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## **MEMORANDUM**

**TO : THE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS**

**FROM : Cecilia AKINTOMIDE  
Secretary General**

**SUBJECT : MULTINATIONAL: INSTITUTION BUILDING OF THE  
MULTI-SECTOR SUB-REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF  
APPLIED TECHNOLOGY, PROJECT PLANNING AND  
EVALUATION (ISTA)**

**PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT(PPER) \***

Please find attached the above-mentioned document.

**Attach.**

**C.C: The President**

**\*Questions on this document should be referred to:**

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**AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP**



**OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT (OPEV)**

**MULTINATIONAL**

**INSTITUTION BUILDING OF THE MULTISECTOR SUB-  
REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF APPLIED TECHNOLOGY, PROJECT  
PLANNING AND EVALUATION (ISTA)**

**PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT (PPER)**

**PROJECT AND PROGRAMME EVALUATION DIVISION (OPEV.1)**

**DECEMBER 2010**

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### Currency Equivalents

Currency Unit = CFAF

<b>At Appraisal (December 1999)</b>	<b>At PCR Preparation (December 2006)</b>	<b>At Evaluation (November 2009)</b>
UA 1 = CFAF 889.081	UA 1 = CFAF 749.247 UA 1 = USD 1 1.50773	UA 1 = CFAF 704.662 UA 1= USD 1.58989

### Exchange Rate Trend

<b>Period</b>	<b>UA/CFAF Exchange Rate (annual average)</b>
1999	772.170
2000	938.475
2001	934.092
2002	905.235
2003	816.566
2004	783.289
2005	776.906
2006	770.533
November 2009	704.662

### Weights and Measures

Metric System

### Fiscal Period

1 January - 31 December

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ADB</b>	: African Development Bank
<b>ADF</b>	: African Development Fund
<b>ADSL</b>	: Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line
<b>AM</b>	: Aide-mémoire
<b>BDEAC</b>	: Development Bank of Central African States
<b>BEAC</b>	: Central Bank of Central African States
<b>BVMAC</b>	: Central African Stock Exchange
<b>CAMPC</b>	: Centre Africain de Management et de Perfectionnement des Cadres (African Centre for Management and Executive Development)
<b>CB</b>	: Competitive Bidding
<b>CCPAC</b>	: Committee of Central African Police Chiefs
<b>CD</b>	: Documentation Centre
<b>CEMAC</b>	: Central African Economic and Monetary Community : Centre Africain d'Etudes Supérieures en Gestion (Institute of Post-Graduate Management Studies)
<b>CESAG</b>	
<b>CEVIRHA</b>	: Economic Commission on Meat and Fisheries
<b>CF</b>	: Consultancy Firm
<b>CICEMAC</b>	: CEMAC Inter-parliamentary Commission
<b>CICOS</b>	: International Commission of Congo-Ubangi-Sangha Basin
<b>CJCEMAC</b>	: CEMAC Court of Justice
<b>COBAC</b>	: Central African Banking Commission
<b>COSUMAF</b>	: Financial Market Monitoring Commission
<b>CRCEMAC</b>	: CEMAC Automobile Pink Card System
<b>CSMTAC</b>	: Regional Telecommunications Maintenance Centre in Central African
<b>DESS</b>	: <i>Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures Spécialisées</i>
<b>DG</b>	: Director General
<b>EAMAU</b>	: <i>Ecole Africaine Mauricienne et Malgache d'Architecture et d'Urbanisme (Architecture and Urban Development Institute of Mauritius and Madagascar)</i>
<b>EIED</b>	: <i>Ecole Inter-états de Douanes (Inter-State Customs Academy)</i>
<b>ERHT</b>	: <i>Ecole Régionale Hôtelière et de Tourisme (Regional Institute of Hotel Business and Tourism)</i>
<b>ISSEA</b>	: Central African Sub-Regional Institute of Statistics and Economy
<b>LC</b>	: Local Currency
<b>M.Sc.</b>	: Master of Science
<b>MBA</b>	: Master of Business Administration
<b>OCAM</b>	: African and Malagasy Common Organization
<b>OCEAC</b>	: Organization for Coordination of Endemic Disease Control in Central Africa
<b>PCB</b>	: Public Competitive Bidding
<b>PCR</b>	: Project Completion Report
<b>PFE</b>	: End of Studies Project
<b>PIU</b>	: Project Implementation Unit
<b>PPER</b>	: Project Performance Evaluation Report
<b>PRASAC</b>	: Regional Applied Research Centre for the Development of Savannahs of Central Africa
<b>PRIEFAC</b>	: Regional Training Centre for Revenue Agencies in Central Africa

<b>PRISTA</b>	: ISTA Institution Building Project
<b>REP</b>	: Regional Economic Programme
<b>TAF</b>	: ADF Technical Assistance Fund
<b>TCI</b>	: Community Integration Tax
<b>TRA</b>	: ADB Temporary Relocation Agency
<b>UAM</b>	: Million Units of Account
<b>UDEAC</b>	: Central African Customs and Economic Union
<b>UEAC</b>	: Central African Economic Union
<b>UMAC</b>	: Central African Monetary Union
<b>UNIDO</b>	: United Nations Industrial Development Organization
<b>UOB</b>	: University Omar Bongo of Gabon
<b>UQUAM</b>	: University of Quebec Montreal

**PROJECT BASIC DATA**

1. Grant Number : F/CEMAC/DN/001 - 2100155000427  
 2. Donee : Central African Economic and Monetary Community  
 3. Beneficiary : Institut Sous-régional Multisectoriel de Technologie Appliquée, de Planification et d'Evaluation (Multisector Sub-regional Institute of Applied Technology, Project Planning and Evaluation) (ISTA)  
 4. Executing Agency : ISTA Management

**A. TAF GRANT:**

Estimate at Appraisal Actual

1. Amount : UA 0.60 million UA 0.60 million  
 2. Approval Date : July 2000 10 May 2000  
 3. Signature Date : July 2000 26 July 2000  
 4. Effectiveness Date : December 2000 1 March 2001

Other Sources

Estimate at Appraisal Actual

- CEMAC : U.A 0.07 million UA 0.07 million  
 GABON : UA 0.12 million UA 0.2 million

**B. PROJECT COST**

1. Sources of Financing (UA million)

Source of Financing	Estimated Cost			Actual Cost		
	F.E.	L.C.	Total	F.E.	L.C.	Total
TAF	0.48	0.12	0.60	0.40	0.20	0.60
CEMAC	-	0.07	0.07	-	0.07	0.07
GABON	-	0.12	0.12	-	0.12	0.12
Total Cost	0.48	0.31	0.79	0.40	0.39	0.79

2. Financing Plan (UA Million)

Source of Financing	Appraisal Estimate	Actual Expenditure
TAF	0.60	0.59
CEMAC	0.07	0.07
GABON	0.12	0.12
TOTAL	0.79	0.78

3. Estimated date of first disbursement : 26 December 2000  
 4. Effective date of first disbursement : 01 March 2001  
 5. Last disbursement deadline : 31 December 2003

6. Revised last disbursement deadline : 30 June 2006  
 7. Project start-up : 26 July 2000  
 8. Project completion date : 30 June 2006

**C. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

1. Total disbursed : UA 598,754.47  
 Unused balance : UA 1,245.53
2. Delays in relation to the schedule  
 - Time overrun at effectiveness : 6 months  
 - Time overrun at completion : 30 months  
 - Time overrun in relation to last disbursement : 30 months  
 - Number of extensions of last disbursement deadline : 1
3. Project implementation status : completed (100%)

**D. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

Mission	No. of Pers.	Composition	Date
Appraisal	1	Education Expert	18-30 August 1998
Appraisal/updates	1	Education Expert	12-21 December 1999
Supervision/01	1	Education Expert	18-24 November 2000
Supervision/02	1	Education Expert	30 April to 8 May 2001
Supervision/03	1	Education Expert	18-21 December 2001
Supervision/04	1	Task Manager	10-25 May 2002
Supervision/05	2	Education Expert and Architect	6-20 June 2003
Supervision/06	1	Education Expert	15-28 October 2003
Supervision/07	2	Education Expert and Architect	31 May to 14 June 2004
Supervision/08	1	Education Expert	1-19 November 2004
Supervision/09	2	Education Expert and Architect	7-17 August 2005
Supervision/10	2	Education Expert and Architect	12-21 December 2005
Supervision/11	1	Education Expert	22 May to 3 June 2006
Completion	1	Economist	3-14 December 2006

### SUMMARY OF RATINGS

		PCR	PPER	PPER Observations
1	<u>Relevance and Quality at Entry</u>	3	2	Despite its consistency with the needs of CEMAC countries and the Bank's strategies for financing multinational capacity building projects, the project's quality at entry is deemed unsatisfactory. In focusing on a catalytic mission, it did not go beyond a strategic study that reflected the actual scale of ISTA's capacity building needs. It did not take into account the need to implement the recommendations of the strategic plan or avail itself of the means of supporting ISTA to fulfil its mission sustainably.
2	<u>Achievement of Objectives and Outputs (Efficacy)</u>	3	2	With its outputs, the project helped to improve the academic and pedagogic conditions of students trained at ISTA as well as revitalize and reposition the institution strategically. It failed to revitalize the activities of the ISTA Research Department. The project did not improve the external effectiveness of ISTA given the non-optimal use, by member countries, of the limited number of graduates trained. Consequently, this reduced the project's impact on improving the capacity of public and private administrations to design, plan, implement and evaluate socioeconomic development policies, programmes and projects.
3	<u>Efficiency</u>		2	Project efficiency is unsatisfactory because of its inability to improve the unit cost of training an ISTA graduate and the doubling of the implementation period.
4	<u>Impact on Institutional Development</u>	3	2	The project helped ISTA to become a highly recognized academic institution. The achievements of ISTA resulting from the revitalization and strategic repositioning by the project currently constitute the bases on which a more ambitious vision of ISTA's development should be built to consolidate the advantages that ISTA gained through the project. However, the project failed to accompany and support ISTA in achieving its financial autonomy. The absence of financial, human and technical support needed for the quantitative development of this post-graduate establishment and the research and continuing education structures mitigated the project's impact on institutional development, which is deemed unsatisfactory.
5	<u>Sustainability</u>	3	2	Sustaining the project's impact is unlikely in view of the: (i) inadequate renewal of the physical assets procured by the project such as computers and other reprographic equipment and teaching aids that have already undergone nearly five years of use; (ii) fiscal structure imposed by CEMAC; (iii) loss of staff trained; and (iv) exogenous factors such as the economic conditions of countries in the region. Demand for training induced by the project is benefiting other institutions.
6	<u>Overall Performance Indicator</u>	3	2	The overall project performance is unsatisfactory as a result of weaknesses regarding quality at entry, achievement of development objectives, efficiency and sustainability of outcomes.
7	Recipient's Performance	2.5	2	The recipient's overall performance is unsatisfactory despite its initiating reforms necessary for project implementation, notably the tax on luxury goods (TCI) which at least guarantees the sustainable funding of the Institute. The Recipient met all grant conditions and paid its contribution to project financing. However, it continued to pursue a highly cautious and minimalist approach in managing the ISTA budget. This was the main cause of failure of the development strategy financed by the project and approved by the countries in 2002.
8	Bank's Performance	2.5	2	The Bank's performance is unsatisfactory in view of the fact that it focused on a strategic study without envisaging how to see the project through. Its performance is also unsatisfactory in terms of supervision, given the unduly long response time, time and cost overrun in executing some components.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **1. Evaluation Objectives and Scope**

1.1 This PPER concerns the Institution Building Project in favour of the Multi-sector Sub-regional Institute of Applied Technology, Project Planning and Evaluation (ISTA) requested by CEMAC at the end of the eighties. The ADF required that some reforms be carried out prior to the project. CEMAC introduced key reforms related notably to the ISTA financing system, its organization and rules governing access to the Institute's training.

1.2 The project goal is to contribute to consolidating the capacity in the Central African Region to manage development projects. The specific project objective is to improve ISTA services in training, development project analysis and management.

1.3 Results, in the form of improvements, were expected in relation to: (i) the capacity of public and private administrations to plan, implement and evaluate economic and social development projects in Central Africa; (ii) the internal and external effectiveness of ISTA; (iii) the revitalization and strategic repositioning of ISTA; (iv) satisfactory services of the ISTA research department; and (v) academic and pedagogic conditions of students trained at ISTA. This entailed the implementation of the following activities: (i) formulation and validation of a study on the evaluation of programmes and activities that would enable the adoption of new syllabi, curricula and strategy; (ii) formulation and validation of a medium- and long-term ISTA development master plan; (iii) retraining of support staff and trainers; and (iv) supply of equipment, furniture, manuals and reviews to ISTA.

### **2. Implementation Performance**

2.1 Overall, virtually all project components were implemented. Supervision was steady and relatively frequent but not effective enough to prevent time overruns, frequent restarts and significant differences in cost by expenditure category.

2.2 Other negative gaps noted were due to the reduction of the training of trainers' component to partly finance audit cost overrun and the project operating cost. The increases in cost by expenditure category are significant. Most of the increases were attributable to implementation slippages that compelled the project to bear the cost of fees and allowances over longer periods, and the impact of service cost changes not taken into account at appraisal. The project closed with three years of delay compared to the original schedule. Project implementation by a part-time PIU run by ISTA staff proved an unsatisfactory option. The overall project performance is unsatisfactory.

### **3. Methodology and Evaluation**

3.1 The evaluation is based on a review of project documents and other relevant studies. It is also based on discussions and interviews with key actors from diverse backgrounds. Specifically, information was obtained from project impact assessment studies, notably individual interviews or group discussions with graduates from ISTA, current students, teachers and officials from ministries using ISTA graduates.

3.1 A survey was conducted among beneficiary institutions, partner institutions, graduates and current students based on semi-structured questionnaires. All the issues addressed stem from the application of the evaluative process derived from the following tools as given in the annex: (i) intervention logical framework; (ii) retrospective matrix of the log-frame; and (iii) evaluation matrix. The evaluation used the “before-after project” method to assess the actual impact of the project in relation to the baseline case.

## 4. Key Findings

### 4.1 Relevance and Quality at Entry

4.1.1 The project was in harmony with the needs of CEMAC countries at the time of the appraisal, even if those needs were not subjected to a quantitative assessment at the general or individual country level. It was essentially to identify these strategic thrusts and needs that the project had the conduct of the strategic study as the most important activity. The relevance of the project stems from the fact that it primarily sought to fill this vacuum. Beyond the study, the ultimate goal was to contribute to building the capacity of the public and private administrations to design, plan, implement and evaluate development projects in Central Africa.

4.1.2 The project was identified, formulated and appraised at a time when the Bank did not have proven experience in strengthening training institutions. It also lacked a capacity building policy, especially for regional or sub-regional multilateral tertiary institutions. Based on current Bank priorities, the project is relevant in view of its consistency with the ADB’s new capacity building strategy.

4.1.3 The project did not implement the recommendations of the strategic study through adequate financial and technical support. Real support to ISTA should have followed the study by using study findings as a starting point for the Institute’s sustainable development.

4.1.4 Relevance and quality at entry are deemed unsatisfactory.

### 4.2 Achievement of Objectives and Outcomes

4.2.1 *Outputs:* Despite the delay compared to the appraisal schedules, the project achieved its outcomes. The main one related to the market survey on training and ISTA services, which led to the formulation of a strategy that included appropriate proposals for ISTA’s development.

4.2.2 *Improved academic and pedagogic conditions of students trained at ISTA.* Overall, the project helped to improve pedagogic conditions (better trained teaching staff, more appropriate teaching aids and enriched documentary resources) that enhanced the quality of teaching, as reflected in the level of satisfaction expressed by ISTA graduates who benefitted from furniture, teaching aids and IT equipment provided through the project. However, this improvement did not contribute to increasing the number of trainees or studies produced by ISTA, or the standard of continuing education the Institute was supposed to provide.

4.2.3 *The ISTA Research Department was not revitalized.* The project did not help to revitalize the ISTA Research Department, which had a mandate to conduct market, feasibility and project development studies for both public and private entities, or on behalf of international organizations, on request. The number and quality of studies have not improved. As a result, the contribution by the ISTA Research Department to self-financing was not

achieved.

4.2.4 *Strategically revitalized and repositioned ISTA.* The project helped to save ISTA from decline. However, its development strategy was not supported by an effective implementation plan describing the material and human resources and planning required. Only the academic aspects of the 2002 strategy proposals were considered and implemented. The ISTA degree was indeed upgraded to a DESS, and subsequently replaced by an MBA during the migration to the LMD (*Licence-Master-Doctorat, i.e. Bachelor's-Master's-Doctorate*) system. The academic reform did not go far enough to transform ISTA into a centre of expertise in its initial niche of designing, appraising, implementing and monitoring development projects, and in community development and poverty reduction.

