

Governance, Democracy and Poverty Reduction: Lessons Drawn from the 1-2-3 Surveys in Francophone Africa

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Summary

Public statistics face quite a challenge when it comes to measuring new dimensions of development (institutional, governance, and social and political participation). To take up this challenge, modules on Governance, Democracy and Multiple Dimensions of Poverty were appended to household surveys by National Statistics Institutes in eight sub-Saharan African countries. This paper presents the issues addressed and the methodological lessons learnt along with a selection of findings to illustrate this innovative approach and demonstrate its analytic potential. We investigate, for instance, the population's support for democratic principles, the respect for civil and political rights and the trust in the political class; the "need for the State", particularly of the poorest; the extent of petty corruption; the reliability of expert surveys on governance; the level and vitality of social and political participation, etc. The conclusive appraisal made opens up prospects for the national statistical information systems in the developing countries. The measurement and tracking of this new set of objective and subjective public policy monitoring indicators would benefit from being made systematic.

Keywords

Democracy, monitoring mechanism, household surveys, governance, poverty, corruption, development policy, statistics.

Résumé

La mesure des nouvelles dimensions du développement (institutions, gouvernance, participation, sociale et politique) pose un redoutable défi à la statistique publique. Pour y répondre, des modules thématiques sur la Gouvernance, la Démocratie et les Multiples Dimensions de la Pauvreté ont été greffés sur des enquêtes auprès des ménages réalisées par les Instituts Nationaux de la Statistique de huit pays africains. On présente ici les enjeux et les enseignements méthodologiques de cette expérience, ainsi qu'une sélection de résultats illustratifs de cette approche novatrice. On s'interroge sur l'adhésion des citoyens aux principes démocratiques ; le respect des droits civils et politiques ; la confiance envers les institutions et la classe politique ; le « besoin d'Etat », notamment des pauvres ; l'ampleur de la petite corruption ; l'efficacité des institutions ; la fiabilité des enquêtes-experts sur la gouvernance ; le niveau et la dynamique de la participation sociale et politique, etc. Le bilan concluant qui en

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est tiré ouvre des perspectives pour les systèmes nationaux d'informations statistiques dans les PED. La mesure et le suivi de cette nouvelle batterie d'indicateurs objectifs et subjectifs au service de la conduite des politiques publiques mériteraient d'être systématisés.

Mots clés

Afrique, Démocratie, Dispositif de suivi, Enquêtes auprès des Ménages, Gouvernance, Pauvreté, Corruption, Politique de développement, Statistique.

1. Introduction

Following the relative failure of structural adjustment policies in the developing countries, there is a growing international consensus today about the importance of both the content of economic policies and the process by which they are implemented, particularly in light of new international poverty reduction strategies, namely, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiatives. New factors such as governance, ownership and participation are now becoming core elements of development programmes. At the same time, the development research agenda has been extended to take into account the interactions between four major dimensions: growth, distribution (of income and assets), the quality of institutions (especially public institutions) and the type of political system (or, more generally, society's value system). Current indicators and aggregates therefore endeavour to incorporate these aspects in order to measure and evaluate development strategies.

It was to address this major challenge that a regional institutions (AFRISTAT) and eight National Statistics Institutes (NSIs) in Africa decided to work in partnership with DIAL to explore the possibilities of using official household surveys as a tool for measuring and monitoring these new development concerns. The statistical operations were conducted in seven economic capitals in West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) and in Madagascar from 2001 to 2003. At the same time, similar studies were conducted in Latin America, in partnership with the Secretariat I of the Andean Community and the NSIs of four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). Three specific modules ('Multiple Dimension of Poverty', 'Governance' and 'Democracy') were appended to classic household surveys (the 1-2-3 Survey in Africa and the main household survey conducted by each NSI in the Latin American countries).

Although still tentative, these initiatives are already producing promising and plausible results including methodological lessons. For example, initial analyses of survey results are shedding new light on phenomena that had hitherto received little (if any) attention. This paper looks at current African experiences showing the usefulness of the household sur-

veys as statistical tools to generate data useful in the development and monitoring of indicators on governance and democracy in developing countries. Section 2 presents the general framework and the issues involved in measuring governance and democracy in the developing countries. Section 3 covers the basic methodology used in surveys and the main lessons learned while Section 4 presents some examples of empirical findings which illustrate the usefulness of such an approach in terms of analytical results and their policy implications. Section 5 presents the conclusions and explores future prospects.

