

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP



Independent Assessment of the Quality at Entry of ADF 2005-2008 Operations and Strategies

FINAL SUMMARY REPORT

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**OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT
(OPEV)**

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Abbreviations

ADB/AfDB	African Development Bank
ADF	African Development Fund
BPS	Best Practice Standard
CODE	Committee on Operations and Development Effectiveness
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DARMS	Documents and Records Management System (of AfDB)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
GAD	Gender and Development
HQ	Headquarters
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MTS	Medium Term Strategy
NDP	National Development Plan
OPEV	Operations Evaluation Department
OpsCom	Operations Committee
ORQR	Quality Assurance and Results Department
OVE	Office of Evaluation and Oversight (of IADB)
PAR	Project Appraisal Report
PBL	Policy-based Lending
PCN	Project Concept Note
PFM	Public Finance Management
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QAG	Quality Assurance Group of World Bank
QEA	Quality-at-Entry Assessment
RBCSP	Results-based Country Strategy Paper
RBLF	Results-based Logical Framework
RMC	Regional Member Country
RR	Readiness Review
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WID	Women in Development

Executive Summary

i. This summary report presents the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of an independent review of quality at entry of African Development Fund operations and strategies for the years 2005 and 2008, commissioned by the Operations Evaluation Department of the African Development Bank. The objectives of the study were: a) to assess whether the quality at entry of strategies and operations financed through the ADF has improved in recent years; b) to identify key factors driving and/or constraining quality at entry of strategies and ADF-funded operations; and c) to recommend further actions to strengthen the quality at entry of future ADF-financed strategies and operations.

ii. **Methodological approach.** Quality at entry refers to aspects of a Bank project, programme or strategy at the time it enters the portfolio—that is, after Board approval, but before implementation begins. The evaluation was based on: a) an assessment of quality at entry in a sample of ADF-financed investment and policy-based lending operations approved during 2005 (the first year of operation under ADF-10) and during 2008 (the first year of operation under ADF-11), drawing comparisons between the review years; b) an assessment of quality at entry in a sample of country strategies approved between the beginning of 2005 and the end of 2008, looking for improvements over the review period; c) a review of Bank policies and procedures relevant to quality at entry, including the effects of recent reforms on quality at entry; and d) staff surveys and interviews.

iii. **Quality at entry: Performance of Operations.** The overall quality at entry of operations showed moderate improvement between 2005 and 2008. The panel assessment using two different frameworks revealed this upward performance, which was also perceived by the majority of the staff interviewed. On the basis of the assessment undertaken using the more conventional assessment framework, the percentage of operations with at least moderately satisfactory or better quality at entry rose from 68% in 2005 to 80% in 2008. A similar trend is also noted in the aggregate quality dimension level scores, which show that 77% of the dimension level scores of all sample operations were at least moderately satisfactory or better in 2005 and this figure rose to 84% in 2008. Statistically significant improvements were noted in the quality dimensions of: a) Technical, financial and economic aspects; b) Policy and institutional aspects; and c) Implementation arrangements. However, quality at entry between 2005 and 2008 significantly deteriorated for poverty, gender and social development, and in terms of “storyline analysis” (i.e. logic linking inputs with expected results).

iv. **Quality at entry: Performance of Country Strategy Papers.** Of the 12 CSPs reviewed, six recorded moderately satisfactory or better quality at entry. These included two 2008 approvals and the two joint assistance strategies which were reviewed. The quality at entry of the remaining six was judged unsatisfactory.

v. Quality at entry of CSPs was found to be better in countries where the Bank has relatively large portfolio of assistance and where the Bank has been undertaking regular portfolio reviews (Ethiopia, Burkina Faso and Zambia). The Joint Assistance Strategies have a significantly higher number of satisfactory ratings overall, except on efficiency and crosscutting issues.

vi. For four countries, CSPs from both 2005 and 2008 were reviewed, allowing comparison of CSPs over time. Although the small number reviewed makes generalization

difficult, the comparisons revealed overall improvement of quality at entry to be negligible. However, between 2005 and 2008, CSP quality at entry increased on four criteria: selectivity, effectiveness, partnership and harmonisation, and learning from experience, and remained unchanged on risk assessment and state fragility analysis. At the same time, quality at entry performance deteriorated on four criteria: relevance, efficiency, managing for results and crosscutting issues. Poverty analysis, mainstreaming of crosscutting issues, stakeholder participation and management for results have received considerable attention since 2000, but did not improve during the review period.

vii. ***Factors influencing quality at entry.*** The major factors that were found to be relevant to the quality at entry of operations and strategies include commitment to results, effectiveness of review structures and processes, adequacy of resources for preparation, availability of staff capacity and required skills-mix, and realistic planning cycles and lending targets.

viii. In recent years, the Bank has implemented several key measures to ensure quality at entry, including the creation of the Quality Assurance and Results Department (ORQR), a new review process spearheaded by the Operations Committee, and simplification of procedures. Various steps have been taken to ensure the consistency of operations with CSPs, and to provide training in economic analysis, financial analysis, and logical frameworks. PARs are now expected to include baseline information, which is a key requirement for improving quality at entry and measurement of results throughout the project cycle. The new PAR format issued in 2008 incorporates these measures and Task Managers have been following the new format.

ix. Most significantly, in the course of 2009, ORQR has piloted Readiness Reviews (RR) targeted directly at improving quality at entry. RRs appear to offer a powerful tool for strengthening the focus on quality at entry. The Bank should complete the piloting of RRs and build this tool into its procedures, adapting it for use with a range of aid instruments.

x. Some of the major reforms initiated by the Bank that have the potential to substantially influence quality at entry such as human resource augmentation and decentralisation are in the early stages of implementation and hence cannot be expected to have impacted quality at entry of operations and strategies in the period under review.

xi. ***Recommendations.*** In order to improve quality at entry, it is recommended that the Bank:

- a) **Set clear quality standards directly targeting quality at entry.** Readiness Reviews provide a set of criteria against which to assess quality at entry, but they do not provide a clear statement of the standards to be met. Explicit quality standards should be included in the forthcoming revised Operations Manual.
- b) **Under the new quality standards for operations and country strategies, provide Bank Staff and management with mandatory, high quality training appropriate to their various responsibilities.** Training in this area has so far not been mandatory and has been somewhat piecemeal. A concerted effort to raise the level of staff skills and awareness is required.
- c) **Carefully monitor compliance by Bank staff and management with the new standards and processes.** Management should undertake annual QEAs to monitor

the effectiveness of the ongoing reforms, including compliance with the relevant standards and procedures. Independent assessments should also be undertaken periodically for validation: CODE should consider tasking OPEV to undertake a further independent QEA review in 2011.

- d) **Undertake, as a priority, a review of constraints contributing to weak quality at entry with regard to poverty, gender and environmental aspects in operations and country strategies, and take appropriate measures to promote improvements.**
- e) **Put in place appropriate IT systems to enable archiving of PAR Annexes and supporting documentation for future use.** Currently, this material cannot be readily retrieved, despite its utility for project implementation.
- f) **Re-emphasise the strategic role of the Operations Committee (OpsCom),** in the forthcoming review, in ensuring quality at entry by giving more attention to the factors driving quality at entry, and ensure effective management of the upstream processes of project identification and design.

1. INTRODUCTION

Background

1.1 This report presents a summary of the main methods, findings, conclusions and recommendations of the synthesis report of an independent review of quality at entry of African Development Fund (ADF) operations and strategies for the years 2005 and 2008, commissioned by the Operations Evaluation Department of the African Development Bank.¹ Quality at entry refers to aspects of a Bank project, programme or strategy at the time it enters the portfolio—that is, after Board approval, but before implementation begins. The quality at entry assessment was carried out as part of ADF-11 mid-term review.² The review was launched in April 2009 and completed in August 2009.

1.2 This section of the summary report outlines the purpose and methods of the review. The next section describes the Bank's approach to quality at entry, including ongoing reforms and the results of previous quality-at-entry assessments. Subsequent sections present the review findings on the quality at entry of operations and of country strategies; analysis of key reforms and factors relevant to improve quality at entry. A final section presents the conclusions and recommendations.

Purpose and objectives

1.3 The 2005-2008 Quality-at-Entry Assessment (QEA) was designed to contribute towards further strengthening of the quality, performance and impact of the ADF strategies and operations. The review aims to assess whether the quality at entry of ADF strategies and operations has improved in recent years and to identify factors driving and constraining quality at entry with a view to identifying cost-effective ways and means of supporting sustained improvements in quality at entry in the future, as well as identifying risks and constraints likely to reduce quality.

1.4 The key QEA questions were:

- a) To what extent has the quality at entry of strategies and operations financed through the ADF improved in recent years?
- b) What are the key factors driving and/or constraining improvements in quality at entry of strategies and operations financed through the ADF?
- c) What are the evidence-based conclusions and practical and appropriate recommendations for further actions to strengthen the quality at entry of future ADF-financed strategies and operations?

Methods

1.5 The review comprised: a) an assessment of quality at entry in a sample of ADF-financed investment and policy-based lending operations approved during 2005 (the first year of operation under ADF X) and during 2008 (the first year of operation under ADF XI), drawing comparisons between the review years; b) an assessment of quality at entry in a sample of country strategies approved between the beginning of 2005 and the end of 2008,

¹ A UK-based consulting firm, ITAD Ltd., was commissioned by OPEV to undertake the assessment. The team was led by Charles G. Chandler, supported by a team of seven consultants with a wide range of sector experience.

² In order to meet the deadlines for ADF-11 MTR, an Information Note on the main findings, conclusions and recommendations based on the Technical Report of the evaluation, was sent to Management in August 2009.

looking for changes over the review period; c) a review of the framework of policies and procedures relevant to quality at entry, including the effects of recent reforms on quality at entry; and d) staff surveys and interviews. Further details on the methodological approach appear in some of the sub-sections of the subsequent sections and in the Annexes.

1.6 Two QEA frameworks were used in the review of operations. One was the framework of assessment criteria developed by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) at the World Bank and also used by AfDB in previous QEAs. The other was a more stringent framework, dubbed the “Best Practice Standard” (BPS), which includes the QAG criteria, but in addition defines quality at entry in terms of the articulation of a viable intervention model focused on achieving expected outcomes (in other words, a clear “storyline” explicitly linking inputs and activities with intended outcomes. See Annexe 4 for further details). The review also benchmarked the results of this review with the results of comparable studies of operations in other MDBs (the World Bank in particular) where relevant information was available.

1.7 The review of country strategies similarly used a comprehensive assessment framework to allow systematic analysis of 12 Country Strategy Papers prepared between 2005 and 2008, with comparison of earlier and later strategies for four countries. While the small number of cases makes generalisations difficult, the analysis is nevertheless illuminating.

1.8 The inception report and the technical report of the review were reviewed by a review committee within OPEV as well as by a Management Advisory Panel chaired by the Directorate of the Quality Assurance and Results Department (ORQR), with membership drawn from across the operational complexes.

2. CONTEXT

Does quality at entry matter?

2.1 Quality at entry is the foundation on which successful implementation is built. According to the World Bank's Quality Assurance Group, "Quality at entry is a prime determinant of successful development outcomes, and deficiencies in design are difficult to correct during Implementation."³ Clear confirmation of this is provided by statistical work undertaken by the World Bank's independent evaluation office, which identified a strong correlation between sound quality at entry and successful development outcomes, as indicated in the figure below.

Fig. 2.1: Quality at entry and development outcomes in World Bank projects

	<i>Unsuccessful (%)</i>	<i>Satisfactory outcomes (%)</i>
<i>Adequate quality at entry</i>	20	80
<i>Inadequate quality at entry</i>	65	35

(n=1125)
Source: L.G.Morra, U.R.W. Thumm, 1997

2.2 Quality at entry is an important determinant of successful outcomes, but of course effective implementation and supervision are also required to ensure delivery of good results. This is especially so for interventions which depend on stakeholder participation to achieve results, as is often the case with community development activities. But even where a "process approach" is taken to project implementation, thorough analysis and careful design is required at the outset. Although quality at entry and supervision is largely within the control of the Bank, implementation depends on the efforts of many stakeholders, especially the client.

2.3 Quality at entry has become an important operational consideration for many development institutions, including multilateral development banks.

