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BURKINA FASO

Project Completion Report

SECOND ROAD PROGRAMME

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INFRASTRUCTURE DEPARTMENT (OINF)

September 2008

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BORROWER'S FISCAL YEAR

1 January 1 to 31 December

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	=	African Development Bank
ADF	=	African Development Fund
CFAF	=	African Financial Community franc
CIDA	=	Canadian International Development Agency
DGC	=	Contract Management Directorate
DGR	=	General Directorate of Roads
EIRR	=	Economic Internal Rate of Return
GDP	=	Gross Domestic Product
LNBT	=	Laboratoire national du bâtiment et des travaux publics (National Building and Public Works Directorate)
MIHU	=	Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing and Urban Planning
PASEC-T	=	Transport Sector Adjustment Programme
PIP	=	Public Investment Programme
SME	=	Small and Medium Enterprise
TSP	=	Transport Sector Programme
WADB	=	West African Development Bank

A. BASIC DATA

Country	:	Burkina Faso
Appraisal Period	:	15 to 27 July 2001
Approval Date	:	14 November 2001
Signature Date	:	07 December 2001
Loan No	:	N° 2100150006693
Effectiveness Date	:	17 October 2002
Total Project Cost	:	UA 24.750 million
ADF Loan Amount	:	UA 22 million
Government Financing	:	UA 2.75 million
Exchange Rate at Appraisal	:	UA1 = CFAF 963.548 (July 2001) and CFAF 799 on average during implementation
Loan Duration	:	50 years
Loan Interest Rate	:	0 %
Loan Repayment	:	1 % of loan principal each year, from the 11th to the 20th year inclusive, and 3% per year thereafter.
Loan Grace Period	:	10 years
Executing Agency	:	Ministry of Infrastructure and Disenclavement (MID) through the General Directorate of Roads (DGR).

B. PROJECT DATA*Cost by Project Source of Finance (in UA million)*

Source of Finance	Appraisal		Completion		Difference	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
ADF	22	88.89%	13.262	76.78	8.738	39.72
Government	2.75	11.11%	4.010	23.22	-1.26	-45.82
Total	24.75	100%	17.272	100		

Source: FFCO and DGR DAF disbursement tables.

	At appraisal	At completion	Difference
Effective date of first disbursement	September 2002	July 2004	1 year 10 months
Effective date of last disbursement	December 2005	June 2008	2 year 6 months
Launching of project implementation activities	October 2002	July 2004	1 year 9 months
Completion date of project implementation activities	May 2004	June 2008	4 years

*Source: Appraisal report, FFCO disbursement table***C. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

1. Undrawn Balance (in UA million)	UA 8.738 million		
2. Time underrun/overrun (year)			
· Slippage on effectiveness (year)	0		
· Slippage on completion date (year)	4 years		
· Slippage on last disbursement (year)	2 years and 6 months		
· Number of extensions to the deadline for last disbursement	2		
3. Project implementation status	Completed		
	Unsatisfactory	Fair	Satisfactory
4. Institutional Performance	X		
5. Performance of the Borrower	X		
6. Performance of Consultants	X		
7. Economic Rate of Return (%)	Appraisal		Completion
	12.5		8.25

D. MISSIONS

N°	Type of mission	Start	End	Number of days per mission	Composition per mission			Staff - Days
					Civil Engineer	Economist Transport	Total	
1	Appraisal	15/07/2001	27/07/2001	12	1	1	2	24
2	Onsite supervision	31/10/2004	20/11/2004	20	1	1	2	40
3	Onsite supervision	11/11/2006	30/11/2006	19	1	1	2	38
4	Onsite supervision	17/02/2007	03/03/2007	14	1	1	2	28
5	Onsite supervision	18/06/2007	24/06/2007	6	1	1	2	12
6	Onsite supervision	26/11/2007	06/12/2007	10	1	1	2	20
7	Onsite supervision	22/04/2008	30/04/2008	8	1	1	2	16
8	PCR	05/07/2008	19/07/2008	14	1	1	2	28

E. DISBURSEMENTS (annual)**Disbursement Status (in UA million)**

Sources of Finance	Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	TOTAL
	ADF	Appraisal	3	12	7				
Completion				2.754	2.869	2.541	3.007	2.091	13.262
Government	Appraisal	0.3	1.6	0.85					2.75
	Completion				0.210	0.892	0.519	1.167	2.788

Source: FFCO and DGR DAF disbursement tables.

F. CONTRACTORS

	Project	Rehabilitation works on 355,80 Km of earth roads	Rehabilitation works on 189,633 Km of earth roads	Periodic maintenance works on 350 Km of earth roads	Periodic maintenance works on 454 Km of earth roads
		(Lots 1 and 3) Contract No. 092/2004/MFB/MIH of 28/04/2004	(Lot 2) Contract No. 100/2004/MFB/MI TH of 06/05/2004	(Lot 1) Contract No. 093/2004/MFB/MITH of 28/04/2004 and Amendment 1 and 20/05/2008	(Lot 2) Contract No. 099/2004/MFB/MITH of 06/05/2004 and Amendment 1 of
Location (Region)		Est and Centre-Est	Sahel	Centre-Ouest and Cascades	Centre-Ouest and Boucle du Mouhoun (Mohound bend)
Contractors		BTM	OK	COGEB	ECG
Works Start-Up Date		26/07/2004	26/07/2004	26/07/2004	26/07/2004
Initial Contract Performance Period		Lot 1: 12 months / Lot 3: 10 months	10 months	23 months (20+03 months)	22 months
Final Contract Performance Period					
	Initial contract	Lot 1: 4 585 317 480 Lot 2: 1 611 240 270 Lots 1+2: 6 196 557 750	3 785 926 810	4 770 162 852	4 018 790 207
Contract amount (in millions of FCFA)	Contract Amendment 1	-	-	711 901 445	No financial implications
	Total	6 196 557 750	3 785 926 810	5 482 064 297	4 018 790 207
	Final implemented	424 140 232	141 080 964	4 476 774 832	3 559 927 426
	Balance	5 772 417 518	3 644 845 846	1 005 289 465	458 862 781
Provisional acceptance date		<i>MoC report of 04/01/2008 in view of conflicting situation involving cancellation of contract</i>	<i>Partial acceptance 08/08/2006 in view of cancellation of contract</i>	19/06/2008	13/06/2008
Date of last ADF disbursement				30/06/2008	30/06/2008
ADF disbursements (millions of CFAF)		826 218 028	504 796 552	3 979 405 148	3 283 267 974
ADF disbursements (millions of UA)					
Govt Disbursements (millions of CFAF)		103 265 635	63 092 470	497 369 684	410 362 326
Govt Disbursements (millions of UA)					

G. CONSULTANTS

Project	Control and monitoring of rehabilitation works on 546 Km (Lots 1, 2 and 3) Contract No. 028/2004/MFB/MITH of 05/02/2004	Control and monitoring of periodic maintenance works on 804 Km (Lots 1 and 2) Contract No. 030/2004/MFB/MITH of 06/02/2004 and Modification n°01 of 28/03/2008	Study to identify viable materials for earth road maintenance works (Single Lot) Contract No. 0017/2004/MFB/MITH/SG/DEP of 19/01/2004
			Service provider
Service Provider	Groupement CIMA International / CIERGEC	CINCAT INTERNATIONAL S.A.	Laboratoire National du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics (LNBTP)
Contract Notification Date	26/07/2004	26/07/2004	01/06/2004
Contract Performance Period	12 months	28 months (24+04 months)	12 months
Contract amount (in CFAF million)	Initial contract	566 780 000	850 764 774
	Amendment 1	-	58 506 400
	Total	566 780 000	909 272 174
	Final implementation	559 840 000	897 703 401
	Balance	6 940 000	11 568 773
Date of last ADF disbursement	30/06/2008	30/06/2008	30/06/2008
Amount disbursed ADF (millions of CFAF)	497 641 776	758 070 126	151 131 311
Amount disbursed ADF (millions of UA)			
Amount disbursed Gov. (millions of CFAF)	62 198 224	94 748 105	18 889 289
Amount disbursed Gov. (millions of UA)			

H. SUPPLIERS

Project	Procurement of 4 four-wheel drive diesel station wagons for the BDR(Lot 1) Contract No. 0231/2003/MFB/MITH/SG/DEP of 22/12/2003	Procurement of equipment for detecting degradations and monitoring the road network and special software for BDR (Lot 2) Contract No. 0232/2003/MFB/MITH/SG/DEP of 22/12/2003	Procurement of computers and various IT equipment and current software for BDR (Lot 3) Contract No. 0077/2004/MFB/MITH/SG/DEP of 14/04/2004
Supplier	Etablissement TRAORE LAMINE	Groupement SCETAUROUTE / R&L	CFAO TECHNOLOGIE
Contract Notification Date	27/02/2004	05/05/2005	03/05/2004
Deadline for contract performance	50 days	50 days	03 months
Contract amount (in millions of CFAF)	Initial contract	171 335 382	97 080 809.49
	Amendment 1	-	-
	Total	171 335 382	97 080 809.49
	Final completed	171 335 382	97 080 809.49
	Balance	0	0
Date of provisional acceptance	06/04/2004	03/06/2005	<i>Delivery of material on 20/07/04</i> Provisional acceptance on 25/01/2005
Date of last ADF disbursement	30/06/2008	30/06/2008	30/06/2008
Amount disbursed ADF (CFAF million)	152 300 021	86 295 131.56	129 938 530
Amount disbursed ADF (UA million)			
Amount disbursed Govt. (CFAF million)	19 035 361	10 785 678	16 240 489
Amount disbursed Govt. (UA million)			