2. Measuring Governance and Democracy: What Can the Household Surveys Contribute?

2.1 The issues at stake: governance and democracy at the heart of the development policies

In late 1999, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched a joint initiative to place poverty reduction at the heart of development policy. All low income countries wishing to receive financial assistance from one of these two organisations, or debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, were required to draw up poverty reduction programmes, known as PRSPs. The PRSP principles have introduced three major innovations. First, the fact that the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) consider poverty reduction rather than structural adjustment to be their main objective is a welcome innovation. Secondly, for the first time the multidimensionality of poverty, beyond its monetary income component, is fully acknowledged (World Bank, 2000). Thirdly, the adoption of the concept of a participatory process to define and monitor PSRPs could reinforce democracy in countries where the population generally has limited ways of making itself heard (Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2003).

With the launch of the PRSPs, the BWIs have made a definite break with past practice. Previously, although national experts helped define policies and such policies were negotiated, however, poor countries had very little influence or leeway. It would be an understatement to say that the information available to the public was limited: the majority of documents used during the negotiations were kept confidential.

Almost all the structural adjustment programmes have failed in the low-income countries, especially in Africa. This is partly due to social and political obstacles preventing the programmes from being fully implemented and partly because the projects were ineffective even when they were properly applied. Two underlying shortcomings in the BWI intervention method go a long way towards explaining these failures. Firstly, it was assumed that international experts were best qualified to draft suitable policies for the countries concerned, based on the notion of best practices. Secondly, those responsible for the programmes at

national level were supposed to be able and willing to implement them efficiently despite the fact that they were considered incompetent, that they were kept at arm's length when the strategies were drawn up. In addition, they did not necessarily fully believe in them.

Two conditions have been established as a result of the development of the notion of "governance", identified as one of the key conditions for the success of the said policies, and the wind of democratisation with its emphasis on the need to pay more attention to the "voiceless" nationally and internationally. Firstly, more attention should be paid to a country's specific economic, socio-political and institutional context. Secondly, there should be a heightened awareness of how important it is for policies to be actively backed by both governments and the population at large.

As regards strategy implementation, the principle of participation by all of society's stakeholders heralds new ways of conducting national affairs. With its emphasis on the right to information and freedom of speech, participation meets the goal of tackling the exclusion and marginalisation aspects of the poor. "Participation", however, can only really make a difference if it helps correct dysfunctions in the workings of democracy in poor countries. It should therefore strengthen the capacities and powers of intermediate bodies including the media, trade unions and associations in the drafting, monitoring, supervision, evaluation and revision of policies. Seen from this angle, information - especially its educational aspect - becomes critically important. It facilitates public choices and the management of affairs of State to be more open, whilst allowing the different stakeholders to put pressure on and even making the State accountable if it fails. In short, the challenge is to ensure that the principle of accountability takes root, making the State responsible to its citizens for its actions.

The concept of a participatory process, which presupposes the active involvement of all society's stakeholders in the drafting, monitoring and implementation of poverty reduction strategies, should first of all enhance the debate and help devise a more appropriate strategy that addresses real social concerns. This approach, known as "empowerment", is intended to give the general public, and the poor in particular, a chance to influence policies that affect their living conditions by improving the definition and consideration of their problems and expectations.

For all these reasons the notions of "good governance" and democracy are now posited as decisive factors for the success of economic policies and, more generally, for explaining national development levels. They are more than just instrumental, for example, democracy contributes to good governance, which itself promotes growth and curbs inequality. They are constituent elements of the population's well-being (UNDP, 2002). For example, respect for individual freedoms, namely political freedom, freedom of speech, etc., may be considered as an intrinsic element of development. By the same token, a good administration boosts the

general feeling of justice in the population by reducing discriminatory practices i corruption.

The latest World Development Report (World Bank, 2005), with its focus on equity and development, provides additional arguments for promoting these aspects. The contention is as follows: although there could be a clash between equity and efficiency in the short run, these two factors are complementary in the medium and long run. Development trajectories are largely conditioned by the institutions, which are themselves shaped by the distribution of power in the different societies. For example, history has shown that the economic institutions that tend to develop and take root in countries where power is in the hands of a small elite are not conducive to development. Conversely, greater political equality, wherein democracy is a catalyst, improves the quality of institutions by extending the range of social groups that can actively contribute to the political, social and economic spheres. This consequently improves the prospects for prosperity. By acknowledging, for the first time, that political processes and institutions are behind virtuous development circles, the report makes empowerment policies one of the two pillars along with reducing market imperfections for both poverty reduction strategies and strategies to promote equal opportunities nationally and internationally.

Lastly, a new demand for public policy monitoring and assessment indicators has been created by the consideration of governance and democracy issues in development policies, and especially in poverty reduction strategies, and the acknowledgement of the crucial role played by the political economy as a factor for successful reforms. The implementation and quantification of these new policies' pertaining to accountability, ownership, participation, voicing and empowerment – pose a formidable challenge to the national statistical systems, which are poorly equipped to meet the challenge in many developing countries..