Addressing quality at entry at the African Development Bank

2.4 The African Development Bank increased the emphasis on project quality as long ago as 1994, with the publication of the landmark report of the Task Force on Project Quality, widely known as the "Knox Report."⁴ The Bank has since made considerable efforts to improve the quality of projects and country strategies. In 2004, a substantial independent evaluation of ADF VII-IX,⁵ found that "Country Strategy Paper processes and products have improved steadily" (p.9); and that, with respect to projects, "Progress on quality at entry has clearly been made...but much remains to be done," especially with regard to better preparation and use of logical frameworks (p.101).

³ *Annual Report on Portfolio Performance FY06*, Quality Assurance Group, World Bank, 2007, p.51

⁴ *The Quest for Quality: Report of the Task Force on Project Quality for the African Development Bank, 1994*: otherwise known as the 'Knox Report.'

⁵ *Stepping up to the Future: An Independent Evaluation of the ADF VII, VIII and X*, DARMS Code: ADF/BD/WP/2004/110

2.5 In 2003, the Bank introduced a results measurement framework (RMF) for the ADF, and enhanced this for use in the ADF-10 period (2005-2007). During this period, the Bank introduced a more results-oriented logical framework for operations and also guidelines on risk management. A new, annotated format for Results-Based Country Strategy Papers (RBCSPs) was introduced in December 2004 and modified over the next two years. This provided detailed guidance for preparation of RBCSPs, which was followed in preparing the CSPs from 2005, including those reviewed in this report.

2.6 AfDB's first Quality-at-Entry Assessment was conducted in 2005-2006, which confirmed a critical need to improve logical frameworks for projects, strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems and increase the availability of baseline data, in order to improve operational performance and results reporting. A subsequent review of nearly 100 operations going to the Board in 2006-2007 found that only 37% had adequate baseline data.⁶ This is a critical weakness in quality at entry, as baseline data is a prerequisite for subsequent results monitoring and evaluation.

2.7 The ADF-11 background report on Results Reporting for ADF-10 and Results Measurement Framework for ADF-11 defines a medium-term agenda on quality and results which focuses on institutional reforms in five areas: i) enhancing quality at entry of operations and strategies; ii) instilling a results-oriented supervision culture; iii) enhancing learning and accountability through evaluation; iv) improving data and results reporting systems; and v) accelerating decentralisation and harmonisation for better results on the ground. This report and the concluding ADF-11 Deputies' Report of December 2007 acknowledge the need to enhance the overall quality of Bank country strategies and operations. Noting that "We must improve the quality at entry of operations so that countries and development partners have clarity as to their purpose, fit and expected impact," the Deputies' Report defines a number of reform commitments related to strengthening development effectiveness and the results focus of ADF operations. More specifically, the ADF-11 Results Framework includes a set of quantitative institutional effectiveness indicators to monitor progress in improving the quality at entry of Bank interventions (see Table 2.1) and spells out a range of reform measures to ensure the quality at entry of Bank country strategies and operations:

- improving analytic work to underpin country strategies and sector programmes;
- enhancing quality review early in the preparation process, at concept stage;
- providing just-in-time guidance to task teams on quality at entry standards;
- strengthening results-frameworks for country strategies and operations;
- including baseline data on expected results in appraisal reports submitted to the Boards;
- including standard output and outcome indicators in operations; and
- reducing delays from operations approval to disbursement.

⁶ *Results Reporting for ADF-10 and Results Measurement Framework for ADF-11*. Background Paper for ADF Replenishment.

Table 2.1: Institutional Effectiveness – Internal Reform Indicators during ADF-11: Ensuring Quality-at-Entry for strategies and operations

Indicator	Baseline Value 2006	Latest Value 2008	Target Value 2009
Percentage of new CSPs with satisfactory baseline data at entry	33	38	60
Percentage of new operations with satisfactory baseline data at entry	37	50	60

Source: African Development Bank 2009a.

2.8 To stimulate and coordinate the implementation of the agenda on Managing for Development Results, the Bank established in July 2008 the Quality Assurance and Results Department (ORQR). One of the main functions of ORQR is to lead Bank-wide efforts to improve quality at entry of Bank operations. Key activities with respect to this function include: i) developing a coherent set of quality standards and review tools for country strategies and operations; ii) reviewing and providing guidance to Regional and Sector Departments on country strategies and operations to ensure their compliance with the Bank’s policies, notably with social and environmental safeguards; iii) promoting Bank-wide ownership and institutionalisation of new results-based approaches through staff development and establishing effective working relationships with Departments; and iv) reporting and monitoring progress on quality at entry dimensions and undertaking related analysis. An important recent initiative led by ORQR is the piloting of a ‘Readiness Review’ exercise aimed at setting quality at entry criteria and standards for operations (see Box 2.1).

2.9 Over the past year, the Bank has also developed an important tool for assessing the quality of its private sector operations—the Additionality and Development Outcome Assessment (ADOA). This has been developed by the Chief Economist’s complex, and provides an *ex ante* approach to assessing the likely development outcomes of private sector operations, thereby strengthening the system of peer reviews and risk analysis already in place.

Box 2.1: Readiness Reviews to enhance quality-at-entry and results focus

In early 2009, the Bank launched a new review tool, the “Readiness Review” (RR), to support the quality-at-entry and results orientation of country strategies and operations. The RR focuses on *generic* quality at entry aspects, thereby complementing technical peer reviews, and provides operations Task Managers with a structured set of comments geared towards improving the conceptual quality and design of Appraisal Reports (PAR) and Concept Notes (PCN) prior to Board submission. Specific RR templates for PARs and PCNs were developed, containing a well-defined set of review criteria, together with guidance to Task Managers on the standards to be met and rating methodology. An overall rating is arrived at with a summary assessment, while specific problem areas that require attention are also flagged. The RR intervenes at Country Team Review stage, thereby providing feedback to project teams early in the preparation process.

ORQR has effectively started to undertake RRs for investment projects at the beginning of January 2009 on a pilot phase basis. Preliminary findings from the RR confirm the need to improve the analytical underpinning of projects, enhance lessons learning, strengthen alignment and harmonisation to the Paris Declaration principles, and improve the results-frameworks of projects.

Sources: i) African Development Bank 2009a; and ii) the Readiness Review formats for CSPs, Public Sector Investment Projects, and Policy-based Lending.


2.10 Another important step taken to enhance the quality of operations has been the establishment of the senior level Operations Committee (OpsCom) with the mandate to strengthen strategic selectivity, internal cohesion, and compliance across all Bank operations, and provide oversight of quality assurance of operations. Although chartered in 2006, OpsCom did not begin active review of operations until January 2008, following streamlining of the process for preparation and review of investment operations. It now meets

regularly and provides an important quality filter for PCNs and PARs (see section 5 for further discussion).

2.11 However, it is important to note that many of the reforms focused on quality at entry and the wider results agenda have only been introduced in the course of 2008 and 2009. Many stem from the recommendations set out in the ADF Deputies' Report of December 2007. As noted above, it is as recently as July 2008 that the major step was taken to establish ORQR with a mandate to take the results agenda forward.

2.12 It follows, therefore, that operations approved in 2008, the first year of ADF-11 operations, could have been impacted by the ongoing reforms to only a limited degree. Many operations approved in 2008 would have been identified and prepared in previous years. Figure 2.2 below illustrates this point.

2.13 Careful analysis of ongoing reforms also bears out this conclusion. Assessment of 27 key reforms indicates that most had not yet progressed sufficiently to impact upon operations approved in 2008, or are not directly relevant to quality at entry. Nevertheless, the review identified three sets of reforms which may have had a measurable influence on quality at entry significantly. These are further discussed in Section 5.



Previous QEAs at AfDB

2.14 **Bank-wide QEA 2005.** The Bank undertook the first QEA in 2005 based on the review of a sample of 20 projects and 7 PBL operations approved in 2004. The QEA was organized by the Operations Policy and Compliance Department (ORPC), and implemented by Bank staff within a peer review framework rather than by an independent external panel.

The QEA used the QAG assessment criteria to track the quality of design logic, development objectives and intended results of Bank Group operations.

2.15 The QEA rated all sample operations satisfactory overall, perhaps indicating that the rating standard was not very stringent. However, the assessment did highlight significant variations in specific quality dimensions, especially between investment and adjustment operations. Adjustment operations were found to be well prepared in several major quality dimensions, including technical, policy and institutional aspects, fiduciary aspects, implementation arrangements and the Bank inputs and processes. Adjustment operations were however weak in social and poverty aspects, and environmental safeguards. These aspects were given better ratings in investment operations. Investment operations were also rated positively with regard to project/programme concept, objectives and approach, as well as technical, policy, institutional and fiduciary aspects. However, the quality of gender analysis received low ratings.

2.16 The major constraints to quality at entry identified by the QEA concerned staff shortages and skills-mix, and severe time constraints during preparation. The analysis identified shortcomings in many areas of project preparation, especially those that required analytical work in gender, governance, poverty analyses, assessment of political capacity and will, financial management capacities of Borrowers, and environmental aspects. The QEA made recommendations to refine the quality improvement measures outlined in the ADF-10 Action Plan 2005-2007, and to improve Bank's institutional capacity especially in the Review Process, Mid-term Reviews, training programmes by the Bank and the Joint Africa Institute, and strategic partnerships for development effectiveness.

2.17 **CSP Reviews and Sector QEAs.**⁷ OPEV has undertaken reviews of quality at entry of operations in the sectors of agriculture and rural development, education and health, as well as a review of CSPs. These reviews found that although the Bank's overall country strategies were relevant to clients' needs, lending programmes did not consistently have a corresponding degree of relevance. Some projects were insufficiently underpinned by analytical work and lessons from experience and some were constrained by weak policy environments in the borrowing countries. The reviews also found an apparent disconnect between the generally high relevance of project objectives and low efficacy and sustainability of implementation, pointing to the need to strengthen the results focus in project design.

⁷ The sector QEAs are available with OPEV as Working Papers for the respective sector evaluations.

3. QUALITY AT ENTRY PERFORMANCE OF 2005 AND 2008 OPERATIONS

Introduction

3.1 Overall, the review found improvement in the quality at entry of ADF operations approved in 2008 over those in 2005. However, as well as noting major areas of good performance, the review also identified areas that require improvement. In presenting these review results, this section first briefly describes the methodological approach.

Methods

3.2 The review assessed the quality at entry of ADF investment and policy based lending (PBL) operations on the basis of the results of: a) an independent panel assessment of a sample of ADF operations approved in 2005 (the first year of operation under ADF-10) and 2008 (the first year of operations under ADF-11); b) review of relevant documents; c) staff interviews and survey; and d) benchmarking with quality at entry performance of World Bank operations for the African Region. The complete methodology is presented in the annexe and Technical report.

3.3 *Sample size and coverage.* The quality at entry assessment covered about 40% of the total number of ADF approvals in 2005 and 2008. Altogether, 39 randomly selected operations were assessed: 19 from 2005 and 20 from 2008. In terms of financial value, the 2005 sample covered 47.1% of the total commitment for that year, while the corresponding figure for 2008 was 35.3%, as shown in Table 3.1 below. This full sample of 39 operations provided the basis for assessment using the framework developed by the World Bank's Quality Assurance Group (QAG). A sub-sample of 20 operations (10 from 2005 and 10 from 2008) was assessed using a more stringent assessment framework, here referred to as the "Best Practice Standard" (BPS).

Table 3.1 Coverage of sample in terms of financial value

Year	ADF commitment (UA million) for all operations	ADF commitment (UA million) for the sample operations	% of sample commitment to total commitment
2005	977.78	460.61	47.1 %
2008	1,426.82	504.02	35.3 %

3.4 In terms of distribution of operations by sector and by region, the sample profile for each year broadly corresponds to the profile of total operations, as shown in the charts below. (The northern region does not feature as it does not include countries receiving ADF finance).

Fig. 3.1 Distribution of all ADF Operations in 2005 & 2008 across Sectors




Fig. 3.2 Distribution of Sample Operations 2005 & 2008 across Sectors




Fig. 3.3 Distribution of all ADF Operations in 2005 & 2008 across Regions





Fig. 3.4 Distribution of Sample Operations 2005 & 2008 across Regions



3.5 Quality at Entry Assessment criteria. The quality at entry of the Bank's operations was mainly assessed on two frameworks: i) QAG with eight quality dimensions and each with sub-dimensions;⁸ and ii) Best Practice Standard (BPS), a more stringent standard with seven quality criteria (see Annexe 4), which integrates the QAG requirements with assessment of the relevance and soundness of the operation's intervention model. A 6-point assessment ratings scale was used. The assessment frameworks and ratings scale are detailed in Annexe 1.

