

# PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT (PCR)

## A. PROJECT DATA AND KEY DATES

### I. BASIC INFORMATION

|   |   |  |   |
|---|---|--|---|
| <b>Project Number:</b><br>P-CM-KF0-001  | <b>Project Name:</b><br>National Governance Programme Support Project (NGPSP) | <b>Country:</b> Cameroon                 |   |
| <b>Lending Instrument(s):</b> GRANT   |   | <b>Sector:</b> Governance                | <b>Environmental Classification:</b><br>III |
| <b>Original Commitment:</b> UA 3.18 million   | <b>Amount Cancelled:</b> UA 93 503.33 (to be cancelled)                       | <b>Amount Disbursed:</b> UA 3 086 496.67 | <b>% Disbursed:</b> 97.06%                  |
| <b>Borrower:</b> Government of the Republic of Cameroon   |   |  |   |
| <b>Executing Agency(ies)</b> [List of the main Ministries, Project Implementation Units, Agencies and civil society organizations responsible for implementing project activities]:<br>Project Implementation Unit (PIU) within the National Coordinating Committee of the NGP  |   |  |   |
| <b>Co-financiers and other External Partners</b> [List all other sources and amounts of financing, technical assistance or other sources used in the project]: The NGPSP was jointly financed by TAF (UA 3.18 million, or 95% of the total cost) and the Cameroonian Government (UA 0.17 million or 5% of the total cost) |   |  |   |

### II. KEY DATES

|  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| <b>Project Concept Note Cleared by Ops. Com.:</b><br>NA  | <b>Appraisal Report Cleared by Ops. Com.:</b><br>NA | <b>Board Approval:</b><br>28 October 2001 |
| <b>Restructuring(s):</b> The project closing date has been extended three (3) times: (i) on 30 June 2008 (+19 months), (ii) on 31 July 2009 (+12 months) and (iii) on 31 December 2009 (+5 months). The list of goods and services was revised in May 2008 and May 2009. |   |   |

|                        | Original Date | Actual Date | Difference in Months [Actual-Original] |
|------------------------|---------------|-------------|--|
| <b>EFFECTIVENESS</b>   | Mar-02        | 28-Oct-02   | 7 months                               |
| <b>MID-TERM REVIEW</b> | Not conducted |             |  |
| <b>CLÔTURE</b>         | 31-Dec-06     | 31-Dec-09   | 36 months                              |

### III. RATINGS SUMMARY

| CRITERIA             | SUB-CRITERIA                        | RATING   |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------|
| PROJECT OUTCOME      | Achievement of Outputs              | 2        |
|                      | Achievement of Outcomes             | 2        |
|                      | Timeliness                          | 2        |
|                      | <b>OVERALL PROJECT OUTCOME</b>      | <b>2</b> |
| BANK PERFORMANCE     | Design and Readiness                | 2        |
|                      | Supervision                         | 2        |
|                      | <b>OVERAL BANK PERFORMANCE</b>      | <b>2</b> |
| BORROWER PERFORMANCE | Design and Readiness                | 2        |
|                      | Implementation                      | 2        |
|                      | <b>OVERALL BORROWER PERFORMANCE</b> | <b>2</b> |

### IV. RESPONSIBLE BANK STAFF

| POSITIONS         | AT APPROVAL      | AT COMPLETION      |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Regional Director | M.L.B.S.CHAKROUN | J. GHARBI          |
| Sector Director   | NA               | G.NEGATU           |
| Task Manager      | M.G.E.GNIKPINGO  | B. ALPERTE         |
| PCR Team Leader   |                  | B. ALPERTE         |
| PCR Team Members  |                  | S.WAKANA/D.TANKOUA |

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## B. PROJECT CONTEXT

**Summarize the rationale for Bank assistance. State:**

- what development challenge the project addresses,
- the Borrower's overall strategy for addressing it,
- Bank activities in country (ies) and sector over the past year and performance, and
- on-going Bank and other externally financed activities that complement, overlap with or relate to this project.

**Please cite relevant sources. Comment on the strength and coherence of the rationale.**

**[300 words maximum. Any additional narrative about the project's origins and history, if needed, must be placed in Annex 6: Project Narrative]**

During the period 1997-2000, the Government of Cameroon implemented a medium-term economic and financial programme, with the support of donors, which produced encouraging results and an average annual real GDP growth rate of 4.5%. As from 2000, the Government embarked on a new three-year public finance consolidation programme, with emphasis on improved governance. It is within this context that Cameroon prepared an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and was able to reach the HIPC initiative decision point in October 2000. Cognisant of the fact that despite some progress at the macroeconomic level, the country still needed to improve the efficiency of public resource management and eliminate the major obstacles to development, stemming mainly from the malfunctioning of the State and the judicial system, the Government prepared a National Governance Programme (NGP), with the support of UNDP.

The main goal of the National Governance Programme was to help transform the State into an effective instrument of administration and regulation adapted to the requirements of a modern democratic society capable of identifying and implementing action programmes that meet the expectations of the population and ensure sustainable economic and social development. The NGP had six main thrusts: i) reform of the justice system, ii) economic and financial improvement; iii) administrative reform; iv) decentralisation and improved provision of essential services; v) combating corruption; and vi) participation of citizens, the private sector and civil society in public affairs management. The USD 4 million National Governance Programme Support Project (NGPSP) represents the Bank's contribution to the financing of the NGP, estimated at an overall cost of USD 57 million, together with other donors including the World Bank (USD 16.82 million), European Union (USD 10.50 million), UNDP (USD 6 million), France (USD 1.35 million), Canada (USD 1.30 million) and German Cooperation, through GTZ (USD 0.9 million).

The Bank also supported macroeconomic stabilisation efforts in Cameroon by financing two structural adjustment programmes, SAP II (1997-2000) and III (2001-2004). It was based on the lessons of SAP II that the Bank identified the need for more specific support, in the form of the NGPSP. The Bank's current portfolio comprises a Governance Reform Support Programme (GRSP), which is hinged on two financial instruments: (i) reform support (UA 25 million) and (ii) institutional support (UA 4 million). The GRSP, which is intended to complement actions undertaken under the NGPSP, has encountered significant delays caused by an inefficient steering structure and delays in mobilising counterpart funds (mainly for running the special procurement commission). Corrective measures to address these shortcomings are on-going.

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## C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

### 1. State the Project Development Objective(s) (as set out in the appraisal report)

The goal of the NGPSP was to contribute to the sustainable development of Cameroon and to poverty reduction so as to improve the well-being of the population, mainly by: (i) reducing the proportion of the population living below the poverty line from 50% in 1999 to 42% in 2003 and (ii) achieving an annual GDP growth rate of at least 5% during the period 2001-2002 and 6% as of 2003. At the sector level, the project sought to establish: (i) efficient and transparent State management and (ii) a modern justice system, accessible to all and which guarantees the rule of law and the security of investments. The specific objectives of the NGPSP were to: (i) modernise and increase the productivity of the judiciary in order to improve the business environment and facilitate access to the judicial services, (ii) build capacity for effective management and control of economic programmes, with a view to improving the execution of the public investment budget and raising the absorptive capacity for external financing, (iii) strengthen State control in order to make it more transparent and efficient, and (iv) promote a more modern, effective, accountable and customer-friendly Administration.

### 2. Describe the major project components and indicate how each will contribute to achieving the Project Development Objective(s)

**Component 1:** «Support to the Justice System» - This component was aimed at the modernisation and increased productivity of the judiciary in order to improve the legal framework of the business environment and facilitate access to judicial services. The modernisation of the country's main courts was to contribute to creating conducive conditions for more effective corruption control and fostering genuine rule of law. **Component 2:** "Support to Improved Economic and Financial Management" – This component focused on building capacity for effective management and control of economic programmes, with a view to improving the execution of the public investment budget and raising the absorptive capacity for external financing, as well as strengthening State control in order to make it more transparent and efficient. **Component 3:** "Support to Administrative Reform" – This component was geared towards promoting a more modern, effective, accountable and customer-friendly Administration.