The legitimacy of this new statistical focus is welcome, in addition to the “institutional” demand generated by the development policies, the academic world and especially the field of economics is showing an interest in it. With the turnaround in players (microfoundations of macroeconomics), new prospects have opened up in growth economics in the last ten years. A considerable number of studies have endeavoured to overcome the limits of the traditional approach by introducing, in addition to the classic production factors (capital and labour) and technological change, new variables to explain long-run development paths (ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, religious diversity, the “quality” of the institutions, the origin of law, legal and political regimes, geographic location, cultural factors, etc.; for a review of the literature in this field, see Feng, 2003; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005a). This revival, that could be called a real growth econometrics “industry” (Srinivasan, 2001), is fuelled by a proliferation of new international databases. Table 1 gives an idea of some of the main sources in this field (see Sudders and Nahem, 2004, for a more comprehensive presentation).

Table 1: Examples of international databases on governance

Indicator/database	Institution
Governance	
- CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment)	World Bank
- Governance Matters I-IV (Voice and accountability, Political stability, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, Control of corruption)	Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi/World Bank
- ICRG (International Country Risk Guide)	Political Risk Services Group
- IEF (Index of Economic Freedom)	The Heritage Foundation
- IPC (Perception Corruption Index)	Transparency International
Democracy	
- Political rights, Civil liberties, Freedom Status	Gastil/Freedom House
- Polity I-IV (Polity's institutionalized-democracy index)	Gurr/University of Maryland (CIDCM)
- Bollen's Index (Bollen's liberal-democracy Index)	Bollen/University of North Carolina/ (ICPSR)
Other indicators	
- ELF (Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization)	Roeder/Dept. Political Science, University of California, San Diego
- World Values Survey (Trust, well-being, etc.)	Inglehart/WVS Association, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan

2.2 Household surveys: an appropriate approach?

The approach based on qualitative and participatory methods, referred to nowadays generically as *Participatory Assessments* (PAs) was first developed in the mid-1990s, particularly in the field of poverty with Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs). Its main objective is to take account of the views of society's different players, especially the poor. It is based on two underlying principles. Firstly, recognition of the fact that the poor are poverty "experts" and are in the best position to define the nature of the phenomenon, its origins and how to escape it. Secondly, recognition that poverty has many facets that may be hard to cover in traditional quantitative surveys and cannot be reduced to the usual lone monetary criterion. The general participatory approach entails more than just collecting data. It is designed to involve the different key players, especially representatives of the poor, in the process of monitoring the policies implemented.

PPAs have been introduced in many countries (around sixty), largely at the encouragement of the World Bank. They are based on sociological and anthropological surveys using various techniques such as open and semi-directive, individual and focus group interviews, visual methods (tables and diagrams) and observations (World Bank, 2002). The participatory assessments have been used for a vast consultation programme (Consultations with the Poor)

initiated by the World Bank to give the poor a hearing (Narayan et al., 2000; Narayan et al., 2000). The objective is to obtain their views on four specific areas:

- Perceptions of poverty (definition of the concept, causes and difficulties encountered);
- The main problems and priorities involved in drafting policies;
- Their experiences with the various institutions (local and outside the community);
- Gender inequality, both within the household and the community.

Main findings and limitations of the PPAs

The PPAs' main findings are twofold. Firstly, this approach has provided greater insight into poverty. In particular, it has shed light on its many aspects. In addition to the traditional aspects associated with income and consumption levels and access to education and health, the analyses reveal other aspects such as vulnerability and insecurity, exclusion and the inability of the poor to influence the socio-economic factors that determine their standard of living (powerlessness), and a lack of dignity and self-respect. Secondly, from the policy point of view, the basis for reform is broader and firmer. Participatory methods have triggered a dialogue, which promotes policy ownership by involving the various stakeholders.

However, this approach has its limitations. The first is that the data collected are over-descriptive and not very helpful for decision-making. Decision-makers more often than not require quantitative data to help with policy-making. Being subjective there is much different interpretation of results, which may create conflicts of interest. The question also has to be asked as to whether the views expressed in the surveys are representative of those of the poor population as a whole - the voiceless. Furthermore, the direct impact of participatory assessments may be limited, especially in the short term. Yet the methods generate huge expectations among those involved, who consider their (time-consuming) involvement to be an investment. Disappointment due to over-optimism can then quickly demotivate the respondents, bringing into question the continuity of the participatory process. Finally, those using participatory approaches are generally not very interested in follow-up work and assessing reforms once they have been implemented.

Subject-specific modules appended to the statistical surveys: an alternative approach


PPAs designed to give the "poor a voice" using qualitative and participatory methods have clearly improved the information available on poverty. But one particular question needs to be asked: how far can we go on this track? This approach leaves unsolved the problem of converting findings into information that can be used to implement specific policies at national level.

