

**AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND**



**SIERRA LEONE
COUNTRY PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE REPORT**

**REGIONAL DEPARTMENT ORWB
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COUNTRY PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE REPORT

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	-	African Development Bank
ADF	-	African Development Fund
AFDEP	-	Artisanal Fisheries Development Project
ASREP	-	Agricultural Sector Rehabilitation Project
CPIP	-	Country Portfolio Improvement Plan
CSP	-	Country Strategy Paper
DDA	-	District Director of Agriculture
DSC	-	District Steering Committee
DO	-	Development Objectives
DP	-	Development Partners
EGRP	-	Economic Governance Reform Programme
ESW	-	Economic and Sector Work
EA	-	Executive Agency
FSF	-	Fragile State Facility
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GoSL	-	Government of Sierra Leone
HDI	-	Human Development Index
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
IP	-	Implementation Progress
ISP	-	Institutional Support Project
MDBS	-	Multi-Donor Budget Support
MDGs	-	Millennium Development Goals
MAFFS	-	Ministry of Agriculture, Food & Fisheries
MoFED	-	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoHS	-	Ministry of Health and Sanitation
MEYS	-	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports
MFMR	-	Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
NSC	-	National Steering Committee
NERICA	-	New Rice for Africa
NTF	-	Nigeria Trust Fund
PIU	-	Project Implementation Unit
PMU	-	Project Management Unit
PCU	-	Project Coordinating Unit
PBL	-	Policy Based Lending
PP	-	Problematic Projects
PPP	-	Potential Problematic Projects
TM	-	Task Manager
SABABU	-	Support to Basic/Non-Formal Education
SASP	-	Social Action Support Project
SDHS	-	Strengthening District Health Services
SL	-	Statistics Sierra Leone
UA	-	Units of Account
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Plan
USD	-	United States Dollar
WB	-	World Bank
WFP	-	World Food Programme

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The ADB Group started operations in Sierra Leone in 1973. As at 1st October 2009, forty-six (46) operations have been approved, with a total commitment net of cancellations of UA 288.4 million. These include 27 projects, 3 institutional support projects, 6 PBLs, 3 lines of credit, and 7 studies. These operations covered the social sector (health and education: 29.9%), multi-sector (27.4%), public utilities (23.8%) and agriculture (18.9%). The current ADF cycle and Fragile State Facility (Supplemental Support) have allocated UA 71.79m for the development and implementation of new projects in Sierra Leone. In addition, the Fragile State Facility Targeted Support (Pillar III) has made US\$ 2.0m available to Sierra Leone for national capacity building activities.

1.2 Historically, the decade of civil war in Sierra Leone devastated the country's physical, economic and social infrastructure. The war disrupted normal Government functions and indirectly affected the capacity and performance of state institutions. This subsequently affected the implementation of Bank Group's operations in the country and the performance of the portfolio. However, since 2001 when the country emerged from conflict, political stability has returned and the country is gradually moving towards recovery and development. The current situation with regard to peace and security, political will of the government and support of development partners is positively contributing to the improving enabling environment in which Bank Group's operations are taking place. The establishment of the Field Office has enhanced dialogue and partnership with Government and other development partners, and provided support in portfolio management.

1.3 To date no portfolio review has been conducted for Sierra Leone. However, an audit of the portfolio was carried out in October 2007, not long after the opening of the field office. The audit revealed that the portfolio was performing poorly, and concluded that on the whole implementation was unsatisfactory. The objective of the current exercise is to review the performance of the portfolio; to identify specific and systemic issues affecting the performance of the portfolio; and to make relevant recommendations towards improvement of the portfolio. The review provides a snapshot of the portfolio as at 1st October 2009 in order to inform the Board of the performance of the portfolio and the measures being put in place to improve its quality.

II. OVERVIEW OF ON-GOING PROJECTS

A. Key Characteristics of Portfolio


2.1 There are eleven (11) on-going projects in the current portfolio at different stages of implementation with a total approved amount of **UA 95.78** million. The Social Sector accounts for UA 45.0m (47%), Agriculture UA 24.85m (26%), Infrastructure UA 13.14m (14%) and Multi-sector UA 12.79m (13%). Within the social sector the Health sub-sector accounts for 37.7%, Education 35.5% and Community Social Services Support 26.7%. Within Infrastructure Sector, the Power sub-sector contributes a significant amount of 78.4%, followed by Transport 15.1% and Water & Sanitation 6.5%. The average size of projects in the portfolio is UA 8.70m.

Table 1 and Figure 1 present the sectoral distribution of on-going projects, and detailed characteristics provided in Annex 1.

2.2 The introduction of the Fragile State Facility resulted in a significant increase in the total fund allocation to Sierra Leone for the period 2008 to 2010. This trend is likely to continue in the next round of allocation and will contribute to the growth of the portfolio. The Bank's project financing has been the traditional lending instrument and is currently the most important, constituting 89.6% of the portfolio. Policy-based lending (Budget Support) is relatively new in the portfolio and constitutes 10.6%. However, with the change in Bank's policy under the FSF the growth in policy-based lending is likely to continue in the near future.

Table 1 Sectoral Distribution of Portfolio as at 1 st October, '09			
Sectors	Apprvd. Amt. (UA m)	% of P'folio	Cummulative % Disb
Agriculture	24.85	25.94	32.84
ASREP	12.00	12.53	15.83
AFDEP	10.00	10.44	52.64
NERICA	2.85	2.97	39.09
Social	45.00	46.98	49.87
SASP	12.00	12.53	54.25
SDHS	17.00	17.75	28.13
SABABU	16.00	16.70	71.04
Infrastructure	13.14	13.72	39.35
Bumbuna HEP	10.30	10.75	41.56
W & S Study	0.85	0.89	51.14
Mototoka/Sefadu	1.99	2.08	23.24
Multi-sector	2.79	13.35	60.05
ISP	2.79	2.91	77.98
EGRP I	10.0	10.44	55.00
TOTAL / AVR.	95.78	100	43.6

