

# PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT (PCR)

## A. PROJECT DATA AND KEY DATES

### I. BASIC INFORMATION

Project Reference: P-GN-AB0-005	Project Name: Support Project for the National Rural Infrastructure Programme, Phase II (PNIR2)	Country: Republic of Guinea	
Lending Instrument(s): Loan No. 2100150006955		Sector: Rural Infrastructure	Environmental Category II
Original Commitment: UA 8.10 million	Amount Cancelled: UA 0	Amount Disbursed: ADF: UA 3,235,876.46	% Disbursed: ADF: 39.95%
Borrower :Ministry of the Economy and Finance of the Republic of Guinea			
Executing Agency (ies): Ministry of Agriculture- National Rural Engineering Directorate/National Feeder Roads Directorate– Project Management Unit Other Partners: SRFR/MA (Lands Unit), DOCAD/MUH (Surveys Department), IGN/MTP (National Geographic Institute), DNSP/MSP, School Mobile Unit/DNGR, Ministry of the Environment.			
Co-financiers (project) : IDB: UA 7 million Government: UA 1.64 million for entire PNIRII Beneficiaries: UA 0.25 million Programme Partner (PNIR 2) IDA: UA 23.5 million			

### II. KEY DATES

Project Concept Note Approved by Com. Ops. Not Applicable	Appraisal Report Approved by Com. Ops Not Applicable	Approval by Board of Directors: 2 October 2002	
Restructuring(s) : Not Applicable			
	Original Date	Actual Date	Difference in Months [Actual-Original Date]
EFFECTIVENESS	January 2003	22 March 2004	14 months
MID-TERM REVIEW	January 2005	-	
CLOSING	31 December 2008	30 June 2010	18 months

### III. RATING SUMMARY

CRITERIA	SUB-CRITERIA	RATING
PROJECT OUTPUT	Achievement of Outputs	0.420
	Achievement of Outcomes	1.5
	Timeliness	3
	<b>OVERALL PROJECT OUTPUT</b>	<b>1.64</b>
BANK PERFORMANCE	Design and readiness	2.14
	Supervision	2.83
	<b>OVERALL BANK PERFORMANCE</b>	<b>2.49</b>
BORROWER PERFORMANCE	Design and readiness	1
	Implementation	1.4
	<b>OVERALL BORROWER PERFORMANCE</b>	<b>1.2</b>

#### IV. RESPONSIBLE BANK STAFF

POSITIONS	AT APPROVAL	AT COMPLETION
Regional Director	E.G. TAYLOR-LEWIS	F.J.M. PERRAUT
Sector Director	C.S. SPENCER(OCAR)	A. ABOU SABAA (OSAN)
Task Manager	M. A. KANE	M. TARHOUNI(OSAN.2)
PCR Team Leader		M. TARHOUNI (Principal Engineer GR)
PCR Team Members		M.H. SNANE (Consultant )

#### B. PROJECT CONTEXT

Despite its vast natural resource potential, the country suffered a long period of economic slump after independence. To remedy this, the Government embarked on a series of economic and financial recovery programmes and, more recently, the implementation of the National Rural Infrastructure Programme (PNIR-1), which was the first attempt at defining a rural infrastructure strategy and developing a global approach in this area. Preparation of the second phase of the PNIR, to which this project is related, began in 1998 with the support of the World Bank. In this regard, broad consultations were held among the various population groups, rural development communities (CRDs), the civil society and the administration. Feeder roads, highways and bridges were identified as the main priorities for combating poverty among the population.

In consultations organized recently to prepare the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), difficulties of access to land and the absence of land tenure security were also identified as impediments to socioeconomic development in rural areas. Consequently, the main objective of the Agricultural Development Policy Letter II (LPDA II) is food security, based on improved productivity and agricultural output in rural areas where land tenure security is enhanced. PNIR-2 was designed to achieve this objective by addressing the following constraints: (i) the degraded state of feeder roads hampering the supply of inputs and marketing of production surpluses; (ii) difficulties of access to land and the lack of guarantees for land transactions, and (iii) lack of jurisdiction for decentralized institutions (CRD) to act as project owners in the implementation of local development plans (PDL) and land legislation, and (iv) the demobilization of village feeder road maintenance committees (CVEP) created under PNIR1. It is against this background that, following a request from the Guinean Government, the Bank accepted to finance PA/PNIR2, whose objectives are consistent with its intervention policy in member countries.

In 2011, the Bank's portfolio comprised seven active projects for a total commitment of UA 74.4 million in the following key areas: agriculture, social and multi-sector and three infrastructure projects amounting to UA 25.4 million yet to be implemented; in agriculture, 1 project was under implementation in 2011 (NERICA) and 2 were completed in 2010 (PADER-HG and PA/PNIR2).

In the feeder roads sector, there are very few large scale donor-funded operations. The IDB has been contributing to the financing of PA/PNIR2, and the IDA is involved in the financing of the General PNIR II Programme with US\$ 9.01 and US\$ 30.10 million respectively.

#### C. PROJECT OBJECTIVE AND LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Sector goal: Contribute to poverty reduction and improve the living conditions of rural communities.  
Specific objective: open up rural development communities and improve security of land tenure.

The project comprises the following 3 components:

Component A: Improvement of feeder roads through rehabilitation and the mobilization of CVEPs.

Component B: Security of land tenure by preparing the land plans for two pilot CRDs

Component C: Project management to coordinate activities and ensure institutional anchoring of other two components.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES DIMENSIONS		ASSESSMENT	WORKING SCORE
RELEVANT	a) Relevant to the country's development priorities.	The sector goal of the project is line with the objectives of LPDA II of Guinea. The two specific objectives derived from the sector goal are in line with the outcomes of the broad consultations for the preparation of PNIR II.	4
ACHIEVABLE	b) Objectives could in principle be achieved with the project inputs and in the expected timeframe.	Land tenure security in 2 CRDs is an attempt to enforce the rural land policy decree passed in May 2001. It is difficult to implement since the constraints raised in the DPFRR have not been addressed to date. On the other hand, the objective of opening up CRDs is achievable in 4 years in view of the experience Guinea has gained in this area, and the decentralized and community institutional framework programmed for its implementation.	2

CONSISTENT	c) Consistent with the Bank's regional or country strategy.	The project was consistent with the Bank Group's intervention strategy aimed at helping to accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty. The strategy was geared mainly towards opening up rural areas. It is in line with Bank-financed operations in this high poverty area, namely the Upper and Middle Guinea Sustainable Social Development Project and the Women's Activities Support Project, which were being launched.	3
	d) Consistent with the Bank's corporate priorities.	The project objectives are consistent with the Bank's rural infrastructure priorities and consolidate the Bank's approach to local community support as regards the land policy and financing of public amenities to ensure their sustainability.	3

*N.B.: In view of the inadequacies in the original project matrix, it has become necessary to reformulate the logical framework as table below, showing details of the appraisal report by component for improved consistency and better use.*