3.6 Other data sources. The review also generated evidence from the review of relevant Bank documentation, interviews with Bank staff and responses from 65 Bank staff to the online survey.

3.7 Methodological limitations. Although the sample of 39 was broadly representative of the overall portfolio of operations (see figures 3.1-3.4), its small size limited the scope of

⁸ The assessment variables include 8 quality dimensions and a criterion relating to Bank Inputs and Processes, and correspond to the World Bank Quality Assurance Group (QAG) framework which was used by the Bank in the 2005 QEA and by OPEV sector level QEAs in: i) Health sector (2005); Education sector (2007); and Agriculture and Rural Development sector (2007).

statistical analysis and with respect to several dimensions made it difficult to derive statistically significant QEA results. Regarding the QAG assessment framework, this has often been criticised for two weaknesses: firstly, for giving equal weighting to all criteria; and, secondly, for including only a limited assessment of the viability of the operation's intervention model. The shortcomings of equal weighting in the QAG framework was partly remedied by introducing a negative weighting for the dimensions that scored moderately unsatisfactory or worse (see Annexe 1 for details). The effects of these weaknesses on the review results were considered minimal because of the relatively short time interval (2005 and 2008) and the use of other sources of evidence such as the BPS analysis.


Overall quality at entry of operations

3.8 As per the QAG framework, overall quality at entry of operations has improved moderately over the period 2005-2008 as illustrated in the Figure 3.5 below. The figure shows the distribution of operations ratings with respect to the various quality dimensions as well as overall quality at entry on a 6-point rating scale. The overall quality at entry rating of operations has increased from 4.1 in 2005 to 4.3 in 2008. Though this overall change is not considered as statistically significant, at the dimension and sub-dimension levels there are statistically significant improvements as well as deterioration.

3.9 *Areas of improvement.* Quality at entry of operations was assessed in terms of eight quality dimensions under the QAG framework and the BPS. The assessment revealed three quality dimensions with substantial improvements between 2005 and 2008.⁹ Statistically significant improvements under the QAG and BPS frameworks were noted in: a) Technical, Financial and Economic Aspects (Dimension 2); b) Policy and Institutional Aspects (Dimension 6); and c) Implementation Arrangements (Dimension 7) (see below: Figure 3.5 & Table 3.2). The assessment of the quality dimensions was based on rating of various sub-dimensions. Among the sub-dimensions, significant improvements were noted in a) Ownership and commitment for implementation (under Dimension 6); b) Readiness of the first year's programme for implementation (under Dimension 7); and c) Quality of project implementation plan (also under Dimension 7).







3.10 *Areas of deterioration.* For most of the remaining quality at entry dimensions, changes in ratings between 2005 and 2008 were not found to be statistically significant. However, the ratings deteriorated significantly on several aspects concerned with poverty, gender, social, stakeholder and the storyline (see Figure 3.5 & Table 3.2). Two dimensions in the storyline analysis as per the BPS, viz. the project concept, objectives and approach and risk assessment have declined. In explaining deterioration in the rating for Dimension 3 (Poverty, gender and social development), it is relevant to note that some of the projects in 2005 had gender specialists and/or poverty reduction specialists as part of their task teams, but this was not as common in 2008. Although these weak areas of quality at entry are being targeted by ongoing measures and reform, they nonetheless present the Bank with a key challenge in improving the overall quality at entry of operations.

⁹ A ninth QAG dimension concerning Bank inputs and processes could not be assessed for lack of adequate relevant information.



3.11 Poverty analysis. The majority of the operations reviewed in the sample have only used quantitative income-related indicators to measure poverty, thus omitting significant aspects of poverty in Africa, reflected in such areas as access to and use of basic services, justice and security. The nexus between poverty, gender-based disadvantages and quality of governance was usually not addressed well in project designs. Poverty analyses rarely disaggregated the population, making it difficult to identify likely impacts on different groups or target interventions efficiently. Project designs rarely included a baseline, impeding measurement of any reduction in poverty attributable to the specific project, although this issue is now being addressed by the requirement that all PARs should include baseline data. It is important to note that the availability and reliability of poverty data at the country level and weaknesses in statistical systems are important factors affecting the quality of poverty analysis. Although the Bank is assisting with statistical capacity building, the quality and availability of statistical data will take time to improve, especially in fragile states.

Table 3.2: Significant changes in BPS quality dimension ratings of operations, 2005-2008⁽¹⁾

Quality Dimension	Year	Average BPS QEA Rating		Significant Change	
		US (1.0-3.4)	MS (3.5-6.0)		
1. Concept, objectives and approach ⁽²⁾	2005		3.8	Deteriorated	
	2008	3.1			
2. Technical, financial & economic aspects	2005		4	Improved	
	2008		4.6		
3. Poverty, gender & social development	2005	3.2		Deteriorated	
	2008	2.7			
4. Environmental aspects	2005		3.7	Negligible	
	2008		3.9		
5. Project management/fiduciary aspects	2005		4.1	Negligible	
	2008		4.3		
6. Policy & institutional aspects	2005		4.6	Improved	
	2008		4.8		
7. Implementation arrangements	2005		4.2	Improved	
	2008		4.5		
8. Risk assessment ⁽²⁾	2005		3.8	Deteriorated	
	2008	3.1			
Overall quality at entry rating	2005		3.6	Negligible	
	2008	3.4			

(1) n = 20 (i.e. 10 from 2005 and 10 from 2008)

(2) Under BPS, dimensions 1 and 8 are rated using storyline analysis technique rather than the QAG questionnaire. MS: Moderately satisfactory or better; US: Unsatisfactory; BPS: Best Practice Standard (assessment framework).

3.12 **Gender analysis.** The Bank has recently stepped up its work on gender equality with the approval of an updated Gender Plan of Action and the appointment of more gender specialists. (See Box 3.1 for the specific steps taken by the Bank since 2008 towards mainstreaming gender.) But there is much to be done to improve the treatment of gender issues in project design. The majority of projects reviewed lacked a contextual gender analysis: this was usually found only when a project focused on women in the traditional areas of health and child care. None of the projects reviewed included a monitoring and evaluation framework integrating gender indicators with indicators for poverty. It should however be noted that operations in social, water supply and sanitation and environment sectors have addressed the gender issues better than those in other sectors. This could be accounted for by the enhanced inputs of gender experts in those operations.

Box 3.1: The Bank addressing gender mainstreaming issues

The Bank has taken several measures towards gender mainstreaming since 2008, in particular the establishment of a Unit for Gender, Climate Change and Sustainable Development (OSUS) in July 2008. By the end of 2009, OSUS had four gender experts. Along with gender experts of other departments, OSUS gender experts are members of Country Teams and provide inputs to these teams. However, gender experts are not yet included in all country teams. The Unit is building collaborative work with various departments including OSHD, OSAN, ORQR, ESTA and OSGE with the aim of enhancing gender mainstreaming across the Bank's work. Currently there are few gender experts in key sectors, and several of these have only recently been recruited.

The gender experts are not always involved early on in the design stage which would enable their inputs to be well integrated into the programme and support quality at entry. There is no mechanism yet to ensure that the inputs of gender experts are taken into account. Recently, the Bank has started a drive to increase participation of gender experts in appraisal and supervision missions. This has begun to show results as reflected in the increased demand for participation of gender experts in appraisal missions.

The Bank has prepared an Updated Gender Plan of Action (UGPA) which was approved in May 2009. The UGPA sets out concrete measures and actions for gender mainstreaming in the Bank. By the end of 2009, OSUS had developed checklists for at least five sectors to help Task Managers and other operations staff to effectively mainstream gender in the project cycle. A Gender Helpdesk has been established to ensure rapid response to requests from Task Managers and other operations staff for information and inputs on gender. OSUS has launched a training programme and has already trained over 60 Task Managers and other Operations staff on various topics relating to gender mainstreaming at sector level. This will be an ongoing exercise to consolidate knowledge but challenges remain regarding the willingness of staff to put this into use.

The Bank has identified inclusion of gender responsive indicators at the outcome level as a KPI which is helpful in both programme design and monitoring. The Readiness Review criteria—designed by ORQR—now include a section on gender, and all projects will be scored as part of the Readiness Review. This was not in existence between 2005 and 2008. All these measures together are expected to accelerate gender mainstreaming in the Bank's programmes and strategies.

Box 3.2: Poverty, gender and social aspects – infrastructure and social sectors compared

A disaggregated analysis of Poverty, Gender and Social Development dimension ratings of the QEA sample operations shows that these crosscutting issues were mainstreamed better in the social sector than in the infrastructure sector. For most of the components in this quality dimension, the social sector operations were rated higher than those in the infrastructure sector, as shown in the table below. Even though the overall rating for this dimension was moderately unsatisfactory, the treatment of poverty issues was rated moderately satisfactory for both social and infrastructure sectors. While the gender sub-dimension was moderately unsatisfactory in infrastructure operations, it was moderately satisfactory in the social sector.

Quality dimension / sub-dimensions	Average quality rating (2005&2008)		
	Infrastructure (n=11)	Social (n=7)	Overall (n=18)
Quality of Poverty, Gender and Social Aspects	3.0	3.4	3.1
a) Focus on poverty issues	3.5	4.1	3.7
b) Extent to which gender issues were considered during project design	2.7	3.5	3.0
c) Extent to which relevant social development issues - including population issues - were considered in project design and institutional arrangements	2.7	3.2	2.9
d) Quality of stakeholder analysis and consultation	3.3	3.4	3.4
e) Appropriateness and realism of arrangements to manage and mitigate any adverse social impact arising out of the project	2.5	2.5	2.5

Note: In this analysis, 'Infrastructure' comprises projects in Transport, Water Supply and Sanitation, and Power sectors. 'Social' comprises projects in Health, Education and standalone Poverty Reduction.

It is likely that mainstreaming of poverty, gender and social development issues in the infrastructure sector operations is more difficult than in the social sector operations without added inputs and commitment in this regard. The recent steps taken by the Bank in gender mainstreaming mentioned in Box 3.1 above is an effort to address this gap in project and programme design practice.

3.13 **Storyline analysis.** The significant deterioration of ratings for the storyline analysis as per the BPS—particularly in two of its three component dimensions, viz. project concept, objectives and approach and risk assessment—could be partly attributed to the implementation of the new PAR format in 2008, which included a page limitation and a stipulation that supporting documents be placed in annexes. This generally resulted in PARs with certain aspects being abridged or left out, including the description of the sector context and the problem description.

3.14 **Overall quality at entry based on quality dimension scores.** The quality dimension-wise analysis of the portfolio of 2005 and 2008 as per the QAG assessment method shows an improvement in the quality dimension scores in operations that are rated moderately satisfactory and above—an increase from 77% in 2005 to 84% in 2008. However, as per the BPS, there has not been any substantial change in the quality dimension scores that are moderately satisfactory and above (see diagrams 3.6 and 3.7).

Fig. 3.6: Percentage of quality dimension scores of all sample operations rated moderately satisfactory and above in 2005-2008 under QAG framework






Fig. 3.7: Percentage of quality dimension scores of sample operations rated moderately satisfactory and above 2005-2008 under PBS



3.15 **Operations rated moderately satisfactory and above.** The dimension level analysis presented above has indicated several important areas for improvement that are necessary for the Bank's operations to ensure satisfactory quality at entry. However, while averaging the quality dimension level scores to calculate the quality at entry of a project, as per the QAG framework, the important shortfalls in quality get masked, as a result of which many of such operations receive a score of moderately satisfactory or above. As per this simple average, 90% of the projects in 2005 and 100% of projects in 2008 scored moderately satisfactory or above. In the context of serious quality shortfalls in certain dimensions as revealed by the QAG framework as well as BPS, it is necessary to arrive at realistic quality at entry ratings for the assessed operations. Serious shortfalls in any quality dimension have the potential to adversely affect the achievement of an operation's objectives and hence should be considered as ineligible for approval by the Board. Hence, this QEA has decided to give a negative weighting to the quality dimensions that were rated moderately unsatisfactory or worse (see Annexe 1 for the details on the method used). As per the revised calculation, 68% of operations in 2005 and 80% of operations in 2008 were rated moderately satisfactory or better. While showing an overall improvement in quality at entry over time, these numbers also indicate that if review processes were rigorous and results-oriented, 32% of operations in 2005 and 20% of operations in 2008 should have been subjected to further quality enhancement processes before approval by the Board. The change in quality at entry of operations over the period 2005-2008 is consistent with the staff

Fig. 3.8: Overall quality at entry of operations in 2005 and 2008 – percentage rated moderately satisfactory or better



survey results which showed that more than two thirds of the respondents perceived that there was an improvement in quality at entry of the ADF-funded operations.