An alternative and/or complementary approach is proposed, which meets the need to gather representative opinions and could consequently solve the problem of having to make a trade-off between the many different points of view. This approach is to attach modules in the form of opinion polls onto classic periodic quantitative surveys - preferably relatively "light" surveys. These opinion polls may relate to topics that vary from year to year. The qualitative questions put by the participatory approaches are thus standardised within these modules. People (including the poor) are asked how they perceive poverty (definition and causes), what their problems and requirements are, what they think about the policies already implemented and how they would devise appropriate strategies to meet their expectations. Diagram 1 presents links between governance, democracy, economic policies and living conditions which can be established with qualitative modules.

In addition to this approach, subject-specific modules can be included to cover the households' cultural, social and political environment. Paradoxically, there is virtually no information available on these subjects in the developing countries, especially Africa, even though many analysts stress social, cultural and political factors as determining the way in which African societies operate.

This approach has the advantage of collecting both objective data on the situation of households and individuals through, for example, the socio-economic part of the survey covering income/consumption levels, housing conditions, etc. and subjective data from respondents' perceptions and evaluations on levels of satisfaction with their living conditions, their difficulties and needs, and their opinions regarding policies and how the institutions are run. Since the surveys are representative, the subjective results can be generalised to the target population. Opinions can also be analysed in terms of the characteristics of the individuals concerned. Lastly, the behaviour and opinions of the poor can be compared with the rest of the population when the survey is linked to a classic living conditions assessment for households, thus shedding light on the impact of poverty reduction strategies.

Diagram 1: Qualitative modules for understanding links between governance, democracy, economic policies and living conditions



Thus, at a time when public policies are starting to focus on the concept of empowerment, socio-political surveys are helping to give a voice to social groups traditionally on the fringes of the decision-making process and boosting their bargaining power. This contribution is proving to be all the more important in that, in the poorest countries where intermediate civil society institutions are in their infancy where they exist, such surveys, along with elections, are the only way in which the voiceless can make themselves heard by the authorities.

Participatory processes provide the conceptual framework and confer legitimacy on the part played by society at large in strengthening governance and democracy in developing countries. The present weakness of civil society organisations in the three areas of representativeness, legitimacy and capacity leads us to cast a critical eye on experiments currently being carried out in the field. If any progress is to be made, action is needed simultaneously on two fronts:

- Strengthening the “intermediate bodies” able to pass on people’s aspirations and act as a counterweight. We have to fill the yawning gap between the State, the political elite, the all-powerful big men and the little men acting alone. This is the stance taken

by numerous donors who support institutional structures such as associations of water users and rural producers, mutual savings and loan associations, trade unions and human rights leagues, and election-monitoring groups. By its very nature, this is a long-term process;

- Strengthening the accountability or democratic responsibility of governments whilst helping the general public to make their preferences and choices known (voicing and empowerment) through household survey results and opinion polls. It is this method, which is largely overlooked and yet much more feasible to put into effect, that we shall explore here.

These two complementary fronts interact positively with each other. The survey findings provide the civil society organisations (CSOs) with an excellent foundation to highlight their demands (advocacy) and increase their legitimacy and also serve as an instrument for informed dialogue with the official bodies. In return, the CSOs can encourage the ownership and sustainability of the surveys by expressing a strong social demand for them and taking part in their design, conducting and dissemination of results.

2.3 Economic policies, governance, democracy: the role of NSIs

Subject-specific modules incorporated into representative household surveys may be an original poverty analysis tool largely underutilised in many developing countries, but they have potential for wide range applications. The wave of democratisation worldwide, and especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, has made the widespread use of opinion polls possible and indeed necessary as a source of information and policy guidance, alongside the classic economic statistics. On the one hand, the setting up of democratic regimes has removed the political obstacles (censorship) that ruled out such polls, and on the other hand, the very fact that democracy exists implies that everyone can have access to information, and as much of it as possible. Hence it is only natural that modern communication technologies should be made available for use by the general public and its representatives, faced as they are with numerous problems in making collective choices.