OBJECTIVES	TITLE	EXPECTED OUTCOMES	EXPECTED OUTPUTS	INDICATORS TO BE MEASURED
Sector Goals	Improve the living conditions	Road density increases from 2.9 to 6 km/100km <sup>2</sup> by 2008.	Access to schools and health centres is facilitated. Commercial and production activities strengthened.	Road density, school enrolment and health centre and market attendance rates. Volume of traded goods
	Reduce poverty	Reduce poverty ratio from 52.5% to 45% in 2008	Food security is enhanced.	Poverty ratio in project area in 2008. Food deficit in the area.
Specific Objectives	Open up rural development communities (CRD)	70 CRDs opened up (in the 11 target Prefectures of the project) with the minimum level of service and transport costs reduced by 25%;	Reduced transport time. Increased commercial activities. Reduced rural-urban drift.	Transport cost and number of vehicles plying to and from CRD by category. Density trend of the population of CRDs.
	Improve land tenure security	Increased agricultural productivity in the 2 pilot CRDs and methods can be extended to other CRDs	Land disputes reduced; increased production.	Crop yields, acreage farmed and number of land transactions made. Preparation of the land procedures manual.
COMPONENTS	ACTIVITIES	EXPECTED OUTCOMES	EXPECTED OUTPUTS	INDICATORS TO BE MEASURED
<u>Component A</u> Improving community feeder roads	Rehabilitation of 1080 km of community feeder roads in 51 CRDs in 9 prefectures in Upper and Middle Guinea	Length of feeder roads rehabilitated is 120 km in Téliimélé, 104 km in Pita, 133 km in Dabola, 79 km in Dinguirayé, 75 km in Lélouma, 101 km in Koubia, 102 km in Mali, 150 km in Mandiana and 155 km in Siguiri	All season access to the 51 CRDs is improved. Increased road traffic and volume of goods traded.	Length of road sections rehabilitated by prefecture. Number and sizes of structures constructed in accordance with final designs and bidding documents.
		ESMP implemented: Planting of trees along 1080 km of feeder roads; control of STI/HIV/AIDS and malaria strengthened in health centres.	Contribution to reducing wood deficit. Decrease in number of cases of STI/HIV/AIDS and malaria.	Length of road shoulders planted with trees; results of screening tests conducted in health centres. Number of mosquito nets distributed and re-treated.
		20 training workshops for SMEs organized by the DNGR mobile school unit	Improved performance of enterprises; quality of works consistent with technical specifications.	Number of training sessions and participants; training content.

	Establishment and training of 224 village road maintenance committees (CVEP)	The 224 CVEP have been formed and equipped	The 224 CVEPs are officially recognized. The CVEPs cover all the feeder roads, representing an average of 5 km/CVEP	Minutes of meetings; statutes formulated. Quantity and state of equipment
		The 224 CVEP have been trained and are operating	Installation of rain barriers; establishment of an operating budget.	Number of sessions and participants in training courses; training documents distributed. CVEP budgets.
		The 1080 km of feeder roads are maintained and monitored by the CVEPs	Installation and operation of rain barriers; structures are operating; black spots eliminated.	Number of kilometres of road maintained, number of rain barriers installed, number of s/d of intervention.
	Participation of CRDs in project supervision	Training of CRDs in the formulation of local development plans (PDLs) and procurement and agreement documents.	The CRDs are capable of identifying their needs. Updating of PDLs with project roads.	Number of training sessions and participants; training documents available in the CRDs.
		Assistance by the DNGR of CRDs in supervision	Participation by CRDs in the procurement and monitoring of project contracts	Number of meetings and visits to sites by CRDs with the SPGRs.
		Ownership of the rehabilitated feeder roads by the CRDs	Strengthening and mobilization of CVEPs; initiation to the financing of CVEPs.	Budget granted by the CRDs to CVEPs; Self-financing system put in place.
<u>Component B</u> Land tenure security	Information, education and communication campaign on land legislation	Establishment of village land committees (CFV) and inter-village land committees (CFIV). Clarification and formalization of the rights of land users	Officialization of CFVs and CFIVs and preparation of their statutes.	Minutes of meetings and assemblies; number of CFVs and CFIVs established.
		Preparation of the decree and 2 orders establishing the National Land Council (CNF), Technical Land Committee (CTF) and land committees of the 2 CRDs	The CNF, CTF and CF/CRD are officially established by decrees and orders	Implementation of protocols signed with governmental institutions (DOCAD/MUH, SRF/MA); minutes of meetings.
	Decentralized application of land legislation in the 2 pilot CRDs	Guarantee land transactions through the establishment and formalization of land contracts by the CF/CRDs; issuance of certified copies of land registration certificates.	Preparation of rural land plans (PMFR) to the scale of 1/2000 and a map to 1/10000 for the 42000 ha in Koukian and 25000 ha in Banko.	Agreements signed with IGN/MTP and survey office; updating of rural land plans by CRDs; Number of transactions and registration certificates made.
		Methodology prepared and disseminated nationwide	Land tenure security applied in other CRDs	Number of CRCs with a plan and land transaction documents; land procedures manual developed.
<u>Component E</u> Project Management	Establishment of a project management, coordination and monitoring system	The management unit and the supervision system (5 BTGR and 11 SPGR) put in place and adequately resourced	The services of the PMU are consistent with the mandates given them.	Staff appointed and organized; logistics and equipment procured.

		The capacity of project staff strengthened	Volume and quality of services and performance of PMU staff improved	Number of training thematic sessions, number of study trips and short courses undertaken.	
		Financial management, monitoring-evaluation and steering tools put in place and operating; 2 experts in management and monitoring-evaluation recruited each for 48 SM.	Project management performance is satisfactory and the activities and outcomes are adequately monitored.	Management tools put in place; Observations on audits; number of steering committee meetings; periodic and mid-term review reports.	
CHARACTERISTICS OF LOG-FRAME		ASSESSMENT			RATING
LOGICAL	a) Presents a logical causal chain for achieving the project development objectives.	As presented, the matrix does not indicate the logical causal chain for achieving the project objectives.			2
MEASURABLE	b) Expresses objectives and outcomes in a way that is measurable and quantifiable.	The outcomes of the opening-up component are expressed in a measurable way. On the other hand, those related to land tenure security are general and vague.			2
THOROUGH	c) States the risks and key assumptions.	Key assumptions and risks are stated. The weak capacity of decentralized entities (CRDs) to contribute to supervision of the implementation of project activities also contributed to the low outcomes obtained.			2

#### D. ACHIEVEMENT OF OUTPUTS

##### I. ACTUAL OUTPUTS

MAJOR ACTIVITIES		Working Score (1 to 4)	Share of Project Costs in % (calculated at completion)	Weighted Score
Expected Outputs	Actual Outputs			
Component A: Improvement of Community Feeder Roads				
Rehabilitation of 1080 km of community feeder roads in 70 CRDs				
The length of feeder roads rehabilitated is 120 km in Téliimélé, 104 km in Pita, 133 km in Dabola, 79km in Dinguirayé, 75 km in Lélouma, 101km in Koubia, 102 km in Mali, 150 km in Mandiana and 155 km in Siguiri completed in December 2008 (duration 15months)	Feeder roads rehabilitated in 4 prefectures :Téliimélé (93 km); Pita (72 km); Dabola (109 km) and Dinguiraye (4.3km) making a total of 278km (27%). More than 2 bridges in Mandiana and 16 culverts in Siguiri. Most of the works carried out at end of project (2010). Unsatisfactory quality.	1	28.04	0.2804
Measures for mitigating environmental impacts outlined in the ESMP implemented; planting of trees along 1,080 km of feeder roads and in borrow areas; control of STI/HIV/AIDS and malaria	Absence of planted trees along feeder roads; 3 health training sessions by DNSP for central and prefectural staffs from DNGR/DNPR and 140 Peers Educators in 11 prefectures; distribution of brochures, condoms and 4500 mosquito nets;	3	1.22	0.0366
20 training workshops for SMEs by the DNGR school mobile unit of Mamou (UME) and the consultant	5 themes (1 theme/week and 12 persons/theme). Participation of 71 enterprises (SMEs, NGOs) in 2005 and in 2006. Weak impact of training since operation of SMEs was defective.	2	1.13	0.0226
Establishment and training of 224 village feeder road maintenance committees (CVEP)				
224 CVEP established and equipped.	112 CVEPs put in place during the PNIR1 were equipped with IDB financing (bicycles and small site equipment)	2	0.288	0.00576