Findings from the comparators' quality assessments

3.16 Several multilateral development banks have taken steps to assess quality at entry. The World Bank established its Quality Assurance Group in 1996. The QAG developed a robust methodology and has undertaken a series of QEAs which have helped management to improve quality at entry over the past decade. Few bilateral agencies appear to have undertaken systematic work on quality at entry. However, AusAid has published several QEA reports.¹⁰

3.17 Comparisons between MDBs is inherently difficult, given wide differences in their mandates, operational contexts, institutional arrangements and their human and financial resources. The effort to compare and benchmark quality at entry of ADF operations and strategies with other MDBs is complicated by several factors including a) the assessment methodology followed; b) the assessment periods; and c) the degree of independence of panellists from Management. However, the available data merit consideration.

3.18 ***QEAs at the World Bank.*** The latest quality-at-entry assessment (QEA8 for FY06-07 operations) by the World Bank's Quality Assurance Group showed that, globally, 93% of the World Bank's operations were moderately satisfactory or better. The corresponding figure for FY04-05 operations was 92%. The operations in the Africa region of the World Bank performed better at 96% satisfactory or better for FY06-07, an increase of 13 percentage points from the QEA for FY04-05 operations. The noticeable improvements were in strategic relevance, candour and realism of operations. Environmental aspects were found to be weak in the Africa region operations (on a par with this aspect of ADF operations). For comparison, the overall rating of ADF operations in 2008 (at 81%) is 15 percentage points lower than the overall rating for the World Bank Africa Region for FY06-07.

3.19 ***QEA at the Asian Development Bank.*** The QEA carried out by the Asian Development Bank for the projects and country strategies approved in 2004–2005 found that 81% of the 31 sample projects assessed were of satisfactory or better quality at entry.¹¹ Coincidentally, the overall rating for ADF operations in 2008 is the same, despite the very different operational context.

3.20 ***Evaluability Assessments of IADB.*** The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) does not usually carry out full-fledged quality-at-entry assessments but the Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE) has conducted evaluability assessments as part of the Bank's commitment to improve management for results. The evaluability assessment examines a set of design-specific aspects that allow these projects to be evaluated, and hence defined as "evaluability."¹² The ratings are not directly comparable with the QEA ratings as the quality dimensions and assessment methodologies are not harmonised.

¹⁰ The most recent was published in 2005: *Rapid review of Quality at Entry (QAE) 2004: innovative activity design*. Australian Agency for International Development. Quality Assurance Group, 2005.

¹¹ *Managing for Development Results in the Asian Development Bank: A Preliminary Assessment Special Evaluation Study 2007*, p. 25.

¹² Evaluability scores for each project are based on the nine dimensions, viz. (i) diagnosis; (ii) definition of objectives; (iii) project logic; (iv) assumptions and risks; (v) outcome indicators; (vi) outcome indicator baselines; (vii) output indicators; (viii) output indicator baselines; and (ix) monitoring and evaluation.

3.21 OVE carried out evaluability assessments of operations approved by the Board in 2001 and 2005. The 2005 evaluability scores of the quality aspects were found to be generally very low ranging between 1.2% satisfactory for the quality of “diagnosis” to 69.9% for “output indicators.” Comparison of 2001 and 2005 showed no significant progress in quality.

3.22 The study found that the general orientation of operations was towards achievement of outputs rather than achievement of outcomes and identified the immediate need to significantly deepen the analytical underpinnings of all operations in order to respond to the typically complex situations found in the member countries.¹³ Despite the difference in regional context, these observations are largely relevant to the ADF operations reviewed in the current QEA.

¹³ *Instruments and Development: An Evaluation of IDB Lending Modalities*, OVE, IADB. August 2004.

4. QUALITY AT ENTRY PERFORMANCE OF COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS

Introduction

4.1 This section indicates visible improvements of the CSP quality at entry over 2005 and 2008 only at a quarter of the dimensions. It also identifies aspects which require improvement.

Methods

4.2 The present QEA rated a purposively selected sample of 12 CSPs from eight different countries.¹⁴ Very few CSPs were prepared in 2008, the first year of the ADF-11 period, limiting the number of recent CSPs available for assessment. However, for four of the eight countries included in the review, CSPs were prepared in both 2005 and 2008, allowing comparison between CSPs for these countries from the respective time periods. Although these flag up a number of issues for consideration, it is unwise to generalise from a very small number of cases.

4.3 Regarding the QEA assessment framework, criteria used by previous CSP reviews and CSP guidance were developed into a set of 28 criteria on the basis of the DAC quality criteria for evaluation of development assistance. The criteria included aspects of aid effectiveness, harmonisation and partnership as defined by the Paris Declaration.

4.4 The assessment criteria comprised 11 quality dimensions: Relevance; Selectivity; Effectiveness; Risk Assessment; Partnership and Harmonisation; Efficiency; Managing for Results; Crosscutting Issues; Fragile States; Impact and Sustainability; and Lessons from Experience (see Annexe 7). Assessments were based on consideration of 27 sub-dimensions. A six point ratings scale was used (see Box in Annexe 1). Although the analysis was systematic, the conclusions drawn are necessarily indicative given the small sample size.

4.5 The assessment was supplemented by staff interviews and the online staff survey to which 47 staff members responded.

CSPs: Overall quality at entry

4.6 The overall quality at entry of CSPs remained, on balance, unchanged between 2005 and 2008. The overall quality at entry ratings of the 12 CSPs reviewed are presented in Table 4.1 (below). Half of the sample CSPs were rated satisfactory overall at the level of moderately satisfactory and above (level 4 and higher). The Burkina Faso and Uganda CSPs were found to be fully satisfactory (level 5), achieving satisfactory ratings against most quality dimensions. However, no CSP was found to be satisfactory on all criteria. Of the remaining CSPs in the sample, five were rated moderately unsatisfactory (level 3) and one unsatisfactory (level 2). None were highly unsatisfactory (level 1).

4.7 Quality at entry of the sample CSPs was found to be better in countries where the Bank has a relatively large portfolio of assistance. The CSP review confirms that in countries where the Bank has been undertaking regular portfolio reviews (Ethiopia, Burkina Faso and Zambia), CSP quality were generally higher on all criteria.

¹⁴ The 2008 CSP for Angola was an Update of the 2005 CSP, not a new CSP.


Table 4.1: Overall QEA Ratings for Sample Country Strategy Papers

Country Strategy Paper	Year	No. of satisfactory ratings *	Rating					
			HUS	US	MUS	MS	S	HS
Angola	2005	8			3			
Burundi	2005	9			3			
DRC	2005	10			3			
Kenya	2005	11			3			
Burkina Faso	2005	22					5	
Uganda (JAS)	2005	20					5	
Ethiopia	2006	17				4		
Zambia (JAS)	2007	16				4		
Angola (Update)	2008	4			3			
Burundi	2008	14				4		
DRC	2008	4		2				
Kenya	2008	14				4		

* Note: out of the 27 criteria rated to assess 11 CSP quality dimensions

HS: Highly Satisfactory; S: Satisfactory; MS: Moderately Satisfactory

HUS: Highly Unsatisfactory; US: Unsatisfactory; MUS: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Figure 4.2: Comparison of ratings (2005-2008) for Case Study CSPs

4.8 The Joint Assistance Strategies have a significantly higher number of satisfactory ratings overall, except on efficiency (where they are rated similar to Bank CSPs) and on crosscutting issues (which are rated lower than good Bank CSPs). They are generally satisfactory on quality aspects including selectivity and focus, effectiveness and risk assessment, as well as—perhaps to be expected—on partnership and harmonisation. On alignment, they are rated highly satisfactory (level 6) because they are not only aligned with country policies but also with country systems. However, on the sub-dimension of regional integration, the JAS were rated as unsatisfactory, in contrast to the CSPs for Burundi (2008), Kenya (2008), DRC (2005), Burkina Faso (2005) and Ethiopia (2005), all rated moderately satisfactory on this aspect.

4.9 For four of the eight countries included in the review, CSPs were prepared both in 2005 and in 2008. Hence it has been possible to compare the changes in quality between the two time periods, as shown in Figure 4.2 above. For two countries (Burundi and Kenya), quality at entry of the CSP improved from moderately unsatisfactory to moderately satisfactory. For Angola, the quality of the CSP remained unchanged. For the Democratic Republic of Congo, the quality of the CSP declined from moderately unsatisfactory in 2005 to unsatisfactory in 2008.

CSPs: Quality at entry at the quality dimension level

4.10 The analysis of satisfactory ratings across the CSP sample shows that: (a) variation between countries is more substantial than changes over time; and (b) improvements of ratings on some criteria between 2005 and 2008 were offset by deteriorations on other criteria in case study countries.

4.11 In case study countries, the number of satisfactory ratings increased on four criteria: selectivity, effectiveness, partnership and harmonisation and learning from experience. At the same time, two criteria remained unchanged: risk assessment and fragile states, while ratings deteriorated on four criteria: relevance, efficiency, managing for results and crosscutting issues.

Areas of improvement

4.12 ***Selectivity***: Selectivity has improved and is now “moderately satisfactory” or better in all recent strategies. Selectivity was rated higher in recent CSPs because they present a clear attempt to reduce the number of sectors of engagement. Selectivity was most effective in Zambia, Ethiopia and Burundi where the Bank has managed to focus approval of new projects on three sectors over the review period.¹⁵ (Zambia is one of the few examples where the CSP demonstrates a decision to withhold engagement in certain sectors—in this case agriculture—because of capacity constraints).

4.13 However, the use of broadly defined “pillar,” which cover a wide range of sectors, seems to have undermined the effort to focus Bank interventions on fewer projects and sectors. The 2005 Annotated Format for CSPs introduced the concept of strategic pillars linking to higher level objectives as part of its drive to strengthen alignment with country priorities. Most CSPs selected two pillars, as required by the Annotated Format, but the pillars often cover several sectors or even several themes in some cases. In eight out of the twelve CSPs assessed, pillars were found to be too broad to be effective in determining strategic focus and selectivity.

¹⁵ OPEV Data on approved operations between 2005 and 2008.

Box 4.1: Country strategy papers: changes in quality at entry

Burundi Country Strategy Papers: Improvement in Quality at entry

The case of Burundi shows that the Bank can be successful in addressing aspects of alignment and harmonisation if it joins strong partnerships. The 2008 CSP presents a focused and well-aligned approach, which builds on and improved understanding of the fragile state context and provides budget support in partnership with other donors. CSP preparation was linked to a joint World Bank /AFDB mission (in preparation of budget support) and therefore could make use of a wider range of expertise (including governance) and analysis.

The main changes noted between 2005 and 2008 include:

- **Selectivity** was very weak (2) in 2005 and improved; it is now moderately satisfactory (4).
- **Risk analysis and mitigation** improved (moderately satisfactory/4), mainly through use of joint analysis.
- **Portfolio performance** and **mix of funding instruments** improved slightly and is now moderately satisfactory (4); however there is still limited justification of the choice and mix of aid instruments included in the CSP.
- **Use of national systems** has clearly improved with the provision of budget support and is now moderately satisfactory (4).
- **Donor harmonisation** -and AfDB's participation in it- has improved significantly between 2005 and 2008 and is now moderately satisfactory (4).
- The Burundi CSP has a particular focus on **governance**; but there are still substantial weaknesses in a number of areas that are relevant in this aspect.
- However the **analysis of policy and institutional aspects** deteriorated between 2005 and 2008.
- No further improvement with regard to **analysis of governance** aspects between 2005 and 2008; it is still moderately satisfactory (4).

The Bank's support is provided as budget support through the Fragile States Facility, which is better tailored to the context of a fragile state; but the analysis of fragility is weak (3).

DRC Country Strategy Papers: Decline in Quality at entry

The 2005 CSP demonstrates good analysis and strategic thinking. The argument for the Bank's engagement is clearly explained; the rationale provided is focused on development priorities and results. Similarly to other strategies at that time (e.g. Burundi), the CSP is more concerned about relevance criteria than selectivity; as a result the Bank spreads itself across a large number of sectors and there is no obvious focus in its portfolio.