BURKINA FASO
Second Road Programme
Project Matrix

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS		MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS/ RISKS
	At appraisal	At completion		
SECTOR GOAL				
Help reduce transport costs to improve the competitiveness of the national economy and ensure better access for rural population	1.1. 5% decrease in transport costs 1.2. 3.5% increase in passenger service and freight traffic	5% increase in transport costs 8% increase in passenger service and freight traffic	1.1. Economic and agricultural statistics 1.2. Transport statistics	
2. PROJECT OBJECTIVE				
Protect the existing road network through rehabilitation and regular maintenance	2.1.1. Condition of road network: degradation index between 5 and 7; 2.1.2. Regular maintenance costs of at least CFAF 5 billion per year	Degradation index of 6 Maintenance costs of 9 billion in 2008 and estimates of 13 billion in 2009	2.2. Economic statistics 2.3. Road counts and surveys 2.4. Agricultural statistics	Optimum implementation of the TSP-2, of which the project is a component
3.Outputs				
3.1 Roads rehabilitated 3.2 Roads regularly maintained 3.3 Road materials deposits identified along the entire network 3.4 BDR strengthened	3.1. 620 Km of roads rehabilitated 3.2. 805 Km of roads maintained 3.3. Road materials map made available to users 3.4. Equipment of the BDR with measuring equipment and processing of road data	3.1 not completed 3.2 644 km of roads maintained 3.3 Maps made available 3.4 BDR equipped	3.1. Progress, supervision, audit and completion reports 3.2. consultant contract and Acceptance Report	3.1. Sufficient resources made available for maintenance of the network 3.2. Privatization of maintenance will be pursued and concluded
ACTIVITIES	4. INPUTS / RESOURCES			
4.1. <u>Works</u> : i) launching of international competitive bidding; ii) Selection of contractors and signing of contracts; iii) works implementation. 4.2. <u>Control and monitoring</u> : i) Shortlist ii) launching of consultants, iii) Selection of consultants and signing of contracts, iv) Control and monitoring services 4.3. <u>Search for materials</u> : i) launching of international competitive bidding; ii) Selection of consultant and signing of contract; iii) Provision of consultants' services; 4.4. <u>BDR</u> : i) procurement of suppliers; ii) selection of suppliers and signing of contract; delivery. 4.5. <u>Audit</u> : i) shortlist; ii) Launching of consultancies; iii) selection of consultant and signing of contract; iv) Provision of service	<u>Cost (in UA million)</u> Works 20.53 Control 1.03 Search 0.21 Support BDR 0.47 Audit 0.08 Contingency 1.08 Price increase 1.36 Total 2 4.75 <u>Financing (in UA million)</u> - FE LC Total ADF 20.20 1.80 22.00 Gov 2.75 2.75 Total 20.20 4.60 24.75	Works 17.132 Control 1.824 Search 0.021 Support BDR 0.518 Audit 0.094 Total 19.589	4.1. Contracts signed 4.2. Estimates at appraisal 4.3. Project accounting 4.4. Disbursement ledgers 4.5. Loan agreement	4.1 Coordination of implementation of project components 4.2 Coordination of project donors 4.3 Compliance with planning 4.4 Efficient monitoring by the ADF Availability of government counterpart funds

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction:

1.1 Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in West Africa. It is surrounded by Mali to the north, Niger in the east, Benin in the south-east, Togo and Ghana in the south, and Côte d'Ivoire in the south-west. The country has a land border of 3192 km: of which 1000 with Mali; 628 with Niger; 584 with Côte d'Ivoire; 548 with Ghana; 306 with Benin; and 126 with Togo. Burkina Faso is divided into 45 provinces and 13 administrative regions. Agriculture accounts for 32% of the gross domestic product and employs close to 80% of the active population. It consists primarily of livestock breeding, but also of farming, especially in the south and south-east. The country's population was estimated at 13.3 million inhabitants in 2006 and covers an area of 274 200 km², or a density of 44 inhab./km².

Project Objective and Description

1.2 The objective of the project was not modified. Only a few design modifications were made during the implementation of the project owing to insufficient resources.

To achieve the project objectives, the following components were planned:

- i) Rehabilitation of 620 km of earth roads;
- ii) Periodic maintenance of 804 km of earth road;
- iii) Control and supervision of works;
- iv) Search for road construction materials;
- v) Support to the road data bank (Banque de données routières - BDR); and
- vi) Auditing of the programme.

Project Implementation and Activities Implementation Period

1.3 The project was implemented by the General Directorate of Roads (DGR) in the Ministry for Infrastructure, identified as the Executing Agency during project appraisal. However, owing to monitoring and supervision requirements, the DGR set up an internal project monitoring unit. Thus, three (3) civil engineers were charged with monitoring the project. Two of them were responsible for monitoring works, while the third worked with the consultant responsible for the search for materials study. The appointment of these engineers was submitted for the prior approval of the Bank based on their respective CVs.

1.4 In accordance with the terms of the loan agreement, contracts were awarded through (i) international competitive bidding which, after being declared unsuccessful, was changed to national competitive bidding; (ii) competition on the basis of a shortlist for services related to control and supervision of works, auditing as well as supply of vehicles, computer materials and equipment; (iii) direct negotiation for the study to search for road materials for maintenance works on earth roads.

1.5 Earth road rehabilitation works were entrusted to BTM and Oumarou KANAZOE (OK), while periodic maintenance of earth roads was entrusted to COGEB and ECG. The implementation of the project, which was supposed to take 24 months, as from October 2002, only started in February 2004 with the procurement of vehicles for the BDR, and ended in June 2008 with the provisional acceptance of additional works on the Banfora Mangodara Road.

1.6 Services related to control and supervision of works, specifically, periodic maintenance, were entrusted to CINCAT International and rehabilitation works to the CIMA International/CIERGECE group.

1.7 The firm CGIC was the successful bidder for the accounts audit engagement contract for the 3 fiscal years as well as for loan closing. Fiscal years 2004 to 2008 reports were prepared and transmitted to the Bank in September 2008, but payment of consultants' invoices for the 2006 to 2008 financial years are pending ORPF approval.

Project Costs and Financial Resources

1.8 At appraisal, the total cost of the project was estimated at UA 24.75 million, comprising UA 19.89 million in foreign exchange and UA 4.86 million in local currency. At completion, it stood at UA 17.272 million, as at June 30, 2008, comprising UA 0.352 million in foreign exchange and UA 16.92 million in local currency. The government's contribution increased by CFAF 932.898 million (close to UA 1.260 million) while that of the Bank recorded a positive balance of UA 8.738 million. Thus, with respect to estimates at appraisal and to the initial financing plan, Burkina Faso's contribution to the project increased from UA 2.75 million to 4.010 million, or 11.11 to 16.20%. Indeed, Burkina Faso bore all the costs of some of the modifications.

Overall Assessment

1.9 As soon as the project was launched, it was obvious that project resources were insufficient for the implementation of the various project components, owing, among others, to (i) the rise in the cost of road works; (ii) implementation delays related to the procurement process; (iii) depreciation of the Unit of Account in relation to the CFAF. Owing to this situation, there was a focus, in some segments, on the construction of structures at the expense of road building. After the cancellation of the contracts of BTM and OK and the partial completion of firm tranches as part of periodic maintenance, only about 60% of ADF resources had been used, resulting in the cancellation by the Bank of the balance, in the amount of UA 8.738 million.

1.10 The project objectives were not achieved, since the road rehabilitation component was abandoned following the bankruptcy of the companies and the periodic maintenance component was only partially implemented. The reasons for the failure of this project lie in particular in the decision, not properly assessed, to assign works to local SMEs which did not have adequate skills, experience and resources; the poor quality of the studies which underpinned the estimates and masked the fact that the required works had to be upgraded, namely, construction instead of rehabilitation, and rehabilitation instead of maintenance.

Economic Performance

1.11 The economic performance of the project is unsatisfactory overall. The project area was on the one hand reduced while, on the other, one of the components was not implemented. Thus, the total final cost of works financed by the Bank under the current project (expressed in CFAF) is 40% lower than the ADF resources made available.

1.12 The economic benefits of the project were supposed to stem primarily from the value added of agricultural products, savings on vehicle operating costs and reduction in maintenance costs. Time gains were also factored into the economic analysis to take into account the need to reduce travel time. However, since the rehabilitation component was not implemented and the scope of the maintenance component was reduced, the economic benefits of the project are not relevant.

1.13 At project completion, the internal rate of return (IRR) of the project stood at 8.25% of the whole project as estimated at appraisal but not fully implemented.

Conclusion

The overall and specific objectives of the project were not fully achieved. Because of the significant delay experienced during the implementation of the project (almost 7 years in relation to appraisal), the failure to implement the rehabilitation component, the reduction in the scope of the periodic maintenance component (684 km instead of 804 km), the project did not improve the road network in Burkina Faso. Road users in the East do not yet have access to modern infrastructure that facilitates the marketing of agricultural produce and opens up the area.

I. Introduction

1.1 The TSP-2 is one of the pillars of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) prepared by the government at the beginning of 2000. This program was designed with a view to participating in the fight against poverty by opening up the communities and reducing transportation costs directly borne by them, given that the landlocked nature of production areas is one of the major constraints to growth and development. Thus, the roads concerned serve many areas with a high agro-pastoral potential and several Department headquarters. Furthermore, the project roads are the anchor pins for rural roads for which a special development program was prepared. Actions taken within the general framework of the TSP-2 with respect to the road sub-sector were aimed, on the one hand, at building the capacity of the DGR with respect to programming and implementing its management activities and, on the other hand, improving maintenance of the road network.

1.2 In addition to rehabilitation and periodic maintenance works, this project was also expected to strengthen the Road Data Bank (Banque des données routières - BDR), which is the nerve center of the country's road information; strengthening this body was intended to significantly increase the operational capacities of the DGR to monitor the network and programme its maintenance. Furthermore, knowledge of borrow material reserves destined for road works nationwide is critical; indeed, with time, the availability of these materials gradually diminishes and may exacerbate environmental problems related to road works thus affecting their costs. Consequently, a "road materials search and identification" component was planned under the road programme.