224 CVEPs are trained and operational	Training of 112 CVEPs organized; Financing not provided; voluntary work not operating; worn out equipment not replaced.	1	0.506	0.00512
The 1080 km of feeder roads maintained by the CVEPs	175 km maintained; no rain barrier installed.	1	0.1	0.001
Participation of CRDs in project supervision				
Training of CRDs in the preparation of local development plans (PDL), preparation of terms of reference of agreements and invitations to bid.	The 51 CRDs of the 9 project prefectures were not trained in bid preparation and evaluation procedures, and preparation of contracts with SMEs and agreements with service providers.	1	0.24	0.0024
Assistance by DNGR (delegated owner) to CRDs (implementing agencies)	The 19 CRDs did not participate in project supervision.	1	0.24	0.0024
Ownership of feeder roads by CRDs	Out of the 112 CVEPs trained, 32 CVEP were mobilized by the CRDs.	1	0.24	0.0024
<b>Component B: Land Tenure Security</b>				
Information, education and communication on land legislation				
Establishment of village land committees (CFV) and inter-village land committees (CFIV)	A workshop organized in the chief town of each of the 2 prefectures of Banko and Koundian. The CFVs and CVIFs are not established. The protocol agreement signed with SRFR/MA (condition of 1 <sup>st</sup> disbursement) not implemented.	1	0.04	0.0004
Preparation and signing of decree establishing the National Land Council (CNF) and 2 orders establishing the Technical Land Committee (CTF) and CF/CRDs	The decree and 2 orders were prepared but not signed. The CNFs, CTFs and CF/CRD not established. The protocol agreement signed with DOCAD/MUH (condition of 1 <sup>st</sup> disbursement) not implemented.	1	0.04	0.0004
Decentralized application of land legislation in the 2 pilot CRDs				
Preparation of rural land plans (PMFR) to 1/2000 and a map to 1/10000 for the 42000 ha in Koukian and 25000 ha in Banko	The monographs of 2 CRDs were produced but the land plans have not been prepared. The protocol agreement signed with IGN/MTP (condition of 1 <sup>st</sup> disbursement) not implemented.	1	0	0
Methodology prepared and disseminated nationwide	The procedures manual representing the tools of land tenure security has not been prepared.	1	0	0
<b>Component C: Project Management</b>				
Establishment of a project management, coordination and monitoring system				
Management unit and supervision system put in place and adequately resourced	Institutional problems disrupted the technical and financial management of the project. Project management divided between 2 Directorates, one technical (DNPR) and the other financial (DNGR).	2	2.35	0.047
Capacity of project staff enhanced	Organization of 2 workshops on the validation of project manuals and action plan. Training in procurement for 24 persons.	3	0.4	0.012
Financial management, monitoring-evaluation and steering tools put in place and used; 2 experts in management and monitoring-evaluation recruited each for 48 SM. Baseline study conducted	Expert in management recruited for 3 months instead of 48 months. Expert in monitoring evaluation not recruited. Baseline study not conducted. Monitoring-evaluation software not procured. Problems encountered in the payment of some operators (JMM, consultant) and the approval of audits (2008 Audit approved in 2010).	1	0.36	0.0036
OVERALL OUTPUT SCORE [calculated as the sum of weighted scores]				0.420

Check here to override the auto-calculated score

<b>Provide reasons for over-riding the auto-calculated score</b>	
Insert the new score or re-enter the auto-calculated score	0.420

## II. OUTCOMES ACHIEVED

OUTCOMES		Working Score
Expected	Actual	
<b>Component A: improving community feeder roads</b>		
1080 km of community feeder roads rehabilitated in 9 prefectures.	278 km of community feeder roads rehabilitated in 4 prefectures. Completion of 2 bridges begun in the Mandiana Prefecture and 16 culverts in the Siguiri Prefecture following the cancellation of contracts of their feeder roads (Mandiana: 150 km; Siguiri: 155 km). The quality of works on the roads is average.	1
20 training workshops for SMEs involved in the project	Training for 88 participants of 71 operators (SMEs, NGO) in 2005-2006. Low impact on road contractors since the engineering consultant mentioned difficulties encountered in preparation of bidding documents and laboratory analyses.	2
Implementation of ESMP with the planting of trees along the roads rehabilitated and in the borrow areas; control of STI/HIV/AIDS and malaria	Trees not planted along the roads. The protocol agreement with the DNSP for sensitization and preventive control of STI/HIV/AIDS and malaria was applied in the 50 CRDs of the project. The protocol agreement signed with the DNE (conditions for 1 <sup>st</sup> disbursement) was not implemented.	2
224 CVEPs to be established, trained and equipped for routine maintenance of 75% of the CRD feeder road network.	The 112 CVEPs established by PNIR I were trained and equipped under the IDB project. They are in charge of 840km distributed in 48 CRDs. The worn-out equipment is not renewed.	2
The CVEPs regularly maintained the 840 km of feeder roads	Maintenance of 174 km of feeder roads by the 112 CVEPs under PNIR 2.	1
The CRDs participated in supervision of feeder road construction works with the assistance of the DNGR (SPGN) and the updating of their PDL	The CRDs did not take part in rehabilitation of feeder roads. The assistance of CRDs in the operation of CVEPs is weak given their lack of ownership of the rehabilitated feeder roads.	1
<b>Component B: Land Tenure Security</b>		
Establishment of village land committees (CFV) and inter-village land committees (CFIV)	The village and inter-village land committees have not been established. Sensitization campaigns in villages not conducted.	1
Preparation and signing of decree establishing the CNF and orders instituting the CTF and CF/CRD.	The DOCAD/MUH and SRFR/MAE did not participate in the project as planned at appraisal. The decree and orders prepared were not signed by the Ministry of Presidential Affairs in charge of Construction, Land Use Planning and Public Buildings (Ex MUH).	1
Preparation of rural land plans (PMFR) to the scale of 1/2000 and a 1/10000 map for 42000ha in Koukian and 25000ha in Banko	The IGN/MTP and surveyors did not participate in the project as planned at appraisal. The mapping and topographic land plans of the 2 pilot CRDs were not prepared.	1
<b>Component C: Project Management</b>		
Management unit and supervision system put in place and adequately resourced	Institutional problems disrupted the technical and financial management of the project. Project management was divided between 2 Directorates, one technical (DNPR) and the other financial ( DNGR)	2
Capacity of project staff enhanced	Training of central and decentralized staff of DNGR	3
Financial management, monitoring-evaluation and steering tools put in place and operating; 2 experts in management and monitoring-evaluation recruited each for 48 SM.	Expert in management recruited for 3 months instead of 48. Expert in monitoring evaluation not recruited. Problems encountered in payment of some operators (JMM, consultant) and the approval of audits.	1
<b>OVERALL OUTCOME SCORE [calculated as an average of working scores]</b>		1.5

Check here to override the auto-calculated score

**Provide reasons for overriding the auto-calculated score**

Insert the new score or re-enter the auto-calculated score	1.5
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Other outcomes: not applicable

Threats to sustainability of the actual outcomes: The utility of the rehabilitated community feeder roads depends on the condition of the prefectural feeder roads to which they are linked and which in principle should be rehabilitated by a donor (IDB). The threat stems from the lack of harmony between the location of sections rehabilitated by the IDB and ADB. The non-approval of the rehabilitated roads by the CRDs as indicated during project start-up by their non-involvement in supervision is another factor of non-operationality of CVEPs trained by the project, which could compromise the viability of the roads. Without a decentralized mechanism for financing community feeder roads, the rehabilitated roads will deteriorate fast. The current system of maintenance of community feeder roads based on voluntary work by the CVEPs or the involvement of Government decentralized services is not working, and the road maintenance fund does not provide support for maintaining community feeder roads.

At the project completion, several road sections had not been provisionally accepted (in Téliélé, 4 out of 7 sections; in Pita, all the sections; in Dabola, 1 out of 4). As of February 2011, not all the sections had undergone final acceptance. The consultant is no longer available to organize the lifting of restrictions. Without the vigilance and involvement of the DNGR services in the final acceptance of the roads and bridges, the restrictions may not be lifted.

The draft decrees and orders prepared and submitted to the ministries for signature are achievements the MA (SRFR) and MUH (DOCAD) land units need to follow them up. Pending the signing of these instruments, the government institutions can continue to train and mobilize the CFVs and CFIVs to finalize the socio-land survey and conduct a situational analysis for the 2 CRDs.

Consequently, sustainability of the actual outcomes depends on continuation of assistance to local communities and the CRDs by government institutions bound by the protocol agreements or covenants with the project to achieve these outcomes.