4.2.5 Internally, the project did not create the expected impact on the ISTA human resources through the training of trainers and support staff. Although the permanent teachers were retrained, they are still not “legally” and “academically” qualified to teach postgraduate courses. The support staff underwent training in office automation and communication, but this did not actually enhance their qualifications. For the two staff categories, the training was provided to those about to go on retirement. Notwithstanding the quality, the training will not benefit ISTA for long and, therefore, from these two perspectives, it may be said that the situation did not record any tangible improvement.

4.2.6 The project did not improve ISTA’s *external effectiveness*. Undoubtedly, it contributed to guaranteeing the continuity of the Institute’s mission to build capacity to analyse, appraise and manage development projects. ISTA graduates do not occupy positions that are commensurate with their skills. The top senior civil servants trained by ISTA and with qualifications in project analysis and management are not optimally used. A vast majority (83%) of ISTA graduates come from the civil service and secondary education. About 57% of them did not work in development project management and have returned to the jobs they were doing before undergoing the training.

4.2.7 *Other indirect impact.* The reputation and success achieved by ISTA created a demand that its highly limited resources did not allow it to meet. A large portion of this demand benefited other tertiary institutions as well as public and private consulting firms that offered similar programmes under more competitive conditions. ISTA graduates who worked for some of these firms found the ISTA services to be of better quality.

4.2.8 ISTA’s contribution to *improving the public administration’s capacity to design, plan, implement and evaluate economic and social development policies, programmes and projects*, is still limited. There is no doubt that ISTA contributes to creating regional expertise in project analysis and management, albeit on a lower scale. Although it is not possible to attribute that expertise to this single project, it is still undeniable that it has contributed to revitalizing ISTA and its academic repositioning, which is more in line with modern trends in higher education (the LMD system).

4.2.9 The project’s impact on human resource development in the sub-region remains hypothetical to date, in view of the fact that the limited number of graduates trained could not effect the desired change. Given its size and current human resources, and in terms of its organization and the structure of its budget, ISTA is not in a position to generate an observable and measurable impact on developing the capacity of sub-regional administrations in poverty reduction. This impact depends on conceptual renovation and adequate human

resources, both quantitatively and qualitatively, which ISTA still lacks, even after the project.

#### 4.3 Efficiency

4.3.1 Project efficiency is unsatisfactory in view of the fact that it did not improve the unit cost of training an ISTA graduate. Furthermore, the implementation period took twice the time initially scheduled. Since ISTA's intake capacity has not increased, its training costs are still high (CFAF 45.5 million per trainee per year) compared to the statistical standards obtaining in Europe, USA and Africa. This cost has doubled since ISTA joined the LMD system. The annual average cost of an ISTA student is 11.6 times that of a student in France and 11.5 times that of a private American university student. It is by far higher than the average annual cost of a student in Tunisia (all courses considered).

4.3.2 This limited efficiency was worsened by the unduly high indirect costs of training (88%) in relation to direct costs (12%), including expenditure on teachers which accounts for 80% of the total ISTA budget. ISTA lacks the resources (especially human) to develop consultancy and continuing education activities needed for self-financing. Besides, the project was completed nearly three years behind the original schedule.

#### 4.4 Institutional Development

4.4.1 The project enabled ISTA to become a recognized high standard academic institution. Since the restructuring that followed the 2002 strategic study financed under the project, it offers a postgraduate course in a highly specialized area that is recognized by the African and Malagasy Council of Higher Education (CAMES). This reputation is acknowledged by the academic world, given the partnership agreements that back it and that provide scientific and academic recognition to ISTA degrees. The results achieved by ISTA, following its revitalization and strategic repositioning by the project, currently constitute the bases of a development vision on which the Institute can be built.

4.4.2 However, the project neither accompanied nor supported ISTA in attaining financial autonomy. The lack of financial, human and technical support needed for the quantitative development of post-graduate education, research and continuing education structures undermined project impact on ISTA's internal institutional development.

4.4.3 The project impact on institutional development is unsatisfactory.

#### 4.5 Sustainability

4.5.1 The academic repositioning and teaching aids provided as part of project physical inputs were enough to restore ISTA's image. In turn, this had spill-over effects that today account for the encouraging indications of the Institute's sustainability. There is a clear and consistent image of ISTA's strategic competitiveness on the development-related training market of the CEMAC zone. This was enhanced by a new strategic study to reposition ISTA as a centre of excellence and backed by a new headquarters built by member states (to be equipped soon). However, as in 2002, there is currently no structured, programmed and budgeted action plan that provides concrete information on the human, material and financial aspects as well as programmes for implementing the strategy to transform ISTA into a centre of excellence. The sustainability of the improvements made in training trainers and support staff is threatened by the retirement of the very staff so trained.

4.5.2 In short, ISTA still bears the signs of uncertain sustainability which gives some concern over the continuity of its mission. These relate to the low economic and financial viability and the level of resilience to exogenous factors (e.g. the economic conditions of member countries of the region and the development of universities and other public/private institutions that offer similar courses). Overall, the sustainability is unsatisfactory.

4.5.3 Overall, project performance is deemed unsatisfactory.

#### 4.6 Recipient and Bank's Performance

4.6.1 CEMAC embarked on requisite reforms for implementing the project, notably the adoption of a community policy aimed at financing the operation of specialized institutions through the introduction of a tax on imported luxury goods charged at the borders of the six member countries. This reform guarantees the sustainable funding of ISTA to shield it from liquidity crises affecting the economies of the sub-region. The Recipient met all grant conditions and paid its contribution for project financing.

4.6.2 However, the interest shown by the Recipient in ISTA's development has not yet materialized through an organized and planned strategic vision supported by a substantial increase in the contribution of CEMAC to the ISTA budget to match the new objectives it has set the Institute. The Recipient took no steps to improve the institutional impact of the project and of ISTA by expanding the structures to receive ISTA graduates. CEMAC and its member countries do not use ISTA as a tool for pursuing their capacity building policy. The performance of the Recipient is deemed unsatisfactory.

4.6.3 The Bank's performance is deemed unsatisfactory since it focused on a strategic study without envisaging the resources for implementing the outcomes – hence the unsatisfactory quality at entry. Consequently, the Bank did not provide support that would foster sustainable change. The supervision missions succeeded in identifying problems facing project implementation. However, the extremely long time that it took the Bank to respond resulted in time and cost overruns which affected some components.

### **5. Conclusions**

5.1 The project satisfactorily achieved the expected outputs, especially the ISTA strategic development plan and specialized information resources. However, ISTA's strategic development was not backed by an implementation plan describing the needed material and human resources or planning. Only the academic aspects of the strategy were taken into account. As a result, the ISTA degree changed to a DESS and was subsequently replaced by a Master's degree following the shift to the LMD system. The use of the equipment procured by the project had a positive impact on the academic and pedagogic conditions of students trained at ISTA. This further helped to revitalize and reposition the Institute.

5.2 However, these results were obtained at the cost of doubling the implementation period from three to six years. Furthermore, the academic reform did not go far enough to transform ISTA into a centre of expertise in its initial niche area, community development and poverty reduction. This created the need to update the strategy by conducting a new study in 2009 to transform ISTA into a centre of excellence of specialized training.

5.3 Project impact sustainability is in doubt in view of the: (i) inability to renew the physical assets procured by the project such as computers, reprographic equipment and teaching

aids that have already undergone nearly five years of use; (ii) fiscal structure imposed by CEMAC; (iii) loss of staff trained; and (iv) exogenous factors (e.g. the economic conditions of countries in the region and the fact that the demand for training induced by the exposure given to ISTA by the project is benefiting other institutions). Overall, project performance is deemed unsatisfactory.

## **6. Lessons and Recommendations**

### **6.1 Key Lessons**

6.1.1 Apart from the existence of a strategic vision for ISTA as a capacity building institution, sustainability factors such as socio-political support, formal commitment of regional or national bodies, institutional, financial and economic viability and adjustment to change must be examined and taken into account prior to any financing decision by the Bank.

6.1.2 Quantitative and qualitative inputs and contributions of qualifying training, continuing training and assistance for revitalizing training for staff of development management administration are pre-requisites for making a regional capacity building institution a reference.

6.1.3 The efficiency of a regional capacity building institution will improve provided it reflects the realities of the socioeconomic development of the region and regional development strategies.

6.1.4 Content development of tertiary education curriculum constitutes a necessary - though not sufficient - condition for any regional capacity building institution which seeks to become a centre of excellence. The adaptation of new development concepts and the launch of research programmes in community development, poverty reduction and mainstreaming of cross-cutting dimensions (environment, gender, climate change) also constitute pre-requisites.

6.1.5 The success of a regional capacity building institution is measured by the level of integration of its activities with public administration human resource development goals in the region.

6.1.6 Apart from the political will of regional decision-makers, sufficient and sustainable financial resources are needed to guarantee the viability and sustainability of the regional capacity building institution, modernize teaching equipment and aids, address the need for diversifying and expanding its activities, and transform it into a centre of excellence.

### **6.2 Recommendations**

#### **To CEMAC:**

- i.) Revisit ISTA's staff recruitment policy starting from the 2010 financial year, to enable the Institute to make the necessary recruitment to replace the teaching and support staff about to go on retirement.
- ii.) Review ISTA's organization and staffing regulations based on the data from the repositioning strategy endorsed by the June 2009 seminar by observing the standard ratio of one permanent teacher to thirty students, for a total of 300 students. The ISTA staffing regulations should help to recruit 10 permanent

teachers with the necessary degrees and qualifications to teach postgraduate courses.

- iii.) Transform ISTA into a major centre of excellence, designed to contribute to the implementation of the Regional Economic Programme through qualifying training, studies, continuing education and support to public and private promoters.
- iv.) Ensure the incorporation of a sub-programme into the ISTA development programme, devoted to the effective operationalization of ISTA's income-generating activities to contribute to its self-financing.
- v.) Ensure that the ISTA curriculum includes specialized courses in planning techniques, regional economic integration and poverty reduction projects and, more specifically, projects to protect vulnerable social groups (hitherto completely absent from ISTA programmes);
- vi.) Regularly identify human resource needs and qualifications by country, monitor the origins of applicants for training at ISTA and the job assignment of graduates on their return.
- vii.) Ensure the formulation of a Regional Continuing Education Plan (PRFC) for development professionals through a recurrent regional study (for example every three years), whose implementation would be entrusted to ISTA.

#### **To ISTA:**

As part of ISTA's development and transformation into a specialized training centre of excellence:

- Give solid academic, pedagogic, organizational and financial content to the strategic objectives for diversifying and expanding its activity;
- Outline a short- and medium-term action plan that would raise ISTA from its current situation to the target situation defined by the 2009 strategic study.

#### **To the Bank:**

As lead donor, the Bank should be involved in formulating and implementing the ISTA development programme, and transforming the Institute into a centre of excellence by obtaining a formal guarantee from CEMAC to undertake:

- A rebalancing of the ISTA budget to ensure that in future it contains a capital budget guaranteeing at least the regular renewal of key equipment and teaching aids, and updating the Documentation Centre
- A significant increase of the operating budget aimed at expanding and diversifying the objectives of ISTA activities geared towards implementing the REP; and

## I. THE PROJECT

### 1.1 Context and Rationale of Bank Intervention

1.1.1 The Multisector Sub-regional Institute of Applied Technology, Project Planning and Evaluation (ISTA) forms part of the specialized institutions of CEMAC<sup>1</sup>. It was created in 1980 in Brazzaville by the UDEAC Council of Heads of State. Its statutes were adopted by the member States in Libreville on 19/12/1981. They conferred on it the following missions: (i) post-university training and advanced training of executives from CEMAC member States in development project design, evaluation and monitoring; (ii) conducting of pre-investment studies for member States; (iii) establishment of a sub-regional information and documentation centre to disseminate economic, technological and industrial data; and (iv) promotion of industrial operations through diverse actions for the identification of technical and financial partners.

1.1.2 The creation of ISTA took place at a time when most African countries lacked skills in development project management. They also did not have the means for each of them to establish equipped academic structures to train these executives.

1.1.3 With the support of various external partners (UNIDO, French and Belgian cooperation agencies), the Institute carried out its missions with varying degrees of success, given the resources available as well as the socio-political and economic situation and constraints of the sub-region. However, it faced serious financing problems that led it to suspend its activities in 1989. These problems mainly stemmed from the inability of most of the member countries to pay their contributions.

1.1.4 A reform by the UDEAC in 1993 instituted a financing mechanism through the *Taxe Communautaire d'Intégration (TCI)* (Community Integration Tax) levied on imported luxury goods. The TCI was collected by a specialized CEMAC agency and redistributed to the specialized institutions. Statutorily, ISTA can finance itself through its internal resources generated from: (i) fees for organizing continuing education; (ii) studies conducted on behalf of public and private entities; and (iii) fees from non-scholarship holders. This type of self-financing was hampered by the fact that ISTA did not have sufficient staff to teach the courses, explore the markets and secure study and continuing education contracts to finance its operation and facilities.

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<sup>1</sup> Created by virtue of the Treaty Establishing the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) signed on 16 March 1994 in N'djamena in Chad

1.1.5 The TCI helped to mobilize the resources needed to finance ISTA's recurrent costs (wages, office equipment, scholarships, short courses and supervision expenses). To date, it continues to cover 95% of the ISTA annual budget. However, this method of financing did not provide the Institute resources for its further development. The TCI-based budget was not enough to renew or modernize equipment, or expand and diversify the activities. Since it resumed its activities in 1995, ISTA has not been in a position to honour its statutory missions. It has limited itself almost exclusively to its post-university education function which it has quantitatively maintained at the 1980s and 1990s level mainly for lack of adequate space. Activities regarding its mission to provide executives of member States with advanced training are limited if not non-existent. The ISTA Research Department is more of an applied research centre than a conventional consultancy agency. Its mission as the sub-regional information, documentation and industrial operations promotion centre has been totally abandoned. It is against this background that towards the 1990s UDEAC and, subsequently CEMAC, approached the Bank Group for an ADF support to ISTA.

1.1.6 The project was justified by the need to strengthen ISTA to enable it maintain its comparative advantages over other training institutions. Indeed, institutions from advanced countries<sup>2</sup> demand higher registration and study fees, and the courses are not necessarily tailored to the needs of the national economies in the CEMAC zone. Besides, some institutions are located in different language areas and less competitive than ISTA given the costs and additional time required for learning a new language other than French before pursuing similar studies. Lastly, training structures created under CEMAC and other regional and sub-regional Francophone and neighbouring political and economic communities<sup>3</sup> mostly provided training for technicians and very few high-level executives in the areas that are ISTA's speciality.

## 1.2 Project Formulation

1.2.1 The ADF required that ISTA undergo wide-ranging reforms prior to its intervention. Conducted in 1998 and 1999, the reforms relate to the conditions for admitting trainees and the duration of studies adopted by CEMAC. They paved the way for launching the project identification and its subsequent appraisal in 1999.

1.2.2 The institution building requested by CEMAC and supported by the ADF mainly entails a study to define a development strategy for ISTA and an allocation covering a portion of the training needs of the staff and the procurement of teaching aids. These two components were subject to the adoption of the findings of the study. The development strategy was to enable it to respond to its original mission (qualifying training, continuing education, studies and documentation) and new challenges (train executives for poverty reduction projects, decentralization and good governance).

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<sup>2</sup> Notably those of the Francophone zone and French, Belgian and Canadian institutions, according to the appraisal report

<sup>3</sup> ISSEA, EIED, CEVIRHA, CESAG – At the time of the evaluation, some of these institutions had ceased to exist.

### **1.3 Objectives and Scope at Appraisal**

1.3.1 The sector goal of the project was to contribute to consolidating development project management capacity in CEMAC region. The specific objective was to improve the services of ISTA in training, development project analysis and management.

1.3.2 The expected results were to improve: (i) the capacity of public and private administrations to plan and appraise socioeconomic development projects in Central Africa; (ii) internal and external effectiveness; (iii) revitalization and strategic repositioning of ISTA; (iv) services of the ISTA Research Department; and (v) academic and pedagogic conditions of trained students. This required the following activities to be undertaken: (i) formulation and validation of a study on the evaluation of programmes and activities that make it possible to adopt new syllabi, training programme and strategy; (ii) formulation and validation of a medium- and long-term ISTA development master plan; (iii) the retraining of support staff and trainers; and (iv) provision of ISTA with equipment, furniture, manuals and reviews.

### **1.4 Financial Arrangements**

1.4.1 The project was financed with a UA 0.6 million grant to CEMAC. In view of the status of five of the six CEMAC countries as ADF eligible countries, the project qualified for a grant in accordance with the guidelines on the use of the Technical Assistance Fund and other guidelines on the financing of multinational projects.