Figure 1: Active Portfolio by Sector



B. General Assessment of Portfolio Performance

2.3 Overall the portfolio is rated **1.97** and is improving. The average Implementation Progress (IP) rating is 1.86 while the average Development Objective (DO) rating is 2.08. By sector, the multi-sector / budget support operations and infrastructure are better performing with ratings of 2.04 and 2.01, respectively. However, the social and agricultural sectors are performing unsatisfactorily, with ratings of 1.98 and 1.85, respectively. Out of the four sectors agriculture is the worst performing one. The summary performance of the portfolio is presented in Table 2 and Figure 2, and detailed ratings provided in Annex 2. As at October 2009, **54%** of the portfolio is at risk (PAR)¹. This is a significant improvement from 2007 and 2008 when 83.3% and 75% (respectively) of the portfolio were at risk. The PAR rate is decomposed into 18% Problematic Projects (PP) and 36% Potential Problematic Projects (PPP). In terms of Commitment at Risk (CAR²) UA 55.78m of portfolio was classified as being at risk. The CAR

¹ Portfolio at Risk is measured by the percentage of the number of projects at risk to the total number of rated operations

² CAR is measured the total value of loans and grants of operations that have been identified as PARs


rate³ of **58%** compared to that of 2007 (88.6%) shows considerable improvement in the commitments at risk. The PAR and CAR rates for Sierra Leone are progressively moving towards Bank-wide performance of 45% PAR and 39% CAR, respectively (Table 3); and is expected to catch up with Bank-wide average performance within a couple of years. Two projects, ASREP and NERICA were restructured under the African Food Crises Response (AFCR) programme and funds made available for the implementation of various activities; evaluation those activities is yet to take place.

Table 2: Summary Performance Ratings of On-Going Portfolio (01.10.09)

Sectors	Age (Yrs)	Number of times Supervised in 2008	Projects Audited in 2009 (for 2008)	Impl. Prog (IP)	Dev Obj. (DO)	Projects at Risk (PP / PPP)
Agriculture	6.2 Avr.	1.5 Avr.		1.56	2.13	
ASREP	4.7	2	Completed	1.62	2.25	Non-PP / PPP
AFDEP	8.0	1	Completed	1.50	2.00	Non PP / PPP
NERICA	6.0	0	Completed	1.50	2.00	Non PP / Non PPP*
Social	5.8 Avr.	Avr. 2.0		1.85	2.11	
SASP	6.3	2	Completed	1.38	2.00	PP
SDHS	4.1	2	Completed	2.23	2.33	Non PP / Non PPP
SABABU	7.0	2	Completed	1.93	2.00	Non PP / PPP
Infrastructure	3.3 Avr.	Avr. 1.0		1.94	2.08	
Bumbuna HEP	1.0	N/A	Pending	2.23	2.25	Non PP / Non PPP
W & S Study	5.3	2	Pending	2.27	2.00	Non PP / Non PPP
Mototoka/Sefadu	3.6	0	Pending	1.33	2.00	PP
Multi-sector	2.7 Avr.	Avr. 2		2.08	2.00	
ISP	5.0	2	Completed	1.92	2.00	Non PP / PPP
EGRP I	0.4	N/A	N/A	2.23	2.00	Non PP / Non PPP
TOTAL / AVR.	4.5	Avr. 1.6	3/10 Pending	1.86	2.08	2 PPs and 4 PPPs

*NERICA being a multinational project is not considered in the performance ratings

Figure 2: Project Ratings by Sector



2.4 Historically, the low performance of the portfolio may be attributed to design flaws in some projects in terms of ill-defined project goals and outputs, and poorly costed activities. In some cases, there are too many unrelated components of ADB funded projects and this exacerbates capacity challenges for implementing agencies. This highlights the importance of quality at entry as a means of improving project implementation. The problems relating to small

³ CAR rate is measured by the percentage of the CARs to the total commitment value of the supervised portfolio

size and poor quality at entry are being corrected in new lending which comprises Port Loko-Lungi Road (UA 26.26m, 2009), Budget Support (UA 10m, 2009), and Water Supply and Sanitation Project (UA 25.23m, 2010).

2.5 Due mainly to weak institutional capacity in a post-conflict state, projects in Sierra Leone generally experience long delays, especially between approval and launching, and during implementation. Some of these slippages include delays in fulfilling conditions of effectiveness and disbursement. During project negotiations Government tends to sign up to conditions it cannot meet. This may be attributed to its limited capacity to negotiate with the Bank. The average time-lag between project approval and effectiveness is 19.6 months compared with Bank-wide average of 14.4 months. In all, five (5) out of eleven (11) of on-going projects have had at least one extension and one project (ASREP) is currently under disbursement suspension.

2.6 The average number of project supervision was 1.6 in 2008, which is higher than Bank-wide average of 1.2 (and target of 1.5). SLFO has been more proactive and taking lead roles in planning project supervision missions, and bringing in more local knowledge in providing support to projects. Project audits for 2008 have been completed for 7 projects, with 3 outstanding; one (1) project is not required as it was only launched during the year. The conduct of project audits and submission of quarterly reports have improved significantly as a result of SLFO follow-up and reminders to all projects to submit reports on schedule. Recommendations of such reports have become useful tools for SLFO monitoring, providing support and follow-up to all projects.

Disbursement Rates and Portfolio Age

2.7 The cumulative disbursement is **UA 43.6m** and represents **45.5%** of the total portfolio. The annual disbursements improved significantly from UA 2.18m in 2007 to UA 15.82m in 2008, and to UA 16.3m at the end of the third quarter of 2009. It is estimated that total annual disbursements in 2009 will top UA 20m. Annex 2 depicts the trend in total annual disbursements between 2004 and 2009. The disbursement ratio⁴ in 2008 was 27.7% and is higher than Bank-wide average of 25% and ADF (only) average of 18%. By sector, the Multi-sector has the highest rate of disbursements of **60.1%**. This is followed by the social sector at **49.8%**, infrastructure **39.4%** and agricultural sector **32.8%**. Improvement in disbursement is attributable to the prioritization by SLFO in the last two years, including the recruitment of a Disbursement Assistant who is providing sustained support to all Bank funded projects in Sierra Leone. In this regard, SLFO is providing prior review of documents before requests for replenishments are submitted by PIUs.