### 3. Provide a brief assessment (up to two sentences) of the project objectives along the following 3 dimensions. Insert a working score, using the scoring scale provided in Appendix 1

| PROJECT OBJECTIVES DIMENSIONS |  | ASSESSMENT   | WORKING SCORE |
|-------------------------------|--|--|---------------|
| <b>RELEVANT</b>               | a) Relevant to the country's development priorities. | The objectives of the NGPSP are entirely consistent with the strategic objectives of the National Governance Programme (NGP), approved in June 2000, and more specifically those relating to efficient and transparent management by the State, as well as equal access to the justice system based on an effective judiciary. The overall objective of the project is in keeping with the National Poverty Reduction Strategy to which the NGP contributes. Furthermore, these objectives buttress the reforms already initiated under the 2000-2003 macro-economic programme, supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other Technical and Financial Partners (TFP) of Cameroon, especially in the key area of public finance management and the justice system, which are critical for the sustainable improvement of governance in Cameroon. | 3             |

|                   |   |  |   |
|-------------------|---|--|---|
| <b>ACHIEVABLE</b> | b) Objectives could in principle be achieved with the project inputs and in the expected timeframe. | The project targets a large number of entities as beneficiaries (judicial, economic management, administrative governance, State control and NGP coordination) in order to meet the scale of needs identified in Cameroonian public administration. Given the difficulties in mobilising the financial and technical capacity required, this approach has somewhat contributed to reducing the project's visibility and impact in the various institutions. The initially estimated project duration (36 months) was optimistic in view of the complexity of the reforms targeted, the sluggishness of the national administration generally observed as well the contingency resources and dispersed capacity that were difficult to assemble and mobilise. The implementation duration was doubled with three extensions lasting a total of 36 months. | 2 |
| <b>CONSISTENT</b> | c) Consistent with the Bank's country or regional strategy.   | The project is consistent with the Bank's intervention strategy in Cameroon, as set forth in the Country Strategy Paper (CSP 1999-2001).   | 3 |
|                   | d) Consistent with the Bank's corporate priorities.   | The objectives targeted are in keeping with Bank policy on promoting good governance and are in line with the Bank Group's public sector intervention strategy.  | 3 |

**4. Summarize the logical framework. If a logical framework does not exist, complete the table below, indicating the overall project development objective, the major components of the project, the major activities of each component and their expected outputs, outcomes, and indicators for measuring the achievement of outcomes. Add additional rows for components, activities, outputs or outcomes if needed.**

| COMPONENTS   | ACTIVITIES  | OUTPUTS  | EXPECTED OUTCOMES  | INDICATORS TO BE MEASURED                               |
|--|---|--|--|---|
| <b>Component 1: Support to the Justice System</b>                |   |  |  |   |
| <i>1.1. Application of the OHADA Treaty and the Uniform Acts</i> | <u>Activity 1:</u><br>Harmonisation of the OHADA Uniform Acts | <u>Output 1:</u> Repealing scope of OHADA acts defined                                     | <u>Outcome 1:</u><br>harmonizing Cameroonian Law with OHADA Treaty and the Cameroon Constitution (for language issues) | Compendium of OHADA laws available                      |
|  | <u>Activity 2:</u><br>Translation of all Uniform Acts         | <u>Output 2:</u> New translation is an instrument of sub-regional and regional cooperation |  | New translation endorsed by OHADA Permanent Secretariat |

|   |  |  |   |  |
|---|--|--|---|--|
|   | <u>Activity 3:</u><br>Training of judicial and para-judicial staff   | <u>Output 3:</u> (i) Thirty-six trainers (justice system professionals) trained in OHADA law and other community laws at ERSUMA (Benin); (ii) Five OHADA seminars organised locally for judges and registrars; and (iii) 3 seminars organised locally for para-judicial staff; iv) OHADA law ownership and sensitization seminar organised | <u>Outcome 2 :</u><br>Improved quality of court decisions handed down           | Number of justice system professionals trained in OHADA Uniform Acts and level of participation by women<br>Local OHADA seminars organised and level of participation by women<br>Reduction in arbitrary arrests<br>Strengthening of civil liberties<br>Trained staff maintained at post |
|   | <u>Activity 4:</u><br>Supply of OHADA documentation  | <u>Output 4:</u> (i) OHADA Uniform Acts published in Official Gazette; (ii) OHADA data stock built up in all courts specialised in business law and for para-legal professions   |   | Data stock built up<br>OHADA laws published in Official Gazette  |
| <i>1.2. Capacity building of courts</i> | <u>Activity 5:</u><br>Procurement of computer hardware, office furniture and equipment for Douala and Yaounde courts and training of users | <u>Output 5:</u> (i) 93 workstations with standard office automation software provided to courts, i.e. 54 in Douala and 39 in Yaounde; (ii) New Yaounde and Douala court premises equipped and occupied; (iii) 165 staff trained in computer use   | <u>Outcome 3:</u><br>Modernisation and increased productivity of justice system | Time taken to produce certain legal documents<br>Regular production of statistical statements<br>Existence of standardised forms   |
|   | <u>Activity 6:</u><br>Establishing and equipping of reception, orientation and information centres for users at Douala and Yaounde courts  | <u>Output 6:</u> Reception, orientation and information centres at Douala and Yaounde courts established and equipped  | <u>Outcome 4:</u><br>Improved access of population to judicial services         | Nature of reception and services to users  |

|   |   |   |  |  |
|---|---|---|--|--|
|   | <u>Activity 7:</u><br>Capacity building of Cameroon Association of Women Lawyers (ACAFEJ)                   | <u>Output 7:</u> Two computers and one photocopier provided to the association and brochures for disseminating the law produced and published   |  | Strengthening of ACAFEJ intervention capacity                                      |
| <b>Component 2: Support to Improved Economic and Financial Management</b> |   |   |  |  |
| 2.1. Support to MINEPAT   | <u>Activity 8:</u><br>Organisation of seminars for officials of the DPD, DPP, DCET and Technical Ministries | <u>Output 8:</u> Training seminar in (i) strategic planning, (ii) programming, (iii) monitoring-evaluation, (iv) performance assessment   | <u>Outcome 5:</u><br>Improved knowledge of the project cycle (preparation, planning and monitoring implementation of public investment projects) | Training seminars organised  |
|   | <u>Activity 9:</u><br>Assistance in strategic planning provided for DPD                                     | <u>Output 9:</u> Coherent framework and realistic overall and sectoral strategies developed   |  | Rate of absorption of external financing increased from 45% in 2002 to 55% in 2003 |
|   |   |   |  | DPD functions in MINEPAT and MIEF harmonised                                       |
|   |   |   |  | Long-term national prospective study conducted                                     |
|   | <u>Activity 10:</u><br>Computer networking of MINEPAT central directorates and 10 provincial delegations    | <u>Output 10:</u> (i) MINEPAT central directorates networked, (ii) 10 provincial delegations equipped with 30 workstations with modems and linked to the central administration   | <u>Outcome 6:</u><br>Enhanced capacity to collect process and transmit economic data.  | Growth rate of investments   |
|   |   |   |  | Improved investor confidence   |
| 2.2. Support to Supreme State Audit Office (CSE)                          | <u>Activity 11:</u><br>Training of CSE officials  | <u>Output 11:</u> (i) 70 auditors trained, (ii) short courses organised in (a) computer training, (b) environmental audit, (c) performance assessment, (d) project evaluation, (e) specific techniques related to computerization of MINEFI financial administrations, (f) retraining in general accounting, (g) accounting specifically relating to banks and insurance companies; | <u>Outcome 7:</u><br>Improved efficiency and results of public finance audit   | Number of auditors trained   |
|   |   |   |  | Number and type of seminars organised  |
|   |   |   |  | OHADA law sensitization seminar organised  |

|  |   |  |  |                                |
|--|---|--|--|--------------------------------|
|  |   | h) OHADA law ownership and sensitization seminar organised                                     |  |                                |
|  | <u>Activity 12:</u> Computerization and networking of 5 CSE divisions | <u>Output 12:</u> 35 Workstations networked and 5 laptops procured for external audit missions |  | CSE computerized               |
|  |   |  |  | report production Time reduced |

**Component 3: Support to Administrative Reform**

|  |  |   |  |   |
|--|--|---|--|---|
| 3.1. Support to SPRA                             | <u>Activity 13:</u> Technical assistance in training and retraining of managers and staff of the Administrative Reforms Permanent Secretariat (SPRA) | <u>Output 13:</u> (i) Coherent SPRA training programme designed (ii), 9 experts trained abroad, (iii) 30 senior officers and advisors retrained and upgraded in administrative organisation, (v) new advisors receive initial training in administrative organisation | <u>Outcome 8:</u> Improved technical skills and adaptation of knowledge to the context of competitiveness and the need to master current reform management methods | Training programme available  |
|  |  |   |  | Job description for senior officers of the 3 key ministries                 |
|  |  |   |  | Number of experts trained abroad  |
|  |  |   |  | Number and type of seminars organised                                       |
|  |  |   |  | Number of senior officers and advisors trained                              |
|  |  |   |  | Number of new advisors trained  |
|  |  |   |  | Computer equipment installed  |
|  |  |   |  | Network installed and operational   |
|  | Number of computer users trained   |   |  |   |
|  | <u>Activity 14:</u> Computerization, networking and training of users  | <u>Output 14:</u> (i) 12 workstations stations and office software and accessories, (ii) a local network and (iii) 27 users trained in computer use and network administration  |  |   |
| <u>Activity 15:</u> Establishment of an IEC Plan | <u>Output 15:</u> User's Manual produced and study conducted on the degree of satisfaction of users of government services                           | <u>Outcome 9:</u> Strengthening of an accountable and customer-friendly Administration  | Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct produced  | Service standards and system of measuring customer satisfaction established |