1.4.2 The project cost, excluding taxes, was estimated at UA 0.79 million, jointly financed with the TAF grant, a contribution from Gabon of UA 0.12 million and one from CEMAC amounting to UA 0.07 million. The agreement was signed on 27/07/2000 and became effective on 1 March 2001. The ADF grant was to be used to cover the entire foreign exchange cost of the project and a portion of the local currency cost. The CEMAC counterpart contribution was used to finance the organization of seminars and part of the operating expenses of the PIU. The contribution of the Gabonese Government represented the counterpart funding of accommodation of ISTA for the project duration.

## **II. EVALUATION**

### **2.1 Evaluation Methodology and Approach**

2.1.1 This report was prepared following the evaluation mission conducted from 28 October to 6 November 2009, in three CEMAC member countries (Gabon, Cameroon and Congo). The main criteria used were: relevance and quality at entry, the effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact on institutional development, Donee's performance, Bank's performance and the overall performance of the project.

2.1.2 The evaluation is based on a review of project documents and other relevant studies. It also draws inspiration from discussions and interviews with key actors from diverse backgrounds. It was conducted in three phases: (i) collection of information at the Bank's headquarters, including preliminary analysis that resulted in a guidance document for this evaluation; (ii) the purpose of the field mission was to collect data and conduct visits to the project intervention area aimed at exchanging views with stakeholders (ISTA, CEMAC, beneficiary structures and former students) on key evaluation issues and, lastly (iii), the analysis of data collected for the preparation of the PPER.

2.1.3 To better reflect the level of expectation of project outcomes, the data was complemented with individual interviews or group discussions with ISTA graduates. The interviews were combined with a survey among the beneficiary institutions, former and current students, based on semi-structured questionnaires. The data collected shed special light on the project that the documentary review could not provide. It was in this context that the local correspondents of ISTA in Cameroon and Congo as well as officials from the Ministries of Economy and Planning provided representative viewpoints of the users on their countries' needs for specialists in project appraisal and management as well as on their effective use in their respective countries.

2.1.4 The issues addressed derive from the application of the evaluative approach stemming from the following tools presented in Annexes 8 and 9 (intervention logic and retrospective matrix of the log-frame. An evaluation matrix was also prepared which included the retrospective evaluation questions.

2.1.5 The evaluation used the before and after project method to assess the actual impact of the project.

## **2.2 Availability and Use of Database, Key Indicators and Outcomes**

2.2.1 The log-frame matrix appended to the appraisal report provides indicators for assessing the level of implementation of the specific project objective: (i) enhancement of the quality of the training starting from 2001; (ii) launch at ISTA of new activities starting from 2002; and (iii) annual increase by at least 10% (over 5 years) of the number of trainees starting from 2002. No references were given for the enhancement of the quality of the curriculum and no indication was given on the type of activities supposed to start in 2002, which limits the monitoring and assessment of the level of achievement of this type of outcome.

2.2.2 Essentially, qualitative data on the benefits to businesses, government institutions and development planning following the respective countries' sending of their nationals to ISTA was also collected during various visits, as was quantitative and qualitative data on steps taken by the respective governments in respect of ISTA and its future projects.

## **III. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE**

### **3.1 Compliance with Project Schedule and Cost**

3.1.1 The project was closed with three years of delay compared with the original schedule. Overall, it stayed within the costs estimated at appraisal with a negligible undisbursed balance of UA 1245<sup>4</sup>.

3.1.2 The totality of goods and services was procured at a lower cost than estimated at the appraisal. The decrease in the training component cannot be deemed a positive performance. Indeed, the scale and duration of the training of trainers and support staff was reduced. The training given did not correspond to what was stipulated in the strategic study financed by the project. Hence, the four teachers trained did not qualify academically and legally to teach at postgraduate level.

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<sup>4</sup> 0.20% of the ADF amount.

3.1.3 The 7.5% cost overrun on the equipment and teaching aids stems from price escalation. This increase is acceptable in view of the considerable delay suffered by the project. The differences on the operating costs also relate to the extension of the project implementation period. The PIU had to cover the wages and benefits of the permanent and part-time staff for a much longer period. The significant difference for the audit component cannot be explained merely by price escalation in view of the extension of the implementation period.

3.1.4 At the end of the initial project implementation period (31 December 2004), it became necessary to extend the last disbursement deadline. The closing date was extended twice (from January to December 2005 and January to June 2006). The delays were often due to the fact that advertisements for invitation to bid were to be published in the 6 CEMAC member countries, but no lesson was drawn to prevent or reduce the delays.

### **3.2 Project Management, Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation of Achievements**

3.2.1 The DG of ISTA who also doubled as the PIU Manager was fully absorbed by the management of the Institute and could only devote very limited time to project management. Furthermore, the permanent teachers who were supposed to assist were also fully occupied by their teaching, administrative and marketing responsibilities within ISTA. The project accountant was far more present (and paid) during off-peak periods of the project than the peak periods. The permanent staff member of the PIU (shared with the project and ISTA management) was the DG's secretary.

3.2.2 The quarterly project activity reports were regularly prepared and transmitted to the Bank for project implementation monitoring and follow-up of recommendations of the supervision teams.

3.2.3 The overall project implementation performance is unsatisfactory.

## **IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RATINGS**

### **4.1 Main Evaluation Findings**

#### **a. Relevance and Quality at Entry**

4.1.1 There is a need for specialists in planning and development project appraisal in CEMAC countries, but this has never been assessed quantitatively either generally or at individual country level. It was to identify these strategic orientations and needs that the most significant project activity was the conducting of a strategic study. Project relevance stems from the fact that it primarily sought to address this inadequacy. Beyond the study, the ultimate goal was to revitalize the Institute and enhance its relevance in relation to the priorities of CEMAC countries.

4.1.2 The Bank ensured that its intervention was subject to a revision of the financing policy of training institutions in the sub-region that would guarantee the sustainability of ISTA's financing. It is in this context that CEMAC put in place a financing mechanism for ISTA based on the Community Integration Tax (TCI). As formulated and appraised, the project took into account these changes and the new financing policy.

4.1.3 The project was identified, prepared and appraised at a time when the Bank did not have proven experience in building the capacity of training institutions<sup>5</sup>. The appraisal period could also be characterized, at the Bank level, by the lack of a capacity building policy, especially, for regional or sub-regional multilateral tertiary education. To date, the project remains relevant in view of its consistency with the Bank's new capacity building strategy<sup>6</sup>.

4.1.4 The project did not go beyond the strategic study needed by ISTA to enable it adapt the nature and volume of its activities to the needs of countries of the sub-region and achieve tangible development results.

4.1.5 The role of the Bank was based on the assumption that "the needs of ISTA were more intellectual than financial since CEMAC provided the financial resources needed for its operation."<sup>7</sup> The project was limited to the study and minor material and pedagogic enhancements. It did not take into consideration the need to implement the recommendations of the strategic study through adequate financial and technical support. The actual support to ISTA should have begun after the study by using its findings as the point of departure for a sustainable development of the Institute.

4.1.6 Despite the academic and structural reforms initiated by the project through the 2003-2008 strategic plan, the need for another strategic study for transforming ISTA into a specialized training centre of excellence emerged in 2009, indicating the need to go beyond the formulation of strategies.

4.1.7 Overall, the relevance at entry is unsatisfactory.

b.) Effectiveness (in achieving objectives and outcomes)

4.1.8 ***Achievements and quality of outputs:*** Despite the delay observed in relation to appraisal schedule targets, the project achieved all the expected outputs. The main output entailed the conducting of a market survey on ISTA training and services leading to satisfactory findings for the development of ISTA, subsequently ratified by the member countries. The strategic study for repositioning ISTA was conducted by a consultant and validated by the stakeholders (donors, CEMAC member countries, employers' associations and chambers of commerce and industry) at a seminar held in Libreville on 19 April 2002. It comprises three parts: (i) a diagnostic assessment of ISTA; (ii) an analysis of the external environment of ISTA and an identification of targeted potential markets; and (iii) a Master Plan for developing ISTA activities. The ISTA development strategic plan proposed hinged on a short-, medium- and long-term strategy.

4.1.9 The four permanent trainers underwent retraining that did not correspond to the minimum required to teach at postgraduate level. This training will not benefit ISTA for long since the majority (75%) of the beneficiaries are about to go on retirement. The quality of the training provided the support staff was not satisfactory either in terms of content, duration and depth of the issues dealt with. In short, the permanent trainers of ISTA did not receive

<sup>5</sup> The appraisal report mentions only a single example for the period, that of Senghor University of Alexandria, and states that it was not enough for lessons to be drawn. In other words, the Bank had adopted a prudent stance towards ISTA. It did not find the assurances provided sufficient enough to make a sizable commitment.

<sup>6</sup> ADB, Bank Group Capacity Building Strategy: ADB/BD/WP/2009 – ADF/BD/WP/2009/158, 24 November 2009, prepared by ECON/CSVP.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Appraisal Report §4.3.2 p.11

significant training since the budget allocated was hugely inadequate. Therefore, the project opted for retraining which helped to strengthen and consolidate the professional standards of the trainers with the hope of subsequently recruiting new trainers with more appropriate academic profiles and thereby having a more balanced team of trainers (practical professionals and theoreticians). The project did not include a plan to replace staff away on training. ISTA continues to mainly depend on part-time teachers and has not been able to secure supplementary skills. The current students to permanent teachers ratio of 5, falls far below the standard of 30.

4.1.10 The most evident result in terms of output is the Documentation Centre for which the graduates who used it expressed a high level of satisfaction compared with other graduates. The Documentation Centre constructed under the project has 1500 reference works in its specialty. The Centre has not yet attained the project target of a regional centre for the documentation, storage and dissemination of data on development projects in the sub-region. Other investments are needed to enable the Documentation Centre attain this status.

4.1.11 *Direct outcomes: Academic and pedagogic conditions of students trained at ISTA improved.* According to the data gathered during group discussions and data provided by the survey, study conditions at ISTA have improved in view of the physical and pedagogic improvements made by the project. The evidence is provided by a comparison of the level of satisfaction of ISTA graduates. Older graduates (before project) show a much less level of satisfaction for their study conditions (particularly with regard to teaching aids) compared to more recent graduates (after project), who benefited from the new equipment provided under the project. From a pedagogic perspective, 100% of the older graduates affirmed this to be unsatisfactory compared with 72% level of satisfaction for the post-project graduates, representing a significant level of satisfaction (see Annex 10). However, the gap in the level of satisfaction was less with regard to intangible impacts, chiefly the quality of teaching (85% and 95%).

4.1.12 The post-project graduates gave a less satisfactory assessment of the quality of practical internships. This probably indicates a higher level of expectation of these interns who are recruited at a higher level of qualification. On the whole, the project had an impact on improving learning conditions (better trained teachers, more appropriate teaching aids and richer information stock).

4.1.13 The use of the equipment procured by the project contributed to improving the quality of teaching. The computer equipment, teaching aids, books, software and journals mark a turning point in the teaching methods and opening up of ISTA to the outside world (improved research and documentation facilities compared to the “before project” situation). They create networking traditions between the various players involved in the management of ISTA, which facilitate the tasks and improve productivity.

4.1.14 In terms of the increase in the number of interns, the project did not achieve the expected results. The project did not in any way increase the intake capacity of ISTA, given lack of adequate space, among other things. The number of graduates from both the country and the sub-region has remained limited to 20 per year.

4.1.15 The project did not make it possible to revitalize the ISTA Research Department whose mandate is to conduct, on request, development project market surveys for both private and public administrations or for international organizations. The main achievements of the

Department for the 2003-2008 period was a “Study on Governance in Gabon” (*“L’étude sur la Gouvernance au Gabon”*) and another work on “Progress by Gabon on its Governance” (*“Les Progrès Accomplis par le Gabon sur sa Gouvernance”*). ISTA also conducted about four seminars over the period<sup>8</sup>, which is inadequate given its regional reputation and weight. This has essentially resulted from a lack of financial and human resources and the low user rate of intermediation to enable it carry out its mandate. For now, the ISTA Research Department operates more like an applied research unit rather than a classic consulting agency. As a result, the actual inputs by ISTA to the financing of its activities have been virtually zero.

4.1.16 It is worth noting that the ISTA development strategy was not supported by an effective implementation plan describing the material and human resources, and the necessary planning for its implementation. Only the academic aspects of the 2002 strategy proposals were considered and implemented<sup>9</sup>. The ISTA degree was indeed upgraded into DESS, replaced by a Masters in the migration to the LMD (*Licence-Master-Doctorat*) system. The first group of graduates in Masters in project Analysis and Appraisal started from the 2007/2008 academic year. In November/December 2009, ISTA saw the passing out of the second batch of Masters Graduates and the admission of the third batch. This helped to revitalize and reposition the Institution more.

4.1.17 However, the academic reform did not go far enough in transforming ISTA into a skills centre for its original niche areas and in those of community development and poverty reduction. As the proposed curriculum in Annex 16 indicates, ISTA has become a purely academic educational institute<sup>10</sup> that has changed, since 2002<sup>11</sup>, only in respect of the nature of the degree issued and standard of education and pre-requisites. The content of the courses taught at ISTA does not contain any direct or indirect reference to the specific realities of the socioeconomic development of the sub-region and the project did not contribute to adapting the curriculum to such realities. Concepts pertaining to community development, micro-projects and income-generating activities as well as the mainstreaming of gender in development projects are still completely absent from the ISTA curriculum.

4.1.18 Internally, the project, with regard to the training of trainers and that of the support staff, did not achieve the expected impact in terms of strengthening the human resources of the Institute. Thus, despite their retraining, the permanent teachers are not always academically and legally qualified to teach at the postgraduate level. Furthermore, the support staff underwent training in office automation and communication which did not effectively improve their qualifications. For these two categories of staff, the training was provided only to those about to go on retirement. In short, this component will not benefit ISTA sustainably and, in this regard, the situation of the institution has not improved.

4.1.19 ***Indirect outcomes: the external effectiveness of ISTA has not adequately improved.*** The field survey showed that the Governments derive benefits at two levels: (i) direct use of the graduates in other structures that need their new skills more; and (ii) in the absence of this direct institutional impact, the older ISTA graduates who are hardly or never used in public

<sup>8</sup> See Strategic Study for Transforming ISTA into a Centre of excellence in « Etude Stratégique pour la Transformation de l’ISTA en Pôle d’Excellence de Formation Spécialisée », SG CONSULTING GROUP, 09 June 2009

<sup>9</sup> See Annex 11 on Implementation of the Strategy

<sup>10</sup> With the exception of practical internship that characterized it prior to the advent of the project

<sup>11</sup> See Table in Annex 11. Also see Annex 17 which shows that the revised ISTA curriculum does not contain any reference to community development and poverty reduction; reference to development is minimum representing (together with the reference to the environment) only 6.66% of the credits and 12.8% of hours of the Master’s 1 courses, and 3.33% of credit and 6.4% of hours of courses of the entire MASTER 1 and MASTER 2 programmes combined.

development projects migrate to the private sector where there is greater demand for their new skills. Most of them enter public and private tertiary institutions to teach. At times, they engage in teaching on a part-time basis, in addition to their normal government jobs. In some instances, the older ISTA graduates engage in continuing education through consulting firms created by some of them or by their employers as experts or on part-time basis. Others have even created consultancy firms while keeping their regular government jobs.

4.1.20 Although ISTA trains elite civil servants in project analysis and management, they are not optimally used. A vast majority (83%) of ISTA graduates came from the administration and secondary education sectors. About 57% of them did not work in development project management and returned to the jobs they were doing before undergoing the training.

4.1.21 The project has contributed to making the continuation of the ISTA mission possible in building capacity in development project analysis, evaluation and management. However, ISTA failed to manage this rationally as a community institution of the countries concerned and CEMAC, the entity for regional integration and management of community affairs. Training at ISTA is provided on request and on strictly individual or personal basis. However, capacity building in the sub-region is a reality and, although it is not well-organized, there is an ISTA effect on the capacity of the six countries in project analysis, appraisal and management.

4.1.22 Taken individually, building the capacity of the six countries in project appraisal and management is effective although limited in number. The persons trained are not all systematically employed in development projects. However, they render similar services in the administration and through private consultancy firms that employ them or those created by some of them. In the best case scenario, only 55% of ISTA graduates are directly employed in their areas of competency in the five years following their graduation.

4.1.23 The survey showed that an ISTA degree is not a determinant for changing jobs with the same employer, promotion or access to management positions. Enrolment at ISTA is not the result of concerted plan between the administrations and trainees to undertake an agreed professional project. It is a right used by the applying civil servants. Being assigned, after completion, to a position commensurate with the new qualification is neither a right nor an obligation. The administration reassigns those who apply in the event of a vacancy. Some must wait for years for this reassignment. It is former secondary school teachers, especially in Congo, who are most affected by the reassignment difficulties.

4.1.24 Overall, employers of ISTA graduates are mainly the ministries of economy and planning. However, there is an increased interest for post-project graduates by departments of education, health and public works.