2.8 Figure 3 depicts average age of projects by sector and disbursement rates. Sierra Leone has two ageing⁵ projects, namely Artisanal Fisheries Development Project (8 yrs.) and Water Supply and Sanitation Study (5.3 yrs.); both have been extended in the past and are near completion. The average age of the portfolio is 4.5 years compared with the Bank-wide average

⁴ Disbursement ratio is measured by the ratio of disbursement during the year (UA 15.82m) to the total undisbursed balance of on-going portfolio (UA 57.19m) at end of year (2008).

⁵ Ageing projects are projects that are 8 yrs (or more) and studies that are 5 yrs (or more).

of 4.2 years. In future, it would be prudent to allow non-performing projects to end without further extensions.

Figure 3



Generally, implementation of agricultural projects tends to take longer. This may be due to the complexity of designing and implementing projects in the sector. The average age of on-going projects in the sector is 6.2 years. This is followed by social sector 5.8 years, infrastructure 3.3 years and multi-sector 2.7 years. The age structure coupled with the low disbursements, suggest that implementation is lagging behind schedule in most of the projects.

Procurement

2.9 Although some progress has been made in project procurement, thereby reducing the time from initiating procurement to delivery of goods and services, there are still persistent systemic procurement problems. Some of these challenges include political interference in procurement procedures, PIUs failure to use Bank standard documents, lack of adequate competition in tender submissions and level of performance by service providers and contractors. However, PIUs are generally improving in following procurement procedures due to continued support from SLFO and training conducted for them in 2008 and 2009. SLFO is also working with PIUs to sensitize and train all stakeholders (including service providers and contractors) in procurement processes in order to improve their performance. Additionally, SLFO is supporting initiatives to build capacity of country systems in procurement. A capacitated National Public Procurement Agency (NPPA) is likely to be able to support PIUs in effective and efficient procurement processes.

C. Comparative Assessment of Portfolio Performance

2.10 Compared with Bank-wide portfolio, Sierra Leone has better disbursement and more frequently supervised projects. However it has higher problematic and ageing projects, and higher PAR and CAR rates. The time lag between approval and effective disbursement is longer for Sierra Leone compared to the Bank-wide average. Although the sector composition of World Bank portfolio in Sierra Leone is similar to that of ADB, World Bank projects are much larger, and are disbursed and implemented faster. This may be due to the fact that the World Bank country office in Sierra Leone has provided closer and sustained support to their projects for

much longer period. Established in 1993 (nearly fifteen twenty years before the establishment of SLFO) the World Bank country office remained opened during the war, except for a brief period between 1997 and 1998. Moreover, World Bank supervision missions are characterized by full complement of skill mix and provide much more support to project implementation than ADB missions. It is expected that as SLFO gains more experience on the ground its support for Bank-funded projects would help improve their performance on the ground. The average size of projects in the portfolio is UA 8.7m, compared with Bank Group average for 2007 of UA 16.9m and World Bank (Sierra Leone) of \$25.8m (UA 17m). Table 3 compares performance of the portfolio in Sierra Leone with that of Bank-wide.

Table 3: Comparison of Portfolio Performance

	Sierra Leone (2009)	Bank-wide (2007)**
Disbursement ratio ⁶	27.7%	25%* (ADF only 18%)
Disbursement - cumulative	44.5%	N/A
Average size of portfolio	UA 8.71m	UA 16.9 m
Avr. Supervision mission per yr.	1.6	1.2
Portfolio at Risk (PAR)	54%	45%
Commitment at Risk (CAR) Rate	58%	39%
Problematic Projects	18%	7% (2008)
Time between approval and 1 st Disbursement	19.64 months	14.4 months
Ageing Projects	18% (2 out of 11)	12%
Operations supervised twice / year	75%	33%
Average age of portfolio	4.5 yrs	4.2 yrs

* ADF only was 18%

**The Bank's APPR for 2008 is to be approved by the Board

III. ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER DONORS

3.1 At PIU Level - Generally, the implementation capacity of PIUs/PCUs is weak. These weaknesses are manifested in inadequate human capacity and lack of project management and other skills necessary for the successful implementation of Bank funded projects.

3.2 At Government Level - The general bureaucratic tendency, particularly in approval processes by line ministries and government agencies, tend to slow down projects implementation. The root cause of implementation management transcends capacity and bureaucracy, and is embedded in the fragility of government systems and performance in the country. Sierra Leone is transiting from a post-conflict situation and moving gradually towards improving government functioning, macroeconomic reforms and improving access to financing. The government is committed to this progress and is enjoying the goodwill and support of donors and development partners. As Government systems improve, it would create a better environment to support the implementation of Bank-funded projects.

3.3 At Bank Level - The Bank's high turnover of Task Managers do not auger well for the projects. Frequent changes in management style of Task Managers tend to confuse project managers / coordinators and delay working arrangements with PIUs. Similarly, delays in granting Bank's 'No Objections' unduly slow down projects implementation.

⁶ Ratio of the disbursement during the year to the portfolio undisbursed balance at end of previous year.

3.4 Donor coordination is improving; however, it remains inadequate by virtue of weak institutional capacities relating to the fragility of government systems. The Bank's participates in coordination arrangements through a Consultative Group (CG) of donors, the Development Partners Committee (DEPAC) and the Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) working group. The recent move of Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) from the office of the Vice President to the Ministry of Finance is contributing to the improvement of donor coordination by harmonizing the multiplicity of aid coordination mechanisms. The Bank plays an active role in donor coordination mechanisms. Currently, the Bank is developing a Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS) with the World Bank for the period 2009 to 2013 to support Government PRSP II, Agenda for Change. The two institutions are aligning their strategies to conduct joint missions as part of donor coordination and harmonization process.

IV POTENTIAL FUTURE PROBLEMS AND LESSONS FOR CSP AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT

4.1 Generally, the portfolio problems identified have been analyzed and categorized into initial difficulties (and delays) relating to meeting conditions precedent to first disbursement; procurement challenges; financial performance and disbursement delays; project designs flaws; poor impact of projects on development; and poor performance by service providers and contractors.