**E. PROJECT DESIGN AND READINESS FOR IMPLEMENTATION**

The intervention of the project over a large geographic area (11 prefectures) was due to its integration into PNIR II funded by several donors. Complementarity in the technical interventions and financial management, as well as the institutional packaging of the project, were not well-defined in PA/PNIR2 appraisal report. Indeed, the distribution of the 1350 km of feeder roads, comprising 1,080km financed by the ADB between 70 CRDs (19 km per CRD) and 280 km by the IDB and prefectural roads between 11 prefectures (600km) all funded by the IDB made it difficult to optimize contracts and achieve harmonious complementarity between the rehabilitated prefectural and community roads.

For Component B, the project document does not detail all the constraints that hampered the application of the 1992 Land Code mentioned in the

rural land policy statement and the decree adopting the rural land policy in May 2001. It does not detail the procedures to be followed and conditions to be met to remove these constraints and facilitate implementation of the component. It is the nature, and not the number of these constraints, that poses the problem. Concentrating efforts on a single pilot CRD instead of two would have sufficed to develop the methodology to be used for implementation.

Several ministries were also partners for the implementation of Component A (MTP, MA, MSP, ME) and B (MA, MUH, MTP). The appraisal report did not specify the contribution of the various institutions of these ministries. This would have helped avoid the inter-institutional impediments that occurred in the implementation of the two components. Furthermore, it gave preference to the principle of delegation by using local communities (CRD) to manage the project, but failed to propose actions to improve their organizational, technical and financial capacity. At project design, a close targeting of some activities would have undoubtedly helped to reduce the risk of padding of the process and monitoring. Thus, Component B should have included activities to assist local communities in their supervisory tasks and not land tenure security that does form part of the responsibilities of the delegated project owner (DNGR).

The appraisal report does not adequately highlight the major lessons learned from the first phase. A critical assessment and application of the lessons from PNIR I, as well as sound analysis of the institutional framework, would have helped to identify the procedures better and define the various activities of PNIR II more precisely. Hence, despite the obvious limitations of the use of national competitive bidding (NCBh) for the implementation of the community feeder road rehabilitation component, the project still recommends its use. Furthermore, changes and institutional instability in the course of the implementation (creation of the National Feeder Roads Directorate placed under the Ministry of Public Works and subsequently under the Ministry of Agriculture with institutional conflicts between this new directorate and the DNGR) was one of the main reasons for the poor monitoring of the project and, in particular, the performance of the contractors. The weak capacity of the latter also accounts for this poor performance. The lessons learnt from the first phase were not sufficiently taken into account because it is more difficult to apply new concepts and methods that require greater expertise by the stakeholders in the project implementation.

The appraisal report provides a brief qualitative and quantitative description of the feeder roads and beneficiary population groups. The analysis of land issues was general and did not indicate the sociological and land tenure specificities of the 2 pilot CRDs selected for the implementation of Component B. In the absence of an in-depth sociological study of the land tenure system, a quantified characterization of a baseline case for the method of land exploitation and its impact on farming (area and yield per type of crop), the expected results cannot be objectively verified.

In view of the ineffectiveness of the CVEPs, it clear that the institutional framework based on the voluntary work of the beneficiaries and financing from the Government budget for local communities (CRDs) to address the problem of ownership of the community feeder roads was unsatisfactory.

PROJECT DESIGN AND READINESS FOR IMPLEMENTATION DIMENSIONS		ASSESSMENT	Working Score
REALISM	a) Project complexity is matched with country capacity and political commitment.	The success and sustainability of the project outputs depend on the financial capacity and level of human involvement of the local communities (CRDs) in the activities. However, its operational size compared to the myriad and diverse constraints of these two parameters was not realistic, and this led to failure of the project.	1
RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION	b) Project design includes adequate risk analysis.	The risk of impediments to the implementation of the Land Component due to the multitude of actors and the socioeconomic, more than the technical nature of the land issue was not adequately analyzed in the project design. The risk of lack of complementarity and technical and financial optimization in the implementation of the Opening Up Component by the 2 donors was not considered in the project design.	1
USE OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS	c) Project procurement, financial management, monitoring and/or other systems are based on those already in use by government and/or other partners	The procurement procedures used were those of the Government (procurement code) and the Bank, but they were inadequately applied, resulting in poor selection of most service providers, which affected the performance. The financial management system used posed some problems. No monitoring-evaluation system was put in place.	2

For the following dimensions, provide separate working scores for Bank performance and Borrower performance:			Working Score	
			Bank	Borrower
CLARITY	d) Responsibilities for project implementation are clearly defined.	As regards the Government, the problems raised by the 2007 and 2008 audits, change of project coordinator (August 2008) and the migration of the Feeder Roads Department from the DNGR/MAE to the DNPR/MTP(2004) impacted on the normal implementation of the project. As regards the Bank, the change of project officers, especially at the end of the project, impacted adversely on the project implementation. Responsibilities between the IDB and the ADB were not clearly defined.	2	1
PROCUREMENT READINESS	e) The documents required for implementation (e.g. specifications, design, procurement documents) are ready at appraisal.	The protocol agreements with the three institutions in charge of implementing the land component were not ready. These protocols were then included as a condition precedent to implementation of the project. The intervention of the technical assistance in the management was short and belated. The numerous duties of the DNGR as the coordinator of several projects had a negative impact. The low involvement of the Bank in the evaluation of bids contributed to the poor selection of service providers.	2	1
MONITORING READINESS	f) Monitoring indicators and plan are adopted	The quarterly internal monitoring-evaluation was not followed. The monitoring-evaluation software was not procured. The mid-term review did not take place, and the steering committee did not function as expected. The Bank's supervision missions were regular but uncoordinated with those of the IDB.	2	1
BASELINE DATA	h) Baseline data are available or are being collected.	The technical advisor in monitoring-evaluation was not recruited. The project did not use the analysis of the surveys on the 19 feeder roads in 4 prefectures. The quantified land data specific to the 2 pilot CRDs do not exist. The central and decentralized staff of the DNGR recruited did not undertake the data collection task.	2	1

## F. IMPLEMENTATION

Major characteristics of the project implementation: The 15 month-delay in project effectiveness was compensated for by an 18-month extension of the closing date (June 2010 instead of December 2008). Overall, the project was implemented in an unfavourable socio-political context exacerbated by institutional conflicts. This did not help to strengthen the CRDs and institutions. The execution of the various contracts (6 works, 2 goods and 7 services) was not satisfactory. The feeder road design phase was completed on schedule in December 2006, leading to the signing of works contracts in September 2007 for an implementation period of 15 to 18 months. However, as of 14 March 2010, the contracts of two contractors for 5 prefectures had been terminated, and the execution rate of the two other contractors was 31.9% in the 2 prefectures of Téliélé and Pita, and 40.5% in the prefectures of Dabola and Dingueraye. As of that same date, the consultant had spent 112% of the period for the control phase, including the extension of his contract. As of 30 June 2010, namely 3.5 months after, 73.6% and 58.9% execution rates had been achieved for the two feeder roads respectively, and the completion of the two bridges on the roads in Mandiana Prefecture, as well as 16 culverts on roads in Siguiri Prefecture by different contractors had resumed. The considerable dispersal of small road sections (average of 20km/section) in each prefecture (8 in Téliélé, 7 in Pita, 7 in Dabola and 2 in Dingueraye), the NCB procedure and the criteria used in evaluating the bids, as well as social unrest, helped to demotivate the more performing regional and even national contractors from bidding for the feeder roads contracts. Neither did the splitting of the procurement into smaller lots adapt the size of the lots to the local SMEs (the example of Semegal PNIR). Furthermore, following the institutional changes that occurred during project implementation (different owners for components funded by the IDB and ADF) and the late start of works (2009) for both the IDB-funded prefectural feeder roads and the ADF-funded community roads, it was not possible to verify the degree of complementarity and optimization in the construction of the two networks of feeder roads. However, it was noted that most CRD roads with ADF funding did not necessarily link up with those funded with IDB resources. Consequently, there is a problem of continuity in the construction of the two types of feeder roads. Indeed, the opening up of a CRD can only be effective provided the rehabilitated community and prefectural roads are linked. The procurement notification of prospective IDB contractors occurred later (September 2008) than that of the ADB (September 2007) but as of 11 February 2011, the IDB had achieved 30, 55 and 80% for the 3 lots as against 0%, 54% and 73% for the ADF.