4.1.25 ***Other indirect outcomes:*** The reputation and successes achieved by ISTA created a demand that its highly limited resources did not allow it to meet. A large portion of this demand benefited other university institutions and public and private consulting firms<sup>12</sup>. Programmes that were originally peculiar to ISTA are offered by a number of institutions in the sub-region with more resources and which manage to produce over 100 graduates annually. Thus, other regional or sub-regional training institutions such as CESAG<sup>13</sup> or ISSEA are

<sup>12</sup> The Social Sciences and Management Faculty (FSSG) of the Catholic University of Central Africa (UCAC) proposes a Third Cycle leading to a DESS in development and management of projects in Africa for a modest cost (compared to that of ISTA) of CFAF 825 000. The University of Yaoundé 2 offers the same DESS training in project analysis and appraisal for an equivalent of CFAF 25000 for registration fees. Outside the sub-region, CESAG also offers training in project analysis and appraisal

<sup>13</sup> See the wide range of courses on offer at CESAG Dakar

growing. Universities such as UOB of Gabon or the Catholic University of Yaoundé “took ownership” of ISTA programmes, which they offer under much more competitive conditions<sup>14</sup>. In contrast, ISTA graduates who attended some of these institutes found the ISTA services to be of better quality.

**4.1.26 Long Term Outcome (Impact):** *The contribution of ISTA to the capacity of public and private administrations to design, plan, implement and assess socioeconomic development policies, programmes and projects is still limited.* Admittedly, ISTA contributes to creating regional expertise in project analysis and management, albeit on a lower scale. Although it is not possible to ascribe the creation of this expertise to the project alone, it is however, undeniable that it has contributed to revitalizing ISTA and its academic repositioning in line with the modern trends of present-day tertiary education (LMD system).

4.1.27 The impact of the project on human resource development in the sub-region has remained hypothetical. It is true that the project enabled ISTA activities to continue and increased the latter’s contribution to a much higher academic level than prior to the project (from the level of Senior Technician to that of DESS and subsequently to a Master’s Degree). Although the elitism created by this training benefited some individuals who, thanks to the degree, got promoted and occupied high positions, it is no longer of benefit to the spread of a culture of project analysis and management in the administrations of the sub-region. This situation is attributable not only to organizational reasons and lack of knowledge of the actual needs but also to the failure to take into account the said needs in enrolling applicants to ISTA and in their post-qualification appointments. With a higher number of graduates, ISTA can be expected to make available to CEMAC members a critical mass of skills that could effect the desired change.

4.1.28 In its current (human, financial and organization) form, ISTA is not in a position to have a significant impact on the development of the capacity of sub-regional administrations in poverty reduction. This impact can only be achieved through a conceptual renovation of the human resources in terms of numbers and qualifications not always unavailable to ISTA, even after the project. This is due to the fact that: (i) the project was not designed with a view to implementing the findings of the strategic study; (ii) the strategy formulated under the project in 2002 did not effectively generate an ISTA development plan with clearly defined objectives in terms of the cost-related results and timelines; and (iii) the strategy did not generate an internal institutional development plan and, notably, a human development scheme corresponding to the objectives of diversifying the activity and continuous build-up of student numbers<sup>15</sup>.

4.1.29 Overall, the effectiveness is deemed unsatisfactory

c.) Efficiency

4.1.30 The project was closed with nearly 3 years of delay on the initial schedule. The main achievement, namely the strategic study, cost (direct costs) over one-quarter (26%) of the total project amount. ISTA owes its current repositioning in its institutional environment to this study which enhanced its contribution to CEMAC’s development effort. The Institute repositioned itself in terms of the quality of education in a more competitive manner on its niche market (that

<sup>14</sup> The annual registration for 10-month training at ISTA costs CFAF 2.5 million. The sub-regional market offers the same degree for between CFA 1 and CFA 1.5 million. On the basis of 5 months of studies and 5 months of internship, ISTA is at the same level as CESAG, which offers (in 2007) a DESS in project management for 12 months of studies at CFAF 3 million (i.e. CFAF 2.5 million for 10 months)

<sup>15</sup> The appraisal projected a 10% annual growth of student numbers - which did not happen

of training in project planning and appraisal). However, the qualitative achievements did not improve ISTA's financial efficiency. Indeed, the Institute continues to produce only 20 graduates annually. For an annual average budget of nearly CFAF 900 million, the annual average cost of a graduate for a 10-month session is CFAF 45 million, which appears to be exorbitant.

4.1.31 Although the project achievements had a positive impact on improving the quality of training given by ISTA and its image, the improvements were achieved at exceedingly high costs in view of the number of interns that ISTA can take annually. ISTA could have used the project achievements to at least double its capacity. In this case CEMAC should have agreed to increase the budget by about 20% in relation to that of 2008.

4.1.32 In comparison, the annual cost of a student in France (in 2006<sup>16</sup> for all branches and levels) is EUR 9370, of which 63.1% is financed by the Government budget corresponding to public assistance of EUR 5912.47, currently equivalent to CFAF 3.878 million, representing nearly 12 times less than the annual cost of an ISTA student. Compared to the total budget of the Ministry of Higher Education of Tunisia, the unit cost of a student (all study branches included) averaged DT 2128 in 2006 and DT 2328 in 2007, equivalent to CFAF 735,625 and CFAF 805,023<sup>17</sup> respectively. The costs of enrolment of a student in the USA for a 4-year study were estimated by UNESCO at US\$ 32,500 in private universities and US\$ 14,000 in public universities, equivalent to CFAF 15.651 million for private universities and CFAF 6.742 million for public universities (i.e. annual average costs of CFAF 3.912 million for private universities and CFAF 1.685 million for public universities, respectively).

4.1.33 Compared to French standards, ISTA could produce 150 graduates annually (biannual with Master 1 and Master 2) of 150 interns. At the cost of CFAF 45 million per year, the cost of training at ISTA is eleven times that of an average private American university.

4.1.34 Although an increase in student intake capacity was projected at the appraisal, no subsequent action was envisaged. ISTA continued to produce graduates at its own pace, namely 20 graduates per annum. The student numbers depended on the available structures, i.e. the buildings housing the temporary ISTA headquarters. Delay in the execution of construction works for the new headquarters resulted in the limiting of the number of students enrolled in view of the current low intake capacity. Following the change to the LMD system, this efficiency has been halved<sup>18</sup> because since 2007, the Master Degree requires three semesters of classroom work and five months of internship - totalling two fiscal years. The degree therefore costs 2 x CFAF45 million.

4.1.35 This reduced efficiency is compounded by the high proportion of indirect costs compared to direct costs. Indeed, the direct expenses (scholarships, internship expenses, fees and expenses of part-time teachers and researchers and other internship directors) only represent 12% of the annual average cost (for the last three years 2006-2007-2008). The indirect costs represented by the permanent staff and the operating cost of ISTA correspond to 88%.

4.1.36 ISTA does not have the resources (especially human) to develop the activities of the Research Department and continuing education to contribute to its self-financing. Currently,

<sup>16</sup> Ministry of Education. Directorate of Evaluation, Long Term Studies and Performance. Information Note No. 07-41: The Cost of Education in France p.3

<sup>17</sup> Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie. West Europe and Maghreb Office. *Campus Numérique Francophone de Tunis: Higher Education Indicators and R&D in Tunisia*. 5.1. Higher Education Budget. P.44

<sup>18</sup> And the costs multiplied by two

there is only one person, its Director of Studies, who carries out all the market surveys, bid preparation and participation. There is no organized form of the use of students under training or former students to develop the studies and/or training, and the Institute does not have available revolving funds to resort to the services of consultants and external trainers.

4.1.37 The observation made in 2002 on the quantitative and qualitative inadequacies of the permanent teaching staff compared with the needs remain valid<sup>19</sup> and could deepen with the departure on retirement of the four teachers if no action is taken. Whereas the standard set by SCGC was 30 students per student, since 2002, ISTA has been operating with 5 students per permanent teacher. The improvements that could have occurred in relation to the number and quality of ISTA courses were achieved mainly with the support of part-time teachers (catering for 80% of teaching hours) whose fees as well as those of the supervisors of the internship and end-of-course dissertation form part of the direct costs of training.

4.1.38 Overall the efficiency is deemed unsatisfactory.

d.) Impact on Institutional Development

4.1.39 Thanks to the project, ISTA underwent an internal restructuring to gain access to the status of a recognized high level academic institution. Since its restructuring stemming from the 2002 strategic study financed by the project, it offers a specialized postgraduate course. This has enhanced its academic reputation as exemplified by the partnership agreements that provide a scientific and academic recognition to its degrees.

4.1.40 The curricula are recognised by the *Conseil Africain et Malgache de l'Enseignement Supérieur (CAMES)*. The partnership agreement with the Omar Bongo University enables it to guarantee the quality of teachers and courses that guarantee the value of the degrees. ISTA has also signed partnership agreements with institutions operating in the qualifying training sector (CESAG-Dakar, UQUAM-Canada, ECA-Addis Ababa, CAMPC-Abidjan, etc.) and continuing education, which guarantees it a supply of specializations<sup>20</sup>, intermediation possibilities in research and continuing education. Since it was restructured, it has established an academic board on which its major partners are represented and constitutes a guarantee of the transparency of recruitments and reliability of examinations and their academic standards.

4.1.41 The project did not support and enable ISTA in achieving financial autonomy. The lack of financial, human and technical assistance needed for the quantitative development of the post-university educational establishment, studies and continuing education structures diluted the impact of the project on ISTA's internal institutional development. To date, ISTA is only marginally operational in this respect, for it does not have the necessary qualified staff numbers or adequate budgets to carry out the said development.

4.1.42 The training provided by ISTA is characterized by its practical aspect and the enhanced operability made possible by the project, thanks to the procurement of practical tools (e.g. project management software). The equipment procured by the project has enabled the students in training to practise with the software and acquire a high level of skills. It is also characterized by its operational orientation. It recruits, on a competitive basis, a crop of confirmed public servants who, after their theoretical training are supervised academically and technically to

<sup>19</sup> By comparison, the ISSEA (Sub-regional Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics), another specialized institution of CEMAC, operates with 14 permanent teachers and 83 part-time teachers for 4 cycles of qualifying training for Statistics Officer (ATS), Senior Statistics Officer (TSS), Economist Statistician (ISE), Applied Statistician (IAS),

<sup>20</sup> Teachers from contracting institutions regularly come to teach courses at ISTA.

conduct actual project studies that serve as their course completion project. The results achieved by ISTA, following its revitalization and strategic positioning by the project, now constitute the bases on which a more ambitious development vision should be built, in order to consolidate the benefits the project has brought to ISTA.

4.1.43 The impact of the project on institutional development is unsatisfactory.

e.) Other Impact

4.1.44 *Impact on Gender:* women are virtually absent among the ISTA student population. As a post-university educational institute for adults (average age above 40 years), very few women from the sub-region can forego their family responsibilities to pursue a two-year course. The existence of a small group of women among the elite trained by ISTA, albeit numerically insignificant (6% of annual student population of ISTA, on average one female per year group), nonetheless constitutes an appreciable precedent in the region.

4.1.45 *Impact on poverty reduction:* ISTA did not attempt to introduce courses relating to poverty reduction as planned at appraisal and explicitly stated in the 2000 strategic study. Currently, it does not provide services in training, development project analysis and management better tailored to the needs of CEMAC countries. The formulation of programmes in 2002 did not take the adaptation aspect into account despite the statements of principle of the strategy. Were the ISTA graduates used optimally, the project would have indirectly contributed to reducing poverty effectively through better formulation and management of development projects in countries of the sub-region. The impact of the project on institutional development is unsatisfactory.

f.) Sustainability

4.1.46 *Technical sustainability:* the academic repositioning and aids represented by the physical achievements of the project enabled ISTA to regain an image which, in turn, produced spin-offs represented by the Institute's encouraging viability indices.

4.1.47 Currently, there is a clear and coherent strategic vision of the competitive intervention of ISTA on the training market related to development in the CEMAC zone. This vision was updated by a new strategic study to reposition ISTA as a centre of excellence, the financing of which was supported by the Bank<sup>21</sup>, and consolidated by the existence of a new headquarters built by member States (soon to be equipped). The strategic study was validated by State representatives and ISTA partners at a seminar held in Libreville in June 2009. In reality, however, the 2009 strategy only confirms the orientations, observations and weaknesses of 2002 which have mostly remained unchanged.

4.1.48 The sustainability of the improvements made in training of trainers and support staff is threatened by the loss of the staff trained. The bulk of persons trained will go on retirement in the next five years. Meanwhile, there are no plans to replace the current team. The number of student-to-teacher ratio could deteriorate with the possible departure on retirement and, especially in the shift towards achieving the target intake capacity made possible with the construction of new permanent buildings. The furniture, teaching and communication aids are still in good working conditions. The computer system is under a maintenance contract and continues to function but the advantage gained with the equipment is not significant in view of its substandard quality and capacity.

<sup>21</sup> Notably through the use of the undisbursed balance for the project, among other things.

4.1.49 *Commitment of authorities to project future:* the countries value ISTA as a tool of sovereignty. The political will of integration to which the Institute has been contributing as a tool of its implementation comes as an addition to the economic rationality that guides its maintenance. The reform process launched in 2006 essentially aims at rationalizing specialized institutions of CEMAC and limiting their number by merging training institutions into a single institution based at ISTA<sup>22</sup>. There is a tendency to abandon this merger in favour of the extension and diversification of the actual ISTA activity, confirmed by the validation of the new strategic study in June 2009 and by the construction new permanent buildings.

4.1.50 Although the current ISTA budget, which is equal to or double that of 2004, is sufficient to cover recurrent operating expenses, it seriously hampers the Institute's student intake capacity of 20 students per year per group. It cannot cater for the operating costs of the new permanent offices. It will not be enough to cover the slight increase in the educational costs and scholarships of the students that will automatically stem from the extension of the activity, in general, and diversification of the qualifying training, in particular.

4.1.51 The sustainability of benefits achieved jointly through the project outcomes and CEMAC's gradual commitment can only be envisaged as part of a firm and explicit acceptance by this Organization to revise upward the budget resources allocated to ISTA commensurate with its new commitments in implementing the REP. For, despite its strengthening by the project, ISTA proved to be highly dependent on the community contribution and has not managed to attain the expected significant and economically sustainable level of financial self-sufficiency.

4.1.52 *Socio-political support:* CEMAC member countries directly financed the construction and equipment of a new ISTA headquarters. However, CEMAC so far not formally committed itself to aligning the ISTA budget with its new needs and, less still, with the objectives of the strategy formulated and validated in 2009.

4.1.53 *Economic viability:* training costs are exceedingly high as a result of the low student numbers in relation to the operational costs. ISTA has virtually no internally generated revenue as a result of the failure to admit paying students and the paltry revenue from the research and continuing education section. The budget allocated by CEMAC through the TCI levy is restricted to covering fixed expenditure (indirect costs of training) which account for 88% of the latter. Only a small portion (12%) is used to cover direct costs, leading to a highly reduced student intake capacity that generates high unit costs. The under-utilization of the Institute's graduates has had a negative effect on its economic viability, given the low impact that the graduates have had on the development of their respective countries.

4.1.54 *Financial viability:* ISTA's sustainability and viability is contingent on the importance the economic policy of CEMAC countries will continue to attach to the training of executives in project evaluation and management. The focus currently given should reflect in their fiscal policy for CEMAC specialized institutions, particularly ISTA. Allocations from the TCI to cover the budgetary needs of ISTA should not be used to finance the current operating costs. However, it is also essential that ISTA generate sizable revenue for its self-financing (notably through the admission of fee-paying students enrolled for qualifying courses and the revitalization of continuing education and studies). This diversification and extension of the activity can only be possible as part of a new fiscal policy or external support.

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<sup>22</sup> A specialized study was entrusted to the consultancy firm "Performance" of Senegal and its report was expected for November 2009.

4.1.55 *Institutional arrangements*: a new strategic repositioning study defined novel areas of intervention, which reflect a new vision of the training policy and call for a fresh organization of the Institute under the new diversified academic objectives for the research, continuing education and retraining branch. The conclusions of the new study on the strategic repositioning of ISTA were adopted by the ISTA Board of Directors on 24 October 2010 in Brazzaville, with three new master's programmes, making a total of four master's programmes (Masters in Project Analysis and Evaluation, Project Management, Logistics and Transport Management and Business Administration –MBA).

4.1.56 *Resistance to exogenous factors*: the economic conditions of countries of the region may influence the amount of resources sent to ISTA for its operation. Furthermore, the reputation of ISTA, with its CEMAC label, is currently creating strong demand on the market for the Institute, but which it currently cannot satisfy given its weak intake capacity. The projected increase of the latter starting from next year should allow ISTA to admit a greater number of students as well as trainers, and thereby operate in more competitive conditions while at the same time taking into account the peculiar interests of the sub-region (poverty reduction, creation of micro-projects, involvement in projects earmarked under the CEMAC regional economic programme, etc.). However, other regional or sub-regional training institutions such as CESAG or ISSEA, are growing and developing. Universities such as UOB of Gabon or the Catholic University of Yaoundé have adopted the ISTA programmes, which they propose under much more competitive conditions. The development of these universities and other public and private institutions that offer the same degree courses can affect ISTA's sustainability.