4.2 To address the problems identified, SLFO is working with government to ensure projects are ready for immediate implementation before ratification by legislature and Board approval. In that regard SLFO and GoSL agreed during a workshop to develop portfolio improvement plan to ensure that:

- Process to designing new projects undertakes adequate capacity and risk analysis and proffer mitigation measures to address such challenges.
- Develop monitoring indicators and monitoring plans before launch of projects.
- Project conditionalities match with country capacity and political commitment.
- Project Implementation Plans are developed prior to implementation
- Government identifies interim team to be part of project design phase.
- Government team negotiating with Bank has the required skill mix and capacity to negotiate loans and grants.
- In line with new Bank rules and procedures SLFO is ensuring that all existing projects develop and revise annual procurement plans in order to manage procurement processes more efficiently and reduce delays.

4.3 In addition to the above, SLFO is:

- Facilitating project coordination activities with Government/PIU on a regular quarterly basis.
- Providing technical and management support to PIUs in dealing with implementation challenges.
- Streamlining and facilitation process of granting 'no objections' to PIU's in order to reduce delays in project implementation.

- Working with other donors to harmonize work in Sierra Leone especially in the area of PIU activities. This is likely to reduce the number of PIU's and will encourage them to make more use of the Bank's technical capacity
- Providing local knowledge and analysis to feed into developing much more coherent logical flow of projects, improving assumptions made during appraisal and developing project components that are realistically related to each other for ease of implementation.
- Monitoring for results of Bank's operations.

4.4 As part of the measures being put in place to improve the quality of the portfolio, SLFO and Government have developed a Country Portfolio Improvement Plan (CPIP). Annex 4A and 4B depicts country portfolio and project implementation improvement plans respectively. SLFO plans to clean the portfolio in 2010 and allow non-performing and ageing projects to end without further extensions, and to allow a new portfolio to emerge.

4.5 Bank's work through the Fragile State Facility is addressing some of the systemic challenges in Sierra Leone. Through the Pillar III supplementary targeted support has made an initial US\$ 2.0m available to Sierra Leone to address capacity issues. Also, the FSF has introduced waivers that have made it possible to address government's challenge of availing counterpart funding by approving 100% financing for new projects.

4.6 Lessons learnt regarding weak capacity of state institutions indicate need for continued dialogue with Government and other development partners to support capacity building. The establishment of the field office in Sierra Leone (SLFO), and subsequent follow-up on project activities has helped to improve an unsatisfactory portfolio.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 The review concludes that the performance of the portfolio is improving since its audit in 2007. However, it has identified several challenges facing portfolio and has articulated them in various sections of this report. Subsequently, the Bank and the Government have agreed on measures to improve the portfolio and have jointly developed a CPIP with government. Additionally, the following (categorized into those related to PIUs, Government and Bank Group) are recommended for portfolio management and improvement.

5.2 PIU's / Executing Agencies

- (i) Training and capacity-building, especially in Bank rules and procedures of procurement, disbursements and project management, should continue to be a high priority for PIUs.
- (ii) There should be more effort to attract qualified personnel to implement projects, especially where staffs of line ministries do not have the requisite skills for project management and loan administration. This should be done sustainably.
- (iii) In the long term the Bank should work with GoSL to reduce the number of stand-alone PIUs and promote integrated units within ministries that can handle several projects, as is in other countries implementing Bank funded projects. Such coordinating units should be capacitated to fulfill this mandate

5.3 Government

- (i) Government should be proactive in utilizing resources from FSF Pillar III to support capacity building initiatives.
- (ii) Government, through the Ministry of Finance, should provide closer monitoring and coordination of projects through an effective oversight mechanism. This should include joint visits (with Bank staff) to project sites as part of its oversight function.
- (iii) Government should also take a more proactive role in honoring existing counterpart funding obligations by putting resources in annual budgets and making such resources available to projects in a timely manner.
- (iv) Line ministries should grant PIU's more authority in making decisions regarding project execution in order to reduce implementation delays due to bureaucracy.
- (v) Government should, in collaboration with SLFO, ensure all projects are carrying out timely annual audits and are following up / implementing recommendations of audits reports.
- (vi) Government should be more assertive during negotiations and should only agree to conditions it can realistically meet.

5.4 Bank Group

- (i) The Bank should, in consultation with Government, fund fewer but bigger projects. This should take into consideration the importance of Government's role in identifying projects relevant to the country's development needs.
- (ii) The Bank should reduce the number of loan conditions that leads to long delays in project start-up.
- (iii) Reduce the turnover of project Task Managers to the extent possible.
- (iv) The Bank should improve the duration and quality of supervisions in order to provide more support in addressing implementing challenges; this should take into consideration need for a complementary mix of skills during supervision missions.
- (v) SLFO should be strengthened and empowered to be able to deal with some key technical and loan administration procedures that cause delays, without reverting to headquarters. This can be addressed through the on-going decentralization process, by upgrading the level of key loan administration positions (e.g. Procurement Officer); relocating more sector specialists to the FO, particularly in agriculture (OSAN staff); and increase the ceilings allowed in the Delegation of Authority Matrix for Sierra Leone and other field offices.

