at a standard level
v)	Financial Viability including cost recovery systems	1	The fall in agricultural yields due to lack of inputs, credits, and an efficient marketing system put at risk the project's financial viability.
vi)	Economic Viability	1	The breaking up of ADECAF with the attendant lack of technical supervision , inputs and credits highly compromised agricultural output . Similarly, the serious degradation of social infrastructure limited the marketing of farm produce, the health of the population and the children's enrolment.
vii)	Environmental Viability	1	The opening of roads and feeder roads by the project encouraged wild and massive forest logging in the region; in the long term; this led to the degradation of biodiversity and dispersion of Pygmies who had been deprived of their natural environment.
viii)	Operating and Maintenance facilities (availability of recurrent funds , foreign exchange , spare parts , maintenance workshops)	1	No mechanism has been put in place to ensure better and efficient operation and maintenance of rolling stock, which is already, non-existent and the infrastructures, which are in a dilapidated state.
4.	Economic Internal Rate of Return	1	Unsatisfactory
	Overall Assessment of Outcome	1	Unsatisfactory