1.3 Overall, the project was expected to help open up production areas, reduce the cost of farm inputs and outputs and increase economic opportunities for the most disadvantaged segments of the population. It was in line with the ADF VIII operations strategy in Burkina Faso under the CSP and, more generally, under the poverty reduction strategy pursued by the government and the ADF in rural areas, in particular.

1.4 The preparation of this completion report drew on the initial appraisal report, information collected during the preparation mission of the said report and project documents available at the Bank.

1.5 The Burkina Faso road network comprises a total of 61,367 km, of which 15,272 km are classified.

- The classified network was the subject of an administrative and technical classification.
- The unclassified network consists of rural roads.

The table below presents the roads in the network (in 2006) by administrative classification and by improvement standard:

	Paved Roads (PR)	Earth Roads	Earth Tracks	Total
National roads	2 547	3 583	567	6 697
Regional roads	31	2 394	1 156	3 581
Departmental roads	6	4 284	704	4 994
Rural roads	0	0	46 095	46 095
Total	2 584	10 261	48 522	61 367

1.6 In these conditions, opening up access internally and externally is a key concern for the socio-economic development of the country. Under this general policy, a comprehensive Transport Sector Adjustment Program (PASEC-T) was implemented between 1992 and 1999. At the completion of the PASEC-T in 1999, the majority of its objectives had been achieved. On the strength of these results, a Second Transport Sector Programme (TSP-2), aimed at consolidating gains under PASEC-T and at pursuing the main objectives as PASEC-T, was launched.

1.7 The AfDB's first intervention in Burkina was in 1970. In total, it has been involved in sixty-seven (67) national operations, of which thirty seven (37) projects, four (4) structural adjustment loans, one budget support, three (3) lines of credit, ten (10) institutional support and 12 studies. Of the 67 operations, forty-one (41) have been completed and twenty-seven (26) are ongoing. The total amount of commitments, net of cancellations, stands at UA 576.79 million, of which UA 101.56 million for the 11 transport sector operations. In terms of sector distribution, the transport sector represents 17.6% of the total amount of interventions.

1.8 Projects financed in the transport sector include: the Dori-Djibo Road Study (1974); Dori-Djibo Road Construction (1978); Sakoince-Hounde Road Construction (1978); Bilanga-Taparko Road construction (1982); Fada-Ngourma-Tintangou Road Construction (1983); Banfora-Batié - Amenda Hydr R. Road (1988); Ouaga-Leo - Bobo Ded Roads Study(1989); Structural Adjustment Programme (1991); Bilanga - Fada N'Gourma Road (1991); Road Maintenance Project (1997); 2nd Road Programme (2001); Improvement of 975 km of Rural Roads Project (2004).

1.9 Owing to the lack of necessary documentation (Borrower's completion report, inspection mission, end of construction site report), the preparation of this project completion report (PCR) drew primarily on documents and information collected in the field, supervision reports, documents at headquarters and discussions with the different services involved during the mission conducted in Burkina Faso from 05 to 19 July, 2008.

2. Project Objectives and Formulation

2.1 Objectives

2.1.1 The overall sector goal is to help reduce transport costs in order to boost the competitiveness of the national economy and ensure better access for rural communities. The specific objective is to preserve and upgrade a segment of the existing earth road network and build the DGR's capacity to collect road data and identify road construction material.

2.2 Project Description

2.2.1 At appraisal, the project had the following components:

a) Rehabilitation Work on Earth Roads:

The rehabilitation works under the project were to cover a total distance of 620 km of earth roads, and concern 12 (twelve) roads selected on the basis of preliminary and detailed designs conducted by a consultant. Given the traffic volume and the socio-economic benefits, 3 (three) different levels of road construction were retained: (i) ordinary earth roads (OER) with a roadbed of 7 metres, a surface course of 20 cm and an improved subgrade of 30 cm; (ii) improved roads (IR) with a roadbed of 6 metres, a surface course of 20 cm and an improved subgrade of 30 cm; (iii) ordinary roads (OR) with a roadbed of 5 metres wide, a surface course of 15 cm and no improved subgrade. In addition to the

various preparatory works, the road development works to be carried out included general excavation, pavements, drainage, small engineering works and signposting and measures to mitigate the environmental impact of the project. At the end of construction, the contractors were expected to hand over the wells, boreholes and camp buildings constructed for project needs to the population and local communities in the project area. These works were to be carried out in 2 (two) distinct lots.

b) Periodic Maintenance Work on Earth Roads:

Periodic maintenance works under the project concerned earth roads exclusively. The relevant studies conducted had shown that the level of periodic maintenance on several road stretches had been largely exceeded. The improvement works retained were aimed at: (i) restoring the surface course and repairing dangerous segments; (ii) cleaning and/or creating ditches and drainage ways, as well as repairing existing road structures; (iii) improving road alignment and profile in order to eliminate dangerous areas. These works were supposed to cover 804 km, comprising 14 road segments classified under 2 (two) distinct lots.

c) *Works Control and Supervision*

Two consulting firms, to be recruited, were to be responsible for onsite supervision of the roadworks. They were responsible for the quality, smooth implementation and timely completion of the works by the companies which were successful bidders for the lots. The consultants were to prepare monthly and quarterly status reports for the executing agency and the donors concerned. The consultants were also responsible for preparing the works bill of quantities, detailed statements, the status reports and the works completion report.

d) *Search for Road Construction Materials*

The goal of this component of the project was to identify and locate road construction materials (laterite, gravel, hard rocks) along the country's various roads; this first operation concerned 1,060 km of national roads, 922 km of regional roads, and 1,177 km of Departmental roads, for a total of 3,100 km. The consultant who was to carry out this study was expected to: (i) assess the current state of existing deposits and quarries; (ii) prospect for and locate potential quarries and deposits, about every 5 (five) kilometres, along the roads retained, and draw maps, at different scales, to show the road network pattern; (iii) evaluate the volumes available, prepare summary tables and make recommendations on the mining of the deposits and quarries, depending on the characteristics of the materials; (iv) make a general summary of the study results and draw up borrow plans, prepare geotechnical and results sheets and make recommendations on the use of materials with a view to making savings on roadworks and protecting the environment.

e) *Support to the Road Database (RDB)*

The goal of this component was to build the technical capacity of the Road Database (RDB) in data collection and processing by reinforcing its technical equipment. In concrete terms, this entailed the procurement of 4 (four) vehicles for road damage detection and network monitoring as well as the relevant equipment, IT equipment and special software for road design and monitoring, visualization and production of thematic maps (traffic, pavement layers, road network layout). This component was also supposed to include the retention and training of RDB employees to use the equipment to be procured.

f) **Project Audit**

The ADF loan accounts were to be audited annually by a renowned independent auditor who was to audit the use of loan resources and prepare annual audit reports. Overall, 3 (three) missions were to be scheduled for October 2002, October 2003 and the end of the project, in August 2004.

2.3 Project Formulation

2.3.1 This project is an integral part of the TSP-2 and particularly, of its road component which included road network preservation and strengthening. The idea was to upgrade the entire classified earth road network, rehabilitate a good number of roads and open up access to all Departmental headquarters to support the Government's decentralization policy.

2.3.2 With respect to road network improvement, a priority program covering 2000 km of earth roads for rehabilitation works and 2100 km of earth roads for periodic maintenance works was identified. The implementation of these works should make it possible to open up access to almost all the country's production areas. These roads were retained following a study to prioritize the maintenance and rehabilitation needs of the entire road network in the country. During the TSP-2 consultative meeting in May 2000, various donors, including the ADF, expressed their intention to participate in the financing of these works. The segment of this program retained for ADF financing concerns 620 km of roads for rehabilitation and 804 km for periodic maintenance. Government commitment to carry out all periodic maintenance and rehabilitation works on earth roads under TSP-2 was one of the conditions for the ADF loan.

2.3.3 Techno-economic studies on the roads proposed for ADF financing were carried out by consultants mainly with CIDA and WADB financing. These studies focused on 620 km of roads for rehabilitation and 804 km for periodic maintenance.

2.4 Identification, Preparation, Negotiation and Approval

2.4.1 The project was identified by the Bank following a donor roundtable meeting held in Ouagadougou in May 2000. During that meeting, a Second Transport Sector Program (TSP-2) was adopted with the support of the main sector donors. Its goal was to consolidate the achievements of PASEC-T.

2.4.2 Project appraisal was conducted by a mission comprising two experts from the Bank (a civil engineer and a transport economist) who visited Burkina Faso from 15 to 27 July 2001. The project was approved on 14 November 2001.

3. Project Implementation

3.1 Effectiveness and Works Start-Up

3.1.1 The project became effective on 16 October 2002, and instructions to the contractor to launch construction works were issued on 26 July 2004. There was a time overrun in project completion of more than 4 (four) years, compared to the target set at appraisal (May 2004), for several reasons which include: (i) the procurement process – when international competitive bidding was unsuccessful, the Government and the Bank agreed to relaunch the process at the national level in a bid to, *inter alia*, promote SMEs; (ii) delays in raising counterpart funds; (iii) delays in payments to enterprises; (iv) inadequate studies since periodic maintenance works turned out to be

rehabilitation works and rehabilitation works rather seemed more like construction works; (v) the limited capacity (material, human and financial) of the SMEs which were awarded contracts; (vi) the impossibility of updating contracts with enterprises despite the rise in prices; and (vii) delays in the fulfilment of loan conditions.

3.1.2 The Government fulfilled all the general and specific conditions for ADF loans. Specifically, it fulfilled the conditions precedent to loan effectiveness, those in Section 5.01 of the General Conditions Applicable to Loan Agreements and Guarantee Agreements, and conditions precedent to first disbursement: (i) undertake to carry out the whole rehabilitation and periodic maintenance program on earth roads under TSP-2; (ii) undertake to promote the use of search findings on road construction materials with a view to promoting environmental protection and making savings on the cost of road works; (iii) provide evidence of the appointment of 3 (three) experts, qualified as civil engineers and whose CVs must have been deemed acceptable by the Bank, to monitor project implementation. A further condition was that the government had to provide evidence of the necessary external resources mobilized for implementation of the entire earth road rehabilitation and periodic maintenance programme, before the end of December 2003.