Annex 1 – On-Going Portfolio As At 1st October, 2009

Appendix 1 - On-Going Portfolio As At 01.10.09																		
Project Designation	Currently Responsible Officer	Main Sector	Approval Date	Signature date	Entry into force date	Effectiveness Date	Revised Completion date	Last Disbursement	# of Ext	Proj Age (Yr)	Overall IP Rating	Overall DO Rating	Amt. Apprvd (UA) m	Amt Signed (UA)	Total Disbnd (UA)	Undisbnd Balance (UA)	% Disbnd	
P-SL-AA0-007	AGRICULTURE SECTOR REHABILITATION	Moses BASALIRWA	Agric	02.02.2005	04.04.2005	02.08.2005	21.02.2006	31.12.2011	22.04.2009	0	4.7	1.62	2.25	10.00	10.00	1.54	8.46	15.40
				02.02.2005	04.04.2005	02.08.2005	09.11.2006	31.12.2011	17.02.2009	0	4.7	1.62	2.25	2.00	2.00	0.36	1.64	17.83
P-SL-AA0-010	ARTISANAL FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	Olagoke OLADAPO	Agric	25.10.2001	15.01.2002	07.01.2003	07.01.2003	31.12.2009	14.04.2009	1	8.0	1.50	2.00	10.00	10.00	5.26	4.74	52.64
P-SL-DB0-004	MATOTOKA TO SEFADU ROAD STUDIES AND INST	Marichellen Melchoir MINJA	Transp	09.03.2006	19.05.2006	19.05.2006	12.08.2008	30.09.2010	30.09.2010	1	3.6	1.33	2.00	1.99	1.99	0.46	1.53	23.24
P-SL-E00-001	WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION STUDY	Rex Kusukuluka STUMBEKO	Water Sup/San	30.06.2004	03.09.2004	03.09.2004	03.03.2006	30.04.2009	30.08.09	2	5.3	2.27	2.00	0.85	0.85	0.43	0.42	51.14
P-SL-F00-003	BUMBUNA HYDRO PROJECT - Add. Financing	Hemchand Rai HEEROO	Power	08.10.2008	11.11.2008	07.04.2009	07.04.2009	28.02.2010	14.10.09	0	1.0	2.23	2.33	10.30	10.30	4.28	6.02	41.56
P-SL-IAZ-001	BASIC/NON-FORMAL EDUC. & VST(EDUCAT III)	Abdi Ibrahim YOUNIS	Social	16.10.2002	16.01.2003	25.08.2003	25.08.2003	30.06.2010	21.04.2009	2	7.0	1.93	2.00	15.00	15.00	10.66	4.34	71.04
				16.10.2002	16.01.2003	25.08.2003	25.08.2003	30.06.2010	03.02.2009	2	7.0	1.93	2.00	1.00	1.00	0.49	0.51	49.25
P-SL-IB0-003	STRENGTHENING DISTRICT HEALTH SERVICES	Fabrice Jacques Michel SERGENT	Social	07.09.2005	17.10.2005	17.10.2005	21.11.2007	31.12.2011	06.02.2008		4.1	2.23	2.33	17.00	17.00	4.78	12.22	28.13
P-SL-IE0-002	SOCIAL ACTION SUPPORT PROJECT (SASP)	Yero H.J. BALDEH	Social	11.06.2003	17.07.2003	08.03.2004	23.04.2004	31.12.2010	09.07.2008	1	6.3	1.38	2.00	10.00	10.00	6.03	3.97	60.28
				11.06.2003	17.07.2003	08.03.2004	23.04.2004	31.12.2010	28.10.2005	1	6.3	1.38	2.00	2.00	2.00	0.48	1.52	24.12
P-SL-KA0-010	ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE REFORM PROGRAMME	Tove STRAUSS	Multi-Sector	06.05.09	14.05.09	14.05.09	02.07.09	31.12.2011	20.07.2009	0	0.4	2.23	2.00	10.00	10.00	5.50	4.50	55.00
P-SL-K00-004	STRENGTHEN PUBLIC FIN. MGT&ENERGY SECTOR	Tove STRAUSS	Multi-Sector	20.10.2004	04.04.2005	19.07.2006	19.07.2006	31.12.2011	20.03.2009	0	5.0	1.92	2.00	2.79	2.79	2.18	0.61	77.98
P-ZI-AA0-074	NERICA DISSEMINATION PROJECT-S/LEONE	Harouna DOSSO	Agric	26.09.2003	26.09.2003	05.02.2005	20.03.2005	31.12.2010	14.05.2009	0	6.0	1.50	2.00	2.85	2.85	1.11	1.74	39.09
													95.78					


Annex 2

Portfolio Performance of On-going Projects - Sierra Leone As at 1st October, 2009

Sector / Projects	Compliance with Conditions	Procurement Performance	Financial Performance	Activities Outputs	Implementati on Progress	Impact on Development	Overall Assessment
Agriculture	1.67	1.5	1.86	1.38	1.56	2.13	1.85
Agric Sector Rehabilitation Project	1.33	1.00	2.25	1.50	1.62	2.25	1.94
Artisanal Fisheries Developmt. Project	2.00	2.00	1.50	1.25	1.50	2.00	1.75
NERICA Rice Dissemination*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Infrastructure	1.97	1.67	1.85	1.35	1.94	2.08	2.01
Matotoka-Sefadu Road Studies	1.60	1.00	0	1.00	1.33	2.00	1.67
Water Supply & Sanitation Study	2.30	2.00	2.75	1.30	2.27	2.00	2.14
Bumbuna Additional Financing	2.00	2.00	2.8	1.75	2.23	2.25	2.24
Social	1.77	1.83	2.12	1.60	1.85	2.11	1.98
Support to Basic/Non-Formal Educ.	2.00	2.00	2.20	1.50	1.93	2.00	1.97
Strengthening District Health Services	2.00	2.00	2.40	2.30	2.23	2.33	2.28
Social Action Support Project	1.30	1.50	1.75	1.00	1.38	2.00	1.70
Multi-sector	2.75	2.00	2.23	1.90	2.08	2.00	2.04
Economic Governance Reform Prog.	3.00	2.00	2.20	2.00	2.23	2.00	2.14
Institutional Support Project	2.50	2.00	2.25	1.80	1.92	2.00	1.96
Weighted Average	2.04	1.75	2.02	1.56	1.86	2.08	1.97

*NERICA, being a multinational, is not considered in the ratings.