The quality of engineering structures on the feeder roads visited by the team was good. But some deficiencies still persist, and their drainage system needs to be reviewed (inadequate roof-shaped profile of the carriageway and scarce drainage gutters). The mission team took advantage of the visit to gather information on the level of maintenance of a feeder road by the CRD through the CVEP. The latter explained that the lack of maintenance of the degraded feeder roads was due to the defective small equipment provided by the project. However, this activity, which should be conducted in the

dry season in view of its voluntary nature, has been facing stiff competition from gold panning which is widespread in the project area. Trees had not been planted along the roads, and traffic signs and rain barriers had not been provided either.

The implementation of the land tenure security component was disorganized right from the start due to the inability of the 2 NGOs to raise guarantee funds for continuation of the works. The establishment of CFVs and CFIVs and the sociological survey of land tenure that did not depend on the signing of the ministerial decrees and orders could have been conducted had the 2 NGOs succeeded in coordinating the execution of the protocols signed with the government institutions in charge of implementing the land legislation.

The Bank undertook 7 supervision missions, but the mid-term review was not conducted. Unfortunately, the teams did not include experts from the disbursement and procurement units to solve the problems that occurred in the 2007 and 2008 audits. Despite the positive role played by the supervision and monitoring missions, it should be noted that the change of project officers in the Bank and Government caused delays in the processing of some files. The institutional changes of 2003-2004 and 2007-2008 and of the coordinator in 2008 delayed implementation of the Opening up Component considerably, thereby contributing to poor selection of contractors and failure of the component. To optimize the use of resources, UA 3 million were reallocated to the response to the food crisis, which was not used as a result of poor management of the process and failure to take into account the harvest season calendar.

Socio-political instability also made the project implementation difficult, particularly with regard to the implementation of institutional measures.

Role of other partners: PNIR 2 concluded many partnerships and protocol agreements covering a wide range of issues (technical, organizational and legal). This approach, which gives preference to the “do-it-yourself” method, enhances the participatory spirit, benefits from the pooling of resources and expertise, as well as strengthens national and local institutions. Some areas of overlapping in the roles of the various partners were noted. At appraisal, the project took into account the intervention of other partners. During implementation, the project did not establish synergies with similar operations funded by the IDB.

Harmonization: Given the fact that few partners are involved in the land sector, no special efforts were made to harmonize instruments and approaches. On the other hand, the project formed part of the national rural infrastructure programme involving other donors (IDB and IDA). Harmonization of partner activities functioned only partially with regard to the supply of equipment to the CVEPs of some CRDs funded by the IDB. There was no harmonization with the IDA, which operates throughout Guinea.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DIMENSIONS		ASSESSMENT		Working Score
<b>TIMELINESS</b>	a) Extent of adherence to original closing date. If the difference on the right is: below 12, score 4 between 12.1 and 24, score 3 between 24.1 and 36, score 2 above 36.1, score 1	Difference in months between the original closing date and the actual closing date or the date for achieving 98% disbursement	The delays in closing correspond to the delays in effectiveness.	3
		18 months		
<b>BANK PERFORMANCE</b>	b) Bank complied with:			
	Environmental safeguards	The ESMP was formulated. Project effectiveness was subject to the conclusion of a framework agreement with the Department of the Environment.		3
	Fiduciary requirements	The supervision missions all reviewed the financial management of the project. Resumption of disbursement of the revolving fund occurred only following approval of the previous financial audits. The Bank did not oversee the implementation of 3 protocol agreements closely related to the implementation of the land component.		3
	Project covenants	The Bank fulfilled its commitments as stipulated in the Loan Agreement.		4
	c) Bank provided quality supervision in terms of skills mix and practicality of solutions.	The Bank was able to monitor the implementation of PNIR 2 satisfactorily through 7 supervision missions and regular contacts by mail. The supervision missions did not always include all the skills required, but generally positively impacted on the activities carried out.		3
	The audit reports submitted each year by the Borrower were validated by the Bank and their recommendations were carefully monitored.		3	

BORROWER PERFORMANCE	e) Borrower complied with:		
	Environmental safeguards	The project did not require major environmental safeguards in view of the nature of its specific objectives, namely rehabilitation of degraded sections of the existing feeder roads. The few easy safeguards were not implemented. No agreement with the DNE.	1
	Fiduciary requirements	The Borrower did not fulfil its financial commitments with regard to the amounts involved (ADF =41%, BND =25%); the recommendations by the supervision teams on auditing were implemented though belatedly. Financial problems remained unresolved at project closure.	2
	Project covenants	The Borrower fulfilled its commitments as stipulated in the Loan Agreement; the protocol agreements concluded between the project and some government institutions were not implemented.	2
	f) Borrower was responsive to Bank supervision findings and recommendations	The Borrower was responsive enough to some recommendations of the supervision teams, but ignored those concerning 2 main project activities, namely finalization of land tenure security decrees and orders and adherence to deadlines by defaulting works contractors.	1
g) Borrower collected and used monitoring information for decision making.	The government monitoring process (steering committee, BSD/MA, Ministry of Planning) did not function during project implementation. Decisions taken during the internal monitoring conducted at the end of the project (2009) slightly improved the project outputs	1	

#### G. COMPLETION

1. Was the PCR on time in accordance with Bank Policy?			
Date of achievement of 98% disbursement (or closing date, if applicable)	Date PCR was sent to pcr@afdb.org	Difference in months	WORKING SCORE (auto-calculated) if the difference is equal to or less than 6 months, the score is 4. If the difference is greater than 6 months, the score is 1.
30 June 2010	March 2011	9 months	1
<p>The completion mission team included a principal rural engineer and a consultant. Their profiles matched most of the project activities. The project team fully assisted the mission team in office and field work. The sampling used for on-site visits in the intervention prefectures and discussions with the local authorities, beneficiaries and partners in the field allowed for better understanding of the realities and outcomes achieved. The discussions indicated the keen interest of the communities in the feeder road works outputs. Thus, the PCR is a product of participatory work involving all the stakeholders, and includes lessons from frank discussions held with the various actors.</p> <p>Peer comments: They were taken into account in this version of the completion report.</p>			

#### H. LESSONS LEARNED

<p><b>Main lessons:</b> At completion, some lessons can be learned from PNIR II with regard to design, implementation and monitoring, in particular:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Better allotment of road sections (taking into account contractors' capacities) would have made it easier to select contractors with the requisite capacity;</li> <li>2. Effective involvement of decentralized entities (CRD) should have been a condition precedent to implementation of the project, whose design is based on a decentralized approach. The socio-political climate did not foster the decentralization process.</li> <li>3. Activities by the decentralized entities (CRDs and urban communes) should be carried out as a priority by local SMEs which use simple and high-labour intensive methods.</li> <li>4. The programming of project activities defined at appraisal should be respected, even at the cost of coercive measures against defaulting operators;</li> <li>5. Prepare appropriate bidding documents and terms of reference for services and works to ensure that suitable bidders are selected for project implementation;</li> </ol>
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6. The intervention schedule of technical assistance and engineering consultant should be flexible enough to match with the project implementation schedule;
7. Community activities should be conducted using a participatory approach based on human and financial resources mobilized to ensure continuity after the project;
8. More strict compliance with the terms of contracts would have made it possible to terminate defaulting contractors and re-open the bidding process in a timely manner;
9. Organizing joint co-financiers' missions would have helped to address difficulties, especially institutional difficulties.