3.2 Project Implementation

3.2.1 The project experienced various types of difficulties (financial, administrative and institutional) during implementation. The result was that the international competitive bidding process did not yield positive results because of inadequate resource projections at appraisal. The Bank and the government agreed to entrust the works to local SMEs without conducting a prior assessment of their technical and financial capability and without ensuring a proper allotment of the works. As a result, there was considerable slippage on the schedule of periodic maintenance works and enterprises defaulted on the rehabilitation works.

3.2.2 The detailed designs should have been updated prior to the launching of works since the bidding process was launched on the basis of preliminary design (PD) documents.

3.2.3 The various project components were not implemented as planned at appraisal. Indeed, while components like the search for road construction materials and support to the Road Database (RDB) have been fully completed since 2005, the periodic maintenance component was completed with some delay, which caused some inconvenience on the network because all the roads were not made available at the same time for the government to programme maintenance on them. Besides, less than 10% of the component on rehabilitation works on 620 km of earth roads was implemented.

3.3 Modifications

3.3.1 The following substantial modifications were made in works on the Banfora – Mangodara road (99 km): (i) waterproofing of the road platform; (ii) reconstruction of all existing road structures due to dilapidation; and (iii) broadening of the road surface from 6 to 9.4 m with a view to paving it. These various modifications called for an additional government contribution of CFAF 1,100,820,219 (inclusive of taxes) financed entirely from the state budget under a parallel contract and an amendment of CFAF 711,901,445 (net of tax and duties) financed by the ADF and the Government. The total cost of works is therefore CFAF 5,482,064,297, plus CFA.F 1,100,820,219 financed entirely from the state budget.

3.3.2 The modifications in Lot 1, which includes the Banfora-Mangodara road, generated an additional works cost of CFA.F 1,644,799,936 (net of taxes), or CFAF 1,940,863,924 (inclusive of taxes), of which CFAF 1,011,990,742 was borne by the Government of Burkina Faso and CFA.F 632,809,194 by the ADF.

3.3.3 These additional cost amounts for Lot 1 were spent on three contracts:

- A negotiated contract with the firm COGEB financed by the Burkina Faso budget in the amount of CFAF 982,898,491 (net of taxes) or CFAF 1,100,820,219 (inclusive of tax);
- Amendment 1 to the works execution contract of CFAF 840,043,705 (net of taxes) or CFAF 711,901,445 (inclusive of tax), financed to the tune of 88.89% by the ADF and 11.11% by the Government of Burkina Faso; and
- Amendment 1 to the works control contract of CFA.F 69,037,552 or CFA.F 58,506,400 (net of tax), financed to the tune of 88.89% by the ADF and 11.11% by the Government of Burkina Faso;

Modifications to Lot 2 did not generate any additional costs.

3.3.4 At completion, project costs by source of finance were as follows:

Project costs by source of finance (in UA million)

Sources of Finance	Appraisal		Completion		Difference	
	Amounts	%	Amounts	%	Amounts	%
ADF	22	88.89%	13.262	76.78	8.738	39.72
Government	2.75	11.11%	4.01	23.22	-1.26	-45.82
Total	24.75	100%	17.272	100		

Source: Disbursement tables of FFCCO and the DAF of DGR.

3.3.5 The total project cost thus showed that, at completion, the government's contribution had increased by more than CFA.F 932,898 million (close to UA 1.260 million) while the Bank's contribution had decreased by UA 8.738 million. Hence, compared to estimates made at appraisal and to the initial financing plan, Burkina Faso's contribution to the completed components of the project rose from UA 2.75 million to UA 4.010 million, or from 11.11% to 23.22%.

3.3.6 In addition, at completion, the various expenditure categories were as follows:

<i>Expenditure costs by category from project resources (in UA million)</i>			
Expenditure category	Appraisal	Completion	Difference
Construction works*	10.954	5.652	5.302
Periodic maintenance works	8.836	8.777	0.8
Control and coordination	0.989	1.457	-0.468
Search for road construction materials	0.200	0.170	0.03
Support to the Road Databank (RDB)	0.450	0.414	0.036
Program Auditing	0.80	0.75	0.05
Total	22.229	17.272	4.957

* Including reimbursements to the firms BTM and OK.

Source: Disbursement tables of FFCCO and the DAF of DGR.

3.4 Implementation Schedule

3.4.1 Project implementation was expected to last for 24 months, from October 2002. However, the project, which effectively started in February 2004 with the procurement of vehicles for the RDB, ended in June 2008 with the provisional acceptance of additional works on the Banfora-Mangodara road. The BTM and OK enterprises, which won contracts for the road rehabilitation works component implemented the works from July 2004 to June 2007 (date of termination of their contract), while COGEB and ECG, which won contracts for the maintenance works component, implemented the works from July 2004 to June 2008.

3.4.2 The consultancy services financed with ADF loan resources were provided during the following periods: (i) from July 2004 to December 2007 for rehabilitation works control by the firm CIMA/CIERGE; (ii) from July 2004 to June 2008 for periodic maintenance works control by the firm CINCAT; (iii) from June 2004 to June 2005 for the search for road construction materials by LNBTP.

3.5 Reporting

3.5.1 The monitoring system made provision for the executing agency to prepare quarterly program status reports to be forwarded to the Bank. These reports were forwarded regularly, albeit late, until 31 December 2007. The last two reports still pending are those of the 1st and 2nd quarters of 2008. Besides, the executing agency did not regularly forward to the Bank the monthly reports of the firms responsible for works control and supervision. Furthermore, the joint supervision meetings, which were supposed to be organized by the management of PST-2, as well as the production of quarterly reports by TSP-2 for all donors were not done.

3.6 Procurement

3.6.1 Pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement, contracts were awarded through: (i) international competitive bidding for works; and (ii) competition on the basis of a shortlist for works control and supervision services as well as auditing. However, the bidding process did not yield positive results because the bid amounts were well above the total budget. Hence, in an attempt to stay within the allocated budget, the project scope was reduced and a new national competitive bidding process was launched.

Rehabilitation Works:

3.6.2 Lots 1 and 3 were awarded to the enterprise, *Bâtiment Travaux Publics Maintenance (BTM)* as a single tranche of: (i) 232.37 km for Lot 1 for the sum of CFAF 4,585,317,480 (net of tax and duties); and (ii) 33.73 km for Lot 3 for the sum of CFAF 1,611,240,270 (net of tax and duties). The initial implementation periods were 12 months for Lot 1 and 3 months for Lot 3, from the start-up date of 26 July 2004. After the works were reorganized in 2006, the initial deadline was extended by 27 months for Lot 1 and 29 months for Lot 3.

3.6.3 Lot 2, which was 189 km long, was awarded to the enterprise Oumarou KANAZOE (OK) as a firm tranche for 151.46 km costing CFAF 3,785,926,810 (net of tax and duties) and as a conditional tranche for 89.7 km costing CFA.F 1,061,709,470 (net of tax and duties) for an implementation period of 12 months, beginning from the works start-up date of 23 November 2004. The estimated completion date was 30 November 2005.

Summary table of rehabilitation works contracts

Lot	Successful Bidder	Firm Tranche	Amount (CFAF)	Initial Period
Lot 1	BTM	232.37	4,585,317,480	12 months
Lot 3	BTM	33.73	1,611,240,270	03 months
Lot 2	OK	151.46	3,785,926,810	12 months

Periodic Maintenance Works

3.6.4 The Lot 1 contract of 350 km was awarded as a firm tranche of 276 km costing CFAF 4,062,301,209 (net of tax and duties) and as a conditional tranche of 74 km costing CFAF 707,861,643 (net of tax and duties) to the enterprise COGEB International, making a total cost of CFAF 4,770,162,852 (net of tax and duties). The initial implementation periods were 20 months (15 months for the firm tranche and 5 months for the conditional tranche), beginning from the works start-up date of 26 July 2004. A supplemental contract was awarded to the enterprise COGEB to enable it to build road structures on the Banfora-Mangodara road and carry on works right up to 30 April 2008.

3.6.5 Lot 2 contract of 454 km: The contract was awarded as a firm tranche of 377.8 km costing CFAF 3,100,568,094 (net of tax and duties) and as a conditional tranche of 76 km costing CFAF 918,222,113 (net of tax and duties) to the enterprise COGEB International, for a total cost of CFAF 4,018,790,207 (net of tax and duties). The initial implementation periods were 22 months (17 months for the firm tranche and 5 months for the conditional tranche), beginning from the works start-up date of 26 July 2004. After reorganization of the works in 2006, the initial deadline was extended by 17 months and the new deadline was set for 30 October 2007. Later on, the ECG was authorized by the Government to carry on with works right up to the end of April 2008.

Summary table for periodic maintenance works contracts

Lot	Successful Bidder	Firm Tranche (km)	Amount (CFAF)	Initial Deadline
Lot 1	COGEB	276	4,062,301,209	15 months
Lot 2	ECG	377.8	3,100,568,094	17 months

Works Control and Supervision:

3.6.6 After limited competition, works control and supervision services for periodic maintenance were awarded to the consulting firm CINCAT International for an initial amount of CFAF 850,764,774 and an additional contract of CFAF 58,506,400, and to the group CIMA International/CIERGECEC for rehabilitation works for an amount of CFAF 566,780,000. The total amount for works control and supervision is CFAF 1,476,051,000, of which 88.89% is financed by the ADF loan and 11.11% by the national counterpart contribution.