Annex 3



Annex 4A
Country Portfolio Improvement Plan (CPIP) – Sierra Leone

General and Cross-cutting Challenges of Portfolio	Major Issues	Action Required	Responsibility	Timeline
1. Initial delays before commencement of projects	1.1 Serious delays before projects become effective and meeting conditions precedent to first disbursement.	1.1 Improve quality at entry and be realistic with conditions	Bank	All New Projects
	1.2 Weak and inefficient country systems as well as government negotiating skills	1.2 Enhance capacity and skills mix of team negotiating grant / loan on behalf of government	Government	All New Projects
2. Project design flaws	2.1 Lack of clarity in project strategies and ill defined goals, outputs and poorly costed activities and unrealistic budget in some projects	2.1 Ensure well-defined strategies are in logical flow with goals, outputs and activities in a SMART manner; and be realistic with scope of projects (based on approved amount)	Bank and Govt.	All New Projects (and where possible existing projects)
	2.2 Too many unrelated project components and activities	2.2 Ensure project design is coherent , rational, consistent and relevant.		
	2.3 Long time lag between project design and implementation (sometimes leading to seemingly poorly costed activities ref in 2.1)	2.3 Conduct baseline studies and develop implementation manuals at the beginning of project implementation. Develop M&E Plans to facilitate monitoring of projects implementation and performance.		
	2.4 Limited participation of stakeholders in design and appraisal of projects	2.4 Open up a consultation process for all potential stakeholders to input into project design and clarify roles and responsibilities during project design; revise project targets where necessary and conduct early project review / MTR. Time allowed for Project appraisal and design should be increased to accommodate all necessary consultations.		
3. Project management and	3.1 Low capacity and skills of PIU staff	3.1 Government to apply resources from FSF (Pillar III) to develop project implementation and management skills;	Govt. and Bank	On-going

supervision		recruit more qualified staff at PIU's (possibly from the international market) and provide continuous relevant training, especially in Project Management.		On-going
	3.2 Implementation of most projects lagging behind schedule	3.2 Timely development and adherence to work programmes and implementation schedules	PIU's	2009 and beyond
	3.3 Lack of implementation oversight and project monitoring by government	3.3 Borrower (MoFED) to be more proactive in project monitoring and oversight	Government	2009 and beyond
	3.4 Projects suffer from bureaucracy of line ministries	3.4 Line ministries to give PIU's more authority and responsibility in making project management decisions	Government	On-going
	3.5 Delays in releasing government counterpart funding stifle project implementation	3.5 Government to plan and make provision for counterpart funding for existing projects and to remit fund on a timely basis.	Govt.	2009 and beyond
	3.6 Delays in conducting project audits and submission of progress reports	3.6 Timely project audits and implementation of recommendations as well as timely submission of quarterly reports; follow up with each PIU to ensure project audits are carried out.	PIU's / SLFO	2009 and On-going
	3.7 High turnover of Task Managers	3.7 Endeavour to reduce turnover of Task Managers. Proper documentation of projects and the use of Local TMs will assist in this case. Emphasis should also be placed on ensuring effective handover between TMs.	Bank	2009 and On-going
	3.8 Inadequate project supervision	3.8 Adhere to annual target of project supervisions and improve quality and length of supervision with the right mix and complementary skills.	Bank	
4. Loan administration procedures	4.1 Slow pace of procurement in several projects	4.1 Continued training of PIU's in new Bank procurement rules and procedures; review procurement modes for certain activities; support all PIUs to develop and update procurement plans for use as management tools; ensure each project has a procurement officer or incentives are provided for effective centralized procurement units.	Bank and PIU's	2009 and On-going

	4.2 Low disbursement rate of portfolio	4.2 Continued training of PIU's in justifying expenditure and replenishment request processes; sensitize and motivate appropriate authorities regarding delays in approval process of replenishment requests	Bank and PIU's	2009 and On-going
	4.3 Long delays in granting 'No Objections'	4.3 SLFO instituting procedures to streamline and liaise with HQ in granting of 'No Objections'.	Bank	2009 and On-going
5. Donor Coordination	5.1 Lack of trust by donors to use country systems	5.1 Donor support (through MDDBS and other initiatives) should continue to support dialogue in capacity building initiatives for country systems	All donors including ADB	2009 and beyond
	5.2 Limited harmonization among donors in relation to the application of different procurement and financial procedures adds pressure on PIUs	5.2 Need for harmonization in line with Paris Declaration, through JAS between ADB and World Bank	All donors including ADB	2009 and beyond
	5.3 Large number of small projects compounds implementation issues	5.3 New trend in financing small number of large projects should continue	All stakeholders	As per recommendations
6. Outstanding mission recommendations	6.1 Outstanding recommendations in Aide Memoiré of supervision missions, MTRs, Quarterly reports and MTRs still outstanding	6.1 Implement as recommended; undertake an analysis with the PIUs on why recommendations have not been implemented and what challenges they need to overcome to implementing recommendations	PIUs	Immediate

Annex 4B
Projects Implementation Improvement Plans – Sierra Leone

Project	Operational / Major Issues	Action Required	Responsibility	Timeline
1. Social Action Support Project	1.1 Resuscitate 42 stalled projects: contractors slow in implementing sub-projects due to capacity and other constraints; limited clarity of beneficiary changing needs in prioritizing sub-projects	1.1 Provide training & support and constantly monitor contractor activity; request the submission of their revised work plans, rates for remaining works and disburse valuation payments in a timely manner; provide to Bank justification for change in priority needs of beneficiaries and necessary ‘No Objections’.	NaCSA	Immediately
	1.2 Lack of a functional management committees (MCs) for completed sub-projects due to negative attitude of beneficiaries to public property	1.2 Prepare and share TORs for the formation of MC’s with Regional Offices and sensitize beneficiaries on the benefits of management committees		
	1.3 Lack of a contract management system (CMS) that complies with contractual obligations	1.3 Establish a CMS for newly generated sub-projects, constantly monitor, supervise and ensure compliance with work plan and invoke relevant clauses when contractors default		
	1.4 Inadequate capacity of MFIs	1.4 Undertake overdue assessment to determine needed support to MFI NGOs and CBOs		
	1.5 Inadequate staff and slow pace of recruitment of relevant staff to handle specific assignments	1.5 Fast-tracked recruitment process, esp in IE&C and Micro-finance		
	1.6 Grant element of project risk cancellation for being idle for more than 2 years	1.6 Implementing agency to request next replenishment from grant component		
2. Agricultural Sector Rehabilitation Project (ASREP)	2.1 Need to streamline roles of executing agency (EA), District Steering Committees (DSCs) and District Directors of Agriculture (DDAs)	2.1 EA to maintain quarterly project progress review meetings with National Steering Committee forum for approval of workplans, expenditure and procurement activities, and ensure efficient project funds in utilization; Update and revive DSCs to support implementation at	EA/PCU/ DDA ⁷	On-going, on a quarterly basis