**Recommendations:**

**For the Government:**

1. Make appropriate adjustments to projects to reflect institutional changes during implementation.
2. Match the design of road section lots to the capacity of local contractors.
3. Issue decrees and orders establishing the national land committee, technical land committee and land committees for CRDs.
4. Create and update a databank on the capacity of the various operators to guide the procurement committee in the selection of appropriate contractors and consultants.
5. Ensure the proper operation of internal and external project monitoring-evaluation entities.
6. Avoid changing project owners in the course of implementation.
7. Ensure that protocols and agreements with governmental institutions are enforced.
8. Ensure the organization of joint supervision missions by co-financiers under the leadership of the Government.

**For the Bank:**

1. Cancel the loan balance of UA 4,773,641.45.
2. Be more involved in the evaluation of bids and award of contracts.
3. Ensure that the implementation schedule of each project activity is adhered to and subject this to the relevant disbursements.
4. At appraisal, ensure accuracy of information on the pre-project situation (institutional framework, social actors, ongoing projects and initiatives, baseline data) in order to better define the objectives and expected impacts of the project and correctly target the activities underpinning them.
5. Ensure that the multidisciplinary composition of the Bank's supervision mission teams reflects the status of services pertaining to the disciplines.
6. At project appraisal, ensure that partner government institutions for project implementation are ready to carry out the activities assigned them.
7. Systematically organize joint supervision missions with the cofinanciers of projects/programmes.

I. PROJECT RATINGS SUMMARY

CRITERIA	SUB-CRITERIA	Working Score
PROJECT OUTCOME	Achievement of outputs	0.420
	Achievement of outcomes	1.5
	Timeliness	3
	<b>OVERALL PROJECT OUTCOME</b>	<b>1.64</b>
BANK PERFORMANCE	Design and Readiness	
	Project Objectives are relevant to country development priorities	4
	Project Objectives could in principle be achieved with the project inputs and in the expected time frame	2
	Project Objectives are consistent with the Bank's country or regional strategy	3
	Project Objectives are consistent with the Bank's corporate priorities	3
	The log frame presents a logical causal chain for achieving the project development objectives.	2
	The log frame expresses objectives and outcomes in a way that is measurable and quantifiable	2
	The log frame states the risks and key assumptions	2
	Project complexity is matched with country capacity and political commitment	1
	Project design includes adequate risk analysis	1
Project procurement, financial management, monitoring and/or other systems are based on those already	2	

	in use by government and/or other partners.		
	Responsibilities for project implementation are clearly defined	2	
	Documents required for implementation (e.g. specifications, design, procurement documents) are ready at appraisal	2	
	Monitoring indicators and monitoring plan are agreed upon	2	
	Baseline data are available or are being collected	2	
	<b>PROJECT DESIGN AND READINESS SUB-SCORE</b>	<b>2.14</b>	
	<b>Supervision:</b>		
	Bank complied with:		
	Environmental safeguards	3	
	Fiduciary requirements	3	
	Project covenants	4	
	Bank provided quality supervision in terms of skills mix provided and practicality of solutions	3	
	Bank provided quality management oversight	3	
	PCR was timely	1	
<b>SUPERVISION SUB-SCORE</b>	<b>2.83</b>		
<b>OVERALL BANK PERFORMANCE SCORE</b>	<b>2.49</b>		
<b>BORROWER PERFORMANCE</b>	Design and readiness		
	Project implementation responsibilities are clearly defined	1	
	Documents required for implementation (e.g. specifications, design, procurement documents) are ready at appraisal	1	
	Monitoring indicators and monitoring plan are agreed upon	1	
	Baseline data are available or are being collected	1	
	<b>PROJECT DESIGN AND READINESS SCORE</b>	<b>1</b>	
	<b>Implementation</b>		
	Borrower complied with:		
	Environmental safeguards	1	
	Fiduciary requirements	2	
	Project covenants	2	
	Borrower was responsive to Bank supervision findings and recommendations	1	
	Borrower collected and used monitoring information for decision making	1	
	<b>IMPLEMENTATION SUB-SCORE</b>	<b>1.4</b>	
<b>OVERALL BORROWER PERFORMANCE SCORE</b>	<b>1.2</b>		

J. PROCESSING

STEP	SIGNATURE AND COMMENTS	DATE
Sector Manager Clearance		
Regional Director Clearance		
Approved by Sector Director		

## Rating and Explanations

RATING	EXPLANATION
4	<b>Very Satisfactory</b> - Fully implemented, flawless
3	<b>Satisfactory</b> – Most of the objectives were achieved despite a few shortcomings
2	<b>Average</b> - Project partially successful; almost as many outputs as shortcomings
1	<b>Poor</b> – very few outputs and serious shortcomings
NA	Not applicable

N.B.: The figures are rounded to the nearest decimal point. Only whole numbers were used for the calculations

ANNEXES TO PA/PNIR II PCR

Project Cost and Financing  
Project Costs and Expenditure by Component (NGF million and UA million)

COMPONENT	APPRAISAL		COMPLETION	
	NGF	UA	NGF	UA
Feeder Roads Improvement	20739.95	8.3	26268.966	3,216
Land Tenure Security	649.7	0.26	39.975	0.0626
Support for Project Coordination	1624.2	0.65	569.827	0.372
Total	23013.85	9.21	26878.768	3.650

Cost and Expenditure by Source of Finance (NGF million and UA million)

Source	Appraisal		Completion	
	NGF Million	UA Million	NGF Million	UA Million
ADF	20240.2	8.1	23831.795	3.326
Government	2148.96	0.86	2027.484	0.259
Beneficiaries	624.7	0.25	1019.489	0.064
Total	23013.85	9.21	26878.768	3.650

Revised list of goods and services of ADF loan

Category	Initial amount (UA million)	Revised (UA million)	Difference
Works	4.82	5.90	+1.08
Goods	0.18	0.10	-0.08
Services	1.65	1.65	0
Training	0.18	0.18	0
Physical Contingencies	0.34	0.04	-0.30
Price Escalation	0.93	0.23	-0.70
Total	8.1	8.1	0

**Bank Contributions**

Date	Mission	No. of pers.	Composition	No. of S/D.
August 2002	Appraisal	2	Agroeconomist, Agronomist, Irrigation Engineer	30
From 12 to 26 February 2005	Supervision	2	Zootechnician, Agroeconomist	28
From 3 to 12 December 2005	Supervision	2	Zootechnician, Senior Agronomist	20
From 14 to 27 May 2006	Supervision	3	Zootechnician, Fisheries Expert, Rural Engineer	30
From 9 to 21 November 2007	Supervision	3	Rural Engineer, Agronomist, Gender Expert	30
From 22/11 to 12 December 2008	Supervision	2	Rural Engineer, Agronomist,	28
29 April to 17 May 2009	Supervision	2	Agronomist, Principal Rural Engineer	30
26 March to 8 April 2010	Supervision	2	Chief Water Engineer, Principal Rural Engineer	26
24 January to 14 February 2011	Completion	2	Principal Rural Engineer, Rural Engineer Consultant	28

PNIR.2 SUPPORT PROJECT  
CALCULATION OF INTERNAL ECONOMIC RATE OF RETURN  
In NGF Million

Year	Developed Acreage (in ha)	Output (in t)	Transport Gains	Invest	Operation. & Maintenance	Total Cost	Cash Flow	H1 Cost +10%
2003	2751.463	523.301	0		624	624	-624	686.4
2004	3026.799	560.157	0		681.6	681.6	-681.6	749.76
2005	3329.506	599.181	1476.8416	994.5	716.8	1711.3	-234.4584	1882.43
2006	3995.353	958.798	2362.2528	1306.27	752	2058.27	303.9828	2264.097
2007	4794.261	1150.666	2834.8768	6504.5	1849.6	8354.1	-5519.2232	9189.51
2008	5753.059	1380.745	3402.0256	5561	1849.6	7410.6	-4008.5744	8151.66
2009	6903.725	1656.894	4082.7776	3322	1849.6	5171.6	-1088.8224	5688.76
2010	8284.47	1988.327	4898.8128	9187	7392	16579	-11680.182	18236.9
2011	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2012	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2013	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2014	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		7392	7392	-1513.2512	8131.2
2015	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2016	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2017	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2018	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		7392	7392	-1513.2512	8131.2
2019	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2020	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2021	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2022	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		7392	7392	-1513.2512	8131.2
2023	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2024	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2025	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56
2026	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		7392	7392	-1513.2512	8131.2
2027	9941.364	2385.884	5878.7488		1849.6	1849.6	4029.1488	2034.56