**5. For each dimension of the logical framework, provide a brief assessment (up to two sentences) of the extent to which the logical framework contributed to achieving the following objectives. Insert a working score, using the scoring scale provided in Appendix 1. If no logical framework exists, score this section as 1 (one).**

| LOGICAL FRAMEWORK DIMENSIONS |  | ASSESSMENT   | WORKING SCORE |
|------------------------------|--|--|---------------|
| <b>LOGICAL</b>               | a) Presents a logical causal chain for achieving the project development objectives. | The logical framework narrative and the objectives and expected outcomes were consistent with the provisions applicable at the time of project preparation. However, the appraisal report did not systematically highlight the causality between the two. Hence the need to complete the logical framework and indicate the causal chain between the activities and outputs.   | 2             |
| <b>MEASURABLE</b>            | b) Expresses objectives and outcomes in a way that is measurable and quantifiable.   | The indicators for assessing the achievement of objectives and expected outcomes were in most cases difficult to determine and the measurable indicators were rarely indicated or difficult to quantify.   | 2             |
| <b>THOROUGH</b>              | c) States the risks and key assumptions  | Some risks identified at project appraisal actually affected project implementation, namely: (i) the limited capacity of some government agencies to implement the actions planned; (ii) the frequent restructuring of ministerial portfolios, which hampered the networking of the key departments responsible for public investment planning, programming and monitoring; (iii) the measure for mitigation of the risk associated with the high turnover of senior civil servants (salary increase), particularly for those who received training under the project, is still inadequate and unrealistic given the lack of financial flexibility in salaries and applicable regulations. | 2             |

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## D. OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES

### I. ACHIEVEMENT OF OUTPUTS

In the table below, assess the achievement of **actual vs. expected outputs** for each major activity, using the logical framework in Section C. Score the extent to which the expected outputs were achieved. Weight the scores by the activities' approximate share of project costs. Weighted scores are auto-calculated by the computer. The overall output score will be auto-calculated as the sum of the weighted scores. Override the auto-calculated score, if desired, and provide justification.

| MAJOR ACTIVITIES   |  | Working Score | Share of Project Costs in Percentage (as stated in Appraisal Report) | Weighted Score (auto-calculated) |
|--|--|---------------|--|----------------------------------|
| Expected Outputs   | Actual Outputs   |               |  |                                  |
| 1. Repealing scope of OHADA acts defined   | The harmonization of Cameroonian Law with OHADA Uniform Acts has been carried out (February 2009), underscoring the texts superceded by the OHADA Uniform Acts (100% implemented)  | 3             | 2%   | 0.06                             |
| 2. New translation is an instrument of sub-regional and regional cooperation   | The translation will be completed at the close of the project, after significant delays caused by the three successive contract award attempts. The OHADA Permanent Secretariat was involved in this activity. However, use of the translation will depend on its ownership by all stakeholders (50% implemented). | 2             | 2%   | 0.04                             |
| 3. (i) Thirty-six trainers (legal professionals) trained in OHADA laws and other community laws at ERSUMA (Benin); (ii) Five OHADA seminars are organised locally for judges and registrars; and (iii) 3 seminars are organised locally for para-legals; | All the training and seminars planned were organised in order to disseminate OHADA law and boost ownership by the relevant professionals of this new community law (100% implemented).   | 3             | 10%  | 0.3                              |

|   |   |          |            |             |
|---|---|----------|------------|-------------|
| <p>4. OHADA Uniform Acts published in Official Gazette and OHADA data stock built up in all courts specialised in business law and within para-legal professions</p>  | <p>The delay in translating the instrument had a knock-on effect on the other stages, particularly publication of the Official Gazette. However, 257 publications were made available to the Justice Ministry in June 2009 towards the building up of the data stock for courts specialised in business law and within para-legal professions (50% implemented).</p>  | <p>2</p> | <p>1%</p>  | <p>0.02</p> |
| <p>5. 93 workstations with standard office automation software provided to courts, of which 54 in Douala and 39 in Yaounde, (ii) new Yaounde and Douala court premises equipped and occupied; and (iii) 165 staff trained in computer use</p> | <p>The computer equipment has been delivered. Training has been dispensed to 45 staff of the Justice Ministry (including 17 women) and this has allowed them to familiarize themselves in the use of computer tools and to be initiated in at least 5 areas (organised by modules) namely: i) computer literacy, ii) the operating system, iii) Microsoft Word, iv) Microsoft Excel and v) Internet. While the introductory courses did not attract a lot of participants, the time allotted to the other modules was considered too short to allow optimum assimilation (70% implemented).</p> | <p>2</p> | <p>42%</p> | <p>0.84</p> |
| <p>6. Reception, orientation and information centres at Douala and Yaounde courts established and equipped</p>  | <p>The reception centres were built with funds provided the CAA by the Ministry of Justice. It was also envisaged that these centres would be computerized and staffed with qualified personnel capable of providing users with information upon arrival to avoid their direct contact with magistrates and clerks. The equipping of the centres has still not been implemented while the computerization of the legal system is at its pilot stage (50% implemented).</p>  | <p>2</p> | <p>5%</p>  | <p>0,1</p>  |
| <p>7. Two computers and one photocopier provided to the Cameroon Association of Women Lawyers (ACAFEJ) and brochures produced and published to disseminate the law</p>  | <p>The equipment planned was installed and the brochures delivered in May 2009 (100% implemented).</p>  | <p>3</p> | <p>1%</p>  | <p>0.03</p> |

|   |  |   |    |      |
|---|--|---|----|------|
| 8. Training seminar in (i) strategic planning, (ii) programming, (iii) monitoring-evaluation, (iv) performance assessment   | The training in strategic planning and project monitoring-evaluation was provided by the Pan-African Institute for Development-Central Africa (IPD-AC) for DPP, DCT and DCIT officials of MINEPAT (100% implemented).  | 3 | 3% | 0.09 |
| 9. Coherent framework and realistic overall and sectoral strategies developed   | The coherent framework and overall and sectoral strategies were developed through the technical assistance provided (100% implemented).  | 3 | 7% | 0.21 |
| 10. (i) MINEPAT central directorates networked, (ii) 10 provincial delegations equipped with 30 workstations fitted with modems and linked to the central administration  | MINEPAT was equipped with 30 workstations, but only 17 were assigned to the regional and departmental delegations, while the others were used to strengthen the central administration. The networking and inter-connection of the three departments, namely, DPD, DCTI and DAE of the Ministry of Economy could not be carried out due to the frequent restructuring of the ministries (50% implemented).   | 2 | 3% | 0.06 |
| 11. (i) 70 auditors trained, (ii) short courses organised in (a) computer training, (b) environmental audit, (c) performance assessment, (d) project evaluation, (e) specific techniques related to computerization of MINEFI financial administrations, (f) retraining in general accounting, (g) accounting relating to banks and insurance companies; h) OHADA law ownership and sensitization seminar organised | The names of the training modules initially planned in the project appraisal report were amended to take account of changing needs. These adjustments led to the implementation of the following modules: i) computer training (40 support staff), ii) training seminar for auditors in environmental audit and sustainable development (25 auditors), and iii) seminar on accounts and financial statement audit in the OHADA accounting system (60 auditors). In addition, a seminar on sensitization and ownership of the documentation and studies prepared as part of the NGPSP was organised (100% implemented). | 3 | 6% | 0.18 |