⁷ District Director of Agriculture

		district levels; develop and agree clear TOR and monitor / follow-up for a robust delivery and accountability by DDAs		
	2.2 Procurement of inappropriate inputs for the African Food Crises Response (AFCR) initiative	2.2 Investigate shortcomings relating to the procurement of poor quality equipment/tools and groundnut seed and send detail report and findings to Bank; and compensate beneficiaries of losses	EA	Immediate
	2.3 Slow staff recruitment process and review of remuneration review	2.3 Expedite recruitment of project staff including a substantive Project Coordinator and Financial Controller; revise LOGS and review/harmonize staff salaries with other ADB funded projects	EA/MoFED/SLFO	Immediate
	2.4 Non-functioning accounting software	2.4 Reinstate accounting software and update all accounting records to original format	PCU	Immediate
	2.5 Co-mingled funds	2.5 Expedite and ensure full reimbursement	EA/MofED/PCU	Immediate
	2.6 Limited capacity of government implementation agencies to implement civil works	2.6 Re-assign feeder roads activities to a more active and operational unit at SLRA; include civil works for community infrastructure in the bidding documents for rehabilitation of MAFFS building; PCU to continue with direct implementation of IVS	EA/PCU	Immediate
	2.7 Lack of effective agreements with project implementing agencies	2.7 Develop and implement effective and adequate procedures in the management of contracts / grants of implementing agents and update activity records	PCU	Immediate
	2.8 Project currently under suspension	2.8 Meet above conditions for disbursement suspension to be lifted by the Bank	PCI/GoSL	Sept, 2009
3. Mototoka-Sefadu Road Studies; Kenema-Zimmi	3.1 Matotoka-Sefadu Road Studies - Lot 1: Delays in receiving comments from the Bank and SLRA; SLRA has requested for 'No Objection' from the Bank for the consultant to finalize the feasibility	3.1 Consultant to ensure they maintain their management team and adhere to their required reporting schedule; SLFO will facilitate Bank's comments reach consultant for incorporation; Bank to speed up granting of 'No Objection'.	SLRA ⁸ /Consultant/SLFO	Immediate

⁸ Sierra Leone Roads Authority

Road	report.			
	.3.2 Matotoka-Sefadu Road Studies - Lot 2:Lack of capacity to comply with rules and procedures in procurement leading to delays in carrying out necessary procurement activities (e.g. evaluation of technical proposals carried out 3x prior to Bank acceptance) 3.3 Kenema-Zimmi Road Study – Consultant based in Spain and execute work as necessary	3.2 Provide more guidance in procurement processes 3.3 Consultant should relocate to Sierra Leone	SLFO SLRA	On-going Immediate
4. Water Supply and Sanitation Study	4.1 Delay in granting NO to evaluation report for study audit	4.1 Facilitate granting of No Objection to evaluation report	SLFO	Immediate
	4.2 Remaining balance of study slated for cancellation	4.2 SALWACO to request for an extension of study to October 2009 to allow for utilization of remaining balance for capacity building and conclusion of audit	MoFED / SALWACO	Immediate
5. Institutional Support Project	5.1 Challenges on the procurement mode for the recruitment of consultants for the installation of the LAN/WAN to link the Debt Management Offices at the Central Bank and MoFED and the formulation of the Debt Management Legislation and the Procedure Manual	5.1 PIU to make a request the Bank for a waiver on the procurement mode	PIU	Immediately
	5.2 Exclusion of the non-civil servants of the Public Debt Unit of MofED to trainings under the project limits the expansion of capacity building on debt management.	5.2 Request should be made for the extension of training to civil servants/permanent staff of other MDAs (e.g. Bank of SL) that are crucial in debt management issues.	PIU	Immediately
	5.3 Extension of contract of the three economists in the PDMU of MoFED.	5.3 Request to be made to the Bank for its ‘no-objection’	PIU	Immediately
6. Basic Formal Education and VST (SABABU)	6.1 Weak capacity of Service Providers (SPs) and Works Management Agents (WMAs) in handling procurement, financial management and civil works; and high staff turnover.	6.1 Organize experience sharing sessions with SPs and WMAs and constantly monitor their work	PCU/SP/WMA	Immediate

	<p>6.2 Weak capacity of contractors in implementing works</p> <p>6.3 Limitation of the PCU in project implementation</p> <p>6.4 Weak coordination with line ministry (Min. of Education Youth & Sports); delays in approving withdrawal applications; second signatory not always available</p> <p>6.5 Service category operational cost exhausted; threshold constraints</p>	<p>6.2 Ensure contractors have the necessary experience and equipment, and requisite capacity in finance and personnel</p> <p>6.3 Introduce penalty clauses in contracts with SPs, WMAs and contractors; and increase number of site visits and regular contacts with them</p> <p>6.4 Develop better coordination with line ministry and plan request for approvals of second signatory to reduce delays</p> <p>6.5 Revise thresholds to accommodate terminated contracts and revise LOGS, subject to Bank approval</p>	<p>Contractors/SPs / WMAs</p> <p>PCU/SPs/WMAs</p> <p>PCU/MEYS</p> <p>PCU/MEYS/Bank</p>	<p>Immediate</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>Immediate</p> <p>Immediate</p>
<p>7. Strengthening District Health Services</p>	<p>7.1 Project design & appraisal problems; As in Annex 4A (2) and changing conditions at Min. of Health & Sanitation and nationally</p> <p>7.2 Inadequate number of personnel available for training; MoH&S delay in identifying staff for training; weak capacity of training institutions and challenges in identifying them</p> <p>7.3 Procurement challenges: challenges in getting specifications; poor response under NCB; low capacity in project districts to estimate drug need and to provide information on drug consumption rate</p> <p>7.4 Support to PIU: Inadequate staffing level and rapid staff turnover in PIU; inadequate logistic support (office space, office equipment, internet facility)</p> <p>7.5 Low capacity and performance of national contractors; delays in execution of works and</p>	<p>7.1 Refer to Annex 4A (2); Use upcoming MTR in February 2010 to review and coherence in project design and implementation challenges.</p> <p>7.2 Encourage MoH&S to recruit relief staff (subject to resources), field mission to training institutions and support/promote capacity initiatives for them</p> <p>7.3 Diversify and expand means of tender advertisement; provide more information to local bidders; sensitize partners and adhere to procurement rules; and train district health workers on drug estimation & record keeping</p> <p>7.4 Review staffing level with the view of strengthening and creating motivation to retain staff over specific period of time to ensure continuity and institutional memory</p> <p>7.5 Endeavour to select proven / performing contractors; sensitize selected them on rules / procedures of</p>	<p>Bank/GoSL</p> <p>MoH&S</p> <p>PIU/MoH&S</p> <p>PIU/GoSL/UNF PA/Bank</p> <p>PIU/Contractors</p>	<p>During MTR in Feb. 2010</p> <p>Immediate and continuous</p> <p>Immediate and continuous</p> <p>Q3 of '09 and beyond</p> <p>Immediate and continuous</p>