Although the merits of the survey approach are not in doubt, there are questions pertaining to which institution should be responsible for them. In the developed countries, they are generally conducted by private opinion research institutes, but many of them are financed from public funds and conducted by governments or scientific research organisations. In France, for example, short-term household surveys are carried out by INSEE and CREDOC, and political surveys by CEVIPOF (1978, 1985, 1995, 1997, etc.). At European and international level, there are the long-term monitoring systems such as the Euro-barometers, opinion polls conducted in the European Union countries every year since 1970, the Political Action Surveys and the World Values Surveys. The latter have already published four successive editions (1981, 1990, 1995 and 1999-2001), extending the geographical coverage from 22

countries for the first wave to 43 for the second and 65 for the most recent wave (Inglehart, 1997, Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

As already mentioned, in the poorest developing countries, especially in Africa, organisations of this kind do not perform this task. In most countries, they are non-existent, and where they do exist, human and financial resources are often too limited for this kind of operation to be undertaken. There are therefore at least three reasons to support that the National Statistics Institutes are the best placed for conducting such surveys. Firstly, the NSI generally has the technical expertise in household surveys. Secondly, these surveys often serve a genuine public service mission and hence require public funds. Thirdly, the strong potential demand for these surveys is a powerful lever that could help reinstate the social function and visibility of the NSIs. Madagascar is a good example of the relevance of this choice. Of course, the involvement of NSIs does not impede private/research institutions from conducting such type of surveys. Multiple sources allow for triangulation of the results and give opportunities for cross checking and evaluating the reliability of data.

3. The Surveys: General Presentation and Methodological Lessons

This section presents the main characteristics of the survey system used with respect to sampling, subject coverage and initial methodological lessons learnt from such studies.

3.1 The surveys' characteristics

Based on the experience acquired by the MADIO project in Madagascar since 1995 – a project that has tested and improved the survey system by identifying the most relevant questions (Roubaud, 2003a) – three specific modules (Multiple Dimensions of Poverty, Governance and Democracy) were developed and appended to the 1-2-3 Survey on employment, the informal sector and poverty. The survey was conducted in seven WAEMU economic capitals (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) and in Madagascar from 2001 to 2004 (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005b). The studies were also conducted in four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) from 2002 to 2005. In Latin America, the modules were attached to the main household survey conducted by each NSI as part of the official statistics programme. The surveys covered a representative sample of over 35,000 adults accounting for 21,000 households in the eight African cities. Over 50,000 people were interviewed in the four Latin American countries, samples large enough to allow for valid inferences of results to be made at national and regional levels.

The studies were successful from both a methodological point of view, in that governance and democracy could be reliably measured, and from the analytical standpoint in that the findings could be used to inform public policy formulation. This prompted an ownership pro-

cess with two countries deciding to permanently incorporate this type of survey into their national statistical survey programme. INSTAT in Madagascar now carries out the survey annually while the INEI in Peru conducts the survey on an ongoing basis using own resources to assess the temporal dynamics (monthly, quarterly and annual) of the indicators studied. Other countries such as Benin and Mali are also considering conducting the surveys on a regular basis.

From an institutional point of view, this programme is part of the international Metagora project hosted by the OECD/PARIS21 and financed by the European Union and Swiss, Swedish and French bilateral co-operation agencies. The purpose of this project is to propose methods for measuring human rights, democracy and governance. At the Montreux Conference on Statistics, Development and Human Rights held by International Association of Official Statistics (IAOS) and the Swiss Federal Statistical Office in September 2000, a dialogue among 123 countries and 35 international organisations was initiated, for the first time, between the community of statisticians and human rights organisations. The organisers showed a great deal of interest in the work presented by MADIO at the above mentioned conference. The consultations continued in subsequent years during the set-up phase of the Metagora project, in particular through a series of seminars (Munich, January 2002; Merida, Mexico, April 2002; Brussels, November 2002; and Berlin, August 2003).² DIAL and its partners' are extending this work beyond the Madagascar by extending it to West Africa and Latin America. This work was therefore incorporated as one of the Metagora components when it was set up in February 2004.

Although repeating the survey annually means that the indicators can be monitored regularly over time, the main benefit from the surveys in the other African capitals was simultaneity of conducting identical surveys in a number of different countries, thus laying the foundation for generating comparable regional data. This is an important contribution as this is the first experiment of its kind in the area of household socio-economic surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 1-2-3 Survey, which forms the basis for this study, is a system of three nested surveys designed to track the trends in employment, the informal sector and poverty. The first phase is a survey of household employment, unemployment and working conditions (phase 1: Labour Force Survey). The second phase focuses on the heads of informal production units (IPUs). The third phase is a household consumption survey designed to estimate households' standards of living and analyse the determinants of poverty which is a survey on consumption, points of purchase and poverty. To this basic structure are added the subject-specific modules appended to one of the phases in line with the statistical unit stud-

2. Measuring Democracy and Good Governance, The European Commission, EUROSTAT, CDG Munich Centre, Munich, January 2002; Indicators and Diagnosis on Human Rights: The Case of Torture in Mexico, Comisión nacional de los derechos humanos, Merida, Mexico, April 2002; Statistics and Human Rights, The European Commission, EUROSTAT, Munich Centre, Brussels, November 2002; the International Statistics Institute International Conference, Berlin, August 2003.

ied (household, individual or IPU). Given that the statistical unit for the Multiple Dimensions of Poverty module of this project was the household, it was appended to phase 1 household sheet. The Governance and Democracy modules were interested in the opinions of individuals aged 18 years and above, and so were incorporated into phases 1 or 3 depending on the country (Table 2).