Compared to this, the 2008 strategy is poorly presented, with unsatisfactory analysis and strategic focus. Most of the mainstreaming issues (gender, environment, HIV/AIDS) have not been covered. The overall score therefore went down from "moderately unsatisfactory" (3) to "unsatisfactory" (2).

The DRC CSP mentions that it was prepared through a consultative process and that it is aligned with the wider donor effort. However, the report has presented limited information about the challenging country context and interaction with partners and other donors.

Though the Bank opened field office in DRC in 2007, the improved engagement within the country which was expected at that time has not yet translated into an improved strategy. Unlike Burundi where the Bank does not have a field office there were no visible efforts to conduct joint analysis or missions with partners such as the World Bank, which would have enhanced the quality of the strategy.

4.14 **Knowledge management and lessons learning.** These aspects were visibly strengthened over the review period. For a number of countries, Country Governance Profiles and Country Gender Profiles were prepared over the review period, and have strengthened the analysis included in recent CSPs. The extent to which countries use existing economic and sector work to inform the CSP preparation process varies. A number of CSPs were planning ESW for the CSP period, although only a few of them intended to support joint donor analysis (Burundi 2008, Kenya 2008). Improvements were also noted with regard to lessons learning. Most CSPs include a substantial discussion of specific lessons learned, often derived from preceding portfolio reviews. Several CSPs include specific actions suggested by portfolio reviews (Burkina Faso 2005, Burundi 2008, Kenya 2008, and Zambia 2007); two CSPs include lessons with regard to results (Burkina Faso 2005 and Kenya 2008).

4.15 Country dialogue and partnership. The Bank has taken efforts to strengthen country dialogue and partnership in a number of cases. Three CSPs were rated as satisfactory (level 5) (Burkina Faso 2005, Kenya 2008 and Zambia 2007). A number of CSPs include an agenda for country dialogue, but partnership arrangements are seldom described. There are still a few cases where country dialogue and partnerships are weak (moderately unsatisfactory, level 3), like DRC and Angola. Kenya presents a case where the Bank has strengthened its engagement with country partners during the process of opening a field office.

Box 4.1: Kenya Case Study

The Kenya 2008 CSP has clearly improved on aspects of country partnership. The CSP demonstrates that despite the only recent opening of the Field office (2007), the Bank has already been successful in establishing some presence and strengthening the dialogue within the country. Issues of government ownership feature strongly in this CSP. However, coordinated funding and use of country system still remains to be strengthened. A joint strategy was planned, but being deferred after the change of government.

- **Knowledge management and lessons learning** has been significantly improved and was rated as satisfactory (5). A number of ESW, including joint analysis are planned for the CSP period, which will support strategic themes of this CSP (regional integration).
- **Alignment with government priorities** is satisfactory (5); this is one of the few CSPs, which assesses broad-based national ownership and commitment to the PRSP.
- The **macro-economic analysis** included in the 2008 CSP is moderately satisfactory (4).
- **Selectivity:** The strategy demonstrates a clear attempt to position the Bank within the overall donor landscape, although this does not yet result in greater selectivity and focus, therefore only moderately satisfactory (4).
- **Role in donor harmonization** has strengthened significantly (from 2 to 5, satisfactory); the Bank is now leading the transport sector working group.
- There is significant emphasis on aspects of country dialogue in the strategy, which is rated satisfactory (5).
- Monitoring of the CSP includes aspects of mutual accountability (joint portfolio reviews).
- However, the strategy is still unsatisfactory with regard to use of national systems (2).

4.16 Alignment: General progress was noted with regard to alignment with country priorities, but there is some marked variation between countries, depending on the overall status of donor alignment with PRSP or national development plans. Joint strategies are highly satisfactory (level 6) with regard to alignment because they are aligned to country policies *and* systems. Bank CSPs are usually aligned with PRS policy priorities since the 2005 CSP Annotated Format has introduced policy alignment as a requirement. Alignment is an area where Bank staff feels CSPs have improved most visibly. There is wider agreement among survey respondents that CSP objectives, pillars and indicators are generally or even always aligned with PRSP or NDP (50% and 27.8%). According to the majority of respondents, the Bank has supported the process of policy preparation in some cases, which helped define country priorities (58.3% agree). The CSPs themselves include only limited evidence on the role of the AfDB within this consultation process. In a few cases (e.g. Zambia 2007, DRC 2005) the CSP includes an explicit statement that the Bank provided support in the preparation of the PRSP or the development of a PRSP M&E system.

Aspects requiring more attention

4.17 Some aspects of quality have received considerable attention since 2000, but did not improve during the review period. This includes poverty focus, mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues, stakeholder participation and management for results.

4.18 **Poverty focus:** This aspect was rated “highly satisfactory” (level 6) for the Uganda JAS (2005) and “satisfactory” for Ethiopia (2006) and Burkina Faso (2005). However, it was rated significantly lower for the four 2008 CSPs compared to 2005 ratings in case study countries. Although the availability of poverty data should have improved rather than deteriorated over the years, the analysis included in the 2008 CSP was only “moderately unsatisfactory” or less. This deterioration can be partly attributed to the seemingly lower emphasis put on poverty in the Revised CSP format 2008 (compared to the 2005 CSP format), which combines analyses of social, gender and crosscutting themes in one section. Most CSPs do not provide a convincing argument that they will make a substantial contribution to poverty reduction in the country. The underlying assumption in most CSPs is that alignment with national PRSP will ensure sufficient poverty focus within the portfolio.

4.19 There are limited guidance and tools available to Bank staff to guide good poverty analysis. Lack of reliable and adequate data and analysis was mentioned as a major issue undermining CSP quality in the CSP staff survey. A majority of the respondents in the CSP staff survey thought that poverty expertise within CSP preparation teams was “slightly deficient” (50%) or “insufficient” (20%). The quality of poverty analysis included in the CSP was rated “good enough” by 55.6% of the respondents, but 38.9% thought it was “deficient.”

4.20 **Cross-cutting issues:** Despite supportive corporate policies, progress in mainstreaming gender, HIV/AIDS and environmental issues was found to be limited.¹⁶ The 2008 CSPs show little improvement and even some deterioration in addressing crosscutting issues. On the other hand, regional integration has been successfully launched as a new cross-cutting issue in recent CSPs.

- **Gender:** There was limited progress on gender between 2005 and 2008. The gender analysis included in the CSPs was unsatisfactory or missing in seven CSPs assessed, including the JAS Zambia (2007). Four CSPs suggested concrete ways to support gender equality within the country (including gender mainstreaming); but only one CSP (Ethiopia 2007) was rated fully “satisfactory” (level 5) with regard to gender. 61.1% of the respondents in the staff survey agree that the gender analysis included in CSPs is deficient.
- **HIV/AIDS:** Mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS was unsatisfactory in most of the 2005 CSPs, but issues of HIV/AIDS are barely addressed in the 2008 CSPs. Only three CSPs include HIV/AIDS mitigation strategies (DRC 2005, Kenya 2005 and Uganda 2005) and are therefore rated “moderately satisfactory” (level 4). The Bank has addressed HIV/AIDS through social sector projects; the CSPs contain no evidence that HIV/AIDS risks are mitigated in other high-risk sectors, such as transport, or addressed strategically at country level.
- **Environment and climate change:** Environmental issues are generally discussed in more depth and detail in CSPs where the Bank has ongoing or planned interventions in

¹⁶ Between 2000 and 2005, the Bank has adopted a number of policies to ensure that cross-cutting issues are mainstreamed in operations and CSPs. Efforts to mainstream gender, HIV/AIDS and environmental issues became effective in the 2005 CSP; the 2005 Annotated CSP Format includes clear requirements to address crosscutting issues.

the environment sector (Angola, Burkina Faso and Kenya). There is little discussion of wider issues of sustainable development.

4.21 ***Stakeholder participation:*** Stakeholder participation was rated at least moderately satisfactory (level 4) in all 2005, 2006 and 2007 CSPs. But it was rated unsatisfactory in three of the 2008 CSPs assessed (Burundi, DRC, Angola). Although a description of the consultative process is required by the 2008 Revised Annotated CSP Format, the recent CSPs reviewed did not describe stakeholder consultations. It appears that CSP priorities are usually developed during general consultations between the Bank staff and selected representatives from government institutions. Only one CSP (Burkina Faso 2005) includes evidence that the stakeholder meetings resulted in an adjustment of CSP priorities. In only two cases (DRC 2005, Ethiopia 2007) was it clear that the Bank had consulted with the private sector during CSP preparation: this is surprising, considering the importance of private sector development in a number of CSPs.

4.22 ***Managing for results:*** The CSPs reviewed provide limited evidence that a focus on results has shaped country portfolios, that feasible and rigorous arrangements for monitoring results were set up and that the Bank will be accountable for delivering its support according to the objectives set in the CSP. However, as noted above, those programmes where regular portfolio reviews were conducted demonstrate generally higher quality at entry ratings.

5. FACTORS RELEVANT TO QUALITY AT ENTRY

5.1 The present analysis has considered several factors deemed to be relevant to the quality at entry of operations and strategies in the Bank. The factors likely to have a positive effect on quality at entry include: a) strong commitment to results; b) effective structures and processes for review; c) adequate resources for preparation; d) adequate capacity for preparation, in terms of staff strength and skills-mix; e) realistic planning cycles and lending targets; and f) flexibility in the document size limit of PARs and strategy documents.

Commitment to results

5.2 In recent years the Bank has taken several steps to strengthen the results focus of its operations and strategies to enhance quality at entry. While the steps taken are in the right direction, the effects are being realised at a pace slower than expected. The results based logical framework was introduced in 2005 followed by a series of staff training sessions for its application. The PAR format was revised in 2008 and requires baseline data before appraisal. Enforcement of these requirements has definitely helped ensure that baseline data are included,¹⁷ in the 2008 operations sample for this QEA. The new PAR format contained a modified logical framework that moved away from the “traditional” 4×5 layout to a new 6×3 results-based logical framework (RBLF) layout. The intent of these changes was to draw distinction between levels of the results hierarchy and establish a causal chain. However, the changes have caused certain degree of confusion among the users. Definitions and standards need to be tested, refined and validated across the Bank to ensure wider acceptance and effective use. A simplified project logframe is currently being developed and tested for this purpose. Training in results-based management and use of the new format has the potential to improve quality at entry but the training content requires updating and steps to ensure uptake of such training by all concerned staff would be needed.

5.3 In 2002 the Bank introduced a Results-based Country Strategy Paper (RBCSP) format which was revised in 2005 and 2008, notably to simplify the structure of CSPs. This, simplification however, was perceived by the staff as placing less emphasis on analyses of poverty and mainstreaming issues and more focus on strategic design and selectivity, alignment and partnership. The reduced quality and depth of analysis of poverty and crosscutting issues have adversely affected overall quality of operations and strategies (Box 5.1).

Box 5.1. Comments on CSP format from CSP Staff Survey

“The CSPs prepared before the 2008 format were often too heavy because adequate time was not allocated towards the preparation process and the economists tend to repeat a lot of analysis made by other donors that did not give much consistency and specificity to our strategy papers which were some kind of board documents.”

“The introduction of the 2008 annotated format has severely weakened the quality of analysis in the CSPs giving priority to visual designs which only summarises them as in a PowerPoint presentation. The presentation of the business plan approach should rather come after the strategy has defined the operational actions.”

Review structures and processes

5.4 With the issuance of the “Presidential Directive (07/2007) concerning the operations review and approval process” the Bank put in place a more stringent quality review process

¹⁷ ADF-11 Mid-term Review Paper on Impact of Reforms, 2009.

based on successive reviews by peers, Country Teams and the Operations Committee (OpsCom), by replacing the prevailing system of another three-tier review process.¹⁸

5.5 The OpsCom was established in 2006, but began reviewing operations only in February 2008. Based on a review of the minutes,¹⁹ it was found that OpsCom carried out a useful function of strengthening internal co-ordination among operational units. However, when it came to improving quality at entry and development impact, the effect is less certain. OpsCom tended to micromanage its review function for operations, rather than establishing appropriate quality at entry standards and robust upstream processes to meet the standards. Being a high level management body, OpsCom would need to position itself more strategically to be more effective.

5.6 In the absence of an updated Operations Manual, the Bank has been piloting since early 2009 a Readiness Review exercise aimed at providing quality at entry standards and building them into project preparation, as elaborated in Section 2. This initiative though, requires further refinement and validation across the Bank to fully play its role on quality at entry.