	adherence to timeline of design of civil works	procurement and terms of contract; undertake regular supervision & monitoring; and ensure timely procurement processes		
8. Multinational NERICA Rice Dissemination Project	8.1 Technology Transfer: late disbursement of funds; insufficient certified seeds and non-release of NERICA varieties adopted; very little palatability test conducted; inappropriate small-scale demonstration equipment procured	8.1 Prompt disbursement of funds; release of NERICA varieties adopted should be expedited; encourage more communities to multiply certified seeds; conduct palatability tests in all four (4) project districts; and engage supplier to supply appropriate equipment	WARDA/PCU/MAFFS	Immediate and on-going
	8.2 Production support: Exact area under NERICA production not known; delays in submission of production reports	8.2 Conduct survey; ensure timely preparation and submission of all reports	PCU/Extension/Service Providers	2009 and Quarterly
	8.3 Delays in implementation of feeder roads rehabilitation and construction of post-harvest facilities	8.3 Timely and accurate preparation and processing of relevant documents and timely release of funds; submission of revised BOQs and diagrams; preparation of revised procurement plan; and prompt 'No Objection' given to requests	PIU/Bank	Immediate and on-going
	8.4 Capacity Building: Baseline study incomplete; review of rice policies and market information delayed; inadequate training of staff and farmers; inadequate sensitization of media, environment and HIV/AIDS; delay in conducting organizational and financial management training	8.4 Expedite baseline study completion and report submission; prepare TOR and implement policy review and market information; intensify training for staff and farmers; conduct sensitization sessions for media; and prepare TOR and conduct organizational and financial management training	PCU/WARDA/Extension/Service Providers/PEMSD	2009 and On-going
	8.5 Project coordination; non-availability of permanent M&E specialist; delay in auditing of project finances; and high bank charges / commission on turnover	8.5 Recruit a more-permanent M&E specialist; contract the services of an auditing firm and ensure audit report for 2008/09 are completed and submitted on time; negotiate with respective commercial banks to reduce commission	8.5 MAFFS/PCU/Bank	Immediate
	8.6 PCU being housed in the MAFFS results in staff being assignment for other tasks for the Ministry and leads to disruption in project activities implementation	8.6 The PCU should focus on project activities and endeavour to follow the implementation plan drawn up during MTR and use it as an effective management tool for project activities to undertaken in a timely manner	PCU	Immediate

9. Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project	9.1 ICB bidding process for Operations and Maintenance Contract failed to attract bidders, report submitted to Bank	9.1 QH to advice on 'way forward' regarding failed ICB process	Bank	Immediate
	9.3 Resettlement programme is underway	9.3 Resettlement programme for persons affected by power lines has begun; compensation include cash and food aid for six months	World Bank	Immediate
			World Bank	On-going
10. Artisanal Fisheries Development Project (AFDEP)	10.1 Delay in completion (construction) of fish receiving centers including jetties	10.1 Consultant/Contractor to revise work schedule, increase workforce and work extra hours, to improve performance; work on possible extension of project disbursement deadline beyond 31 December 2009.	PMU/GoSL/Bank	Immediate
	10.2 Inefficient management of the Fish Receiving Centers envisaged.	10.2 Engage services of private operators to run the facilities on a strictly commercial basis	PMU/GoSL	Immediate
	10.3 Poor micro credit loan recovery	10.3 Intensify recollection of outstanding loans	PMU/GoSL	Immediate
	10.4 Long outstanding matter of project beneficiaries shares and savings trapped in the defunct NCDB	10.4 To implement a supervision mission recommendation that GoSL addresses (on a case-by-case basis) the repayment of the shares and savings.	PMU/EA	Immediate
	10.5 Undisbursed funds (sitting idle for more than two years) in credit special account	10.5 To implement supervision mission/audit recommendations of moving the undisbursed funds to the projects main special account to be used for other approved project activities.	PMU	Immediate
	10.6 Delay in submission of returns/financial reports by IPs to facilitate regular withdrawal of funds.	10.6 Conduct training for IPs on Bank's Project Management Cycle and financial management procedures.	PMU	Immediate
	10.7 Resuscitating the Bo Fish Farming experimental Station and transforming it to an Aquaculture Demonstration, Training and Research Unit of Njala University	10.7 Review of national curricula for aquaculture and fisheries studies; facilitate training support for some aquaculture students and hand over facilities to Njala.	PMU/GoSL	Immediate
11. Economic Governance	11.1 Limited implementation capacity in MDAs	11.1 GoSL's request for assistance under the Targeted Support window of the FSF should be considered by Bank.	Bank	Immediate

Reform Programme I	11.2 The IPFMRP programme supported by the Bank through the EGRP I is yet to be declared effective, and this has caused delay in the opening a project account into which the funds provided by the Bank should be lodged	11.2 GoSL to expedite the fulfillment of conditions necessary for effectiveness of the IPFMRP.	GoSL	Immediate
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