Table 2: Main characteristics of the modules in Africa

%	West Africa							Madagascar	Total
	Cotonou	Ouaga-dougou	Abidjan	Bamako	Niamey	Dakar	Lome	Antananarivo	
Phase 1 sampling plan:									
Total number of basic units	464	713	2,483	993	368	2,041	129	1,330	8,521
Number of basic units in sample	125	125	125	125	125	125	125	108	983
Initial number of households in sample	3,000	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	3,019	21,019
Final number of household in sample	3,001	2,458	2,494	2,409	2,500	2,479	2,500	3,019	20,860
Subjective Poverty module:									
Survey date	10/2001	10/2001	06/2002	10/2001	09/2002	02/2003	09/2001	12/2002	-
Unit of analysis	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld	Househld
Number of households	3,001	2,458	2,494	2,409	2,500	2,479	2,500	2,734	20,575
Questionnaire	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full
Number of questions	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
Governance and Democracy modules									
Survey date	10/2001	10/2002	06/2002	10/2001	09/2002	02/2003	10/2001	04/2003	-
Unit of analysis	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult	Adult
Survey phase	Phase 1	Phase 3	Phase 1	Phase 1	Phase 1	Phase 1	Phase 3	Phase 2'	-
Number of individuals	6,328	2,023	4,794	4,482	6,431	6,829	1,840	2,807	35,534
Questionnaire	Full	Partial	Partial	Partial	Full	Partial	Partial	Partial	-
Number of questions	124	119	117	117	124	113	114	120	-

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phase 1, Phase 3, Multiple Dimensions of Poverty, Governance and Democracy modules, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

From the point of view of subject content, the DIAL researchers developed three generic modules: Multiple Dimensions of Poverty, Governance and Democracy. These were then discussed and revised by the project's different partner institutions, bearing in mind that the final choice of questionnaires was made at national level by a process of reviewing the draft questionnaire and consultations in each country. In general, the design of the questionnaires and the formulation of questions had to meet the following two criteria:

- Firstly, the total number of questions included in the modules took into account the fact that the modules were appended to existing surveys whose scope (employment, consumption, living conditions, etc.) differed from that of the modules and from one country to the other. This constraint obviously affected the amount of data that could be reasonably collected;
- Secondly, the project's comparative objective had to be balanced with the need to avoid glossing over national particularities and areas of interest.

The Multiple Dimensions of Poverty module proposes new poverty tracking indicators to evaluate, and enhance the content of poverty reduction policies. Particular attention has been paid to household perceptions of their living conditions and their own subjective assessment of their level of well-being. The Governance module focuses mainly on the running and efficiency of the public institutions, objectively and subjectively, and the role of the State. A number of questions solicit for information on the main sources of dysfunctions, with a particular focus on corruption and absenteeism among civil servants. The Democracy module addresses three classic subjects in the field of political surveys: support for democratic principles, the actual practice of democracy and the nature of the link between citizens and polity.

As a complement to the household in the areas of Governance and Democracy, a survey of experts was conducted in the eight African countries. A total of 250 specialists from the South and the North responded to this Mirror Survey (researchers, development specialists, decision-makers, high-ranking public officials, politicians, etc.). Its aim was to compare the general public's responses with those of the experts on questions common to both studies.

The "experts" were asked to select a country, among the eight, based on their individual knowledge of a country and then completed the Mirror Survey questionnaire, which was actually a simplified version of the questionnaire administered to the general respondents. Two sets of questions were put for each of the two modules (Governance and Democracy):

- The first and most original set of questions were designed to gain an idea of what the experts thought the interviewees answered on average. For example, as regards the question "Does democracy work well in the country?", each respondent had to estimate the percentage of ordinary citizens who answered "Yes" in their chosen city;
- The second set of questions concerned the expert's own opinion as regards these same questions. For example, given the same question as above, they were asked to give their personal opinion of how well democracy worked in the chosen country.

To facilitate the analysis, the experts were asked to provide some socio-economic and demographic characteristics such as gender, age, occupation, knowledge in the field, etc.