Resources for preparation

5.7 The available resources for preparation are still a major constraint for operations and CSP quality at entry. Staff survey and consultations show that the time, resources and efforts going into the preparation are the most important factors affecting the quality of CSP documents. In many cases the CSP process is limited to the obligatory two missions, carried out mostly by HQ staff; there are few underpinning reviews or studies carried out to support preparation. At the same time, improved coordination with other development partners at the strategic level and joint analytic work could reduce the burden on the Bank of preparing its own studies to inform CSPs. This would also help focusing the Bank's economic and sector work on its core areas of expertise and develop its areas of comparative advantage while addressing the resource constraints noted above. In this context, it is worth repeating that the CSP review found improvements in the quality of CSPs in countries where the Bank had been undertaking regular portfolio reviews (Ethiopia, Burkina Faso and Zambia).

5.8 A number of issues were brought up during the staff survey. Time is usually limited as are opportunities to engage in wider consultations with stakeholders, partners, donors and representatives of civil society. The ongoing decentralisation process and increased field presence could respond to the need for broader consultation and participatory approaches in strategy formulation. Coordination between departments within the Bank and the availability of technical expertise are also limited. On the last point, a recent Bank study emphasises the need for better utilisation of the existing expertise on crosscutting issues. It suggests that ORPC/OSUS staff should be more directly involved in the preparation of country strategies and operations: a recommendation that also seems justified by the findings from this QEA.²⁰

¹⁸ At the levels of: a) Departmental Working Group, b) Interdepartmental Working Group, and c) Senior Management Committee.

¹⁹ Only minutes from 28 August 2007 until 25 June 2008 were available on the web site.

²⁰ See: Stock-Taking Assessment/Review of the Bank Environmental and Social Assessment Procedures (ESAP) and organisational institutional analysis of the Sustainable Development Division (ORPC.3), 2008, p. 20.

Capacity: staff strength and skills-mix

5.9 Capacity constraints in terms of staff strength and skills-mix seem to limit the attention given particularly to poverty analysis, governance, gender or social issues including participatory processes. The need for selectivity and cost-effectiveness in project preparation seems to have delimited the attention paid to certain crosscutting issues. Key reforms such as decentralisation and staff augmentation are progressing, but inadequacies in human resource capabilities and management processes persists within the operational departments at HQ and Field Offices. A majority of the staff felt that because key reforms are still ongoing, they had made only a moderate impact so far in terms of improving quality at entry.

Planning cycles and lending targets

5.10 It was evident from the staff survey and consultations that the managers and staff are operating under extreme pressure to meet the Board dates and/or planning cycles and lending targets. These are often rigid, and as a result the managers and staff at times show a tendency to push operations forward without sufficient attention paid to meeting the necessary quality characteristics.

Document size limit and quality

5.11 While acknowledging the merits of the 20-page limit of 2008 PAR format, it appears to have constrained the efforts to adequately justify and document preparation processes, particularly for investment operations. The Bank's document management system does not routinely capture background documents during preparation. The restriction on page limits has in fact exacerbated quality problems through superficial treatment of some of the issues relevant to the context. Such a short report needs to be complemented by a set of mandatory technical annexes to ensure that quality analysis is conducted and later used for implementation and supervision purposes.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

6.1 This assessment of quality at entry of the Bank's operations indicates moderate improvements overall between 2005 and 2008. Improvements over the review period for quality at entry dimensions of operations are: i) significant for technical, financial, economic, policy, institutional and implementation aspects; ii) marginal in relation to results frameworks, environmental aspects, as well as fiduciary and risk assessment aspects; and iii) negative for poverty, gender and social aspects as well as presentation of the intervention model (or "storyline"). Regarding the quality at entry assessment of CSPs, the review indicates unchanged performance overall between 2005 and 2008, but with clear improvements in four dimensions including selectivity and learning from experiences. This review of quality at entry of operations and CSPs between 2005 and 2008 concludes that the relatively recent introduction of a complex and uncoordinated set of reforms has not yet made a significant impact on quality at entry.

6.2 The recent reforms include several key measures to ensure quality at entry, including the creation of the Quality Assurance and Results Department, a new review process spearheaded by the Operations Committee, simplification of procedures, in addition to various steps taken to ensure consistency of operations with CSP, training in economic analysis, financial analysis, and logical frameworks. The new PAR format issued in 2008 incorporates these measures and Task Managers have been following the new format. PARs are expected to include baseline information, a key requirement for improving quality at entry and measurement of results through the project cycle.

6.3 Most significantly, in the course of 2009, ORQR has piloted Readiness Reviews (RRs) targeted directly at improving quality at entry. This QEA has not evaluated the RR instrument, as it was introduced after the period under study, but it appears to offer a powerful tool for strengthening the focus on quality at entry. The Bank should complete the piloting of RRs and build this tool into its procedures, adapting it for use with a range of operational instruments including policy-based lending operations as well as investment projects.

6.4 However, it is too early for the recent reforms to have made a substantial impression on quality at entry in 2008. This QEA sampled operations from 2005 and 2008, but it was only in the course of 2008 that many of the reforms directly relevant to quality at entry were initiated, and their effects can only be expected to show in terms of improved quality at entry in future years. The 2008 findings therefore provide a useful baseline against which impending changes could be measured in 2011 or 2012.

Recommendations

6.5 In order to improve quality at entry, it is recommended that the Bank directly address quality at entry of operations and country strategies through the following actions:

- a) **Set clear quality standards directly targeting quality at entry.** Readiness Reviews provide a set of criteria against which to assess quality at entry, but they do not provide a clear statement of the standards to be met. Explicit quality standards should be included in the forthcoming revised Operations Manual.

- b) **Under the new quality standards for operations and country strategies, provide Bank Staff and management with mandatory, high quality training appropriate to their various responsibilities.** Training in this area has so far not been mandatory and has been somewhat piecemeal. A concerted effort to raise the level of staff skills and awareness is required.
- c) **Carefully monitor compliance by Bank staff and management with the new standards and processes.** Management should undertake annual QEAs to monitor the effectiveness of the ongoing reforms, including compliance with the relevant standards and procedures. Independent assessments should also be undertaken periodically for validation: CODE should consider tasking OPEV to undertake a further independent QEA review in 2011.
- d) **Undertake, as a priority, a review of constraints contributing to weak quality at entry with regard to poverty, gender and environmental aspects in operations and country strategies, and take appropriate measures to promote improvements.**

6.6 It is further recommended that the Bank:

- a) **Put in place appropriate IT systems to enable archiving of PAR Annexes and supporting documentation for future use.** Currently, this material cannot be readily retrieved, despite its utility for project implementation.
- b) **In the forthcoming review of the Operations Committee (OpsCom), re-emphasise the Committee's strategic role in ensuring quality at entry.** OpsCom has devoted considerable attention to the details of quality at entry on a case by case basis. It needs to give more attention to the factors driving quality at entry, and ensure effective management of the upstream processes of project identification and design.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: A Note on Review Approach and Methodology

QEA Sample

For the review of operations, a sample of 39 operations comprising 19 operations approved in 2005 and 20 operations approved in 2008 were randomly selected. The sample covered both investment projects and policy-based lending. The sample size works out to be 40.6% of all approved ADF operations during these years, i.e. 50 operations approved in 2005 and 46 in 2008.

For the assessment of country strategies, a sample of 12 CSPs was selected from a total of 8 countries: Angola (2), Burundi (2), Democratic Republic of Congo (2), Kenya (2), Burkina Faso (1), Ethiopia (1), Uganda (1), and Zambia (1). The CSP samples had representation from Fragile States, ADF-eligible countries with large medium and small portfolios, and countries that produced two CSPs during the review period.

Information gathering

The QEA exercise resorted to extensive review of documents related to operations and country strategies. These include the sample PARs and CSPs and all background documents from the identification stage till approval with all related policy papers and Presidential Instructions. The QEA team carried out interviews with concerned professional and managerial staff at different levels. Separate online perception surveys on operations and country strategies were administered for wider participation by the Bank staff. Sixty-five responses were received from the online survey for operations quality at entry and 47 responses were received from the CSP quality at entry survey. The distribution of the respondents is as below:

Online survey respondents for operations QEA

Respondents	Number	Percentage
Operation Task Manager	31	50.0
Lead expert or Division Manager	6	9.7
Sector specialist	14	22.6
Safeguards specialist (social or environ. impact)	3	4.8
Procurement specialist	2	3.2
Financial management specialist	2	3.2
Project economist	5	8.1
Part of Country Team	16	25.8
Others ^[*]	13	21.0
Total	65	^[**]

[*] Country Programme Officer, Operations officer, Detailed costs, Country economist (x3), Appraisal Team Leader, Technical Cooperation Fund & Partnerships Management, Team member assigned varying tasks by team leader, Gender specialist and co-task manager, Quality assurance reviewer, Infomaster, and Gender Specialist.

[**] Percentages do not add up to 100 due to multiple roles played by the respondents.

Online survey respondents for CSP QEA

Respondents	Number	Percentage
Country economist	16	34.0
Lead economist	3	6.4
Country Manager	2	4.3
Division Manager	3	6.4
Sector specialist (OSVP)	13	27.7
Quality assurance (ORQR)	2	4.3
Field Office staff	2	4.3
Others	6	12.8
Total	47	100

The results of the surveys are analysed and integrated into the evaluation report. See the review templates for operations QEA and CSP QEA in Annexes 2 and 3 respectively.

Rating Scale

A 6-point scale was used to assess the quality dimension and sub-dimensions of operations and CSPs. As per this rating scale, an operation or CSP can receive a maximum score of 6 and a minimum of 1. Different levels on the rating scale are as defined below.

Level 6 - Highly Satisfactory	: Best practice model, suitable for emulation
Level 5 - Satisfactory	: Fully satisfactory quality
Level 4 - Moderately Satisfactory	: Generally okay, but not fully satisfactory
Level 3 - Moderately Unsatisfactory	: Quality deficient in some respects
Level 2 - Unsatisfactory	: Quality deficient in important respects
Level 1 - Highly Unsatisfactory	: Quality highly deficient in most respects

The ratings received for quality dimensions and operation level quality at entry were classified as follows:

5.5 - 6.0	: Level 6 - Highly Satisfactory
4.5 - 5.4	: Level 5 - Satisfactory
3.5 - 4.4	: Level 4 - Moderately Satisfactory
2.5 - 3.4	: Level 3 - Moderately Unsatisfactory
1.5 - 2.4	: Level 2 - Unsatisfactory
1.0 - 1.4	: Level 1 - Highly Unsatisfactory

Assessment of overall quality at entry

Overall quality at entry of the sample operations for 2005 and 2008 was considered in two different ways: a) by calculating the percentage of moderately satisfactory or better quality dimension level scores to the total number of dimension level scores of all sample operations of the given year; and b) by calculating the percentage of operations rated moderately satisfactory or better to the total number of sample operations. While calculating the quality at entry of each operation, a negative weighting was given to the dimensions that were rated moderately unsatisfactory or worse. That is, the dimensions that scored less than 3.5 were assigned the value 'zero' while the value of dimensions that scored moderately satisfactory or higher were retained as such. These adjusted dimension level scores were averaged to arrive at the operation level quality at entry rating. The negative weighting assigned to quality dimensions that scored moderately unsatisfactory or worse could be justified on the following grounds: a) unsatisfactory dimensions have the potential to negatively affect the overall project outcomes; b) simple averaging of the quality dimension scores without discretion leads to masking of the areas that require remedial actions as many of them would be technically rated as satisfactory; and the review mechanisms in the Bank should set a standard for all operations to meet at least moderately satisfactory ratings for all quality dimensions in order to qualify for Board approval.