Search for Road Construction Materials

3.6.7 The contract was awarded to *Laboratoire national du bâtiment et des travaux publics* (LNBTP) for the sum of CFAF 170,020,600, fully financed by the ADF and the government. The final report on the search campaign for road construction materials has been submitted to the government.

Support to the Road Database (RDB)

3.6.8 The contract for the supply of 4 four-wheel drive vehicles for detecting road deformations was awarded to *Etablissements TRAORE Lamine*, for the sum of CFAF 171,335,382 (net of tax and duties). The four vehicles were supplied and accepted on 6 April 2004.

3.6.9 The contract for the supply of technical equipment for detecting road deformations was awarded to *Groupement SCETAUROUTE/ R&L*, for the sum of CFAF 97,080,809 (net of tax and duties). The equipment was supplied and accepted on 3 June 2005.

3.6.10 The contract for the supply of IT equipment and technical software was awarded to the firm CFAO TECHNOLOGIE for the sum of CFA.F 146,179,019 (net of tax and duties) for a delivery period of 3 months from 3 May 2004. The equipment was supplied and accepted on 25 January 2005.

Project Audit

3.6.11 The firm CGIC was a successful bidder for the project audit contract after close consultation. The initial amount of the firm's contract was CFAF 62,000,000 to audit project accounts for 3 fiscal years, and an additional contract of CFAF 12,505,000 for the 4th year and the final audit, for a total of CFA.F 74,505,000. The reports for fiscal years 2004 to 2008 were prepared and forwarded to the Bank but the consultant's invoices corresponding to reports for 2006, 2007 and 2008, submitted after several reminders by the Bank, are still pending validation by the Bank before they are paid.

3.7 Cost, Sources of Finance and Disbursements

PROJECT COST

3.7.1 At appraisal, the total project cost was estimated at UA 24.75 million, of which UA 19.89 million in foreign exchange and 4.86 million in local currency. At completion, the cost was UA 17.272 million as at 30 June 2008, of which 0.352 million was paid in foreign exchange and 16.92 million in local currency. The government's contribution increased by CFAF 932,898 million (close to UA 1.260 million) and that of the Bank registered an uncommitted balance of UA 8.738 million. Hence, when compared to estimates made at appraisal and the initial financing plan, Burkina Faso's contribution to the project increased from UA 2.75 million to UA 4.010 million, or from 11.11% to 23.22%.

SOURCES OF FINANCE

3.7.2 At appraisal, the project had to be jointly financed by the Bank up to 88.89% and the Government of Burkina Faso for the remaining 11.11%. At completion, the Bank's share had dropped to 76.78% while that of the Government had risen to 23.22%. The increase in the government's share stems from: (i) the upgrading of certain roads, which were fully financed; and (ii) penalties paid to enterprises because of delays.

Financing Plan (in UA million)
Project Costs by Source of Finance (in UA million)

Source of Finance	Appraisal		Completion		Difference	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
ADF	22	88.89%	13.262	76.78%	8.738	39.72%
Government	2.75	11.11%	4.01	23.22%	-1.26	-45.82%
Total	24.75	100%	17.272	100		

Source: Disbursement tables prepared by FFCO and the DAF of DGR.

Expenditure Costs by Expenditure Category (in UA million)

<i>Expenditure Costs by Category from Loan Resources (in UA million)</i>			
Expenditure Category	Appraisal	Completion	Difference
Construction works*	10.954	5.652	5.302
Periodic maintenance works	8.836	8.777	0.8
Control and coordination	0.989	1.457	-0.468
Search for road construction materials	0.200	0.170	0.03
Support to the Road Databank (RDB)	0.450	0.414	0.036
Program Auditing	0.80	0.75	0.05
Total	22.229	17.272	4.957

* Taking into account reimbursements to the BTM and OK firms.

DISBURSEMENTS

3.7.3 At appraisal, disbursements were to be spread over a period of 18 months, from October 2002. At completion, this period had been extended by close to 2 years and disbursements were made between 2004 and 2008.

3.7.4 Following loan closure on 30 June 2008, total disbursements represented 76.78% of the total loan amount, thus generating a positive balance of UA 8.738 million.

4. Project Performance and Outcomes

4.1 Overall Assessment

4.1.1 Project objectives were not attained since the road rehabilitation component was abandoned when enterprises defaulted and certain segments of the road maintenance component were either not implemented or were reduced.

4.1.2 Right from project start-up, it became apparent that project resources were not enough to implement the various project components due to, *inter alia*: (i) an increase in road maintenance costs; (ii) implementation delays, stemming from delays in the procurement process; and (iii) depreciation of the unit of account against the CFA franc. As a result, priority was given to the construction of road structures along certain segments rather than to road development. Not much was done in the rehabilitation works awarded to BTM and OK. For Lots 1 and 3 awarded to BTM, only some road structures and the workers' camp were constructed. These contracts were finally cancelled in July 2007. Indeed, embankment works on 546 km were not started. However, after several meetings on the subject, BTM refused to sign the final works statement and the government finally had to file a complaint to CRAL (Commission for the Amicable Settlement of Disputes) about this enterprise's refusal to sign the works estimate as prepared in the presence of both parties.

For Lot 2, covering 189 km, only the opening of a few roads and construction of the workers' camp were partially executed. After a works estimate prepared by both parties, OK accepted to reimburse the sum of CFAF 426,808,058, which was the difference between the advance received at start-up and the works carried out.

4.1.3 After termination of the contracts of BTM and OK and the partial execution of the firm tranches on road maintenance, only about 76.78% of ADF loan resources were consumed, thus leading the Bank to cancel the balance of UA 8.738 million.

4.1.4 With respect to the rehabilitation component, the roads concerned actually had to be constructed and those to be maintained had to be rehabilitated. In fact, most of these roads were mere tracks which sometimes, and over long distances, were virtually footpaths with nothing other than rudimentary road structures.

4.1.5 The origin of the difficulties encountered during implementation can be traced back to the studies. Indeed, the TORs had been drafted as if these were existing roads that had to be rehabilitated, whereas the reality on the ground was different. In fact, what was needed were studies for new roads. The topographical studies envisaged in the TORs did not make it possible to gauge the cubature accurately.

4.2 Operational Performance

4.2.1 Development works on various segments of the project, including the construction of road structures, were carried out according to standards. Indeed, the geometrical and structural characteristics of certain segments of the project were better executed than prescribed in the specifications given in the bidding documents.

4.2.2 Project implementation was delayed because of the procurement process. However, the Bank, the Government of Burkina Faso, the Executing Agency (DGR), and the contractors (4 enterprises, 3 consultants and 1 auditor) did not satisfactorily carry out the activities entrusted to them. Indeed, the Bank: (i) agreed to finance a project whose studies were incomplete; (ii) accepted the unit prices agreed under the TSP as benchmark prices whereas they were outdated (15 million/km whereas the actual cost was 35 million/km); (iii) did not play its rightful role of urging the Government to move quickly in canceling the contracts of enterprises that had defaulted on the rehabilitation component. Vis-à-vis the Bank, the Government defended its need to entrust the works to SMEs as part of its policy to promote local enterprises. Unfortunately, it did not carry out a prior assessment of the capacity of these SMEs; it did not terminate the contracts of BTM and OK in time; it did not reorganize the project after the delays at start-up; and it was not firm in asking BTM and OK to reimburse sums received in excess. BTM and OK received substantial advances without implementing the corresponding works. They did not want to acknowledge their incapacity to execute the contracts despite the many meetings held to that end.

4.3 Institutional Performance

4.3.1 The project's institutional performance was deemed unsatisfactory because the executing agency did not monitor and manage the contracts properly; did not prepare supplemental contracts in time; cancelled the contracts of BTM and OK late even though these enterprises had demonstrated their incapacity to execute the contracts right from start-up by requesting that prices be adjusted by 40%.

4.4 Performance of Contractors and Consultants

PERFORMANCE OF WORKS CONTRACTORS

4.4.1 Given the sharp and exaggerated surge in the prices of cement, iron rods and fuel, all the enterprises working under the second road program requested a price adjustment in vain.

4.4.2 BTM and OK, which were successful bidders for the rehabilitation works, started implementation in July 2004 and their contract was terminated in July 2007, which is almost 36 months. During this period, they implemented less than 10% of the estimated works, even though a substantial advance had been paid for the firm tranche and the conditional tranche; moreover, the works were implemented only in the firm tranche. Given the limited volume of works implemented and delays in the reimbursement of the balance from the start-up advance, performance is deemed unsatisfactory.

4.4.3 COGEB and ECG, which were successful bidders for periodic maintenance works, began in July 2004. The works, which were planned to last for 24 months, were partially implemented with almost 24 months delay. Despite this time overrun, the performance of these enterprises is deemed satisfactory because they were able to carry out the works without any updating or adjustment of prices, even though the cost of inputs and building materials had risen sharply.

PERFORMANCE OF CONSULTANTS

4.4.4 The consulting firm CINCAT, which was responsible for controlling the periodic maintenance works, left a very good impression on the government. Consequently, its performance is deemed satisfactory.

4.4.5 The firm CIMA/CIERGECE controlled rehabilitation works, somewhat. Although the works were cancelled in June 2007, the government did not terminate its services; hence its contract ran from June to December 2007 without any notable activities and the enterprise continued to submit its invoices as if nothing was amiss. Its performance is deemed unsatisfactory.

4.4.6 The performance of the consulting firm responsible for auditing the accounts of the various project components is unsatisfactory. It prepared audit reports, belatedly sometimes, for fiscal years 2005 to 2008, in which it presented: (i) financial statements; (ii) an assessment of the internal control system; (iii) an analysis of compliance with loan agreement conditions; and (iv) project implementation status. The report for the 2006 fiscal year, which gave rise to observations from the Bank, was reviewed with great delay. Furthermore, according to ORPF, the independent auditors cannot prepare and audit the same financial statements.