4.1.57 Although strengthened by the project, the sustainability indices of ISTA remain inadequate. This creates some concern over the future of its missions. Improving human and financial resources is a pre-requisite for ISTA's development. On the whole, sustainability is unsatisfactory.

## **4.2 Performance Rating**

### a.) Overall Project Performance and Outcomes

4.2.1 The overall project performance is deemed unsatisfactory given the inadequacies of the quality at entry, achievement of development outcomes, efficiency and sustainability of results. The project mainly financed a strategic study on the repositioning of ISTA but the CEMAC authorities failed to implement its recommendations. The project gave a boost to the survival of ISTA and did not help to effect the changes in the design, planning, implementation and evaluation of socioeconomic development projects in CEMAC member countries.

4.2.2 Admittedly, the project contributed to improving the academic and teaching conditions of students trained at ISTA who obtain a more highly-rated degree to match the development of the LMD system at the academic level. However, the number of degrees the Institute issued annually did not change in relation to the pre-project situation. The ISTA qualifications are not used to contribute to improving the performance of the respective countries in terms of development projects.

b.) Recipient Performance:

4.2.3 The Recipient met all the conditions of the grant on time and paid its contribution to the project financing as stipulated in the loan agreement. It reformed ISTA's funding to ensure sustainable financing that would protect the Institute from liquidity crises that could affect the economies of the sub-region and which caused the financing difficulties of the previous period.

4.2.4 Since 2004, the Recipient did its utmost to enable ISTA play a more significant role in the training of executives that CEMAC would need to implement its Regional Economic Programme and at the same time prepare ISTA for the impending extensive and diversified activities by financing and equipping its new headquarters. With the support of the Bank, it funded a new study on the strategic repositioning of ISTA that was endorsed at a seminar held in June 2009 and that the Council of Heads of State was expected to examine in November-December 2009. The recipient showed some interest in closer collaboration with the Bank Group to complete ISTA's institution building. ISTA is designed to be a centre of excellence for specialized training in the sub-region under the new Development Plan.

4.2.5 The Recipient fulfilled its financial obligations to the project. Gabon and CEMAC paid their respective contributions (UA 0.12 and UA 0.07 million). The ISTA human resource management policy guided by the key principle of equitable representation of the six nationalities of the community in the ISTA teaching and management staff, generated indirect training costs that reduced the efficiency of the Institute. This has compromised the strategic positioning of ISTA in favour of public and private universities in the sub-region.

4.2.6 However, the development of ISTA has not yet materialized through an organized and planned strategic vision (and revision of its structure and student numbers necessary for the implementation of the REP), through a significant increase in CEMAC's contribution to the ISTA budget in relation to the new objectives that CEMAC has defined for it.

4.2.7 The ISTA curriculum remains strictly academic and without obvious relationship with socioeconomic realities and sustainable development needs in the region. Upon proposal by the ISTA General Directorate at its last session of 24 October 2010, the board of directors authorized the Director General to recruit three permanent doctorate-level research teachers, an expert research officer and support staff. The recruitment process is underway. However, this does not appear to match the needs of the new headquarters or the recommendations of the "centre of excellence" study.

4.2.8 The ISTA salary policy, notably for the permanent teaching staff, is marked by political considerations without much regard to teaching effectiveness and academic standards. Its human management is characterized by the absence of management planning. This could pose serious challenges to ISTA which must grapple with the massive loss of its permanent teaching staff and support staff.

4.2.9 The Recipient did not take steps to improve the project and ISTA's institutional impact through the development of structures to receive ISTA graduates. CEMAC and the member countries do not use ISTA as a tool for implementing their capacity building policies. ISTA is managed as an institution of higher learning, whose training does not necessarily meet the needs of countries of the sub-region. Overall, the performance of the Recipient may be deemed unsatisfactory.

c.) Bank Performance

4.2.10 At the time of PRISTA identification and appraisal, the difficulties encountered and the inexperience of the Bank could account for the excessive caution with which the ADF approached the CEMAC request for assistance.

4.2.11 At the implementation and monitoring phases, the difficulties and delays affecting the project could have been avoided if the Bank had conducted, as required, a launch mission aimed, inter alia, at providing training in Bank procedures. The Bank attempted to make up for these lapses during the supervision mission by organizing an accelerated training on its procurement and disbursement procedures. This was not crowned with success because of a lack of the necessary technical assistance. The formula, which had been used for the project management and which was clearly intended to minimize the PIU operating costs, produced contrary effects both in terms of the operating costs and implementation schedule, indeed even on the quality of some components.

4.2.12 In conclusion, as a result of the lapses surrounding project identification and appraisal, and weaknesses during the implementation phase, the Bank's performance may be deemed unsatisfactory.

### **4.3 Factors Affecting Implementation Performance and Outcomes**

4.3.1 The most determining factors of the project implementation performance chiefly lie with CEMAC, which was unable to provide ISTA with the resources needed for implementing the Institute's development plan.

4.3.2 With regard to factors outside the control of the authorities, the project positively benefitted from the downward trend of prices of some products procured. Furthermore, some modifications to the studies component helped to make some savings, thanks to which it was possible to substantially increase the budget allocated to the procurement of furniture, teaching aids and computer equipment.

4.3.3 The project also suffered the negative effects of the application of Bank procedures, these being more adapted to governmental Donees than to multinational projects. The application of these procedures accounted for the extension of the schedules and increase in a portion of the project operating costs.

## **V. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 Conclusions**

5.1.1 The project satisfactorily achieved the expected outputs, especially the ISTA strategic development plan and specialized information resources. However, ISTA's strategic development was not backed by an implementation plan describing the needed material and human resources or planning. Only the academic aspects of the strategy were taken into account. As a result, the ISTA degree changed to a DESS and was subsequently replaced by a Master's degree following the shift to the LMD system. The use of the equipment procured by the project had a positive impact on the academic and pedagogic conditions of students trained at ISTA. This further helped to revitalize and reposition the Institute.

5.1.2 However, these results were obtained at the cost of doubling the implementation period from three to six years.

5.1.3 Despite the project achievements, constraints and challenges persist, notably as a result of the introduction of the LMD system and the institutional and economic restructuring of CEMAC. The overall project performance is deemed unsatisfactory.

## **5.2 Key Lessons**

5.2.1 Apart from the existence of a strategic vision for building the Institute's capacity, the sustainability factors such as socio-political support, formal commitment of regional or national bodies, institutional, financial and economic viability and adjustment to change must be examined and taken into account prior to any decision to be taken by the Bank.

5.2.2 The quantitative and qualitative inputs and contributions of the qualifying training, continuous training and assistance towards revitalizing training for the staff of development management administrations are pre-requisites for making a regional capacity institution a reference one.

5.2.3 The efficiency of a regional capacity building institution will improve provided it reflects the realities of the socioeconomic development of the region and regional development strategies.

5.2.4 The content development of tertiary education curriculum constitutes a necessary, though not sufficient condition, for any regional capacity building institution which seeks to become a centre of excellence. The adaptation of new development concepts and the launch of research programmes in community development, poverty reduction and mainstreaming of cross-cutting dimensions (environment, gender, climate change) also constitute pre-requisites.

5.2.5 The success of a regional capacity building institution is measured by the level of integration of its activities with public administration human resource development goals in the region.

5.2.6 Apart from the political will of regional decision-makers, sufficient and sustainable financial resources are needed to guarantee the viability and sustainability of the regional capacity building institution, modernization of teaching equipment and aids, and to address the need for the diversification and expansion of its activities as well as its transformation into a centre of excellence.

## **5.3 Recommendations**

5.3.1 **CEMAC** should:

- i.) Revisit its staff recruitment policy for ISTA starting from the 2010 financial year to enable the Institute to make the necessary recruitment to replace the teaching and support staff about to go on retirement.
- ii.) Revise the organization and staffing regulations of ISTA based on the data from the repositioning strategy endorsed by the June 2009 seminar by observing the standard ratio of one permanent teacher to thirty students for a

total of 300 students. The ISTA staffing regulations should help recruit 10 permanent teachers with the necessary degrees and qualifications to teach postgraduate courses.

- iv.) Transform ISTA into a major centre of excellence designed to contribute to the implementation of the Regional Economic Programme, through qualifying training, studies, continuing education and support to public and private promoters.
- v.) Ensure the integration into the ISTA development programme of a sub-programme devoted to the effective operationalization of ISTA's own income-generating activities to contribute to its self-financing.
- vi.) Ensure that the ISTA curriculum includes specialized courses in planning techniques and regional economic integration and poverty reduction projects, and more specifically vulnerable social group protection projects hitherto completely absent from the ISTA programmes;
- vii.) Regularly identify of human resource needs and qualifications by country and monitor the origins of applicants for training at ISTA, and the job assignment of graduates on their return.
- viii.) Ensure the formulation of a Regional Continuing Education Plan (PRFC) for development professionals through a recurrent regional study (for example every three years), whose implementation would be entrusted to ISTA.

### 5.3.2 **To ISTA:**

As part of its development and transformation into a specialized training centre of excellence:

- Give academic, pedagogic, organizational and financial content to the strategic objectives for diversifying and expanding its activity;
- Outline a short- and medium-term action plan that would raise ISTA from its current situation to the target situation defined by the 2009 strategic study; and

### 5.3.3 **The Bank** should:


Be involved, as the lead donor, in the formulation and implementation of the ISTA development programme and its transformation into a centre of excellence by obtaining from CEMAC a formal guarantee to undertake:

- A rebalancing of the budget to ensure that in future it contains a capital budget guaranteeing at least the regular renewal of major equipment and teaching aids, and the updating of the Documentation Centre;
- A significant increase in the operating budget commensurate with ISTA's expansion and diversification activities for implementing the REP;

# **ANNEXES**

ANNEX 1

MAP OF CEMAC MEMBER COUNTRIES



## Udeac/Cemac

### INDICATEURS SOCIO-ECONOMIQUES COMPARATIFS

	Année	Cameroun	Rép centrafricaine	Tchad	Congo	Guinée Equatoriale	Gabon	Udeac/Cemac
<b>Indicateurs de Base</b>								
Superficie (000 Km <sup>2</sup> )		476	623	1 284	342	28	268	<b>3,020</b>
Population totale (millions)	2009	19.5	4.4	11.2	3.7	0.7	1.5	<b>41.0</b>
Population urbaine (% of Total)	2009	57.6	38.7	27.1	61.7	39.5	85.6	<b>40.2</b>
Densité de la population (au Km <sup>2</sup> )	2009	41.1	7.1	8.7	10.8	24.1	5.5	<b>13.9</b>
Revenu national brut (RNB) par Habitant (\$ EU)	2008	1 150	410	530	1 970	14 980	7 240	<b>1,422.6</b>
Participation de la Population Active - Total (%)	2009	38.0	44.8	40.1	40.4	38.6	46.9	<b>39.8</b>
Participation de la Population Active - Femmes (%)	2009	41.6	45.0	48.9	40.7	32.6	44.0	<b>43.9</b>
Valeur de l'Indice sexospécifique de dévelop. humain	2005	0.524	0.368	0.370	0.540	0.631	0.670	<b>0.474</b>
Indice de développement humain (rang sur 182 pays)	2007	153	179	175	176	118	103	<b>n.a</b>
Population vivant en dessous de \$ 1 par Jour (%)	2004-07	...	...	...	54.1	...	4.8	<b>...</b>
<b>Indicateurs Démographiques</b>								
Taux d'accroissement de la population totale (%)	2009	2.2	1.9	2.6	1.9	2.6	1.8	<b>2.3</b>
Taux d'accroissement de la population urbaine (%)	2009	3.7	2.4	4.5	2.5	3.0	2.3	<b>3.5</b>
Population âgée de moins de 15 ans (%)	2009	40.9	40.6	45.7	40.5	41.0	36.1	<b>42.0</b>
Population âgée de 65 ans et plus (%)	2009	3.6	3.9	2.8	3.8	2.9	4.3	<b>3.4</b>
Taux de dépendance (%)	2009	80.1	80.2	94.4	79.5	78.2	68.0	<b>83.2</b>
Rapport de Masculinité (hommes pour 100 femmes)	2009	100.0	96.6	98.8	99.7	98.4	99.8	<b>99.2</b>
Population féminine de 15 à 49 ans (%)	2009	24.1	24.3	22.5	24.2	24.3	25.6	<b>23.7</b>
Espérance de vie à la naissance - ensemble (ans)	2009	51.4	47.4	49.0	53.7	50.6	60.9	<b>50.8</b>
Espérance de vie à la naissance - femmes (ans)	2009	51.9	48.8	50.2	54.7	51.8	62.1	<b>51.7</b>
Taux brut de natalité (pour 1000)	2009	36.4	34.9	45.3	34.0	37.9	26.9	<b>38.0</b>
Taux brut de mortalité (pour 1000)	2009	14.0	16.7	16.5	12.8	14.7	9.5	<b>14.7</b>
Taux de mortalité infantile (pour 1000)	2009	85.0	103.1	128.3	79.3	97.1	48.8	<b>99.3</b>
Taux de mortalité des moins de 5 ans (pour 1000)	2009	140.6	175.3	207.6	128.6	164.0	76.1	<b>162.2</b>
Indice synthétique de fécondité (par femme)	2009	4.5	4.7	6.1	4.3	5.3	3.2	<b>4.9</b>
Taux de mortalité maternelle (pour 100000)	2005	669.0	980.0	1099.0	781.0	680.0	520.0	<b>771.2</b>
Femmes utilisant des méthodes contraceptives (%)	2006	26.1	19.1	2.8	44.3	...	...	<b>19.1</b>
<b>Indicateurs de Santé et de Nutrition</b>								
Nombre de médecins (pour 100000 habitants)	2005	18.4	4.5	3.4	21.6	32.4	31.1	<b>12.9</b>
Nombre d'infirmières (pour 100000 habitants)	2005	43.9	28.8	23.8	118.9	48.2	549.1	<b>59.0</b>
Naissances assistées par un personnel de santé qual	2006	63.0	53.4	14.4	83.4	...	...	<b>64.1</b>
Accès à l'eau salubre (% de la population)	2008	74.0	67.0	50.0	71.0	...	87.0	<b>66.8</b>
Accès aux services de santé (% de la population)	2006	...	61.7	...	...	...	50.2	<b>...</b>
Accès aux services sanitaires (% de la population)	2008	47.0	34.0	9.0	30.0	...	33.0	<b>33.0</b>
Pourcent d'adultes de 15-49 ans vivant avec le VIH/s	2007	5.1	6.3	3.5	3.5	3.4	5.9	<b>4.7</b>
Incidence de la tuberculose (pour 100000)	2007	192.0	345.0	299.0	403.0	256.0	406.0	<b>265.6</b>
Enfants vaccinés contre la tuberculose (%)	2007	81.0	90.0	72.0	86.0	56.0	67.0	<b>79.1</b>
Enfants vaccinés contre la rougeole (%)	2007	74.0	99.0	77.0	67.0	37.0	62.0	<b>76.0</b>
Insuffisance pondérale des moins de 5 ans (%)	2006	18.0	29.3	36.7	14.4	...	...	<b>30.2</b>
Apport journalier en calorie par habitant	2005	2 239	1 924	1 992	2 351	...	2 800	<b>2,168.0</b>
Dépenses publiques de santé (en % du PIB)	2006	1.0	1.3	2.6	1.5	1.7	3.3	<b>1.8</b>
<b>Indicateurs d'Education</b>								
Taux brut de scolarisation au (%)								
Primaire - Total	2008	110.9	77.4	75.5	114.0	98.7	134.3	<b>105.8</b>
Primaire - Filles	2008	102.4	64.4	61.9	110.1	96.2	133.9	<b>97.1</b>
Secondaire - Total	2005	37.3	...	19.0	43.1	...	...	<b>97.1</b>
Secondaire - Filles	2005	33.0	...	11.7	40.0	...	...	<b>97.1</b>
Personnel enseignant féminin au primaire (% du total)	2008	44.2	12.7	13.4	46.5	34.4	44.7	<b>35.3</b>
Analphabétisme des adultes - Total (%)	2007	...	...	...	13.2	...	13.8	<b>...</b>
Analphabétisme des adultes - Hommes (%)	2007	...	...	...	7.9	...	9.8	<b>...</b>
Analphabétisme des adultes - Femmes (%)	2007	...	...	...	18.3	...	17.8	<b>...</b>
Dépenses d'éducation en % du PIB	2006	3.9	1.3	1.9	1.8	...	...	<b>3.2</b>
<b>Indicateurs d'Environnement</b>								
Terres arables en % de la superficie totale	2007	12.6	3.1	3.4	1.4	4.6	1.3	<b>4.4</b>
Taux annuel de déforestation (%)	2006	...	...	...	...	...	...	<b>...</b>
Taux annuel de reboisement (%)	2006	...	...	...	...	...	...	<b>...</b>
Emissions de CO2 par habitant (tonnes métriques)	2008	0.4	0.1	0.0	1.6	6.9	3.2	<b>0.6</b>

Source : Base des données du Département des Statistiques de la BAD;  
UNAIDS; UNSD; WHO, UNICEF, WRI, UNDP; Rapports des pays.

dernière mise à jour: Juillet 2010

Notes: n.a. Non Applicable; ... : Données non disponibles.

## ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project

**EVALUATION CRITERIA**

No.	Component Indicator	Rating (1 to 4)	REMARKS
1	<b>Relevance and Quality at Entry</b>	<b>2</b>	Unsatisfactory
i)	Consistency with the overall development strategy of countries of the sub-region	3	By putting ISTA back in a position to continue with the services it was rendering the sub-region, the project aimed at providing the sub-region with competent and specialized professionals in planning and development project evaluation in a context of crisis. Hence, it is consistent with the needs of CEMAC countries.
ii)	Consistency with the Bank's aid strategy	3	The project is consistent with the guiding principles of ADF - VIII for the financing of multinational operations all the more since the mission of ISTA was to carry out activities that contribute to accelerating the regional integration process.
iii)	Macroeconomic policy	2	The project was prepared in collaboration with CEMAC although it did not take into account the macroeconomic development objectives. Only the need to resume the resumption of the operation of the institution was considered. The sizing of the project components did not in any way take into account the needs of the CEMAC countries. This contributed to diluting the development strategy of ISTA.
iv)	Sector policy	2	At the appraisal, the aim of PRISTA was to bring ISTA back to a position to contribute to defining and implementing a viable capacity building strategy in development and poverty reduction. The development of the academic aspect of the teaching of project analysis and evaluation was the main output. Contribution to poverty reduction was not included in the project components and the courses taught at ISTA
v)	Reform of the community policy	1	PRISTA included objectives for improving the quality of teaching at ISTA and those for the diversification and extension of its activity. However, these objectives were not quantified or set within an adequate spatial, temporal and financial framework. Quality improvement objectives were merely expressed as principles in the project appraisal. It was not until the strategy was formulated that the objectives were defined. But there again, the formulation remained at the conceptual level and was not expressed in operational terms.
vi)	Poverty reduction	3	The ultimate goal of the project is to combat poverty for which the CEMAC should acquire the necessary skills for managing the project.
vii)	Social and gender equality	n.a.	
viii)	Environmental issues	n.a.	
ix)	Human resource development	3	Qualitatively the objectives of improving the standard of teaching at ISTA are human resource development objectives.

<b>ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project EVALUATION CRITERIA</b>			
<b>No.</b>	<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>REMARKS</b>
x)	Institutional Development	3	PRISTA is a project for the institution building of a training and studies institution. In proposing the strategic study as the main output, the project aims to provide ISTA resources to direct it towards a centre of excellence. The main output of the project was to impact effectively on the institutional development of ISTA.
xi)	Private sector development	2	PRISTA was to build the capacity of ISTA to train project analysts capable of working on their own and providing services to private operators. ISTA itself should benefit from the project to develop its capacity to attract private investors and provide them project study services. These objectives were not clearly defined.
xii)	Regional economic integration	3	The uniqueness of the model for training development professionals is in itself a factor of regional integration. The fact that high-level professionals from six CEMAC countries live together and share common working values and principles are factors of integration.
xiii)	Quality at entry (including, exactingness, complexity, risks, etc.)	2	On focusing on the strategic study which is only an output, the project failed to examine the means for translating this into an effective development outcome. Thus, the implementation of the strategy had not been envisaged from the outset. The plan was therefore considered to be an end and not a means of achieving sustainable changes in the capacity of ISTA to provide its services.
<b>2</b>	<b><u>Achievement of objectives and outputs ("Efficacy")</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	Unsatisfactory
i)	Achievements and quality of outputs	3	The strategic study was conducted and validated by a seminar and subsequently adopted by the CEMAC member countries. However, contrary to expectations, it did not lead to an ISTA Development Plan. It made recommendations for improving the quality of teaching and development of studies and support to promoters. This strategy was completed in 2009 with another study.
ii)	Achieving direct impacts of the project	2	Unsatisfactory
	Revitalize and reposition ISTA strategically	2	The project helped save the Institute which was on the decline. By implementing the academic aspects of the strategy proposals put forward by the project, ISTA saw its DESS degrees upgraded to DESS, replaced by a master's degree during the migration to the LMD system. However, the academic reform was not sufficient to transform ISTA into a centre of excellence in its initial niche and in community development and poverty reduction.

<b>ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project EVALUATION CRITERIA</b>			
<b>No.</b>	<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>REMARKS</b>
	The ISTA Research Department is revitalized	2	The project did not improve the number and quality of studies undertaken by the ISTA Research Department which is an applied research centre rather than a conventional consulting agency.
	Improve the academic and teaching conditions of students trained at ISTA improved.	2	The project helped improve the teaching conditions at ISTA (teaching staff better trained, more appropriate teaching and learning aids and enriched documentary holdings). However, this improvement did not help increase the number of students trained by ISTA or the standard of continuing education.
iii)	Achieving indirect (intermediate) outcome	2	Unsatisfactory
	Improve the external effectiveness of ISTA	2	ISTA has trained a group of elite qualified civil servants in project analysis and management but who are not used optimally in their respective countries. About 57% of the graduates do not work in development project management.
iv)	Achieving long term outcome (Impact)	2	Unsatisfactory
	Contribute to the definition and implementation of a viable human resource development strategy in the Central African region	2	ISTA is certainly contributing to creating a regional expertise in project analysis and management but on a lower scale. For various reasons, the impact of the project on human resource development has remained hypothetical to date. However, this contribution did not change the intake capacity of ISTA and the number of graduates produced annually has remained limited to 20 unevenly distributed between the countries of the sub-region. The elitism created by this training benefit others The elitism created by this training may benefit some individuals who, thanks to the degree, get promoted and occupy high positions. But it has not as yet resulted in the expected spread of a culture of project analysis and management in the administrations of the sub-region in view of the lack of identification of needs in the countries and the placement of the graduates.
v)	Other indirect outcomes	2	The reputation and successes achieved by ISTA created a demand that its highly limited resources did not allow it to meet. The bulk of this demand benefited other university institutions and public and private consulting firms. The programmes which were originally the preserve of ISTA are offered by many an institution in the sub-region with more resources and turn out over one hundred graduates annually.
v)	Other impacts	2	Unsatisfactory
	Impact on gender	2	Women account for only 7% of students trained at ISTA. No special effort was made to admit more female students and no legal or regulatory measure was made to attract women to the ISTA training courses. The gender aspect of socioeconomic development of projects is overlooked in the ISTA activities and programmes.

<b>ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project EVALUATION CRITERIA</b>			
<b>No.</b>	<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>REMARKS</b>
	Impact on poverty reduction	2	The development strategy of ISTA did not attach much importance to the curriculum specifically devoted to poverty reduction. There are no specific data on this theme but an indirect contribution could be obtained with the participation of ISTA graduates in project formulation. .
	Private sector development	2	The implicit objectives of the project were to improve the capacity of ISTA to develop projects initiated by private operators but no practical measure was taken in this regard. The strategy financed by the project also endorsed this principle but failed to make any concrete recommendation to establish this option. Indirectly, the trainees benefit the private sector by working full or part time for consulting firms or by starting their own consultancies. It has also had an impact on the private sector through the intervention of ISTA trainees working in project management in support of the private sector.
<b>3)</b>	<b>Efficiency</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
i)	<u>Economic rate of return</u>	-	Not calculated
ii)	<u>Financial rate of return</u>	-	Not calculated
iii)	<u>Cost-effectiveness ration indicators (specify....)</u>	2	The impact of the project on the quality of teaching at ISTA and on its image, were acquired at high costs in view of the small number of trainees ISTA admits annually. The annual unit cost of a student for the 2006-2008 period was CFAF 45 million. This cost is 12 times more than that of a student in France (in 2006 all courses and level considered). That of a Tunisian student (all courses considered) is equal to CFAF 735,625 (in 2006). That of a student in the USA is about CFAF 3.912 million in private universities and CFAF 1.684 million in public universities, which eleven times higher than the average private American university. If it followed the French system, ISTA could produce 150 graduates annually (2-years with MBA 1 and MBA 2). ISTA continued to operate with an annual turnout of 20 graduates. Staff expenses represent 44% of the operating costs of ISTA. They represent over 50% of the total unit cost per student. The ISTA buildings furnished by the project (notably classrooms, computer room and documentation centre are used only 5 months in a year). Since the migration to the LMD system, the Master's degree requires three semesters of classroom work and five months of practical work making a total of two financial years. Hence, the degree costs twice as much as before. Also, the project was closed with nearly 3 years of delay on the initial schedule. Overall, efficiency is unsatisfactory.

ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project EVALUATION CRITERIA			
No.	Component Indicator	Rating (1 to 4)	REMARKS
4	<b><u>Impact on institutional development</u></b>	<u>2</u>	The impact of the project on institutional development is unsatisfactory. ISTA has gained academic recognition. It is linked to prestigious institutions through partnership and sponsorship agreements. It is managed by an academic board including representatives from universities guaranteeing the validity of its degrees and ensuring the transparency and regularity of its examinations. However, the project did not support ISTA attain financial autonomy. The lack of financial, human and technical support for the quantitative development of the post-university educational structure and studies and continuing education structures reduced the impact of the project on institutional development, which is deemed to be unsatisfactory.
i)	National capacity	<u>3</u>	The building of the capacities of six countries taken one by one in project management and evaluation is effective but highly reduced in number. The persons trained are not all employed in the development project sector. However, the persons trained render services in this area either in the administration, or through private consulting firms that employ them on a permanent or part-time basis through consulting firms or projects created by some of them. Only 55% of the persons trained at ISTA are directly employed in their areas of specialization in the five years after they had obtained their degrees.
	- Economic management	2	The limited number of graduates in relation to needs and their under-utilization has reduced the impact of the project in improving economic capacity management of CEMAC members.
	- Sector capacity	3	The project has contributed, with the CEMAC budgetary reforms, to the continuity of the ISTA mission in capacity building. However, this capacity is not managed rationally by either ISTA as a community institution or by CEMAC member countries or CEMAC as an entity managing community affairs. The training at ISTA is requested and used on a strictly individual and personal basis. However, capacity building in the sub-region is a reality, albeit an imperceptible one; there is an “ISTA” effect on the project analysis, evaluation and management capacity of the six member countries.
	- Executing agency	<u>2</u>	The project was administered by ISTA through a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) comprising a Director (ISTA Director General), a Secretary (which is at the same time the DG’s secretary) and an Accountant. Despite the training provided by the supervision team, the effects are not perceptible.

<b>ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project EVALUATION CRITERIA</b>			
<b>No.</b>	<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>REMARKS</b>
	- Skills improvement	1	The four permanent trainers of ISTA received retraining that did not match the one stipulated by the project at the appraisal or the needs of the development strategy. This training will not benefit ISTA for long since the beneficiaries are on the verge of going on retirement. The training of the support staff was not beneficial enough for the institutions either in terms of content, duration and depth of the themes treated. ISTA continues to mainly depend on part-time teachers and did not renew or bring its human resources up to the standard indicated at the appraisal and by the strategy.
	- Staff management	2	The ISTA DG and PIU Director, absorbed by his ISTA management duties devoted very little time to the project management. The permanent teachers who were supposed to assist were also preoccupied by their teaching and administrative responsibilities at ISTA. The project accountant was more present than the others but more during off-peak periods than the busy periods of the project. The project accountant was more present (and paid) during the off-peak periods than the peak periods of the project.
	- Information management system	1	There was not an information management system specific to the project. The ISTA/Project combination diluted the project management information and its documentation in that of ISTA. Apart from accounting information, it is difficult to find information specific to the project in an organized and systematic way.
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<b>ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project EVALUATION CRITERIA</b>			
<b>No.</b>	<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>REMARKS</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Sustainability</b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b>Unsatisfactory despite the commitment by CEMAC to support the institution.</b>
i)	Technical sustainability (including E&E facilitation, availability of recurrent financing, spare parts, workshops, etc.)	2	The number and quality of equipment need to be upgraded in view of the demand created. The CEMAC member states reserve adequate budget for the equipment of the new headquarters. The sustainability of minimum improvements acquired in the training of trainers and the support staff is threatened by the loss of the staff trained. Computers and other reprographic equipment and teaching aids are already nearly five years old. The computer equipment is obsolete and no longer adequate for the required applications.
ii)	Sustainable commitment of Donee (legal/regulatory framework included)	2	The operating budgets are not enough to allow for an increase in the Institute's intake capacity (20 trainees per annum). Increases in ISTA budgets could only cover the normal increase in the latter's operating costs (salaries, benefits and price escalation). However, since 2006, there has been a positive change in the attitude of CEMAC towards ISTA motivated by the emergency of new policies (REP) and some positive results despite the challenges and limitations, were obtained by ISTA.
iii)	Socio-political support (including the participation of beneficiaries, protection of vulnerable groups, political stability)	3	The CEMAC member countries directly financed the construction and equipment of a new ISTA headquarters. But, there is no formal commitment by CEMAC to align the ISTA budget to the new needs and much less the objectives of the strategy formulated and validated in 2009.
iv)	Economic viability	2	Training costs are exceedingly high in view of the low student numbers. Internally generated incomes of ISTA are virtually nil, in view of the lack of any efforts to extend admission to paying students and the paltry incomes from the studies and continuing education activity. The budget allocated by CEMAC through the TCI levy is restricted to covering fixed expenses (indirect costs of training) which account of 88% of the latter. Only a small portion (12%) is used to cover direct costs leading to highly reduced student intake capacity that generates high unit costs.

<b>ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project EVALUATION CRITERIA</b>			
<b>No.</b>	<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>REMARKS</b>
v)	Financial viability	2	The sustainability and viability of ISTA is conditioned by the importance the economic policy of CEMAC countries will continue to attach to the training of executives in project evaluation and management. The focus currently given should reflect in their fiscal policy for CEMAC specialized institutions, particularly ISTA. Allocations from the TCI to cover the budgetary needs of ISTA should not be used to finance the current operating costs. However, it is also essential that ISTA generates sizable revenue for its self-financing (notably through the admission of fee-paying students enrolled for qualifying courses and the revitalization of continuing education and studies). This diversification and extension of the activity are only possible as part of a new fiscal policy or external support.
vi)	Institutional arrangements (organisational and managerial)	<u>3</u>	A new strategic repositioning study has defined the new areas of intervention, which reflect a new vision of the training policy and call for a new organization of the institution under the new diversified academic objectives and those for the studies, continuing education and retraining. No concrete arrangement had been made at the time of the evaluation.
Vii	Environmental viability	n.a.	-
Viii	Resistance to exogenous factors	2	The economic conditions of countries of the region may influence the level of resources given to ISTA for its operation. Furthermore, the development of these universities and other public and private institutions that offer the same degree courses can affect the sustainability of ISTA.
<b>6</b>	<b>Overall performance indicator</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>The overall assessment of the project is unsatisfactory</b>

**ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project**

**DONEE PERFORMANCE**

<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>1. <u>Quality of Preparation:</u></b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Satisfactory.</b>
- Quality of preparation	<b>3</b>	The Donee undertook the reforms required by ADF and adopted an improvement policy that satisfied the ADF and enabled it to undertake the project preparation and appraisal. CEMAC mainly guaranteed the financing of the operation of ISTA by adopting a community policy that involved the financing of specialized institutions through a levy on luxury goods paid at the borders of the six countries, which is subsequently distributed to the institutions concerned (TCI). This revenue redistribution is not based on an analysis of development objectives of the said institutions but through relatively opaque distribution keys. While its fiscal policy on ISTA guarantees the operation of the institution, it is not enough to cover its development. Prior to the project, CEMAC adopted measures for restructuring of ISTA and a reform of the trainee selection process that enabled the ADF undertake the preparation of the project. Donee performance at the preparatory stage was satisfactory.
<b>2. <u>Quality of Implementation</u></b>	<b>2</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
- Assignment of key staff	2	The PIU has operated with a director, a secretary and an accountant. It was supposed to be backed by the ISTA permanent teaching staff. This did not work out well. The director (also ISTA DG) and the permanent teachers were too busy to perform this additional function.
- Performance of executing agency	2	Due to a lack of training in the Bank procedures at the start of the project, and to its composition, the performance of the executing agency, despite its desire to adhere to the schedule, is unsatisfactory.