|   |   |   |    |      |
|---|---|---|----|------|
| 12. (i) 35 workstations networked, (ii) 5 laptops procured for external audit missions  | The computer equipment planned was provided. However, there were some problems including the absence of basic software and operating licences that rendered their use impossible until the Government financed additional equipment from its own funds (60% implemented).   | 2 | 8% | 0.16 |
| 13. (i) Coherent SPRA training programme designed, (ii) 30 senior officers and advisors retrained and upgraded in administrative organisation, (iii) 27 users trained in computer use and network administration, (iv) new advisors receive initial training in administrative organisation | The SPRA training programme was prepared with the technical assistance provided by the project and all the training was conducted locally. It involved the following activities: (i) increased SPRA staffing by attracting professionals already at post within the Administration and interested in the career of administrative organisation advisor, (ii) training in change management implementation of reforms, (iii) capacity building of SPRA staff in reform management techniques. 30 applicants were trained and recruited (one-third women), (iv) 45 permanent secretaries of ministries were trained on the status of the strategy for the roll-out of the State human resource decentralization reform and SIGIPES (including 10 women), (v) a seminar on the deployment of skills of operational staff in the implementation of reforms (100% implementation). | 3 | 3% | 0.09 |
| 14. (i) 12 workstations and office software and accessories and (ii) one local network  | The equipment was provided with the same problems as in the case of the CSE. Unlike the CSE, the interconnection was not carried out due as the department was unable to provide funds to complete the operation (50% implemented).   | 2 | 4% | 0.08 |

|   |   |   |    |      |
|---|---|---|----|------|
| 15. (i) User's Manual produced; (ii) Study conducted on the degree of satisfaction of users of public service clients | Production of the User's Manual had to be cancelled during the last revision of goods and services, due to the time required for carrying out this activity, which experienced significant delays and postponements stemming from inadequate mobilisation of resources. The study on the degree of user satisfaction was conducted (50% implemented). | 2 | 3% | 0.06 |
| <b>OVERALL OUTCOME SCORE</b><br>[Score is calculated as an average of the working scores]                             |   |   |    | 2    |



Check here to override the auto-calculated score

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <b>Provide justification for over-riding the auto-calculated score</b> |   |
|  |   |
| Insert the new score or re-enter the auto-calculated score             | 2 |

## II. ACHIEVEMENT OF OUTCOMES

|  |   |                      |
|--|---|----------------------|
| <b>1. Using available monitoring data, assess the achievement of expected outcomes. Import the expected outcomes from the logical framework in Section C. Score the extent to which the expected outcomes were achieved. The overall outcome score will be auto-calculated as an average of the working scores. Override the auto-calculated score, if desired, and provide justification.</b> |   |                      |
| <b>OUTCOMES</b>  |   | <b>Working Score</b> |
| <b>Expected</b>  | <b>Actual</b>   |                      |
| 1. Streamlining of Cameroonian Law with OHADA Treaty   | Cameroonian Law has been harmonised with the French version of the OHADA Uniform Acts. The significant delay in the availability of the translated English version has held up the impact sought by the project (its easy use by all stakeholders of the region and its adoption as a sub-regional cooperation instrument). | 2                    |

|   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| 2. Improved quality of court decisions handed down  | The training sessions on OHADA law sensitization contributed to strengthening ownership of this new community law by judicial professionals (judges, registrars and para-legals). Their impact will however remain limited if the training is not extended to all socio-economic actors, particularly public enterprises, lands departments, etc. The delay in the translation of the Uniform Act has had an effect on the implementation of the other stages of the ownership process envisaged, particularly its publication in the Official Gazette. Moreover, for no obvious reason, the Ministry of Justice has taken several months to make available to the courts specialising in business law and the para-legal professions the publications given to it since June 2009 to build up the data stock.   | 2 |
| 3. Modernisation and increased productivity of justice system   | The rate of producing reports improved thanks to the computer equipment provided under the project. Presently, the Trade Register and the Real Estate Financing Credit is produced automatically and is no longer subject to criticism. However, for the other legal instruments, it is difficult to determine the timeframes, because they depend on several factors that the project failed to take into consideration.  | 2 |
| 4. Improved access of population to judicial services   | The objective of improving the reception of the population through the establishment and equipping of the reception centres was not achieved. The centres were built, but could not function due to lack of equipment and the human resources required. Nonetheless, ACAFEJ clearly contributes to the dissemination of law and the defence of persons in distress, mainly through the dissemination of brochures countrywide.   | 2 |
| 5. Better knowledge of the public investment project cycle (formulation, planning and monitoring-implementation of public investment projects). | Not enough time has lapsed to measure the impact of the training in mastery of the project cycle recently received by the officials of MINEPAT DPP, DCT and DCIT. However, consolidation of knowledge transfer by the technical assistant recruited for the project was affected by the departure (shortly after training) of the expert's counterpart, who had been appointed by the Government. With regard to this retirement, the authorities could have anticipated this change or selected another person.   | 2 |
| 6. Enhanced capacity to collect, process and transmit economic data   | The three relevant MINEPAT departments - DPD, DCTI and DAE – are equipped with computers, but the limited number of equipment provided did not make it possible to cover all the regional and departmental delegations. Furthermore, the interconnection of the three departments was hampered by the effects of the government restructuring in 2004, when the department in charge of economic cooperation was transferred to the Ministry of Finance. In September 2007, the department was again brought under the Ministry of Economy and a new computerization master plan of the Ministry defined. The difficulties encountered in the implementation of this activity reflect an organisation beset with poor inter-ministerial collaboration, which translates into limited exchange of information, and sometimes even creating conflicts between departments. | 2 |

|   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| 7. Improved efficiency and performance in public finance audit  | Although the project did not identify a specific indicator for measuring the level of improved efficiency of the Supreme State Audit Office (CSE) staff, it emerged from the evaluation mission that the training courses dispensed meet a real need and affects a critical mass of inspectors, who say they are satisfied. Furthermore, despite the limited number of computers provided, they still contributed to improving significantly the rate of production of reports. The five laptops available to the auditors to render them mobile are still very insufficient in view of the considerable needs and the accelerated pace of recruitment in the last two years, which was not anticipated. | 2 |
| 8: Improved technical skills and adaptation of knowledge to the context of competitiveness and the need to master current reform management methods | The capacity of SPRA was particularly strengthened due, in part, to the increased staffing (30 people trained and recruited) and also to the upgrade of knowledge and mastery of modern reform management methods acquired from the training organised. However, the expected improvement in technical skills through the distribution of the computer tools and improved exchange of information through networking, have not yet produced the desired effects owing to the flaws relating to the computer equipment delivered and the lack of interconnection between the various departments.   | 2 |
| 9. Strengthening of an accountable and customer-friendly Administration   | The activities planned to strengthen the accountability of the Administration, mainly through focusing on customer satisfaction were not fully implemented. The study on the degree of customer satisfaction was conducted, but the preparation of the User's Manual could not be completed under the project (delays in the award of the contract for production of the manual,, mainly due to debate over the procurement arrangements selected in the appraisal report, SPRA's desire to review the design of the model, lack of funds, etc.). SPRA is however continuing this activity with ACBF funding.  | 2 |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <b>OVERALL OUTCOME SCORE</b><br><b>[Score is calculated as an average of the working scores]</b> | 2 |
|--|---|

Check here to override the auto-calculated score

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <b>Provide justification for over-riding the auto-calculated score</b> |   |
| <b>Insert the new score or re-enter the auto-calculated score</b>      | 2 |

**2. Additional Outcomes: Comment on the project's additional outcomes not captured in the logical framework, including cross-cutting issues (e.g., gender).**

The activities carried out under this project will have an impact on other sectors. Even though it is difficult presently to assess the impact, the improved business legal environment and public resource management also contribute to creating the conditions for restoring the climate of confidence needed for private sector development. In addition, although some activities could not be implemented, such as equipping the public information and sensitization centres of the Ministry of Justice, the activities conducted to improve public information and communication of public policies boost the population's participation in establishing the rule of law. Women's development was also enhanced through the training activities with nearly 50% of the participants being female senior civil servants and government workers. Finally, by specifically targeting the capacity building of the Cameroonian Association of Women Lawyers (ACAFEJ), the project contributed to the dissemination of the law among the population and, particularly, the female audience favoured by the association.

**3. Risks to the sustained achievement of outcomes. State the factors that affect, or could affect the long run or sustained achievement of programme outcomes. Indicate if any new action or institutional change is recommended to help sustain outcomes. The analysis should draw upon the sensitivity analysis in Annex 3, where appropriate**

The risks that could affect the achievements of the NGPSP are mainly the absence of the budget necessary for the maintenance and repair of the information systems and equipment procured under the project and the persistent high turnover of senior public officers. This risk was identified during the preparation of the appraisal report, but the mitigating measure stated (motivation of senior civil servants with salary increases) is unrealistic. Furthermore, the duration of the computer literacy training sessions was considered too short; continuous training in this area is necessary, more so as this is a sector with fast-evolving techniques. In terms of performance, it is noted that some of the products delivered are not yet operational (networking of MINEPAT and SPRA).

## PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT (PCR)

### E. PROJECT DESIGN AND READINESS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

**1. State the extent to which the Bank and the Borrower ensured the project was commensurate with the Borrower's capacity to implement by designing the project appropriately and by putting in place the necessary implementation arrangements. Consider all major design aspects, such as extent to which project design took into account lessons learnt from previous PCRs in the sector or the country (please cite key PCRs); whether the project was informed by robust analytical work (please cite key documents); how well Bank and Borrower assessed the capacity of the implementing agencies and/or Project Implementation Unit; scope of consultations and partnerships; economic rationale of project; and provisions made for technical assistance.**

**[250 words maximum. Any additional narrative about implementation should be included in Annex 6: Project Narrative]**

The design of the NGPSP draws from the various works implemented at the initiative of the Cameroonian Government at the end of the 1990's, mainly: (i) the IMF-supported medium-term economic and financial programme, 1997-2000; (ii) the three-year public finance restructuring programme, 2000-2003; (iii) the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP), which enabled it to reach the decision point of the HIPC Initiative in October 2000, and (iv) the National Governance Programme (NGP) adopted in 2000. Furthermore, selection of the components and activities took into consideration the lessons learnt from the SAP II implemented by the Bank up to 2000, particularly with respect to the need for specific support for improved governance: the NGPSP is thus the first initiative in this sector. In order to ensure the relevance of the activities selected under the project, the Bank worked in consultation with TFPs operating in the area of governance and fielded: (i) a dialogue mission on Cameroon's 1999-2001 CSP; (ii) two identification missions in September and November 2000, (iii) a preparation mission in February-March 2001, and (iv) an appraisal mission in June 2001. These missions, undertaken in a participatory manner between the Bank, the authorities and the other TFPs led to the holding of a joint seminar for the validation of the components and activities selected. The project institutional coordination and implementation framework comprised: (i) project supervision, provided by the NGP Coordinator, (ii) a project management unit (PIU) and (iii) the focal point structures involved in the project and responsible for coordinating the activities relating to their respective components. By assigning the project coordination to NGP, which comes under the Prime Minister, the Bank optimised the chances of ensuring proper coordination of donor interventions and enhanced effectiveness of its intervention. The implementation of activities was however strongly affected by the institutional dysfunctions observed within the project, stemming mainly from the oversight authority's involvement in the day-to-day running of the project, as well as the management and monitoring-evaluation weaknesses of the team put in place at the start of the project.

**2. For each dimension of project design and readiness for implementation, provide a brief assessment (up to two sentences). Insert a working score, using the scoring scale provided in Appendix 1.**

| <b>PROJECT DESIGN AND READINESS FOR IMPLEMENTATION DIMENSIONS</b> |   | <b>ASSESSMENT</b>   | <b>WORKING SCORE</b> |
|---|---|---|----------------------|
| <b>REALISM</b>  | a) Project complexity is matched with country capacity and political commitment.  | The Bank earmarked significant resources for financing of training activities and the provision of technical assistance within the beneficiary structures in order to build their capacity to implement reforms. However, the risk arising from the weak project management capacity of the supervising entity and the PIU, which seriously affected the smooth running of activities was not sufficiently anticipated. Moreover, some important activities planned had not been carried out, notably: (i) the production of a User's Manual for the Civil Service, (ii) IEC campaigns, (iii) the networking of the central departments of the Ministry of Economy, Planning and Land Development (MINEPAT) and (iv) equipping of the user reception, orientation and information centres of the Yaounde and Douala courts. | 2                    |
| <b>RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION</b>                             | b) Project design includes adequate risk analysis.  | The main risks were identified and relevant mitigating measures envisaged. By concentrating its efforts on strengthening the rule of law, the project contributed to mitigating the risks relating to issues of political stability raised during the appraisal mission. Furthermore, the activities geared towards the modernisation of the Administration through the computerization of the beneficiary structures and staff training contributed to building the capacity of public administration. However, the risk mitigating measure addressing the high turnover of senior civil servants was limited, because it basically involved motivating these officials through salary increases.  | 3                    |
| <b>USE OF COUNTRY SYSTEMS</b>                                     | c) Project procurement, financial management, monitoring and/or other systems are based on those already in use by government and/or other partners | The national laws and regulations governing procurement were reviewed and considered acceptable by the Bank. However, implementation of provisions relating to the procurement of goods and services encountered considerable difficulties, notably: (i) the involvement of the Autonomous Sinking Fund in the disbursement process and, especially, the special accounts which bogged down the procedure, (ii) the national procurement committees, which, owing to their weak capacity, considerably slowed down the pace of procurement and disbursements, (iii) putting in place a reliable accounting and financial system took a lot of time, rendering the justification of advances from the special account difficult and, as a result, the replenishment of the revolving fund.                                   | 2                    |

| For the following dimensions, provide separate working scores for Bank performance and Borrower performance: |   |   | WORKING SCORE |          |
|--|---|---|---------------|----------|
|  |   |   | Bank          | Borrower |
| <b>CLARITY</b>   | d) Responsibilities for project implementation were clearly defined.  | Institutional arrangements for project implementation were put in place and responsibilities defined. Thus, the PIU is responsible for the routine running of the project as well as the preparation of quarterly status reports. It has administrative and financial autonomy. The PIU Coordinator facilitates, coordinates, oversees project implementation and chairs monitoring meetings (involving focal points) with the PIU providing secretariat services. However, misinterpretation of the provisions governing the project's oversight bodies, particularly the institutional malfunctioning stemming from the supervising body's involvement of the authority in routine project management resulted in reducing the PIU's responsibility and leeway, which hampered the rate of implementation of activities and, especially, compliance with the Bank's Rules of Procedure. The appointment in September 2007 of a new PIU manager with full management powers helped to speed up the pace of implementation of project activities. | 2             | 2        |
| <b>PROCUREMENT READINESS</b>   | e) Necessary implementation documents (e.g. specifications, design, procurement documents) were ready at appraisal. | The documents required were available, with the exception of the accounting and financial procedures manual. However, the reliability of the financial and accounting system used in project implementation up to the end of the first half of 2007 raise questions. Indeed, serious flaws were highlighted by successive Bank supervision missions, including mainly: (i) irregular management of project resources (lack of supporting documents, partly unrecorded transactions), (ii) unaccounted for movement of funds on the special account (unsubstantiated advances), (iii) absence of a clearly identifiable counterpart account and no tracking of funds made available to the project (several counterpart accounts opened in the project's name and project counterpart funds mixed up with those of the NGP); (iv) ineligible expenditure, (v) irregular transfers on the special account (from the Government as counterpart contribution whereas the account can only receive Bank funds).  | 2             | 2        |

|                             |  |   |   |   |
|-----------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| <b>MONITORING READINESS</b> | f) Monitoring indicators and monitoring plan were adopted. | The monitoring indicators were not sufficiently prepared.   | 2 | 2 |
| <b>BASELINE DATA</b>        | h) Collection of baseline details complete or on-going.    | The baseline situation was not established (the project is old). The project did not make sufficient provision for the quantifiable indicators necessary to facilitate the monitoring and evaluation of the outputs and outcomes, as stipulated by current Bank guidelines. | 2 | 2 |

# PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT (PCR)

## F. IMPLEMENTATION

**1. State the major characteristics of project implementation with reference to: adherence to schedules, quality of construction or other work, performance of consultants, effectiveness of Bank supervision, and effectiveness of Borrower oversight. Assess how well the Bank and the Borrower ensured compliance with safeguards.**

**[300 words maximum. [Any additional narrative about implementation should be included in Annex 6: Project Narrative]**

The NGPSP started 18 months after the signing of the loan agreement, owing partly, to delays in the preparation and signature of the ratification decree, issuance of the legal opinion and setting up of the PIU and also, the Bank's difficulty in following up on documents shortly after its relocation to Tunis in 2003. Project implementation was delayed by 36 months (three extensions: 31 July 2008, 31 July 2009 and 31 December 2009). Weaknesses in project implementation stemmed mainly from two factors: (i) the PIU's insufficient knowledge of the Bank's Rules of Procedure for project management at the start of the NGPSP and (ii) the institutional dysfunctions resulting from the involvement of the oversight authority in routine project management. This situation led to irregularities: (i) absence of a PIU coordinator for 9 months and (ii) the use of a system that was inconsistent with financial and accounting management practices, characterized by the absence of supporting documents, unrecorded transactions, non-justified and irregular movement of funds on the special account, lack of clearly identifiable counterpart funds and lastly ineligible expenditure.