4.5 Economic Performance

4.5.1 The cost of works (expressed in CFAF), which were only partially implemented compared to the initially planned project components, were financed with up to 76.78% of the resources initially budgeted by the ADF.

4.5.2 The economic benefits of the project stem essentially from value-added to agricultural products, savings on vehicle operating costs and a reduction in maintenance costs. Time gains were also factored into the economic analysis to take into account the substantial reduction in travel time.

4.5.3 In terms of technical characteristics and targeted economic objectives, the greatest benefits from project completion are: (i) an overall increase in traffic; (ii) a reduction in vehicle operating costs; and (iii) a reduction in road maintenance costs. Given past traffic trends and prospects for the development of economic activities, especially agro-pastoral activities, in the project area, traffic is estimated to grow by 3.5% per year on average. The failure to implement the rehabilitation component corresponds to a "no-project" situation where the estimated increase is 2.5%.

4.5.4 Surplus agricultural and pastoral production was estimated based on its current performance rate of less than 10%, which virtually corresponds to a "no-project" situation. Output in the 7 provinces concerned is 103,345.6 tons for cereals, 6,664.1 tons for cotton and 3.9 million livestock, including 916,000 head of cattle. It has been observed that in the baseline scenario, agricultural output grows very slightly (barely 2%), while livestock grows at an annual rate of 2.5%. However, since the roads are in a state of advanced degradation, nearly all cattle for sale has to be led on foot to the various markets, with the result that they lose weight or die, which translates into a decline in their market value.

4.5.5 Under the periodic maintenance component which offers a significant improvement in traffic conditions, the following elements were retained:

- during the pavement life of rehabilitated roads, set at 15 years from the year of commissioning of some roads (2005), the cereal output records a net annual growth rate of 5.5% on average, while cotton stands at 3% and livestock at 2.5%;
- at least 80% of the additional cereal output and all of the additional cotton output are sold;
- the share of cattle sold has inched up from 40% to 41% of total production following a reduction in losses since some of the animals are transported by lorry to the market.

Surplus production figures obtained from the statistics and assumptions presented above are as follows:

Surplus production	Years			
	2005	2009	2014	2019
Cereals (thousands of tons)	6,613	8,193	10,708	13,995
Cotton (tons)	233	262	304	352
Livestock (number of heads)	9,114	10,060	11,382	12,878

Source: Ministry of Agriculture

4.5.6 The additional income generated by the project comes from the marketing of surplus output in the proportions presented above. The unit prices applied are producer prices provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. They are as follows: cereals CFAF 75/kg, cotton CFAF 175/kg and cattle CFAF 102,500 per head. The results obtained are summarized below:

Product	Additional Income (CFAF million)			
	2005	2009	2014	2019
Cereals	396	491	642	839
Cotton	40	45	53	61
Livestock	934	1 031	1 166	1 319

Source: Ministry of Agriculture

4.5.7 At appraisal, the rehabilitation component consisted of the rehabilitation of 620 km of village roads designed for traffic volume of 20 to 50 vehicles/day, with the primary objective of increasing and improving output in agriculture and stockbreeding, the two main sources of income for the population, as follows: (i) surplus agricultural and pastoral output; and (ii) additional income from sale of part of the surplus output. The reduction in vehicle operating costs and road maintenance costs appear as “other benefits” under these conditions. Apart from a few road structures and the opening of roads, there was no major output. At completion, this component yielded no benefit. Furthermore, the implementation costs for this component were factored into the project economic analysis at completion.

4.5.8 At appraisal, the periodic maintenance component entailed maintenance of 804 km of earth roads, classified as national and departmental roads, which receive a traffic volume of 76 to 110 vehicles per day. At completion, only 604 km of road had been completed out of the 804 km estimated at appraisal. The most significant benefits from completion of this project component are: (i) an overall increase in traffic; (ii) a reduction in vehicle operating costs; and (iii) a reduction in road maintenance costs. Given past traffic trends and prospects for development of economic activities, especially agro-pastoral activities, in the project area, traffic is estimated to grow by 3.5% per year on average. Vehicle operating costs and road maintenance costs will be reduced by 12% respectively, following the significant improvement in traffic conditions on the roads targeted.

4.6 Economic Rate of Return and Sensitivity Test

4.6.1 The rate of return is calculated from three elements, namely: the agricultural and pastoral value-added, gains in maintenance costs and the cost of tax-free investments. The result is an 8.25% rate of return compared to 12.5% at appraisal, which shows that the project (as a whole) is not economically viable when implemented. This situation stems from the non-implementation of the rehabilitation component, the reduction of the project scope and delays in works implementation. Indeed, the IRR was calculated based on the whole project and the initial objectives, and not on the implemented component. These results were subjected to sensitivity tests on the estimated cost and quantifiable benefits from project implementation.

4.6.2 A sensitivity analysis of the project’s rate of return was conducted based on cost variation and benefits from project implementation. A 10% reduction in project benefits brings the economic rate of return down to 7.65% while a 10% increase in project costs takes the rate up to 9.35%.

Sensitivity Analysis

Situation	IRR
Baseline	8.25%
- 10% of external benefits	7.65%
+ 10% increase in project costs	9.35%

5. Social and Environmental Impact of the Project

5.1 Social Impact

5.1.1 The project covers 5 of the country's 12 regions (East region, the Cascades, the Southwest, Sahel and the Boucle du Mouhoun). These regions are predominantly agricultural production areas. By improving access to social infrastructure and to markets, the second road programme was expected to support economic and social recovery and poverty reduction, especially in the provinces

concerned. The rehabilitation component of the project did not facilitate access to infrastructure, neither did it reduce travel time and transport costs nor facilitate access to services.

5.1.2 The major impact expected from the implementation of the project is that it will render more accessible several villages and secondary socio-economic centers. Unfortunately, since traffic conditions have not improved, the commercial production of this segment of the population is still not being distributed, the latter cannot earn from it supplementary income likely to improve its standard of living.

5.1.3 The project, which was expected to promote the development of the small and medium sized enterprises that implemented the second road programme, exposed their weaknesses and very limited capacities.

5.2 Environmental Impact

5.2.1 To the extent that project activities were supposed to be limited to resurfacing and regrading works and to patching of the existing alignment, there were no major changes in human settlements and land tenure, particularly as only periodic maintenance works were implemented.

5.2.2 Owing to the nature of the works, in particular the extraction of a low quantity of materials from existing quarries, the project had no significant impact on the environment. Thus the restoration of borrow pits and quarries was done in a satisfactory manner.

6. Project Sustainability

6.1.1 Apart from the support to BDR component and search for road materials, which are fully implemented, the road components of the project were only partially implemented with significant delay. Given the delays experienced, some of the roads delivered to the government in 2005 have already faced 3 rainy seasons without maintenance. It was noted that, to a large extent, the sustainability of the project after its completion depends only on the government's commitment to carry out maintenance works which require financial resources. During 2007, the government set up a Burkina Faso Road Maintenance Fund (REB-B) and a review of estimated maintenance allocations show a budget of 9,750 million for 2008 and estimates of 11,750 million for 2009. This fund, which is allocated from the national budget, does not have financial autonomy. The maintenance programme for 2008 commenced modestly because of the late and partial release, by the government, of the necessary resources.

6.1.2 The direct recurrent project expenditures consist of the periodic maintenance costs of the roads concerned, and those associated with the operation and exploitation of resources made available to the DGR. Routine maintenance costs are usually covered in the national budget through the road fund. The operating expenses of the BDR are covered by the operating budget of the DGR, which is itself provided for in the national budget. These resources should be made available in a satisfactory manner for maintenance of the road network.

6.1.3 The government has developed a road maintenance strategy that streamlines the programming of this maintenance, and allows greater participation by the decentralized services and population concerned. In this regard, strengthening resources for the monitoring of the network by the BDR is an essential asset.

6.1.4 Road materials were identified under the project; it was expected that this would lead to

significant savings by the road maintenance teams and preserve the environment, thanks to the rational use of these non-renewable resources, thus contributing to the sustainability of the project and of its impact.

6.1.5 The sustainability of outputs could be compromised if sector weaknesses persist, namely: (i) inadequate programming; (ii) under-equipment as well as weak capacity of local SMEs, despite the existence of regional road subdivisions that can ensure project supervision in the field.

7. Performance of the Bank, the Borrower and other Donors

7.1 Bank Performance

7.1.1 The performance of the Bank is deemed unsatisfactory overall. Admittedly, it was involved in every stage of the project life cycle, from appraisal to completion. However, it underestimated the cost of works by basing its estimates on unit costs agreed under the TSP, without updating them, and did not envisage an adjustment of contractors' prices and, in particular, allowed the administration to postpone, several times, decisions that needed to be taken to resolve problems encountered during the implementation of works, in particular the termination of the contracts of BTM and OK.

7.1.2 Thus, the Bank was partially responsible for the postponement of the project deadline, after the interruption of works, for more than two years and for the failure to complete the rehabilitation component.

7.1.3 The Bank conducted missions during the implementation of this project. However, apart from the project appraisal and launching missions, only 6 supervision missions were conducted in 6 years instead of at least 9 in view of the ratio of 1.5 supervision missions per year. Even though the project implementation rate did not justify more frequent supervisions, it should be acknowledged that the missions conducted were not effective. The performance of the Bank is deemed unsatisfactory.

7.2 Borrower Performance

7.2.1 The performance of the Borrower is deemed unsatisfactory overall. The government certainly fulfilled all the special conditions under the loan agreement but did not honour all its undertakings that would allow the implementation of the project. It failed to make courageous decisions to cancel the contracts of BTM and OK (defective) in order to relaunch the call for bids; it was not able to redesign the project to allow the implementation of the project and take appropriate measures to save the project; a UA 8.738 million balance was cancelled while works had only been partially implemented.