IRR	8%	4%
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Main Contracts with Loan Financing (ADB/ADF)

.*	Category	Contractor	Contract Amount		Amount Paid	Start-up Date
			Amount	F.E.		
Studies and Control by 2005/0351/16/1/2/N	Services	CIRA/WEST Ingénierie	822372	Euro (excl. taxes)	821 441,80	10/11/2005
Establishment of 56 CVEP 2006/054/6/1/2/N	Services	BERCA- BAARA	189030000	NGF (HT)	189030000	4/4/2006
Establishment of 56 CVEP 2006/055/1/6/1/2/N	Services	BERCA- BAARA	199030000	NGF	199030000	4/4/2006
Supply of motorcycles 2007/104/1/4/1/2/N	Goods	TRANSMEX	193725000	NGF	193725000	18/6/2007
Land Component 2006/053/1/6/1/2/N	Services	AVODEG- UDEBA	397607000	NGF	39975000	4/4/2006
Account Auditing 2005-2006 2007/0186/1/5/2/2/N	Services	TAFSIR AUDIT	115200000	NGF	115200000	19/9/2007
Feeder Rd Rehabilitation 2007/0221/1/2/1/2/N	Works	SERPAG	17269238809	NGF	3108462985 (terminated)	3/10/2007
Feeder Rd Rehabilitation 2007/0212/1/2/1/2/N	Works	SACODES	11699410219	NGF	10129905913,85	26/9/2007
FR Rehabilitation 2007/0205/1/2/1/2/N	Works	SOMACO	10911649008	NGF	5123857609,20	25/9/2007
STI/HIV/AIDS Master Agreement	Services	DNBP	249804000	NGF	204843200	31/1/2007
Computer Equipment 2007/103/1/4/1/2/N	Goods	JMM	194160000	NGF	194160000	18/6/2007
Consultant 2008/1/6/1/2/N	Services	BAH HADY	36798315	NGF	36798315	2008
Construction 2 Bridges 2010/202/1/2/1/2/N	Works	SELEN construction	976634080	NGF	791070892	2010
2008-2009 Audits	Services	GAGEC	25982450	XOF	27160560	2008
2008-2009 Audits	Services	GAGEC	10144000	XOF	10144000	2009

Main Contracts with Counterpart Funding (BND)

Nature of Contract	Category	Contractor	Contract Amount		Amount Paid
			NGF	(UA)	(UA)
Feeder R Rehabilitation	Works	SERPAG	17269238809	2 328 605	31316
Feeder R Rehabilitation	Works	SACODES	11699410219	1 577 563	113 379
Feeder R Rehabilitation	Works	SOMACO	10911649008	1 471 340	100 995
Construction 2 Bridges	Works	SELEM	976634080	131 690	13 169
Total			40856928756	5 509 198	258 859

**List of Reference Documents**

1. Aide-memoires of all PA/PNIR II supervision missions (December 2005, May 2006, December 2006, December 2007, November 2008, May 2009, April 2010,
2. Revised Appraisal Report of PNIR II (August 2002)
3. Consultant's Works Completion Report on Design and Control of Works CIRA SARL/WEST Ingénierie SARL (July 2010);
4. Final Report of NGO, BERCA-BAARA/BICS for CVEP ;
5. Report by National Public Health Directorate for Implementation of STI/HIV/AIDS and Malaria;
6. Final Designs and Bidding Documents on Community Feeder Roads by CIRA sarl/WEST ingénierie sarl ;
7. Interim Report of AVODEG/UDEBA for implementation of Land Tenure Security Component
8. Provisional and Final Acceptance Reports on Feeder Roads and Bridges Works;
9. Internal Works Supervision Reports by Project Management Unit (April-November 2009);
10. PCPR Activity Report (IDB Project) of National Feeder Roads Directorate
11. PA/PNIR II Progress Reports (March 2010) ;
12. Completion Report by Project Management Unit (September 2010)

## Project Description

1. Project Basic Data, Organization and Objectives
  - 1.1 The ADF loan amounting to UA 8.1 million was appraised in August 2002 and approved by the Bank Group Board of Directors on 2 October 2002. The signing of the loan agreement and effectiveness occurred on 16 January 2003 and 29 March 2004 respectively. The project commenced on 6 January 2005, which marked the first disbursement, for a 4-year period. Implementation of the project, initially scheduled to close on 31/12/2008, was extended to 30 June 2010 (5.5 years) for a total of 2 extensions (31/12/2009 and 30/6/2010). The under-estimation of the project unit costs noted during procurement of works led to a revision of the list of goods and services in December 2007. Annex 1 shows the original and revised lists.
  - 1.2 Delegated ownership was transferred from the DNGR of the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) to the National Feeder Roads Directorate (DNPR) of the Ministry of Public Works (MTP) by Decree No. D/2003/062/PRG/SGG of 15 July 2003 after the signing of the loan agreement on 16 January 2003. The DNPR returned to the MA on 27 October 2004, but the Project Management Unit (PMU) was compelled to collaborate with the two delegated owners at the MA namely the DNGR for administrative matters and the DNPR for technical matters. These institutional reforms contributed to delaying fulfilment of the Bank conditions precedent to the first disbursement on 6 January 2005 and affected the 4-year duration of the project estimated at appraisal since the closing date remained 31/12/2008. The change of the PMU Coordinator in 2008 and the Project Officer at the Bank disrupted the smooth implementation of the project.
  - 1.3 Thus, the first procurement activities of the project started in 2005 resulting in: (i) the award in October 2005 of the engineering designs contract (completed end 2006) and control of works on the feeder roads (completed in December 2009) to the CIRA Sarl/WEST INGENIERIE Sarl Group; (ii) the signing in March 2006 of a service contract with BERCA-BAARA/BICS for support to 112 CVEPs (completed in 2008) but not operational; (iii) signing in March 2006 of a contract with AVODEG/UDEBA NGO group for the implementation of the Land Tenure Security Component whose implementation rate was very low; (iv) the signing in 2005 of three protocol agreements with technical services involved in the implementation of the latter component (SNRFR, DOCAD, IGN) which were not executed, and (v) the signing of a framework agreement in January 2007 with the DNSP for the STI/HIV/AIDS and malaria component at project closure (June 2009).
  - 1.4 The project prepared the ESMP and made provision for environmental aspects of the roads improvement works (tree planting and rehabilitation of borrow areas) and assistance to the CRDs for the supervision of community works (feeder roads and land tenure security). The project did not sign a framework agreement with the BSD of the Ministry of Environment for implementation of the component. The baseline studies of the impact of the roads to be rehabilitated were not conducted, rendering the analysis of the project economic rate of return unreliable.
2. Project Objectives:
  - 2.1 The sector goal of the project is to contribute to poverty reduction and improve the living conditions of the rural communities. The specific objectives are to open up rural development communities (CRD) and improve security of land tenure. The 3 project components are: (i) the rehabilitation of 1080 km of community roads to open up 70 CRDs in 9 prefectures; (ii) improvement of land tenure security in two pilot CRDs, and (iii) project coordination.
3. Outcomes
  - 3.1 The table below briefly describes the status of the main project activities. The final designs and bidding documents on the feeder roads were ready at end 2006. The works contracts for the opening up of the CRDs were awarded on 26/7/2007 to four contractors. However, as of March 2010, the works implementation rate did not exceed 15%. Internal site monitoring missions were conducted at end of the project (April 2009) and led to termination of the contracts of the 2 defaulting contractors (SERPAG and GFC) in May 2009 and revitalization of the works of the other two contractors (SACODES and SOMACO). The belated termination of the contracts resulted in only partial resumption of the works started by the defaulting contractors. Thus, after termination of SERPAG SA, the contract for the two uncompleted bridges in Mandiana Prefecture was transferred to SELEN Construction on 9 April 2010 for a three-month period and the contract for 16 culverts on the 14-km road to Siguiri to SACODES. As of February 2011, although the works had been completed, they had not yet undergone provisional acceptance. The mobilization advance paid to SERPAG was returned to the project.
  - 3.2 The re-award of the other contracts helped SACODES to achieve 73.5% progress in physical output corresponding to 164.4 km and SOMACO 53.7% corresponding to 113.7 km. Overall, the rate of physical implementation of the opening-up component, comprising 2 bridges and 16 culverts, is estimated at 33% for a disbursement rate of 37.48% for the works category.
  - 3.3 The 112 CVEPs set up during PNIR I were trained and supplied with equipment by BERCA-BAARA/BICS NGO Group. Out of the 840 km of earth roads for which they were responsible, they maintained only 175 km. The CVEP of the road visited in Kankan CRD complained about the sub-standard tools provided under the project rendering them unusable in a short time.