Annex 2: Template for Review of Investment Operations

Quality Dimension	Criteria and sub-criteria
1. Quality of Project Concept, Objectives and Approach	1.1 Coherence, consistency and strategic relevance of development rationale underpinning the project 1.2 Clarity and realism of the project's objectives 1.3 Appropriateness of the project's development objectives 1.4 Extent to which lessons of experience are adequately reflected in project approach 1.5 Adequacy of country and sector knowledge underpinning the project 1.6 Level of borrower ownership 1.7 Appropriate partnership arrangements with other donors
2. Quality of Technical, Financial and Economic Aspects	2.1 Technical soundness of the project – based on well tested technologies, and appropriate for current country conditions 2.2 Appropriateness of alternative designs 2.3 Quality and coherence of economic rationale and analysis underpinning the project 2.4 Appropriateness and realism of project conditionality 2.5 Realism of the project's financial plan 2.6 (for revenue-earning projects) Quality of financial analysis, performance indicators and long-term fiscal impact 2.7 Compliance with safeguard policies
3. Quality of Poverty, Gender and Social Aspects	3.1 Focus on poverty issues 3.2 Extent to which gender issues were considered during project design 3.3 Extent to which relevant social development issues (including population issues) were considered in project design and institutional arrangements 3.4 Quality of stakeholder analysis and consultation 3.5 Appropriateness and realism of arrangements to manage and mitigate any adverse social impacts arising out of the project
4. Quality of Environmental Aspects	4.1 Assessment of environmental impacts and risks 4.2 Adequacy of arrangements for monitoring environmental impact of the project, and consistency with the Bank Environmental Social Management Plan (ESMP) 4.3 Adequacy of mitigating and managing any adverse environmental impacts during (and following) project implementation 4.4 Appropriateness of linkage of project to country Environmental Assessment
5. Quality of Project Management Aspects	5.1 Financial Management arrangements 5.2 Procurement arrangements
6. Quality of Policy and Institutional Aspects	6.1 Public Policy Framework: Extent to which the prevailing economic policy environment incentive and public administration structures which will bear on the project, were considered in project design 6.2 Stakeholders and Project Management: Appropriate identification of and definition of the type of partnership agencies and institutions responsible for project execution and clarity of their respective roles – including the PIU/PMU.
	6.3 Ownership, Commitment and Capacity to implement the project, including associated reforms and institutional changes. 6.4 Appropriateness and realism of capacity building measures

Quality Dimension	Criteria and sub-criteria
7. Quality of Implementation Arrangements	7.1 Project Timeframe: Prospects for completing the project within the prescribed time-frame 7.2 Readiness of the first year's program for implementation 7.3 Quality of the Project Implementation Plan 7.4 Appropriateness of arrangements to monitor implementation and review progress 7.5 Appropriateness of means and methods for evaluating impact and measuring outcomes
8. Quality of Risk Assessment and Management	8.1 Quality of risk assessment and mitigating strategies 8.2 Residual risk – i.e. risks not amenable to mitigation
9. Other Crosscutting Issues	9.1 Regional Integration 9.2 Private Sector 9.3 Governance
10. Bank Inputs and Processes	10.1 Project preparation/appraisal 10.2 Project processing 10.3 Preparation/appraisal expenditures 10.4 Task team's assessment 10.5 Task team's compositions in relation to operation's complexity 10.6 Appropriateness of processing time 10.7 Overall efficiency of resources used in relation to operation's complexity 10.8 Value added from operations management 10.9 Quality enhancement during preparation 10.10 Quality of support provided 10.11 Quality of other project documents

Note: Each of the criteria and sub-criteria was rated supported by the rationale.

Annex 3: Template for Review of Policy-Based Lending

Quality Criteria	Criteria and sub-criteria
1. Quality of Program Concept, Objectives and Approach	1.1 Coherence, consistency and strategic relevance of development rationale underpinning the program 1.2 Clarity and realism of the program's objectives 1.3 Appropriateness of the program approach 1.4 Extent to which lessons of experience are adequately reflected in program approach 1.5 Adequacy of country and sector knowledge underpinning the program 1.6 Level of borrower ownership 1.7 Appropriate partnership arrangements with other donors
2. Quality of Structural, Financial and Macro-Economic Aspects	2.1 Adequacy of external financing case for the operation 2.2 Adequacy of overall external financing arrangements 2.3 Extent and appropriateness of medium-term framework 2.4 Appropriateness and realism of program conditionality 2.5 Appropriateness of tranching arrangements 2.6 International and regional agreed conventions 2.7 Compliance with safeguard policies
3. Quality of Poverty, Gender and Social Aspects	3.1 Focus on poverty issues 3.2 Extent to which gender issues were considered during program design 3.3 Extent to which relevant social development issues (including population issues) were considered in program design and institutional arrangements 3.4 Quality of stakeholder analysis and consultation 3.5 Appropriateness and realism of arrangements to manage and mitigate any adverse social impacts arising out of the program 3.6 Compliance with Bank's safeguard policies
4. Quality of Environmental Aspects	4.1 Assessment of environmental impacts and risks 4.2 Adequacy of arrangements for monitoring environmental impact of the program, and consistency with the Bank Environmental Social Management Plan (ESMP) 4.3 Adequacy of mitigating and managing any adverse environmental impacts during (and following) program implementation Appropriateness of linkage of program to country Environmental Assessment 4.4 Compliance with Bank's safeguard policies
5. Quality of Fiduciary Aspects	5.1 Adequacy of financial management systems for the program 5.2 Adequacy of procurement arrangements
6. Quality of Policy and Institutional Aspects	6.1 Appropriateness of prevailing economic (especially macroeconomic) policy environment for achieving the operation's objectives 6.2 Consistency of the policy and institutional reform actions supported by the operation with the stated reform/development objectives 6.3 Appropriate identification of, and definition of the type of partnership of agencies and institutions responsible for program execution and the clarity of their respective roles 6.4 Extent to which the implementing agencies are competent and effective
7. Quality of Implementation Arrangements	7.1 Project Timeframe: Prospects for completing the program within the prescribed time-frame 7.2 Readiness to proceed at the time of Board approval 7.3 Appropriateness of arrangements to monitor implementation and review progress with the Borrower

Quality Criteria	Criteria and sub-criteria
	7.4 Appropriateness of means and methods for evaluating impact and measuring outcomes
8. Quality of Risk Assessment and Management	8.1 Quality of risk assessment and mitigating strategies 8.2 Residual risk – i.e. risks not amenable to mitigation
9. Other Crosscutting Issues	9.1 Regional Integration 9.2 Private Sector 9.3 Governance
10. Bank Inputs and Processes	10.1 Project preparation/appraisal 10.2 Project processing 10.3 Preparation/appraisal expenditures 10.4 Task team’s assessment 10.5 Task team’s compositions in relation to operation’s complexity 10.6 Appropriateness of processing time 10.7 Overall efficiency of resources used in relation to operation’s complexity 10.8 Value added from operations management 10.9 Quality enhancement during preparation 10.10 Quality of support provided 10.11 Quality of other project documents

Note: Each of the criteria and sub-criteria was rated supported by the rationale.

Annex 4: A Note on the Best Practice Standard


The Best Practice (BP) Standard is a more stringent assessment method compared to the QAG framework and is proposed for the future quality at entry assessments by the Bank. It includes the QAG framework requirements, but goes beyond them to define quality at entry in terms of the presence of a viable intervention model (a *storyline*) focused on achieving expected outcomes. Beyond the presence of the content required by the Bank guidelines, the BP standard demands that all of the pieces work together as a whole in support of the achievement of well-defined expected outcomes. Given below is a description of how the BP standard is applied, including the definition of a storyline and the reasoning behind construction of the BP rating.

Storyline analysis

A storyline in the context of an investment- or PBL operation describes what the project is trying to accomplish and how it is expected to be completed. In its simplest form, a storyline can be broken down into four elements (see Figure A1):

- a) the current problem being faced by the population;
- b) the strategy to address the problem (i.e. components, activities, outputs);
- c) the vision of success (i.e. project objective and expected outcomes); and
- d) key performance indicators that verify achievement of the objective.

Figure A1: Diagrammatic representation of a Storyline



Rating operations using the BP standard

The BP rating evaluates quality at entry in terms of the appropriateness and completeness of the project's intervention model (i.e. storyline) and compliance with Bank policies. As defined by the BP standard, a fully satisfactory operation contains a well conceived intervention model which i) is designed to bring about specific, worthwhile and economic outcomes; ii) embodies a focused and realistic strategy; and iii) can be expected to achieve and document the expected results (outputs and outcomes) within the time frame and resources allocated to the intervention. A fully satisfactory operation also meets or exceeds the requirements of the Bank's current guidelines and procedures for projects at entry (evaluated through a subset of QAG framework dimension).

The first step in rating a project against the BP standard is to create the Storyline by reading and summarising the PAR and relevant supporting documents. The storyline draws heavily from the Logframe, but also requires further justification throughout the text to convincingly describe the problem, goal, strategy, and measures of success.

The second step is to perform key elements of the QAG framework analysis: namely Dimensions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Dimensions 3, 4, and 5 are grouped together (since they all pertain to safeguard measures—Poverty, gender and social development; Environmental aspects; and Fiduciary aspects,) and Dimensions 6 and 7 are grouped together (because they both address readiness for

implementation—Policy and institutional aspects and Readiness for implementation). Dimension 2 (Technical, economic and financial aspects) is grouped with the overall rating from the first step (the storyline analysis) since they both describe the project’s justification.

The QEA BP rating is calculated by starting with the most important rating: project justification (A). The Storyline rating was weighted twice as much as and averaged with Dimension 2:

$$A = [(Storyline \times 2) + Dimension\ 2] \div 3$$

The project justification rating (A) is the highest the BP rating can be because a good project must necessarily be well justified. All other aspects of the project can only detract from the overall rating. This is logically consistent: a poorly-justified project cannot be made into a good project by having excellent safeguard measures or by having a perfect implementation plan. A well-justified project, however, might become a waste of money if the way it has been conceived does not provide adequate safeguards or is not feasible for implementation within the resources available.

An average score for each of these other two important groups of QAG dimensions is calculated:

B = Average of Safeguard dimensions (3, 4, and 5)

C = Average of Implementation readiness dimensions (6 and 7)

If safeguard measures (B) are less than satisfactory, then the overall BP rating is reduced; likewise for implementation readiness (C). In this study, if B was less than 3.5 (the half-way point on the 1 to 6 rating scale used), then A was decremented by ½ point. Similarly, if C was less than 3.5, the result of the previous step was decremented by ½ point, for a total possible loss of one full point if both B and C were not satisfactory:

The Best Practice Score therefore is: $A - [\frac{1}{2} \times (B < 3.5)] - [\frac{1}{2} \times (C < 3.5)]$

Annex 5: List of Operations Reviewed

No	Country	Project Name	Sector	Amount Approved (UA million)
2005 Sample				
1	Angola	BOM JESUS -CALENGA RURAL DEV PROJECT	Agriculture	17.2
2	Benin	GESTION FORETS COMMUNALES (PAGEFCOM)	Agriculture	35.0
3	Burkina Faso	APPUI AU DEV SANIT REG CEN -EST ET NORD PROGRAMME D'APPUI A LA STRATEGIE DE LA RED. DE LA	Social	25.0
4	Burkina Faso	PAUVRETE - PASRP III	Multi-Sector	30.0
5	Cameroon	PROJET D'ASSAINISSEMENT DE YAOUNDE (PADY)	Water Sup/Sanit	25.6
6	Chad	PARG I - APPUI AUX REFORMES PROJET DE REHABILITATION DES ROUTES NSELE - LUFU	Multi-Sector	17.6
7	DRC	ET KWANGO - KENGE	Transport	52.5
8	Ghana	URBAN POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECT PROJET D'APPUI AU DEVELOPPEMENT DE L'EDUCATION	Social	25.0
9	Guinea	(PROJET EDU. IV) EWASO N'GIRO NORTH NATURAL RESOURCES	Social	14.0
10	Kenya	CONSERVATION PROJECT	Environment	16.5
11	Mozambique	FINANCIAL SECTOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE	Finance	6.8
12	Multinational	MALI PROGR CORRIDOR BKO-DAKAR PAR LE SUD	Transport	49.8
13	Niger	PROGRAMME D'AJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL V	Multi-Sector	18.0
14	Senegal	PROJET D'ENTRETIEN ROUTIER	Transport	29.0
15	Senegal	PROJET DE MODERNISATION DU CADASTRE	Multi-Sector	2.5
16	Sierra Leone	STRENGTHENING DISTRICT HEALTH SERVICES	Social	17.0
17	Sierra Leone	ECONOMIC REHABILITATION AND RECOVERY PRO	Multi-Sector	10.7
18	Uganda	ROAD SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT	Transport	28.5
19	Uganda	RURAL WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION PROGRAM	Water Sup/Sanit	40.0
2008 Sample				
1	Burkina Faso	PRET SUPPLEMENTAIRE TRVX ROUTE OUAGA-PO	Transport	18.0
2	Burkina Faso	APPUI STRATEGIE REDUCTION PAUVRETE IV	Multi-Sector	45.0
3	Burundi	APPUI AUX REFORMES ECONOMIQUES -PARE II	Multi-Sector	119.0
4	Cape Verde	APPUI STRATEGIE REDUCTION PAUVRETE II	Multi-Sector	5.0
5	Centrafrique	PROGRAMME D'APPUI REFORMES ECO.PARE II	Multi-Sector	6.5
6	Gambia	LIVESTOCK AND HORTICULTURE DEVELOPMENT SUPP. LOAN FOR LOT 2 OF TEMA AFLAO PROJECT	Agriculture	4.0
7	Ghana	(AGBOZUME- AFLAO)	Transport	25.4
8	Madagascar	PRET COMPLEMENTAIRE- BAS MANGOKY	Agriculture	15.0
9	Mali	PROJET AEPGA GAO, KOULIKORO ET SEGOU	Water Sup/Sanit	22.0
10	Mozambique	POVERTY REDUCTION SUPPORT LOAN II	Multi-Sector	60.0
11	Multinational	DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE BASSIN LAC TCHAD ETHIOPIA/DJIBOUTI SUPPLEMENTARY LOAN (LOAN TO	Environment	30.0
12	Multinational	ETHIOPIA) THE WAMZ PAY. SYS. DEV. PROJ. IN THE GAMBIA,	Power	5.2
13	Multinational	GUINEA AND SIERRA LEONE	Finance	14.0
14	Multinational	BANK SUPPORT FOR AERC PROGRAMME AFRICAIN DE LUTTE CONTRE	Social	1.0
15	Multinational	L'ONCHOCERCOSE (APOC III)	Social	15.0
16	Multinational	STATISTICAL CAPACITY BUILDING IN RMCs	Multi-Sector	17.9
17	Rwanda	SUPPORT TO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SKILLS COMMUNITY AGRIC. INFRA. IMPROVEMENT PROG. -	Social	6.0
18	Uganda	PROJECT II CAIIP-2	Agriculture	45.0
19	Zambia	NKANA WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION PROJECT	Water Sup/Sanit	35.0
20	Zambia	POVERTY REDUCTION BUDGET SUPPORT II	Multi-Sector	15.0