7.3 Executing Agency Performance

7.3.1 The General Directorate of Roads (DGR), in particular the Directorate of Construction and Reconstruction (DCR) for works and their control, and the Directorate of Planning, Studies and Monitoring (DPES) for the components "Search for Materials" and "Support to BDR" in the Ministry of Transport had been identified as the executing agency during project appraisal.

7.3.2 Although the DGR has many years of works implementation experience, during which its senior staff has acquired sufficient skills to conduct studies, control and monitor works, it was not equal to the task in the implementation of this project. Weaknesses were noted in the monitoring of

works implemented by firms, management of contracts, monitoring of payments from counterpart funds, lack of firmness in dealing with control firms and BTM and OK companies with respect to termination of their contracts, and monitoring and reimbursement of BTM and OK firms.

7.3.3 The performance of the executing agency was deemed unsatisfactory because the project experienced multiple problems and delays, works were not completed and segments completed since 2005 are not maintained. No component, with the exception of the "search for materials" and "support to BDR" was implemented to the satisfaction of the users.

8. Overall Performance and Rating

8.1.1 The project is rated 1.25 out of 4 for implementation performance, 1.25 out of 4 for the performance of the Bank. Furthermore, in view of the project's low rate of return at completion, the overall rating of project performance increases to 1.75 out of 4.

9. Conclusion, Lessons Learnt and Recommendations

9.1 Conclusion

9.1.1 The project, as identified during the appraisal phase, was not implemented and did not achieve its objectives because of the difficulties encountered during its implementation, which resulted in significant delay. The total estimated cost of the project was UA 24.75 million, of which 22 million in ADF loans. Disbursements were UA 13 261 421, 47, about 60% of approved amounts. As a result, the balance stands at UA 8.738 million.

9.1.2 The different actors, namely the Bank, the government, the executing agency, and the enterprises responsible for conducting road works, the control mission all contributed to the delay experienced in the implementation of the project; thus, none of them fulfilled their missions in a satisfactory manner. Consequently, project objectives set at appraisal were not achieved. Roads users affected by the rehabilitation component still do not have transport infrastructure that allows them to market their farm produce and opens up their region.

9.1.3 The project, as appraised, was only partially completed. The overall and specific objectives of the project were not achieved. Its socio-economic impact on costs and on transport delays as well as on the environment and road safety are mixed. The population in the project influence area along the project roads does not yet have access to transport infrastructure and the living environment is not better than before. As well, the initial project implementation duration was largely exceeded as a result of late start-up of works, the default of SMEs responsible for implementing the rehabilitation component, delays in the mobilization of counterpart funds, etc.

9.1.4 The component of the second road programme relating to the rehabilitation of 546 km of earth roads was well designed because its effective implementation would have resulted in the opening up of a region in which road transport is very difficult. The implementation of this project should have improved the mobility of the rural population in the area and would have thus been a powerful development factor for all the areas concerned. Indeed, the interest of the population in the East for the project is clear: This population was waiting for the construction of these infrastructures which was supposed to allow not only the opening up of Gayeri, a locality with a high agro-pastoral potential, but also allow the distribution of agricultural products.

9.1.5 The weaknesses of the designs were a deciding factor; however, they were not the main

reason for the failure to implement the project. The main factor that underpinned the failure of the project seems to be the attitude of contractors, which were not able to implement the works or refused to do so.

9.2 Lessons Learnt

9.2.1 The following lessons may be learnt from this project:

- (1) The significant delay between the period when the designs were prepared (2000) and the start-up of works (2004) and the failure to re-update these designs before the launching of works resulted in technical problems and delays in the implementation of the project;
- (2) The loan balance, UA 8.738 million, representing close to 35% of the total loan amount, was cancelled by the Bank, although this balance could have been used to undertake necessary works to improve project roads and consolidate some works, for example, embankments for access to works, improvement of tracks, etc.;
- (3) The government's persistence to have work done despite calls for price adjustments and business failures contributed to the postponement of the project implementation deadline and to the disastrous results recorded;
- (4) Works were assigned to SMEs, with a view to promoting local enterprises, without prior assessment of their technical and financial capacities.
- (5) The failure to monitor works implemented by contractors, poor management of contracts, delays in the mobilization of counterpart funds and monitoring of payments, the failure to be firm in dealing with control firms and the BTM and OK contractors with respect to the termination of their contracts and with reimbursements reveal the weak capacity of the executing agency.

9.3 Recommendations

9.3.1 It is recommended that the Bank:

- (1) Pay special attention to the up-to-dating of prices. Indeed, contractors' price commitment periods are often exceeded for various reasons; when this happens, the issue should be reviewed with the Borrower and the contractors and a solution found before the signing of contracts;
- (2) Have a discussion, with the countries, about factoring in exchange rate fluctuations, as with inflation, at project appraisal in order to avoid or limit the impact of these fluctuations, which generally lead to re-sizing (as is the case of this project) or cancellation of project components.
- (3) Conduct an effective and sufficient number of supervisions and associate them with the concept of alerts, early warnings, notice to comply or at least the timely taking of corrective measures or sanctions in consultation with the executing agency; and
- (4) Demonstrate rigor and firmness towards the Borrower and contractors in order to

terminate contracts under which there is no progress in works and significant delays have been noted.

It is recommended that the Borrower:

- (1) Claim, as soon as possible, the final guarantee deposit of BTM and OK as compensation for damage endured by the administration because of their failure to execute their contract, in accordance with Article 5 of the decree on defaulting contractors, cases of default and sanctions.
- (2) Make all necessary arrangements to reimburse to the Bank, as soon as possible, amounts improperly collected by OK and BTM.
- (3) With respect to the award of contracts, verify the technical as well as financial implementation capacity of SMEs; promote local enterprises gradually by adapting the nature, the level and work packages to the real capacities of the enterprises.
- (4) Take into account the work load of contractors to help them avoid constraints related to execution of public contracts (prefinancing, extended payment terms, etc.) which could even lead to bankruptcy; this measure could help rehabilitate the business environment and lead to better distribution of contracts among operators.
- (5) For some types of works, require in the call for bids that contractors provide a price breakdown, as a supplementary tool for analysis of bids and of possible updating of prices; this measure will also help train local enterprises with respect to the study of their prices....

Annexes

1. Actual Cost and Financing of Project by Expenditure Category and/or Component
2. Results of Economic Analysis
3. Form IP1 Implementation Performance
4. Form BP1 Bank Performance
5. PO1 Form Development Impact
6. Matrix of Recommendations and Follow-up Measures
7. Borrower's PCR
8. Sources of Information
9. Summary of Principal Modifications
10. Borrower's Comments

Actual Cost and Project Financing by Expenditure Category and/or Component*Costs by source of project financing (in UA million)*

Source of finance	Appraisal		Completion		Completion	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
ADF	22	88.89%	13.262	76.78%	8.738	39.72%
Government	2.75	11.11%	4.01	23.22%	-1.26	-45.82%
Total	24.75	100%	17.272	100		

Expenditure costs by category from loan resources (in UA million)

<i>Expenditure costs by category from loan resources (in UA million)</i>			
Expenditure Category	Appraisal	Completion	Difference
Construction works*	10.954	5.652	5.302
Periodic maintenance works	8.836	8.777	0.8
Control and coordination	0.989	1.457	-0.468
Search for road construction materials	0.200	0.170	0.03
Support to the Road Databank (RDB)	0.450	0.414	0.036
Programme Auditing	0.80	0.75	0.05
Total	22.229	17.272	4.957

* Taking into account reimbursements to the BTM and OK firms

Results of Economic Analysis Second Road Program
Assessment of the economic situation (in CFAF million)

Year	Economic costs			Economic benefits				Result
	Investments	Maintenance costs	Total	Value added	Value added	Value added	Total	
				Cereals	Cotton	Cattle		
2004								
2008	19.589		19.589				0	-19.589
2009		225.40	225.40	89.48	9.04	98.49	197.01	-28.39
2010		225.40	225.40	94.41	9.31	100.95	204.67	-20.73
2011		225.04	225.04	99.60	9.59	103.48	212.66	-12.38
2012		227.29	227.29	52.54	9.87	106.06	168.47	-58.82
2013		227.29	227.29	55.43	10.17	108.71	174.31	-52.98
2014		227.29	227.29	58.43	10.48	111.43	180.34	-46.95
2015		229.56	229.56	61.69	10.79	114.22	186.70	-42.86
2016		229.57	229.57	65.09	11.11	117.08	193.27	-36.30
2017		229.57	229.57	68.66	11.45	120.00	200.11	-29.45
2018		137.74	137.74	72.44	11.79	123.00	207.23	69.49
2019		82.64	82.64	76.43	12.14	126.08	214.64	132.00
2020		139.12	139.12	38.21	12.51	184.61	235.33	96.22
2021		139.12	139.12	85.06	12.88	132.46	230.40	91.28
2022		139.12	139.12	89.74	13.27	135.77	238.78	99.66
2023		83.47	83.47	94.68	13.67	139.16	247.51	164.04
								1597
							IRR	8.25%

Sensitivity Analysis

Situation	IRR
Baseline	8.25%
-10% benefits	7.65%
+10% increase in project costs	9.35%

The surplus production calculated from statistical data and from assumptions about the lifetime of the roads (15 years) is as follows:

<i>Surplus production (in thousands of tonnes)</i>	<i>Year</i>			
	<i>2005</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2019</i>
<i>Cereals</i>	<i>6 613</i>	<i>8 193</i>	<i>10 708</i>	<i>13 995</i>
<i>Cotton</i>	<i>233</i>	<i>262</i>	<i>304</i>	<i>352</i>
<i>Livestock (number of head)</i>	<i>9114</i>	<i>10 060</i>	<i>11 382</i>	<i>12 878</i>

The additional income generated by the project comes from the marketing of surplus production in the proportions presented above. The unit prices applied are producer prices provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. They are as follows: cereals CFAF 75/kg, cotton CFAF 175/kg and cattle CFAF 102,500 per head. These incomes were related to the length completed, i.e. 644 km instead of the 1425 km initially planned at appraisal.