<b>ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project DONEE PERFORMANCE</b>		
<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
- Adherence to time schedules and costs.	2	The project suffered a 3-year delay. This was caused by the lack of familiarity by project managers with Bank procedures and delays resulting from this in the issuing of non-objection and payment process at the Bank. No changes were made to the content or financing of the project but it became necessary to extend the date of the last disbursement. The closing date was extended twice. The project should have been modified at mid-term to include the outcomes of the strategic study and its recommendations. Overall, the project costs were adhered to but the distribution between the expenditure categories underwent variations that reflected the cost overruns for the audit and operating cost categories.
3. Compliance with covenants	3	Compliance with covenants was satisfactory. The loan agreement conditions were observed and fulfilled on schedule. CEMAC and Gabonese Government paid their contributions. The Government of Gabon provided ISTA with buildings but these were not suitable for its mission and status.
4. Adequacy of monitoring & evaluation and reporting	2	The project underwent 11 supervision missions at an average of a mission every six months. The shortest lead time between two missions was 3 months and the longest was 13 months. The supervision missions focused on the formal and procedural monitoring. Very few issues of substance were discussed or reported. There was never any issue of suspending activities related to ISTA continuing training and studies. Overall, 5 quarterly reports were submitted to Bank by the PIU, but the first three years (2000-2003) were only covered later and at the request of the supervision mission. The project operated without an adequately compatible system until 2004. Two audit firms undertook an audit of the 2000, 2001 and 2002 financial years for the former and 2003, 2004 and 2005 for the latter. Only one monitoring mission was organized in 09/2004. There was no monitoring-evaluation system.
5. Satisfactory operations (where relevant)	2	The main output of the project, the strategic study, was only implemented for the quantitative development and improvement of the quality of teaching in the qualifying courses of ISTA activities. The material procurement of the project contributed much to improving the quality of teaching and the administrative tasks of ISTA. ISTA has become more visible as an educational institution. But the material limitations imposed could have made it lose this image. The studies and continuing education activities did not benefit the project.
<b><u>Overall Donee Performance</u></b>	<b>2</b>	<b>On the whole the overall Donee performance is deemed unsatisfactory.</b>

ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project

**BANK PERFORMANCE**

<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
At Identification	<u>2</u>	Unsatisfactory
- Consistency of project with Government's development strategy	2	CEMAC did not have a clear strategy in the development of technical training for professional staff in project evaluation and management. The ADF expected that clear measures guaranteeing the viability of the institution and nature and standard of teaching would be taken before committing itself.
- Consistency of project with strategy Bank's country strategy	3	The project is consistent with the Bank Group's capacity building strategy. It is also consistent with the guiding principles of ADF-VIII for financing multilateral operations.
- Participation of government/beneficiaries	2	The five CEMAC countries eligible for ADF-VIII contributed to the project through CEMAC. The only non-eligible country, Gabon, contributed directly to the project. However, their level of involvement in the definition of the project objectives and means for achieving them are inadequate.
- Innovative nature of project	2	At the time of the appraisal of PRISTA, the Bank did not have much experience in the strengthening of multinational institutions of higher education. Hence, PRISTA provided an opportunity to identify, assess and ensure the monitoring of the implementation of this type of project. The difficulties encountered helped identify the factors of success and failure for such operations. This experience could account for the exploratory nature given to the project.
At project preparation	<u>3</u>	Satisfactory
- Rational of Bank support	<u>3</u>	The project was designed as a contribution to building the capacity of socioeconomic development projects in Central Africa. Its rationale also stems from the fact that it is a follow-up to several requests by the Council of Heads of State and meetings of ministers in charge of economic planning. It also reflects the needs of social partners (private enterprises, NGOs, grassroots communities and individuals).
- Timeliness of Bank support	<u>3</u>	The Bank's support was timely since it occurred at a time when, even after the boost from the CEMAC budgetary reforms, ISTA urgently needed to reposition itself, assess the consistency of its programmes and courses with the needs of the CEMAC country members in a post-conflict period.

<b>ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project</b>		
<b>BANK PERFORMANCE</b>		
<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
At appraisal	<u>2</u>	Unsatisfactory
- Quality of technical, economic, financial, institutional, social and environmental analyses	1	<p>No technical or economic analysis served as a basis for the project. The appraisal report was limited to analysing the rationale of the project. It did not deduce the project objectives from a logical analysis of the objective data of the ISTA situation. It followed the request from CEMAC and defined the volume and duration of the project in an empirical and unjustified manner.</p> <p>The major assumption on which the project is based is that strengthening the content of the courses and the expertise of the teachers will help enhance the quality of the programmes on offer. In so doing, ISTA will be able to attract more students, offer more services to the community and consequently increase its self-financing capacity and regional and continental appeal.</p>
- Relevance of conditions and covenants	3	The Bank required that the reforms be taken in relation to the ISTA system of financing and its organization and duration of studies. Its requirements were justified and only had positive impacts on the viability of the institution. But the Bank should have required the implementation of the approved development strategy.
- Adequacy of the loan instrument - Adequacy of financial packaging	2	The grant was mainly intended to finance a study which defines the development prospects of ISTA. It minimized the Bank's commitment. It enabled ISTA to survive without growing. The financing of the study would have been only half productive.
- Quality of coordination with other donors/partners	2	The Bank was the only operator in this area. It could have associated other donors operating in the region.
- Implementation and supervision plans (including performance indicators, M&E criteria)	2	The implementation plan was adequate. However, the physical procurement which did not depend on the outcome of the studies should not have been deferred but could have initiated right from the project start-up to accelerate its positive effects. An assumption about the project design was used to link the strategic study and the physical achievements through a causal relationship with the enhancement of the quality of services and diversification of the policies. The project did not take into account the need to implement the recommendations of the strategic study through financial and technical supports. Real support to ISTA should be initiated after the strategic study by using the findings of its conclusions as the point of departure for the sustainable development of ISTA.

<b>ISTA/CEMAC Institution Building Project BANK PERFORMANCE</b>		
<b>Component Indicator</b>	<b>Rating (1 to 4)</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
At supervision	<u>2</u>	Unsatisfactory
- Adequacy of Bank staff (skills, time & continuity)	3	The Bank always dispatched supervision mission teams led by an Education Expert. The continued involvement of the education expert constituted a constant that facilitated relations between ISTA and the Bank. However, the education expert was accompanied by an architect whereas the project did not include any component related to this specialty. The supervision mission was sometimes enriched with the inclusion of a socioeconomist. Overall, the Bank conducted 11 supervision missions with an average frequency of a mission every six months. The shortest lead time between two missions was 3 months and the longest was 13 months. Very often, the supervision mission concerned both PRISTA and the Education III Project of Gabon.
- Problem solving	2	All the problems raised by the project implementation were addressed. However, response times were at times exceedingly long, which greatly contributed to exceeding the deadlines and thereby increasing the cost of implementation of some components.
- Sensitivity to cyclical changes	2	The supervision missions always focused on the internal management factors of the project and failed to assess the direct or indirect impacts on the environment. It became necessary for the Donee to make progress on the concept of training and urge the Bank to intervene in a fresh bid to effect a change at ISTA.
- Adequacy of monitoring of recommendations/decisions	3	The recommendations were relevant and always helped address issues. The project implementation did not follow any specific monitoring-evaluation system. The audit missions only focused on the auditing of accounts. A mid-term evaluation would have modified the nature of the loan instrument or only the grant amount in order to adjust the project to the strategy.
- Realistic ratings at the CPPR/APPR	-	N.A.
- Attention to likely impact on social development	2	No significance was given to the likely impact of the project on social development. The assumptions of the appraisal report were not objectively verified in the Bank's completion report or that of the Donee.
- Attention to sustainability issues	2	The development strategies of ISTA formulated with the support of the Bank were not backed by any implementation plan that could foster the sustainability of the project. The Bank did not provide support that could help obtain lasting changes.
<b><u>Overall assessment of Bank performance</u></b>	<u>2</u>	<b>Overall Bank performance is unsatisfactory</b>

**FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOMES**

Factors positively (+) or negatively (-) affecting implementation and achievement of major objectives


Factors	Substantial	Partial	Negligible	N.A.	Remarks
<b>1. Outside Control of Authorities</b>					
1.1 World market prices		+			
1.2 Natural disasters					
1.3 Bank performance	-				
1.4 Contractors/consultants' performance	+				
1.5 Civil war					
<b>1.6 Other (specify)</b>					
<b>2. Subject to Government Control</b>					
2.1 Macroeconomic policies	+				
2.2 Sector policies	+				
2.3 Government commitment	+				
2.4 Appointment of key staff	+				
2.5 Provision of counterpart funding		+			
2.6 Administrative capacity	+				
<b>2.7 Other (specify)</b>					
<b>3. Subject to Executing Agency's Control</b>					
3.1 Management	+				
3.2 Provision of staff	+				
3.3 Use of technical assistance			+		
3.4 Monitoring & Evaluation	+				
3.5 Participation of beneficiaries	+				
<b>3.6 Other (specify)</b>					
<b>4- Factors Affecting Implementation</b>					
4.1 Changes in project scope/scale/design	+				
4.2 Deficiency in estimating physical inputs, basic unit costs	+				
4.3 Inadequacies of price contingencies		+			
4.4 Changes in exchange rates, financial and institutional arrangements	+				
4.5 Unrealistic implementation schedule		+			
4.6 Quality of management and financial management included	+				
4.7 Delays in selecting staff/consultants/contractors and receiving counterpart funds			+		
4.8 Inefficient procurement and disbursement		+			
4.9 Other (specify)					

<b>MATRIX OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW UP –MPDE- PPER</b>		
<b>Main Observations and Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
The four permanent trainers of ISTA received retraining that did not meet the minimum required to teach at postgraduate level. This training will not benefit ISTA for long since the majority (75%) of the beneficiaries are about to retire. The training provided the support staff was not of a satisfactory quality either in terms of content, duration and the depth of the issues dealt with. In short, for both groups of staff, the training was given to those on the verge of going on retirement	Review ISTA's staff recruitment policy beginning of 2010 financial year to ensure that the institute can undertake the necessary recruitment to replace outgoing teaching and support staff	<b>CEMAC</b>
ISTA continues to mainly depend on part-time teachers and has not managed to secure supplementary skills. The current students/permanent teacher ratio of 5, falls far below the standard of 30 students per permanent teacher	Maintain the international staff status of permanent teachers to attract competent teachers and provide ISTA with an optimal number of permanent teachers per student necessary for its effectiveness. .	<b>CEMAC</b>
The reputation and successes achieved by ISTA created a demand that its highly limited resources did not allow it to meet. A large portion of this demand benefited other university institutions and public and private consulting firms.	Revise the organization and staffing regulations of ISTA based on the repositioning strategy data endorsed by the June 2009 seminar by observing the standard ratio of a permanent teacher to thirty students for a total of 300 students. The ISTA staffing regulations should help, in the medium term and progressively recruit 10 permanent teachers with the necessary degrees and qualifications to teach postgraduate courses.	<b>CEMAC</b>
The observation_made in 2002 on the quantitative and qualitative inadequacies of the permanent teaching staff compared with the needs remain valid and could deepen with the departure on retirement of the four teachers if no action is taken. Whereas the standard set by SCGC was 30 students per student, since 2002, ISTA has been operating with 5 students per permanent teacher.		
In its current (human, financial and organization) form ISTA is not in a position to have a significant impact on the development of the capacity of sub-regional administrations in poverty reduction. This impact is can only be achieved through a conceptual renovation of the human resources in terms of numbers and qualifications not always unavailable to ISTA, even after the project	Approach donors for their contributions to the ISTA development and institution building aimed at transforming ISTA into a major centre of excellence designed to contribute to the implementation of the Regional Economic Programme, through qualifying training, studies, continuing education and support to public and private promoters.	<b>CEMAC</b>

<b>MATRIX OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW UP –MPDE- PPER</b>		
<b>Main Observations and Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
The project did not make it possible to revitalize the ISTA Research Department, which had a mandate to conduct, on request, market, feasibility and project development studies for both public and private entities, or on behalf of international organizations. The number and quality of studies have not improved. As a result, the contribution by the ISTA Research Department to self-financing was not achieved.	Ensure the integration into the ISTA development programme of a sub-programme devoted to the effective operationalization of ISTA’s own income-generating activities to contribute to its self-financing.	<b>CEMAC</b>
The content of the courses taught at ISTA does not contain any direct or indirect reference to the specific realities of the socioeconomic development of the sub-region and the project did not contribute to adapting the curriculum to such realities. Concepts pertaining to community development, micro-projects and income-generating activities as well as the mainstreaming of gender in development projects are still completely absent from the ISTA curriculum	Ensure that the ISTA curriculum includes specialized courses in planning techniques and regional economic integration and poverty reduction projects and more specifically vulnerable social groups protection projects hitherto completely absent from the ISTA programmes;	<b>CEMAC</b>
The lack of knowledge about CEMAC’s human resource policy orientations related to economic development led to the general principles and assumptions used in the project formulation outlined in the appraisal report.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organize the improvement of the human resources of CEMAC member countries in development by regularly identifying human resource needs and qualifications by country and monitoring the origins of applicants for training at ISTA and the job assignment of graduates on their return.</li> <li>• Ensure the formulation of a Regional Continuing Education Plan (PRFC) for development professionals through a recurrent regional study (for example every three years) whose implementation would be entrusted to ISTA.</li> </ul>	<b>CEMAC</b>
Human and material factors were not adequately taken into account compared to the reality of the socioeconomic needs of CEMAC countries. The project did not go beyond the strategic study needed by ISTA to enable it adapt the nature and volume of its activities to the needs of countries of the sub-region and achieve tangible development results.		

<b>MATRIX OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW UP –MPDE- PPER</b>		
<b>Main Observations and Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
<p>The ISTA development strategy was not supported by an effective implementation plan describing the material and human resources and the necessary planning for its implementation. Only the academic aspects of the 2002 strategy proposals were considered and implemented.</p> <p>In its current (human, financial and organization) form ISTA is not in a position to have a significant impact on the development of the capacity of sub-regional administrations in poverty reduction. This impact can only be achieved through a conceptual renovation of the human resources in terms of numbers and qualifications not always unavailable to ISTA, even after the project</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Give academic, pedagogic, organizational and financial content to the strategic objectives for diversifying and expanding its activity;</li> <li>• Outline a short and medium term action plan that would raise ISTA from its current situation to the target situation defined by the 2009 strategic study.</li> <li>• Implement the action plan for: (i) restructuring its pedagogic services, administration and financial services through the formulation and implementation of an organization chart, operational and managerial procedures of new orientations and dimensions of ISTA; (ii) concretization and implementation of new pedagogic options through interventions that facilitate a new master's degree and train regional teachers to prepare them to take over at the end of the external technical assistance period; (iii) the structuring, organization and launch on new bases, and with appropriate logistical and human resources, of the consultancy and training branch as part of a sub-programme separate from the development and post- university education diversification sub-programme;</li> </ul>	<b>ISTA</b>
<p>The centre has not yet attained the project target of a regional centre for the documentation, storage and dissemination of data on development projects in the sub-region. Other investments are needed to enable the Documentation Centre attain this status.</p> <p>The impact of the project on the development of human resources in the sub-region remains hypothetical to date.</p>	<p>As the lead donor, it should be involved in the formulation and implementation of the ISTA development programme and its transformation into a centre of excellence by obtaining from CEMAC a formal guarantee to undertake:</p> <p>1.4.2.1 A rebalancing of the ISTA budget to ensure that in the future it contains a capital budget guaranteeing at least the regular renewal of major equipment and teaching aids and the updating of the Documentation Centre</p> <p>1.4.2.2 A significant increase of the operating budget to expand and diversify the objectives of ISTA activities for the implementation of the REP</p> <p>1.4.2.3 To directly or indirectly cover a portion of the financing of the programme to transform ISTA into a centre of excellence.</p>	<b>BANK</b>

### PPER ISTA INSTITUTION BUILDING PROJECT INTERVENTION LOGICAL MODEL



**RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF THE ISTA INSTITUTION BUILDING PROJECT**

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES	EXPECTED RESULTS	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS				4.4 ASSUMPTIONS/ RISKS
		Description	At Appraisal	At Completion (PCR)	At Post-Evaluation	
<b>GOAL/Sector Goal</b>	<b>Long-Term Results</b>					
Consolidate development projects management capacity in Central Africa	Capacity of public and private administration to manage development projects in Central Africa improved	Number of development project management specialists in Central Africa	10 % increase in the number of trainees per annum over 5 years starting from 2002	ISTA continues to receive about 20 trainees annually	Insufficient	Increase in number of specialists in project management used optimally in CEMAC country members
		Quality of implementation of development projects in CEMAC countries	Not applicable	Not applicable	Unsatisfactory	
<b>Project Objectives</b>	<b>Results / Direct Impacts</b>					
Improve ISTA services in training, development project analysis and management	External effectiveness of ISTA improved	Use of graduates by member countries	Not applicable	Not applicable	Unsatisfactory	Consistency of ISTA programmes with needs of CEMAC countries.  Adequate financing of the implementation of ISTA development strategy.
	ISTA revitalized and strategically repositioned	Number and quality agreements signed		Several agreements signed	Several agreements signed	
	Academic and teaching conditions improved	Satisfaction rate of students trained at ISTA	Not applicable	Not applicable	Satisfactory (Annex 11)	
	ISTA Research Department revitalized	Number and quality of studies conducted	Not applicable	Not applicable	Unsatisfactory (2 major studies over the 2003-2008 period)	
<b>Activities/Inputs</b>	<b>Outputs</b>					

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES	EXPECTED RESULTS	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS				4.4 ASSUMPTIONS/ RISKS
		Description	At Appraisal	At Completion (PCR)	At Post-Evaluation	
Assessment of programmes and activities	ISTA strategic development plan validated	Existence and implementation of ISTA development strategic plan	Master plan adopted in 2001	Master plan adopted in 2001	Strategy available but partially implemented (Annex 12)	Recommendations of the strategic study approved by CEMAC member countries
Retraining of support staff and trainers	Support staff and trainers retrained	Quality of services of support staff and trainers	6 support staff trained in 2002, re-training abroad of 4 trainers in 2002 and 2003.	6 support staff trained in 2006, re-training abroad of 4 trainers in 2005 and 2006	Unsatisfactory.	Adequate training received and maintaining of support and training staff at ISTA
Supply of equipment,, furniture, text-books and journals	ISTA supplied with equipment,, furniture, text-books and journals	Operating condition of equipment and documentation centre	Software, computers, projector, tables, text-books and subscription cupboards	Equipment, furniture and media procured between 2002 and 2005.	Satisfactory	Equipment procured is of sound quality.