The issue of sampling design for the Mirror Survey was not a probability sample in that there was no comprehensive sampling frame covering all potential “experts”. We therefore applied the method used by most of the expert surveys, drawing on DIAL’s networks of correspondents worldwide, in both the North and the South. We also had access to the networks of other partner institutions working on these issues (the DAC/OECD GovNet, the Metagora project, the French Directorate General for International Co-operation and Development (DGCID), etc.). In addition, the questionnaire was applied during meetings of experts (CODI, ECA and Addis-Ababa meetings) and training sessions organised by various institutions (In-Went Centre, Munich) for development practitioners. Last but not least, the survey questionnaire was sent to all recipients of DIAL’s newsletter Dialogue and was also put online on the DIAL website. Although the nature of the Mirror Survey is such that its representativeness cannot be formally assessed due to a lack of a clearly defined reference population, the close correlation with the main international databases on this subject can be considered to be a form of ex-post validation of the survey (see the findings below).

3.2 The main lessons learned


The general methodological lessons that can be drawn from these studies are as follow:

- The approach offers all the recognised advantages of a statistical household survey: transparent measurement procedures, representativeness of collected information and quantification of phenomena, providing benefits such as the ability to compare indicators across different time periods. Such properties compare positively with those of the macro indicators drawn from the international databases, despite the gradual improvement in their quality (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005). The household survey sample sizes and sampling methods provide high-quality estimates whose precision can be meticulously computed. This is not possible with most of the opinion polls using the quota sampling method.
- The wealth of the collected information allows for in-depth policy-oriented analyses, which would be impossible using other sources. These analyses are more useful to the development of specific policies than the aggregate indicators on governance and democracy available from international databases. There is also a broad consensus today that the two approaches are more complementary than competitive. Firstly, the aggregate governance indicators, where the basic data are made up of country/year, have the advantage of extensive geographic and/or time coverage. They can be used for both “growth econometrics” analyses and to rank the countries, subject to caution as to the accuracy of the indicators. These uses are of direct interest to the donors. Secondly, the surveys provide many possibilities for understanding individual behaviour and hence for a more thorough definition of specific and better targeted policies.

- While collecting both objective (behaviour and actual experiences) and subjective data (perception and satisfaction) on poverty, governance and democracy, we consider the possibility of monitoring and comparing the two basic aspects of these phenomena. For example, the perception of corruption can have just as decisive an impact on a country's political or economic stability as the objective incidence of corruption.
- Moreover, these two aspects can be combined with classic variables concerning the individuals and households' socio-economic characteristics (income, occupation, gender, age, ethnic group, etc.). The findings can hence be disaggregated and specific sub-group population characteristics and disparities highlighted, focusing in particular on the cases of the most disadvantaged and those who suffer the most from discrimination. This approach therefore allows for indicators to compare the situations (or perceptions) of men and women, poor and rich, and even different ethnic groups.³
- Furthermore, this approach of simultaneously conducting the same surveys in different countries opens up new and interesting possibilities for collecting international comparable data.

The strong points and basic principles of the modules appended to the 1-2-3 Survey are summarized in Diagram 2.

Diagram 2: The strong points and basic principles of the modules appended to the 1-2-3 Survey



3. In Peru and Ecuador, subnational representativeness means that regional indicators can be produced (spatial disaggregation). This is of particular relevance to steering existing decentralisation processes and assisting local democracy and governance.

3.3 An evaluation of the mechanism's relevance and the robustness of its findings

An evaluation of the surveys conducted and related studies clearly shows that it is possible to develop indicators to evaluate how well the institutions and democracy are working, and to measure the extent of support for policies among the general public. Data used in computing indicators are generally easier to collect than traditional socio-economic data, for example, relevant to measurement of monetary poverty (Table 3). The non-response rate for questions on governance and democracy is generally lower compared to observed non-response rate for questions on income (Amegashi *et al.*, 2005).

Table 3: % rates of non-response to certain module questions in Africa

Questions on:	Cotonou	Ouaga-dougou	Abidjan	Bamako	Niamey	Dakar	Lome	Total
Running of the State	0	3.6	0.9	1.1	2.7	5.2	3.5	2.2
Opinion of democracy	0	2.8	0.5	0.9	1.9	3.1	0.3	1.1
Income stated in value	59.9	45.7	59.0	56.6	47.6	43.3	62.7	53.4
Income stated in value or brackets	97.7	93.4	96.8	93.3	84.8	90.2	98.3	93.6
Income not given	2.3	6.6	3.2	6.7	15.2	9.8	1.7	6.4

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Phase 1, Governance and Democracy modules, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