Annex 6: List of CSPs Reviewed

Country Strategy Paper	DARMS Code
1. Angola: Country Strategy Paper Update 2008-2009	ADF/BD/IF/2008/137
2. Angola: Results- Based Country Strategy Paper, 2005-2007	ADF/BD/WP/2005/79
3. Burundi – 2005-2007 Country Strategy Paper	ADF/BD/WP/2005/122
4. Burundi: 2008-2011 Country Strategy Paper	ADF/BD/WP/2008/113
5. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Results-Based Country Strategy Paper 2005-2007	ADF/BD/WP/2005/127
6. Democratic Republic of Congo: Results-based Country Strategy Paper 2008-2012	ADF/BD/WP/2008/90
7. Kenya - 2005-2007 Country Strategy Paper	ADF/BD/WP/2005/97
8. Kenya: 2008-2012 Country Strategy Paper	ADF/BD/WP/2008/152
9. Burkina Faso – 2005-2009 Country Strategy Paper	ADF/BD/WP/2005/80/Rev.1
10. Uganda: 2005-2009 Joint Assistance Strategy	ADF/BD/WP/2005/130
11. Ethiopia: 2006-2009 Country Strategy Paper	ADF/BD/WP/2006/51
12. Zambia: Cover Note for the Bank Group’s Intervention in the Context of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia 2007 – 2010	ADF/BD/WP/2008/02

Annex 7: CSP Review Template

Name of the Strategy:	Reviewer:
General Comments about Consistency, Completeness and Quality of the Strategy:	Rational to support rating: Overall Rating:

CSP: General Quality Criteria

1. Relevance

Assess the **relevance** of country programme objectives and the logic behind them given domestic policy objectives for poverty reduction, as well as for AfDB's own strategic objectives. Assess if the analysis of key issues is sufficient, whether country priorities have been identified (and how), and whether the assistance consistent with the identified priorities.

Strategic priorities are aligned with **national priorities**, as documented within national frameworks (e.g. MDGs) and strategies (e.g. PRSP). Does the strategy examine and validate the pro-poor focus of national policy priorities? Has the Bank been engaged with the government in the process of defining national priorities (PRSP)? Does the strategy provide evidence that national priorities were developed through broad-based participation?

Strategic priorities are aligned with the **Bank's corporate strategies** (2008-2012 Medium Term Strategy, and the 2003-2007 Strategic Action Plan). Are priority sectors and sub-sectors aligned?

Strategy includes a clear **poverty focus**: Does it include an in-depth poverty diagnosis and does it support pro-poor policies and activities within the relevant sectors and areas?

Strategic priorities have been informed by sound **sectoral analysis** within the country context. Does strategy provide a clear rationale for engagement in certain sectors, based on the Bank's comparative advantage? Does it provide a rationale for exiting from certain sectors or entering into new sectors? Any strategy to deal with underperforming sectors?

Extent to which an **analysis of the macro-economic framework** has informed strategic priorities.

2. Selectivity

Assess selectivity and focus of the Bank's proposed portfolio.

Extent to which the strategies Identifies comparative advantage and **Strategic positioning** of AfDB (vis-à-vis other donors) and **selection** of priority areas with regard to Sectors and themes. Does the strategy present a clear effort to focus on selected pillars, sectors and sub-sectors?

3. Effectiveness

Assess the extent to which strategic outcomes are likely to be achieved, whether the strategy builds on the progress made in the previous period and whether the determinants of performance in achieving the objectives have been identified. Examine the Arrangements that will support the overall programme in achieving the objectives set out in the country strategy, including choice of aid instruments, set-up within the policy and institutional context, partnership and country dialogue.

Country dialogue and **partnership**: Adequacy, coherence and complementarity of Bank's engagement and the assistance provided to national partners, including NGOs. Does the strategy present clear ideas on partnerships and priority issues for country dialogue? To what extent is the Bank engaged with high-level policy makers?

Analysis of **Policy and institutional aspects** influencing progress on national strategies: Have the major institutional opportunities and challenges been identified? Is the proposed policy and institutional framework for this strategy consistent with this analysis? Where policy lending is proposed, does the strategy provide a rationale to support this choice?

CSP: General Quality Criteria

Portfolio performance and mix of funding instruments: the extent to which critical factors influencing portfolio performance and aid delivery have been identified and are addressed by the strategy. Does the strategy provide clear ideas and actions to improve portfolio performance? Is the choice of lending instruments appropriate and supported by sufficient analysis? How are the non-lending activities expected to support the overall portfolio objectives?

4. Risk assessment and mitigation

The extent to which different types of risk (fiduciary, political, governance, conflict etc.) have been identified, analysed (e.g. using Country Financial Accountability Assessment, Country Procurement Assessment Review, conflict assessments etc) and addressed in the strategy (by appropriate risk mitigation measures). Extent to which risks are regularly monitored. Extent to which the strategy has been adapted in light of changing country context (corruption etc.) identified in the relevant sectors and addressed (use Country Procurement Assessment Review where available)?

5. Partnership and Harmonisation

Assess harmonisation with other aid agencies and alignment with country priorities and use of country systems and accountability mechanisms

Use of national systems: The extent to which the strategy is aligned to and uses national systems including public financial management systems for improved effectiveness of support. To what extent is CSP monitoring aligned with country systems (e.g. PRSP, PAF)? Does the strategy provide suggestions to what extent national systems (for procurement, financial management, monitoring) should be used? To what extent does will the implementation of this strategy depend on Project Implementation Units?

Donor harmonisation: shared analysis and global resource envelope, priorities and approach of major funding agencies AfDB participation in joint country analysis such as Country Financial Accountability Assessments, Country Procurement Assessment Reviews, Country Governance Assessments, Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes.

Donor coordinated support and funding: Coordination and co-financing reached under the previous CSP period; prospects for co-financing sectors in future. To what extent does the Bank join donor coordination forums? Is the Bank's contribution to coordinated funding adequate considering the general level of donor coordination in this country?

6. Efficiency

Assess arrangements that will help to ensure that programme plans are translated into activities, including human resource and office management, and collaboration with other stakeholders.

The extent to which **stakeholders have participated** in the CSP process: Have government partners, donors and other stakeholders, including civil society been consulted during the preparation process? Does the strategy respond to feedback from these consultations? Does the strategy include consultation mechanisms to support strategy implementation?

Strengthening **national capacities:** Does the strategy provide a clear assessment of government capacities? Does it propose specific options to address existing capacity constraints? Are implementation arrangements in line with this assessment? Does the strategy propose any actions to strengthen the capacities of civil society?

The extent to which the strategy provides a realistic assessment of the **resources and capacities of the country team** to implement the strategy and proposes options to overcome existing capacity constraints. Given the resources and capacities, which the Bank will provide, are the objectives for the CSP realistic and achievable?

7. Managing for Results

Assess arrangements for monitoring the results that the strategy will deliver. Assess whether they are

CSP: General Quality Criteria

realistic and monitorable and the extent to which the Bank will be accountable to delivering those results.

Results orientation: Is the strategic planning consistent and focused on results? Does it help to understand the potential impacts which the Bank wants to achieve? Are key target groups for Bank assistance identified? Are linkages between institutional support and potential impacts clear?

Does the **results framework** present a consistent results-chain; does it include clear and realistic objectives, specific and measurable indicators, outcome indicators and risks? Does it include baseline data and **gender disaggregated data** for outputs and outcomes, as required by the CSP guidelines?

The extent to which the Bank will be **accountable** for its strategy: How will progress on CSP be assessed and shared with partners? Does the strategy include practical actions to monitor progress and assess results (e.g. **self-evaluations**)? Any joint evaluations planned? Any mechanisms for **joint accountability** built into the M&E system?

8. Crosscutting issues

Assess whether crosscutting issues have been addressed by the strategy.

Does the strategy identify and address **gender issues** within the relevant sectors and areas: Does it include an in-depth gender analysis within the country context? Does it propose strategies to strengthen gender equality within the main areas of the Bank's engagement?

Does the strategy identify issues in relation to HIV and Aids within the relevant sectors and area? Does it include effective ways to support partners in fighting **HIV and AIDS** and supporting mainstreaming HIV and AIDS in Bank funded operations.

Are issues of **environmental degradation and climate change** identified within the relevant sectors? Does it include strategies to address those issues or mitigate risks in relation to environmental degradation and climate change?

Does the strategy reflect a "sharpened focus" within the Bank's work on **governance**? Does it identify main challenges, reform priorities and potential for progress on governance issues, based on what analysis (governance profile)? Are the Bank's governance operations selective (based on the Bank's mandate, track record and internal capacity) and aligned with the government's priorities for reform? Does the Bank's work include CSO and private sector? Is the strategy seeking increased synergies and complementarities with other donors? Does the strategy include indicators to monitor progress in governance?

Regional integration: Has an analysis been undertaken to identify opportunities & challenges to regional economic integration? Extent to which the strategy has addressed these?

9. Fragile states

Analysis of specific conditions applicable to fragile states

Strategies to address the specific situation of **fragile states**. Have root causes of fragility been analysed? Is the strategy sensitive to the fragile country context? Does the strategy address the root causes of fragility? Does the strategy recognise the links between political, security and development objectives? Does the strategy allow for rapid action to address (changing) fragile contexts? Are the OECD/DAC principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States taken into account?

10. Impact and sustainability

Assess whether the strategy has taken issues of impact and sustainability into account.

Does the strategy reflect considerations about impact and sustainability of Bank support? Does it include mechanisms to sustain the results of the Bank's support, in particular where the Bank plans to exit from sectors and programmes as part of their focusing strategy? Does it include mechanisms to increase the predictability of bank support where the Bank continues its engagement?

CSP: General Quality Criteria

Considering focus, realism and alignment of strategic goals, is the strategy likely to make a significant contribution to overall development goals within the country context?

11. Learning from experience

Assess whether the strategy builds on its previous experiences and supports a learning approach to strengthen performance within the country.

Knowledge management: Does the strategy include practical ways of strengthening country and sector analysis and country-specific knowledge? Does it propose studies or other analytical exercises to support the Bank's performance? To what extent does this strategy use analysis undertaken during the previous period?

Substantive discussions of **lessons learned** from previous CSPs, incorporation of findings from MTR and Country Evaluations (where available) and application of lessons in new strategy. Does it provide practical ways to deliver better results, based on the previous strategy? Does it demonstrate learning from previous risks and failures?

Note: Each of the criteria was rated and rationale to support the rating was provided.

Annex 8: References

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