- 3.4 The contract for the improved land tenure security component was signed on 4/4/2006 with AVODEG/ODEBA NGO Group for a 4-year period. Right from the outset, the latter was faced with challenges in paying the start-up deposit. The awareness activities and the monograph of the 2 pilot CRDs of Banko and Koundian were carried out by the NGO group; but the draft decree establishing the National Land Board (CNF) and the orders of the Land Technical Committee (CTF) and land commissions of the CRD (CF/CRD) CF were never approved by the Ministry of Presidential Affairs in charge of Construction, Land Use Planning and Public Buildings (ex-Ministry of Town Planning and Housing). The sociological survey on lands was not conducted and the land allotment plans were not produced.
- 3.5 The activities of the STI/HIV/AIDS-Malaria component under a protocol agreement with the DNSP started in June 2010 with the training of staff of DNGR/DNPR, SPGR, SPPR and MCM and Peer Educators and the distribution of 1,200 posters, 1,200 flyers and 4,000 mosquito nets.

#### 4. Coordination

- 4.1 The institutional arrangements proposed in the Appraisal Report were respected. The project was implemented by the National Rural Engineering Directorate (DNGR) whose National Director also served as the PMU Coordinator. He was assisted by two national consultants recruited as technical advisers (an administrative and financial expert of the project and an expert in feeder roads).
- 4.2 The PMU was supported in project implementation by 5 staff members at the central level (DNGR), 8 at the regional level (SRGR) and 33 at the prefectural level (SPGR). The international technical assistant for Rural Engineering and the National Monitoring-Evaluation Expert were not recruited. The mid-term review was not conducted.
- 4.3 The PMU is under the authority of the Steering Committee, which is placed under MA supervision and comprises representatives from the administration and the civil society. However, the Steering Committee met only once.

#### 5. Financial Situation

- 5.1 The financial management of the project was deficient until project closing and marred by errors in works certificates, delays in the payment of some operators and approval of the audits of the 2007 and 2008 financial periods. As of February 2011, the audits for 2009 and 2010 had not yet been conducted.
- 5.2 As regards financial commitment, the Bank and the Government complied with the mutual project provisions. The current disbursement rate of the Bank is 41.03 % and the Government counterpart funding was paid to the tune of 80.04%. The total amount disbursed by ADB stands at UA 3.326 million compared to a budget of UA 8.1 million, representing a disbursement rate of 41.06% and the portion of counterpart contribution paid is estimated at UA 0.259 million as against an estimated UA 0.86 million, representing 30.1%. The contribution of beneficiaries is estimated at UA 0.064 million compared to an estimated UA 0.250 million in human and works investment.

#### 6. Lessons Learnt and Recommendations

- 6.1 The comparison between the estimates and outcomes presented in the table below (27% physical output for feeder roads) and the description presented above show that the project generally failed to achieve the objectives set. Sustainability of outcomes depends on the financial participation and supervision of CRDs by the DNGR after the completion of the project. The main lessons to be learnt and recommendations to be made in the completion report may be summarized as follows:

##### Main Lessons:

- The involvement of decentralized entities (CRDs) in activities related to their local development plans during the project preparation and implementation must be effective.
- The implementation of activities by the decentralized entities (CRDs and urban councils) should, in priority, be for local SMEs which use simple and high labour-intensive methods.
- The programming of project activities defined at appraisal should be adhered to, even at the cost of coercive measures against defaulting operators.
- Prepare appropriate bidding documents and terms of reference for services and works to ensure that suitable bidders are selected for project implementation
- The intervention schedule for technical assistance and engineering consultant should be flexible enough to reflect the project implementation schedule.

- Community activities should be conducted using a participatory approach based on the mobilization of human and financial resources to ensure continuity of the project.

- The project owner must ensure implementation of coercive measures against non-performing contractors who fail to abide by their contractual commitments.
- The technical and financial management of a project co-financed by several donors must be entrusted to a single project coordination entity.
- Avoid including in a project components that are not inter-related which do not form part of the prerogatives of the delegated project owner

Recommendations:

For the Government:

- Expedite the approval of draft decrees and orders establishing the National Land Board, Land Technical Committee, and Land Committees of the CRDs.
- Update the databank on the capacity of each country to guide the procurement committee in selecting appropriate contractors and consultants.
- Ensure that internal and external project monitoring-evaluation entities function satisfactorily.
- Avoid changing project owners in the course of implementation.
- Ensure that protocols and agreements with government institutions are enforced.

For the Bank:

- Cancel the loan balance of UA 4,773,641.45.
- Be more involved in bid evaluation and contract award;
- Ensure that the implementation schedule of each project activity is adhered to and subject this to the relevant disbursements.
- At appraisal, ensure the accuracy of information on pre-project situation (institutional framework, social actors, ongoing projects and initiatives, and baseline data) in order to better define the objectives and expected impacts of the project and correctly target the activities underpinning them.
- Ensure that the multidisciplinary composition of the Bank's supervision mission teams reflects the status of services pertaining to the disciplines.
- At project appraisal ensure that partner government institutions in the implementation are ready to carry out the activities assigned them.

Physical and Financial Status of Main Project Activities

Activities	Operator	Quantities	Amount	Disbursed	Outputs		
					NGF Billion EUR 1000	NGF Billion EUR 1000	As at 10/3/10
Feeder Road Rehabilitation (lot 1)	SACODES	224 km	10.529	7.567	71.6 km	164.7km	73.6%
Feeder Road Rehabilitation (lot 3)	SOMACO	212 km	9.820	6.575	86.5km	113.7km	53.7%
Feeder Road Rehabilitation (lot 2)	GFC	279 km	12.536	0	0km	0km	Terminated in May 2009
Feeder Road Rehabilitation (lot 4)	SERPAG	305 km	15.542	3.108 avance	0	0	Terminated in May 2009
Construction of Bridges in Mandiana	SELEN	2 bridges	0.976	0.791		2	100%
Construction of culverts over 14 km of feeder roads in Siguiri	SACODES/E GA	16 culverts	0.542	0.396806		16 culverts on 14 km	100%
Strengthening of CVEP	Berca/Baara	112		0.151046	112	112	100%
Final designs and BDs (8months)	CIRA/WEST ing	1080km	218,428 M.Euros	291.452 M.Euros	1080	1080	100%
Control of Works (20months)	CIRA : WEST ing	540 km	627,433 M.Euros	529.271M.Euros	112 km	293 km	54.3%
Land Tenure Security (monographs 2 CRDs)	Avodeg Udeba 4/4/06	2 CRD	0.3976	0.03997	2 CRD	2 CRD	19.42%
Topo-land Surveys	Avodeg Udeba	2CRD	0.3976	0	0	0	0
Preparation of Joint Decrees and Orders for CNF and CTF	DOCAD/MH	1decree and 2 orders	NA	NA	0	0	0
Rural Land Plans 1/2000 and 1/10000 Map	IGN/surveyor		NA	NA	0	0	0
Putting in place of CF/CRD, CFV and CFIV	SRFR/NGO		NA	NA	0	0	0
HIV/AIDS	DNSP	11 prefectures	0.249804	0.227603	0	11 prefectures	100%