IPI FORM
IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION CRITERIA	RATING (1 to 4)	REMARKS
1. Adherence to General Schedule	1	A time overrun of almost 4 years in construction, maintenance works, and the rehabilitation component was not executed. Completion, scheduled for 2004, was only attained in June 2008.
2. Adherence to Cost Schedule	1	The final cost of the project at completion recorded a positive balance of UA 8.738 million and a UA 1.26 million, or 45 per cent, increase in the participation of Burkina Faso in relation to estimates at appraisal although the rehabilitation component was not implemented.
3. Compliance with Conditions/Covenants	3	The government fulfilled all the general and special conditions required for the ADF loan.
4. Adequacy of Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting	1	No monitoring-evaluation studies were conducted on the impact of the project. Also, reports were occasionally forwarded to the Bank; the control mission did not prepare a final report and the country did not prepare a completion report.
5. Satisfactory Operations		
TOTAL	6	
<u>Overall Assessment of Implementation Performance</u>	1.25	Category: unsatisfactory

BP1 FORM
PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK

EVALUATION CRITERIA	RATING (1 to 4)	REMARKS
1. At Identification	2	The project was part of the transport sector master plan. It had been identified at a donor round table meeting in 2000.
2. At Project Preparation	0	The Bank did not conduct any preparation mission.
3. At Appraisal	1	The appraisal report had indeed addressed all project viability and risk aspects, as required at the time. However, this was done 4 years after identification. In addition, the appraisal was based on incomplete studies that were supposed to be updated. The Bank had taken as reference prices outdated unit prices agreed under the TSP.
4. At Supervision	1	The Bank's monitoring of the implementation of the loan was average. The composition of supervision missions was adequate but the number of field supervision missions (6 of the 9 times required) was insufficient, hence the delays and implementation difficulties. As well, the Bank was supposed to update the studies before the start of the project.
TOTAL	4	
Overall Assessment of Bank Performance	1.25	Category: Unsatisfactory.

PO1 FORM
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT

EVALUATION CRITERIA	RATING (1 to 4)	REMARKS
1. Relevance and Achievement of Objectives	2	<u>Only part of the project's objectives were achieved</u>
i. Macroeconomic Policy	3	The project is part of a policy to open up the interior.
ii. Sector Policy	3	The project is part of the TSP.
iii. Physical	-	N/A
iv. Financial	1	Positive balance on ADF resources although the rehabilitation component was not implemented and the improvement of some roads abandoned.
v. Poverty Reduction, Social and Gender Issues	1	Social objectives were not achieved.
vi. Environment	3	Environmental objectives were attained. In fact, considering the nature of works, especially the extraction of a small quantity of materials from existing quarries, the project had no significant impact on the environment. Thus borrow pits and quarries were restored in a satisfactory manner
vii. Private Sector Development	2	Within the framework of its SMEs promotion policy, the government convinced the Bank to entrust works to the national private sector. Two (2) SMEs failed while two (2) others properly executed the works entrusted to them.
viii. Other (specify)	-	
2. Institutional Development	1.75	<u>The institutional performance of the project was not attained</u>
i. Institutional Framework (including restructuring)	1	The executing agency's fulfillment of its role is average since it has not always implemented its tasks with diligence.
ii. Financial and Management Information Systems including audit systems	1	Project accounts were partially audited.
iii. Transfer of Technology	2	The project was partially implemented, and by local SMEs.
iv. Staffing (including turnover), training and counterpart staff	3	The DGR has qualified staff to monitor and supervise project implementation.
3. Sustainability	1.75	<u>The sustainability of the project depends on the quality of road maintenance.</u>
i. Continued Borrower Commitment	1	The Borrower assumed full responsibility for the changes and improvements. However, it failed to demonstrate firmness in terminating the contracts of defaulting companies. It set up a RMF endowed with substantial resources.
ii. Environmental Policy	-	SO
iii. Institutional Framework	2	The RMF has enough resources and functions properly despite delays in the provision of resources.
iv. Technical Viability and Staffing	2	The operator has enough staff.
v. Financial Viability and Cost Recovery mechanisms	1	The RMF operates properly and the road maintenance budget that increased significantly since it was set up in 2007. The budget has increased from CFA 9 to 13 billion but the release of funds is a serious problem.
vi. Economic Viability	1	The economic viability of the project was partially illustrated since all the components were not executed.
vii. Environmental Sustainability	1	The living environment of the riparian population has remained the same thanks to the associated project measures.
viii. Operation and Maintenance facilitation (availability of recurrent funding, foreign exchange, spare parts, workshops, etc).	2	The RF will assume responsibility for road maintenance.
4. Internal Rate of Return	1.75	The project rate of return stands at 8.25 %.
<u>Overall Assessment of Development Impact</u>	1.75	The overall performance of the project is unsatisfactory.

Matrix of Recommendations and Follow-up Measures

MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS	LESSONS / RECOMMENDATIONS	FOLLOW-UP MEASURES	RESPONSIBLE BODY
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Project Formulation and Justification</u> No identification and preparation missions was conducted under the project. But the appraisal was based on techno-economic studies (PDs but no DDs) of the project road. 	<p>The appraisal was based on the PDs of the project which were incomplete at the time of appraisal and outdated at the time of works implementation.</p>	<p>The launching of works should have been subject to the updating of detailed designs since calls for bids were launched on the basis of preliminary designs (PDs).</p>	<p>Borrower / Executing Agency</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Project Implementation</u> The government and the Bank agreed to assign the works to local SMEs. 	<p>It would have been better if the executing agency had conducted a prior assessment of its technical and financial capacities and an appropriate assignment of works.</p>	<p>Implementation of a study on SMEs and their capacities</p>	<p>Borrower/Executing Agency</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Performance Evaluation and Project Outcomes</u> The project did not achieve its objectives. It was implemented in an unsatisfactory manner considering the failure to implement the rehabilitation component, delays that caused inconveniences on the network, since all the roads were not made available to the administration at the same time in order to programme their maintenance and unpaid bills. 	<p>It would have been highly desirable to programme as soon as possible maintenance of roads handed over to the administration, and settle pending payments.</p>	<p>The Borrower should make all necessary arrangements to mobilize the necessary resources within the RMF framework to finance road maintenance and pay the bills of the contracting companies as soon as possible.</p>	<p>Borrower/DGR/Executing Agency</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Sustainability</u> The technical characteristics of roads under the road maintenance component of the project make it possible, considering traffic estimates, to ensure good resistance on condition that they are well maintained. 	<p>The role of SMEs should be strengthened to ensure the quality of road maintenance.</p>	<p>Carry out current and periodic road maintenance properly as well as control axle overload and respect road signage.</p>	<p>Borrower/Executing Agency</p>

Borrower's Completion Report

Sources of Information

Sources

Project Appraisal Report prepared by the Bank, July 2001

Some project supervision reports prepared by the Bank:

- March 2007
- June 2007
- December 2007
- April 2008

Summary of the Principal Modifications:

Road Stretch	Length (km)	Initial Scale	Modifications during Implementation
Lot 1 (350 km) awarded COGEB company			
Koudougou Didyr	50	Reconstruction of the roadway in some areas; construction of a 15-cm surface course along the entire road stretch; improvement of the sanitation and drainage system by building an additional box drain and road ditches.	Change in alignment between PK 49 and 50 to improve the bend located in this area.
Koudougou River Mouhoun	51	Reconstruction of the roadway in some areas; construction of a 15-cm surface course along the entire road stretch; improvement of the sanitation and drainage system by building 18 additional box drains and road ditches.	Increase the size of all box drains from 6 to 9m as well as increase the roadway in the works area.
Koudougou Sabou	29	Reconstruction of the roadway in some areas; construction of a 15-cm surface course along the entire road stretch; improvement of the sanitation and drainage system by building road ditches.	None
Banfora Mangodara	100	Reconstruction of the roadway in some areas; construction of a 15-cm surface course along the entire road stretch; improvement of the sanitation and drainage system by building 124 additional box drains and road ditches.	Change in type of lane, from building a modern PK1 earth road to PK 52 (width of roadway: 9m); waterproofing of the whole road; increase the size of all box drains in the stretch from 6 to 9m.
Banfora Sindou	50	Reconstruction of the roadway in some areas; construction of a 15-cm surface course along the entire road stretch; improvement of the sanitation and drainage system by building 22 additional box drains and road ditches.	Works not executed.
Lot 2 (454 km) awarded ECG International Ltd company			
Yako Malou	82	Reconstruction of the roadway in some areas; construction of a 15-cm surface course along the entire road stretch; improvement of the sanitation and drainage system by building 13 additional box drains and road ditches.	Addition of seven (7) more works, or 20 additional box drains.
Yako Kordié	49	Reconstruction of the roadway in some areas; construction of a 15-cm surface course along the entire road stretch; improvement of the sanitation and drainage system by building 2 additional box drains and road ditches.	None

Road Stretch	Length (km)	Initial Scale	Modifications during Implementation
Lot 1 (350 km) awarded COGEB company			
			None.
Dédougou River Mohoun	70	Reconstruction of the roadway in some areas; construction of a 15-cm surface course along the entire road stretch; improvement of the sanitation and drainage system by building 9 additional box drains and road ditches.	Cancellation of all works in order to strengthen the roadway and resurface the road.
Yako Saran	84	Reconstruction of the roadway in some areas; construction of a 15-cm surface course along the entire road stretch; improvement of the sanitation and drainage system by building and road ditches.	None
Didyr Tougan	50	Reconstruction of the roadway in some areas; construction of a 15-cm surface course along the entire road stretch; improvement of the sanitation and drainage system by building 8 additional box drains and road ditches.	Cancellation of all works in order to strengthen the roadway and dykes along some portions of the road stretch.

Borrower's Comments on the Bank's PCR