The September 2007 audit of the project accounts led the Bank to suspend replenishment of the special account in October 2007 (direct payments were however maintained) and to make the following recommendations: (i) keeping reliable accounts, (ii) clarification of all past transactions on the project accounts, and (iii) commissioning another audit covering the entire project duration by an independent and reputable auditor, acceptable to the Bank. Disbursements were resumed partially in September 2008 after implementation of the recommendations: (i) cleaning up of accounts since the start of the project, (ii) preparation of audit reports by a competent firm, (iii) putting in place an autonomous PIU with management powers, and (iv) authorisation by the CAA of the opening of a sub-account of the special account managed by the PIU Coordinator. The performance of the new team enabled speedy implementation of the project, which was modified to meet training needs, particularly in the area of OHADA law. The disbursement rate, which was 68.7% by end 2008, was 97.06% at project closing.

**2. Comment on the role of other partners (e.g. donors, NGOs, contractors, etc.). Assess the effectiveness of co-financing arrangements and of donor coordination, if applicable.**

The project was co-financed solely by the Government. The Bank's support falls within an agreed framework, recently formalized by a memorandum, between the different TFPs operating in the area of governance in Cameroon (World Bank, UNDP, European Union and bilateral cooperation – France and Canada). The coordination of donor interventions allowed complementarity in terms of the concentration and identification of activities, which fostered synergy between the interventions. On the whole, the NGPSP institutional arrangements were in keeping with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. However, the government's initiative to coordinate the governance sector through the NGP did not achieve the desired outcomes. Indeed, despite being attached to the Prime Minister's Office (to strengthen its position and avoid the problem of compartmentalization between ministerial departments) the NGP's visibility is still low, especially as its capacity and resources do not allow it to ensure effective coordination.

The reform activities of the NGPSP beneficiary structures were hampered by serious coordination difficulties between the various sectors concerned and, particularly, with the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The natural tendency of the ministries was to manage autonomously the funds allocated to them, thus making it even more important for the authorities to assert the political will to guarantee minimum coordination of operations, in order to improve the implementation framework of projects. Consequently, the activities carried out through the project were not listed in the public finance modernisation plan, which covers all TFP support in this area, and which has just been finalized by the Government. The Bank, through its Yaounde Office, had to raise the issue formally in order for the activities implemented by the project to be included in this plan.

**3. Harmonisation. State whether the Bank made explicit efforts to harmonise instruments, systems and/or approaches with other partners.**

Implementation of the project did not right from the start address the need for harmonisation with other donor operations. However, the Bank is currently the lead agency of the partnership framework with the Government of Cameroon and its Technical and Financial Partners for support to public finance reform, and actively participates in the multi-donor committee, which is intended to implement the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

**4. For each dimension of project implementation, assess the extent to which the following project objectives were achieved. Provide a brief assessment (up to two sentences) and insert a working score, using the scoring scale provided in Appendix 1.**

| PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DIMENSIONS |  | ASSESSMENT  |   | Working Score |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|---|---------------|
| TIMELINESS                        | a) Extent of project adherence to the original closing date. If the number on the right is: below 12, score 4 between 12.1 to 24, score 3 between 24.1 to 36, score 2 beyond 36.1, score 1 | Difference in months between original closing date and actual closing date or date of 98% disbursement rate | The timetable for achievement of outcomes was not adhered to. A total of three extensions of the project closing date led to slippage of 36 months on the initially estimated closing date (from 31 December 2006 to 31 July 2009). | 2             |
|                                   |  | 36 months   |   |               |

|                         |   |   |    |
|-------------------------|---|---|----|
| <b>BANK PERFORMANCE</b> | b) Bank complied with:  |   |    |
|                         | Environmental safeguards  | The project had no impact on the environment. There were no special environmental protection measures   | NA |
|                         | Fiduciary requirements  | The fiduciary requirements were generally complied with. It is worth noting however that the audit conducted in September 2007 revealed that the contract for the recruitment of the G7P consulting firm to conduct the project audits for 2003, 2004 and 2005 contained irregularities and it recommended the recruitment of another independent and reputable auditor, acceptable to the Bank.  | 2  |
|                         | Project covenants   | Agreements were generally complied with, but the times for processing of no-objection notice were considered too lengthy.   | 2  |
|                         | c) Bank provided quality supervision in the form of skills mix and practicality of solutions. | The skills mix within the supervision missions on the whole made it possible to cover all areas, especially in terms of disbursement issues. Task managers have benefited from the support of the Bank Regional Office in Yaounde (CMFO) since its opening two years ago,   | 2  |
|                         | d) Bank provided quality management oversight   | Since the start of the project coincided with the relocation of the Bank to Tunis, project supervision for the first two years was insufficient. From the third year, the Bank supervised and made the necessary recommendations to correct the irregularities and weaknesses observed, which helped improve project implementation. Furthermore, in view of the lapses noted, the Bank took the disbursement suspension measures required to sanitize the project operating framework, while avoiding penalizing the beneficiary structures which needed the Bank's support. | 2  |

|                             |                            |   |    |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---|----|
| <b>BORROWER PERFORMANCE</b> | e) Borrower complied with: |   |    |
|                             | Environmental safeguards   | The project's environmental impact is deemed marginal. There were no special environmental protection measures  | NA |
|                             | Fiduciary requirements     | There were breaches to compliance with the fiduciary arrangements and irregularities in project audits. Until September 2007, the project was characterized by: (i) lax management of project resources (lack of supporting documents, unrecorded transactions), (ii) non-justified movement of funds on the special account (unsubstantiated advances), (iii) absence of a clearly identifiable counterpart account and no tracking of the funds made available to the project (several counterpart accounts were opened in the project's name and project counterpart funds mixed up with those of the NGP), (iv) ineligible expenditure, and (v) irregular transfers from the special account. These lapses led to the suspension of the revolving fund for one year (October 2007 to September 2008). The new project team set up in September 2007 helped to improve the situation, enhance the quality of implementation and bring the disbursement rate up to 97%. | 2  |
|                             | Project Covenants          | The provisions of the grant agreement were not entirely complied with, particularly with respect to the timetable of activities whose duration doubled; the autonomy of the PIU's management was not always a reality. Furthermore, there were serious breaches of the Bank's rules of procedure on financial management, procurement and audit.  | 2  |

|  |   |  |   |
|--|---|--|---|
|  | f) Borrower was responsive to Bank supervision findings and recommendations | The Borrower was not as responsive as expected to the recommendations of the Bank supervision missions during the first four years. The Bank had to take stringent measures, including the suspension of disbursement of the revolving funds and the appointment of a new PIU team, before the corrective measures could be effective. The new team's responsiveness to the recommendations made it possible to achieve an implementation rate of 97%.                 | 2 |
|  | g) Borrower collected and used monitoring information for decision making.  | For more than four years, there was no clear decision-monitoring mechanism. The focal points did not meet and there were no regular status reports on the implementation of the project components. Moreover, the PIU was not producing the quarterly reports as required, for by the project monitoring-evaluation mechanism. The new PIU team set up in June 2007 organised a system of monitoring the Bank's recommendations and regularly produced status reports. | 2 |

## PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT (PCR)

### G. COMPLETION

#### 1. Was the PCR delivered on a timely basis, in compliance with Bank Policy??

| Date of achievement of 98% disbursement (or closing date, if applicable) | Date PCR was sent to pcr@afdb.org | Difference In Months | WORKING SCORE (auto-calculated) If difference is 6 months or less, a 4 is scored. If above 6 months, a 1 is scored. |
|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------|---|
| 31-Dec-09  |                                   |                      |   |

**Briefly describe the PCR Process. Describe the Borrower's and co-financers' involvement in producing the document. Highlight any major differences of opinion concerning the assessments made in this PCR. Describe the team composition and confirm whether a site visit was undertaken. Mention any major collaboration from other development partners. State the extent of field office involvement in producing the report. Indicate whether comments from Peer Reviewers were received on time (provide names and positions of Peer Reviewers**

**[150 words maximum]**

The PCR preparation mission was fielded to Yaounde from 7 to 27 November 2009. It was prepared and supervised by the Project Task Manager in coordination with the Bank Regional Office in Yaounde (CMFO). The programme for the meetings was drawn up in coordination with the PIU and the discussions were led by the consultant, who also worked on the draft report, and Denis Tankoua, Economist, CMFO. The mission was supported by Athanase Gahungu, Resident Representative, and Samba Bocary Tounkara, CPIO. It held several working meetings with the NGP Coordinator, the PIU, focal points and representatives of beneficiary structures, as well as with service providers and the consultant responsible for preparing the Government's PCR. The mission also held discussions with the major TFPs based in Cameroon. The mission's conclusions were shared with all the participants. Peer Reviewers provided their comments on time (Christian Sarr, Financial Expert, SNFO; Fabrice Sergent, Principal Health Analyst, OSHD; Issabre Koudeidiatou Sow, Financial Analyst, MLFO; and Achille Toto Same, Principal Public Finance Management Expert, OSGE).