2. How did you find **teaching and scientific conditions** of your studies at ISTA?

Quality of courses

Level of Satisfaction	Before Project Students	During Project Student	TOTAL	Before Project Student	During Project Student
1 Highly unsatisfactory	0.00%	4.76%	3.57%	14.29%	9.52%
2 Unsatisfactory	14.29%	4.76%	7.14%		
4 Fairly satisfactory	57.14%	23.81%	32.14%	85.71%	90.48%
3 Satisfactory	0.00%	19.05%	14.29%		
5 Highly satisfactory	28.57%	47.62%	42.86%		
TOTAL	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Quality of internship

Level of Satisfaction	Before Project Students	During Project Student	TOTAL	Before Project Student	During Project Student	TOTAL
1 Highly unsatisfactory	0.00%	9.52%	7.14%	28.57%	42.86%	39.29%
2 Unsatisfactory	28.57%	33.33%	32.14%			
4 Fairly satisfactory	57.14%	28.57%	35.71%	71.43%	57.14%	60.71%
3 Satisfactory	14.29%	9.52%	10.71%			
5 Highly satisfactory	0.00%	19.05%	14.29%			
TOTAL	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100%	100%	100%

**Summary Table of ISTA Development Strategy Proposed by the SG Consulting Group  
Study Validated by the CEMAC Seminar of April 2002 in Libreville**

<i>Elements of ISTA Development Programme defined by the Strategic Study Conducted by SG Consulting Group and Validated in 2002</i>	<i>Situation in 2009</i>		
	<i>Elements achieved</i>	<i>Partially achieved</i>	<i>Fully achieved and satisfactorily</i>
<i>1. Short-term strategy: (two-year duration)</i>			
<i>i.) proposes to change the curriculum into a DESS in project analysis and evaluation involving a specialized curriculum based on 11 courses entailing a total of 390 hours spread over 6 months plus a 5-month internship;</i>			<i>Yes, the DESS has even been transformed into Master 1 and Master 2</i>
<i>ii.) Creation of an academic board including teachers from external universities</i>			<i>Yes</i>
<i>iii.) Recruitment of two new permanent teachers</i>	<i>No recruitment made</i>		
<i>iv.) Provide a trainers training to four teachers spread over 3 years leading to a postgraduate degree (MBA, MSc);</i>		<i>Training organized, but not qualifying, mere retraining</i>	
<i>v.) Recruit as part-time teachers only holders of a postgraduate degree (DEA, DESS at least) with a minimum of 5 years of relevant experience;</i>			<i>Yes</i>
<i>vi.) No longer recruit for the preparation of the ISTA degree only holders of undergraduate qualification (Bac +4);</i>			<i>Yes</i>
<i>vii.) Involve the academic board in the management of the entrance examination o enhance transparency;</i>			<i>Yes</i>
<i>viii.) Conduct corporate seminars and projects in relation to the DESS programme;</i>		<i>Some seminars but just a few and not related to courses</i>	
<i>ix.) Propose and organize ISTA entrance examination preparatory classes in the countries;</i>	<i>Not achieved</i>		
<i>x.) Increase the volume of activities using part-time staff and through sub-contracting (intermediation)</i>	<i>Part-time teaching staff exists but no increase in volume of activity or in terms of main training or as a consultancy agency or in other ISTA missions</i>		

<b>Elements of ISTA Development Programme defined by the Strategic Study Conducted by SG Consulting Group and Validated in 2002</b>	<i>Situation in 2009</i>		
	<i>Elements achieved</i>	<i>Partially achieved</i>	<i>Fully achieved and satisfactorily</i>
<i>xi.) involve the entire ISTA staff as well as former ISTA students and students preparing end-of-session studies in the research department;</i>	<i>Not achieved</i>		
<i>xii.) Produce monographs based on the studies conducted;</i>	<i>Not achieved</i>		
<i>xiii.) Procure computers and connect to internet (the entire staff and all students);</i>			<i>Procured by the project ; recent internet connectivity ; equipment already outdated</i>
<i>xiv.) Recruit a specialist of documentary research and data analysis; analyse, collate and disseminate various data on the sub-region;</i>			<i>Yes, but only manages the library ; no development or research work</i>
<i>xv.) Enrich the documentation centre with books and documents relating to the courses taught;</i>		<i>Yes, the project procurements enriched the DC but the latter cannot in any way be said to be a reference in the sub-region</i>	
<i>xvi.) Procure accounting and financial management software;</i>			
<i>xvii.) Recruit and train an accountant;</i>	<i>Not achieved</i>		
<i>xviii. Create a partnership office attached to the DG's office;</i>	<i>Not achieved</i>		
<i>xix. Operationalize the three main units (Training and Documentation Department, Studies and Applied Research Department, Administration and Finance Department and provide them with staff and managers and formulate an action plan for each operation unit;</i>	<i>Though the departments exist, they at an embryonic stage. Their staff is reduced to managers; only the Training Department has a Director and a unit head. Action plans have not been formulated</i>		
<i>xx Establish and action plan in relation to the products and services available at ISTA and to each of the four strategic segments with the public and international institutional segments as the priority.</i>	<i>Not achieved</i>		
<i>xxi. Seek the financing necessary for the implementation of the various programmes</i>	<i>No, because no action plan was formulated</i>		

<i>Elements of ISTA Development Programme defined by the Strategic Study Conducted by SG Consulting Group and Validated in 2002</i>	<i>Situation in 2009</i>		
	<i>Elements achieved</i>	<i>Partially achieved</i>	<i>Fully achieved and satisfactorily</i>
xxii. <i>Choose and appoint the national correspondents given the market opportunities they can offer at ISTA</i>		<i>The correspondents exist but are all high officials who are not readily available for the ISTA commercial development activities. They merely manage the link with ISTA for the preparation and organization entrance exam</i>	
<i>b. Medium term strategy: (duration of one year or less) the aim is to position ISTA as the development project analysis and evaluation specialist. It will entail the consolidation of the achievements of short term strategy through:</i>			
i. <i>Creation of specialized curricula (health, municipal infrastructure management, rural projects, etc.) in the form of complementary modules to the main DESS programme;</i>	<i>Not achieved ; training is still academic and the sector modules have not been created</i>		
ii. <i>Open up intermediation and the use of part-time teachers in and outside CEMAC</i>		<i>Yes, but the form of a one-week crash course in which the teacher teaches, organizes the exam and goes back home.</i>	
iii. <i>Strengthen the documentation centre through new acquisitions and start producing the monograph series and use CDs as a training support tool for corporate training;</i>		<i>Procurements made within the budget limitations set under the project. The Centre is not completely deprived but does not continue to be regularly fed. No production except making books and journals available to students for on the spot consultation. The accelerated nature of the courses often creates long wait lists due to the existence of only single copies</i>	

<i>Elements of ISTA Development Programme defined by the Strategic Study Conducted by SG Consulting Group and Validated in 2002</i>	<i>Situation in 2009</i>		
	<i>Elements achieved</i>	<i>Partially achieved</i>	<i>Fully achieved and satisfactorily</i>
<i>v. Continue looking for clients in the four strategic segments;</i>	<i>The search for clients is not organized as a result of lack of resources. ISTA participates in CBs depending on human resources available</i>		
<i>v. Establish an action plan in relation to ISTA products and services available on offer at ISTA and to each of the four strategic segments.</i>	<i>This plan was never established</i>		
<i>vi. Pursue the search for partnerships and affiliations;</i>		<i>A few partners exist such as the Omar Bongo University of Gabon, UQUAM, University of Clermont Ferrand but this partnership is not very active and does not go beyond sending teachers for the regular courses or OBU backing degrees par</i>	
<i>vii. At the level of the Research Department pursue the production of the monograph series and corporate contracts ;,</i>	<i>Not achieved</i>		
<i>viii. continue using intermediation to develop the volume of activities</i>			

**ISTA Budget Structure for Last Three Years (2006-2007-2008)**

(Amount in CFAF million)

2. INCOME	2006		2007		2008		Average (2006-2008)	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
<b>1.1 Ordinary Internal Income</b>								
Publication of ISTA Newsletter								
Consultancy Fees	25.0	2.94	17.0	2.00	20.0	1.94	20.7	2.27
ISTA Fees	7.5	0.88	7.5	0.88	10.0	0.97	8.3	0.92
Collection of Revenue	1.0	0.12	5.0	0.59	6.0	0.58	4.0	0.44
Transfer of Equipment and Furniture	1.5	0.18	4.0	0.47	5.0	0.49	3.5	0.38
Recovery of Staff Loans and Advances	4.0	0.47	3.0	0.35	4.0	0.39	3.7	0.40
Miscellaneous Rentals (Bus)	0.5	0.06	0.5	0.06	1.0	0.10	0.7	0.07
Other Revenue	0.5	0.06	3.0	0.35	3.0	0.29	2.2	0.24
<b>1.2 Total Ordinary Income</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>4.71</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>4.71</b>	<b>49.0</b>	<b>4.76</b>	<b>43.0</b>	<b>4.73</b>
<b>1.3 States Contributions</b>	<b>810.0</b>	<b>95.29</b>	<b>810.0</b>	<b>95.29</b>	<b>981.0</b>	<b>95.24</b>	<b>867.0</b>	<b>95.27</b>
<b>1.4 TOTAL</b>	<b>850.0</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>850.0</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1030.0</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>910.0</b>	<b>100.00</b>
<b>1. EXPENDITURE</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>%</b>
Materials and Supplies	17.5	2.06	17.5	2.06	31.2	3.0	22.1	2.42
Transport	55.8	6.56	53.3	6.27	57.8	5.6	55.6	6.11
External Services	236.8	27.86	246.3	28.98	294.1	28.6	259.1	28.47
Staff Expenses	390.0	45.88	409.5	48.18	453.0	44.0	417.5	45.88
Benefits in Kind	69.2	8.14	69.7	8.20	76.2	7.4	71.7	7.88
Social Contributions	10.0	1.18	10.0	1.18	15.0	1.5	11.7	1.28
Studies Fund	2.5	0.29	1.5	0.18	1.5	0.1	1.8	0.20
Financial Expenses	1.7	0.20	1.7	0.20	1.7	0.2	1.7	0.19
Fixed Assets	52.5	6.18	30.5	3.59	65.5	6.4	49.5	5.44
Advances on Salaries and Loans	14.0	1.65	10.0	1.18	34.0	3.3	19.3	2.12
<b>2.2 TOTAL</b>	<b>850.0</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>850.0</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1030.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>910.0</b>	<b>100.00</b>
<b>1.3 TOTAL ANNUAL COST PER STUDENT</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>45.5</b>	<b>5.00</b>
• Of which direct costs	<b>5.2</b>	<b>12.31</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>12.22</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>12.35</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>12.30</b>
• And indirect costs	<b>37.3</b>	<b>87.69</b>	<b>37.3</b>	<b>87.78</b>	<b>45.1</b>	<b>87.65</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>87.70</b>

Source: ISTA - 2006, 2007, 2008 budgets

**Structure of Annual Average Cost of ISTA Student (2006-2007-2008 Average)  
(CFAF Million)**

<b>COSTS</b>	<b>AMOUNT</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Direct costs (scholarships, school supplies, internship expenses and benefits, part-time teachers fees ...)	5.60	12.30
And indirect costs (permanent teachers + ISTA operating costs):	39.91	87.70
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>45.50</b>	<b>100.00</b>
Of which:	0.00	0.00
ISTA permanent staff costs	21.46	47.16
Part-time teachers' fees and expenses	2.47	5.42
Scholarships, practical course allowances and other expenses paid directly to students	2.38	5.23
Other ISTA operating costs	19.20	42.19
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>45.50</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: ISTA budget

**CAREER DEVELOPMENT OF ISTA GRADUATES**  
**Types of studies and employment held prior to ISTA training by country**

	CONGO	GABON	CAMEROUN	TOTAL	%
Economic Sciences	10	1	2	13	44.83%
Civil Engineering	1	0	0	1	3.45%
Industrial Engineering	0	1	0	1	3.45%
Management	0	2	0	2	6.90%
Statistics	0	0	3	3	10.34%
Architecture	0	2	0	2	6.90%
Planning	0	1	0	1	3.45%
Sociology	1	1	0	2	6.90%
Pure Sciences	1	0	1	2	6.90%
IT	0	1	0	1	3.45%
Undetermined	0	0	1	1	3.45%
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Survey and focus group with former ISTA students

1. Employment prior to ISTA training among graduates

	CONGO	GABON	CAMEROUN	TOTAL	%
Administration	8	4	2	14	48.28%
Secondary Education	5	3	2	10	34.48%
Statistician	0	1	3	4	13.79%
Architect	0	1	0	1	3.45%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Survey and focus group with former ISTA students

2. Career development since obtaining ISTA degree

Category of Response	Number	%
No response	3	10.34%
No career change after ISTA	15	51.72%
1 Promotion	5	17.24%
2 Promotions	1	3.45%
Several successive promotions	1	3.45%
1 change of employment	3	10.34%
0 promo but + responsibilities	1	3.45%
<b>Total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Source: Survey and focus group with former ISTA students

3. Professional future of ISTA graduates

	a	b	c	and then b	a and c	NR	TOTAL
Gabon	55.56%	22.22%	0.00%	11.11%	0.00%	11.11%	100.00%
Congo	69.23%	23.08%	0.00%	0.00%	7.69%	0.00%	100.00%
Cameroon	71.43%	14.29%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	14.29%	100.00%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>65.52%</b>	<b>20.69%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>3.45%</b>	<b>3.45%</b>	<b>6.90%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

*a. Remained with employer    b found a new job    c. continued with studies (DEA or Doctorate)*

Source: Survey and focus group with former ISTA students

**COURSE UNITS of ISTA Curriculum in 2009 (120 CREDITS)**

<b>MASTER 1</b> 60 credits							
Semester 1	HC 258	CDT 30	Coef.	Semester 2	HC 251	CDT 30	Coef.
Core Course Units (UE 1)							
Economic Cycle	33	4	2	Public Economy	33	4	2
Accounts and Financial Management	33	4	2	Human Resource Management	33	4	2
Quantitative Methods	33	4	2	Management Projects Decision	33	4	2
Complementary Course Units (DE 2)							
Information Technology	40	2	1	Community Law	33	2	1
English (Part 1)	20	2	1	English (Part 2)	20	2	1
Speciality Course Units (UE 3)							
Project Management	33	6	3	Project Team Management	33	4	2
environment and	33	4	2	Technical Project Analysis	33	4	2
Legal Aspects and	33	4	2	Market Analysis	33	6	3

<b>MASTER 2</b> 60 credits							
Semester 3	HC 247.5	CDT 30	Coef.	Semester 4	HC 247.5	CDT 30	Coef.
Core Course Units (UE 1)							
Cost-Benefit Analysis	33	6	3	Research Methodology	33	6	1
Project Risk Analysis	33	4	2				
Project Impact Analysis	33	4	2				
Procurement and Negotiation	33	4	2				
Complementary Course Units (DE 2)							
Project Financial Analysis	33	6	3	Course +Dissertation+ Dissertation Oral Examination	241.5	24	4
International Project Financing	33	4	2				
Project Ethics and Governances	33	2	1				

Source: ISTA Studies Department

HC: number of course hours

CDT: number of credits

Coef: coefficient of each course

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