## H. LESSONS LEARNT

**Summarize key lessons for the Bank and the Borrower suggested by the project's outcomes. [300 words maximum. Any additional narrative about implementation should be placed in Annex 6: Project Narrative]**

*In terms of design,* (i) the precise definition of project objectives, their measurability and the soundness of the logical framework are prerequisites to good project performance, (ii) the number of project components and beneficiary structures and institutions must match the resources made available, the capacity available, the level of commitment of the various stakeholders and the complexity of reforms, so that the objectives remain realistic, (iii) all provisions of the regulatory instruments governing project executing agencies must guarantee the administrative and financial management autonomy required for more effective coordination of project activities, (iv) compliance with the timetable of activities is critical to ensuring the mobilisation of stakeholders and project credibility, (v) strengthening the framework for consultation between TFPs in Cameroon, particularly in the area of governance, contributes to better coverage of needs through the complementarity of interventions, as well as more effective and structured dialogue.

*During implementation,* (i) the availability of a manual of administrative and financial procedures at project start-up is indispensable for the monitoring-evaluation of the project and its good performance, (ii) the poor ownership of ADF procurement procedures by project managers constitutes a major constraint to the implementation of programmes and the execution of institutional support provided, (iii) the technical opinion of experts in defining the terms of reference and the determination of lots in the procurement of goods and services for specialised areas is a prerequisite for effective execution of contracts, (vi) for the procurement of computer equipment, it is important to anticipate the changing needs of the various professions, particularly the audit professions.

*Recommendations : To the Government:* (iv) ensure better visibility of the coordination framework of the governance sector (NGP) through effective political commitment, which translates into the allocation of sufficient resources and adoption of means of effective monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects, (ii) participate actively in project formulation (definition of objectives and outcomes, development and setting up monitoring-evaluation mechanisms), (iii) strengthening horizontal collaboration between ministerial departments to allow better integration of cross-cutting reforms. For future operations, (iv) accord the necessary importance to the institutional aspects of projects by guaranteeing the administrative and financial autonomy of PIUs and clarifying the responsibilities of project coordination and monitoring agencies, (v) ensure sound management capacity of PIUs, (vi) allow the relaxation of internal procedures for project management (transfer of management powers to the PIUs while maintaining the control and supervision powers of the Autonomous Sinking Fund (CAA) in order to promote transparency and reliability of project accounting.

*To the Bank:* (i) remain selective in choosing areas of intervention to improve the impact of assistance, (ii) continue strengthening the capacity of stakeholders in the management and activity monitoring chain (namely, the PIU, the special procurement committee and focal points for components) to be conversant with the Bank's Rules of Procedure right from the start of activities, and (iii) for future operations in governance, the Bank's action must fall within an agreed framework with other TFPs to ensure the complementarity of activities and enhance their impact.

# PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT (PCR)

## I. PROJECT RATINGS SUMMARY

All scores are auto-generated by the computer from the relevant section in the PCR

| CRITERIA                | SUB-CRITERIA   | WORKING SCORE |
|-------------------------|--|---------------|
| <b>PROJECT OUTCOME</b>  | Achievement of outputs   | 2             |
|                         | Achievement of outcomes  | 2             |
|                         | Timeliness   | 2             |
|                         | <b>OVERALL PROJECT OUTCOME SCORE</b>   | <b>2</b>      |
| <b>BANK PERFORMANCE</b> | <b>Design and Readiness</b>  |               |
|                         | Project Objectives were relevant to country development priorities   | 3             |
|                         | Project Objectives could in principle be achieved with the project inputs and in the expected time frame   | 2             |
|                         | Project Objectives were consistent with the Bank's country or regional strategy  | 3             |
|                         | Project Objectives were consistent with the Bank's corporate priorities  | 3             |
|                         | The logical framework presents a logical causal chain for achieving the project development objectives.  | 1             |
|                         | The logical framework expresses objectives and outcomes in a way that is measurable and quantifiable   | 2             |
|                         | The logical framework states the risks and key assumptions   | 2             |
|                         | Project complexity was matched with country capacity and political commitment  | 2             |
|                         | Project design includes adequate risk analysis   | 3             |
|                         | Project procurement, financial management, monitoring and/or other systems were based on those already in use by the government and/or other partners. | 2             |
|                         | Responsibilities for project implementation were clearly defined   | 2             |
|                         | Necessary implementation documents (e.g. specifications, design, procurement documents) were ready at appraisal  | 2             |
|                         | Monitoring indicators and the monitoring plan were adopted   | 2             |
|                         | Collection of baseline data is complete or on-going  | 2             |
|                         | <b>PROJECT DESIGN AND READINESS SUB-SCORE</b>  | <b>2</b>      |
|                         | <b>Supervision:</b>  |               |
|                         | Bank complied with:  |               |
|                         | Environmental Safeguards   | NA            |
|                         | Fiduciary Requirements   | 2             |
|                         | Project Covenants  | 2             |
|                         | Bank provided quality supervision in the form of skills mix provided and practicality of solutions.  | 2             |
|                         | Bank provided quality project management oversight   | 2             |
|                         | PCR was delivered on a timely basis  | 0             |
|                         | <b>SUPERVISION SUB-SCORE</b>   | <b>2</b>      |
|                         | <b>OVERALL BANK PERFORMANCE SCORE</b>  | <b>2</b>      |

|                                 |  |          |
|---------------------------------|--|----------|
| <b>BORROWER<br/>PERFORMANCE</b> | <b>Design and Readiness</b>  |          |
|                                 | Responsibilities for project implementation are clearly defined  | 2        |
|                                 | Necessary implementation documents (e.g. specifications, design, procurement documents) are ready at appraisal   | 2        |
|                                 | Monitoring indicators and monitoring plan are agreed upon and baseline data are available or are being completed | 2        |
|                                 | <b>PROJECT DESIGN AND READINESS SCORE</b>  | <b>2</b> |
|                                 | <b>Implementation</b>  |          |
|                                 | Borrower complied with:  |          |
|                                 | Environmental Safeguards   | NA       |
|                                 | Fiduciary Requirements   | 2        |
|                                 | Project Covenants  | 2        |
|                                 | Borrower was responsive to Bank supervision findings and recommendations   | 2        |
|                                 | Borrower collected and used monitoring information for decision-making   | 2        |
|                                 | <b>IMPLEMENTATION SUB-SCORE</b>  | <b>2</b> |
|                                 | <b>OVERALL BORROWER PERFORMANCE SCORE</b>  | <b>2</b> |

J. PROCESSING

| STEP                        | SIGNATURE AND COMMENTS | DATE |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|------|
| Sector Manager Clearance    |                        |      |
| Regional Director Clearance |                        |      |
| Sector Director Approval    |                        |      |

# **ANNEXES**

## APPENDIX 1

### Scale for Working Scores and Ratings

| SCORE | EXPLANATION   |
|-------|---|
| 4     | <b>Very Good-</b> Fully achieved with no shortcomings                               |
| 3     | <b>Good-</b> Mostly achieved despite a few shortcomings                             |
| 2     | <b>Fair-</b> Partially achieved. Shortcomings and achievements are roughly balanced |
| 1     | <b>Poor-</b> Very limited achievement with extensive shortcomings                   |
| NA    | Not Applicable  |

**N.B.: The formulas round up or down for decimal points. Only whole numbers are computed.**

## ANNEX I: PROJECT COSTS

Table 1: Project Costs by Component

| Components  | Project Costs        |                      | Remarks  |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|--|
|   | Estimates            | Actual               |  |
| <b>Component 1: Support to the Justice System</b>                         | 1 596 500 000        | 924 115 506          | The difference between the estimated amounts and achievements is due to foreign exchange losses between the project appraisal date (UA 1 = CFAF 943.056) and completion (UA1= FCFA 704.056). The revision of the list of goods and services also led to the cancellation of some activities considered non-priority. |
| <b>Component 2: Support to Improved Economic and Financial Management</b> | 660 800 000          | 588 532 652          |  |
| <b>Component 3: Support to Administrative Reforms</b>                     | 499 500 000          | 276 743 752          |  |
| <b>Component 4: Project Management</b>                                    | 472 500 000          | 646 099 672          |  |
| <b>Total Project Cost</b>   | <b>3 229 300 000</b> | <b>2 435 491 582</b> |  |

Table 2: Resources by Source of Financing (in UA million)

| Category                    | Estimates   | Actual       | Remarks  |
|-----------------------------|-------------|--------------|--|
| <b>ADF (in UA)</b>          | 3 180 000   | 3 086 496.67 | The revision of the list of goods and services in May 2008 and May 2009 led to the cancellation of some activities considered non-priority. By the closing date of the project, ADF had disbursed UA 2.88 million, and a balance of UA 93 503.33 will be returned.   |
| <b>Government (in CFAF)</b> | 130 200 000 | 298 000 000  | The over-estimation of the Government's contribution was due in part to the doubling of the project implementation time, and in part to the Government covering the operating costs of the PIU (staff allowances, water and electricity bills, rent) for an amount of CFAF 60 million during the period of suspension of the revolving fund. |

| ANNEX II: BANK CONTRIBUTION                        |                          |   |   |
|--|--------------------------|---|---|
| Type of Mission                                    | Date                     | Composition of Teams  | Designation   |
| Identification                                     | From 31/08 to 06/09/2000 | Souley AMADOU, Principal Legal Counsel,                                       | Team Leader   |
|  |                          | LEGUOJEU, ADB Programme Officer in Cameroon                                   | Team Member   |
| Preparation  | February-Mar 2001        |   |   |
| Appraisal  | From 04 to 20 June 2001  | M.G.E. GNIKPINGO, Economist, OCDC.1   | Team Leader   |
|  |                          | Consultant, Institutional Economist, OCDC.1                                   | Team Member   |
|  |                          | Consultant, Legal Expert, CLEG.1.   | Team Member   |
| Supervision  | From 25/06 to 15/07/2004 | M.Christian Georges Diguimbaye, Principal Disbursement Officer                | Financial supervision of Bank Group Portfolio in Cameroon |
|  | From 09 to 28 July 2004  | M.A.Bernoussi, Chief Economist, Country Operations Department, Central Region | Team Leader   |
|  |                          | M.T.Najeh, Principal Economist  | Team Member   |
|  |                          | M.V.Planque, Trainee at Country Operations Department, Central Region         | Team Member   |
|  | From 28/02 to 11/03/2005 | M.A.Bernoussi, Chief Economist, Country Operations Department, Central Region | Team Leader   |
|  |                          | M. Diomandé, Consultant   | Team Member   |
|  | From 15 to 26 May 2006   | M.A.Bernoussi, Chief Economist, Country Operations Department, Central Region | Team Leader   |
|  |                          | M.T.A.Gogué, Consultant, Macro-Economist                                      | Team Member   |
|  |                          | D.Tankoua, Bank National Programme Coordinator, Cameroon                      | Team Member   |
|  | From 12 to 24/09/2007    | André NZAMPAYEKE  | Member of RBCSP review mission                            |
|  | From 26/04 to 12/05/2008 | André NZAMPAYEKE, Project Officer   | Team Leader   |
|  |                          | M.El Ghali, Consultant, Financial Analyst                                     | Team Member   |
|  | From 25/10 to 01/11/2008 | André NZAMPAYEKE, Project Officer   | Team Leader   |
|  |                          | D.Tankoua, Economist, ADB Regional Office, Yaounde                            | Team Member   |
|  | From 12 to 25/05/2009    | B.Alperte, Task Manager, OSGE.1   | Team Leader   |
| D.Tankoua, Economist, ADB Regional Office, Yaounde |                          | Team Member   |   |

|                   |                          |  |             |
|-------------------|--------------------------|--|-------------|
|                   | From 25/09 to 08/10/2009 | B.Alperte, Task Manager, OSGE.1                    | Team Leader |
|                   |                          | D.Tankoua, Economist, ADB Regional Office, Yaounde | Team Member |
| <b>Completion</b> | From 09 to 27/11/09      | S.Wakana, Consultant                               | Team Leader |
|                   |                          | D.Tankoua, Economist, ADB Regional Office, Yaounde | Team Member |

**3. Economic Analysis (ERR) and Financial Analysis, if applicable.** Recalculate the economic rate of return on the basis of costs and benefits at completion, and compare them with the estimates at appraisal. Break down by component if necessary. Analyse the sensitivity of the ERR to the key assumptions. Present a financial analysis of the project beneficiary entities.

**4. LATEST PROCUREMENT PLAN (Schedule of NGPSP activities outstanding as at 22 May 2009)**

| N°  | Activity   | Duration | Start                       | End                       | Remarks               |
|---|--|----------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Component 1: Support to Justice System</b>                             |  |          |                             |                           |                       |
| 1   | Translation of OHADA Uniform Acts  | 6 months | 1 <sup>st</sup> June 2009   | 30-Nov-09                 |                       |
| 2   | Data stock of the Ministry of Justice  | 45 days  | 07-May-09                   | 16-June-09                |                       |
| 3   | OHADA law sensitization seminar (in BAMENDA)   | 3 days   | 15-June-09                  | 17-June-09                |                       |
| 4   | Seminar for training and capacity building in OHADA law for judges/magistrates, registrars and para-legals | 3 days   | 22-June-09                  | 24-June-09                | Northern Region       |
|   |  | 3 days   | 29-June-09                  | 1 <sup>st</sup> July 2009 | Eastern Region        |
|   |  | 3 days   | 06-July-09                  | 08-July-09                | Southern Region       |
| <b>Component 2: Support to Improved Economic and Financial Management</b> |  |          |                             |                           |                       |
| 5   | OHADA accounting system ownership seminar for Supreme State Audit Office                                   | 6 days   | 13-July-09                  | 18-July-09                | 2 seminars in Yaounde |
| <b>Component 3: Support to Administrative Reform</b>                      |  |          |                             |                           |                       |
| 6   | User's Manual for SPRA/MINFOPRA  | 30 days  | 08-June-09                  |                           |                       |
| 7   | Skills development seminar for operational staff in implementation of reforms at SPRA                      | 10 days  | 1 <sup>st</sup> July 09     | 13-July-09                |                       |
| <b>Component 4: Support to Project Management</b>                         |  |          |                             |                           |                       |
| 8   | Procurement of computer, photocopying and reproduction equipment and accessories for the PIU               | 10 days  | 1 <sup>st</sup> June 2009   | 10-June-09                |                       |
| 9   | Project audit, 2008 and 2009   | 6 months | 1 <sup>st</sup> August 2009 | 31-Oct-09                 |                       |
| 10  | Completion Report  | 3 months | 1 <sup>st</sup> August 2009 | 31-Oct-09                 |                       |

## **5. LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS**

1. Agreement Protocols between Cameroon and African Development Fund, Governance Programme Support Project
2. Appraisal Report of the Governance Programme Support Project
3. Supervision reports of the National Governance Programme Support Project
4. Financial supervision mission reports of Bank Group financed projects from 25 June 2004 to 15 July 2004
5. Report of the Bank assistance evaluation mission from 10 to 26 November 2007.
6. Partnership framework between the Government of Cameroon and its Technical and Financial Partners (TFP) for support to public finance reforms
7. Status reports of the National Governance Programme Support Project (NGPSP)
8. Cameroon National Governance Programme (2006-2010)

## 6. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| ACAFEJ  | Association Camerounaise des Femmes Juristes (Cameroonian Association of Women Lawyers)                   |
| CAA     | Autonomous Sinking Fund   |
| PIU     | Project Implementation Unit   |
| CSE     | Supreme State Audit Office  |
| BD      | Bidding Document  |
| DCET    | Economic and Technical Cooperation Department   |
| DPD     | Planning and Development Division   |
| DPP     | Programmes and Projects Department  |
| PRSP    | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  |
| ERSUMA  | Ecole Régionale Supérieure de la Magistrature de Porto Novo (Regional School of Magistracy of Porto Novo) |
| IEC     | Information-Education-Communication   |
| MINEFI  | Ministry of Economy and Finance   |
| MINEPAT | Ministry of Economy, Planning and Land Development  |
| OHADA   | Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa  |
| NGPSP   | National Governance Programme Support Project   |
| NGP     | National Governance Programme   |
| UNDP    | United Nations Development Programme  |
| TFP     | Technical and Financial Partners  |
| HIPC    | Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative   |
| PCR     | Project Completion Report   |