A scientific comparison with other international initiatives (Afrobarometer and African Governance Project) reveals a close convergence of findings in the common fields – confirming the robustness of the proposed indicators – and the areas in which the different instruments complement each other (Tables 4). The close involvement of National Statistics Institutes in the measurement of governance and democracy, the accuracy of the estimates and the intrinsic link with traditional economic indicators, particularly poverty indicators, are major advantage of this approach. Also, the wide diversity of political contexts, in terms of freedoms and rights, in which the surveys were conducted, shows that the approach can be implemented in a wide range of developing countries, extending well beyond the scope of just the new democracies. Furthermore, in countries that have experienced huge political upheavals (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar and Togo), where the general public has shown particularly strong support for democracy, the survey provides a better insight into the nature of the problems, and could probably be used for the implementation of targeted preventive measures before the identified tensions degenerate into open conflict. From a more general point of view, an additional argument for the merits of the approach is found in the proliferation of regional projects using household surveys to gauge governance

questions worldwide, including in sub-Saharan Africa (see, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) on Afrobarometer and ECA (2005) on the surveys associated with the peer review mechanism).

Table 4: Comparative table of three regional initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa

	PARSTAT Project (AFRISTAT/DIAL) 1-2-3 Survey	AFROBAROMETER (MSU/IDASA/CDD-Ghana)	UN-ECA Project (NEPAD peer review process)
Countries concerned (coverage)	Capitals of 7 African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) + 7 cities in Madagascar - Urban areas samples (35,000 individuals; over 4,000 per country on average)	18 countries (Southern Africa, East Africa and West Africa) National sample (urban+rural) (in general 1,200 individuals/country)	Phase 1: 14 countries Phase 2: 19 countries national coverage (samples of 100 experts and 2,000 heads of household per country)
Objectives Methodology	Overview of situation/ understanding/ measurement and tracking+comparison à Statistical household survey (all individuals in the household) Standardised modules (opinion surveys) appended to classic surveys (1-2-3 Survey on employment and consumption) à Cross-referencing with socio-economic variables (income, employment, etc.)	Measurement of the social, political and economic climate Monitoring and comparison of countries à Household survey (opinion polls) (one individual/household) A standardised set of questions (standard tool: see Eurobarometer; latino-barometro and Asian Barometer)	Monitoring of good governance progress in Africa Peer Review for NEPAD à Three instruments: 1- Opinion of a panel of experts (assessment \diamond indicator) 2- Opinion survey (of heads of household) 3- Documentary review (factual and/or background info on the institutions)
Organisation / Institutions: Co-ordination team & partners	Co-ordination and technical assistance: AFRISTAT and DIAL Partners responsible for the surveys and analyses: National Statistics Institutes	Network co-ordinated by IDASA – South Africa, CDD-Ghana and Michigan State University (MSU) National partners (in charge of the surveys): Independent private bodies: research institutes, NGOs, private sector	Co-ordination UN – CEA Partners: National Research Institutes and/or private consultants (research bodies) \diamond (independence)
Dissemination of findings	Country analysis \diamond Local press National and regional conferences/seminars Broad public dissemination	Informs the policy decision-making process, generally by the NGOs Dissemination to decision-makers, donors, journalists/ researchers	Discussion workshops & publication of findings at national level + Africa Governance Report (AGR) presented at the 2005 African Development Forum

3.4 The process of setting up the surveys and disseminating the findings

As regards demand, the processes of setting up the surveys and disseminating the findings form one of the strong points of the system. The aim here is to build a process that satisfies the principles of the new poverty reduction strategies and, more generally, the development policies: accountability, ownership and participation. This can only be realised if it is in line with the real situation of the institutions in each country, whether public or originating from civil society. It is moreover this constraint that justifies the application of a different strategy in Africa to Latin America.

In Africa where institutions are weak, the process is a long-term one starting with the Madagascar example and moving onto the West African countries. At the outset, at the instigation of the MADIO project, variable subject-specific modules were added to the 1-2-3 Surveys every year starting in the mid-1990s. Based on the pilot test conducted in 1995 and decided on unilaterally by the statisticians, the process has been gradually consolidated by a system of mutual feedback and adjustment between “supply” and “demand”.⁴ The systematic holding of public conferences and the wide circulation of findings beyond the small circle of decision-makers has demonstrated social demand for these issues, while repeating the surveys has provided the possibility to hone the statistical tools. Although the institutions (ministries, employers' organisations, trade unions, etc.) took part in the process, the media played a central role. By massively reporting on the findings, raising new questions and supporting the entire approach, the media brought to light the existence of an initially latent and then explicitly formulated demand and contributed to the institutionalisation of the process.

Only when the experiment had been consolidated in Madagascar was it extended to the WAE-MU countries where a similar cycle tailored to each national circumstances was launched. Generally speaking, such an approach in itself helps to promote and enhance the democratic debate and strengthen the institutions – the NSIs, obviously, but also civil society organisations that draw on the surveys to underpin their expertise and hence their legitimacy – while spreading the “culture of statistics”.

Downstream, experience has shown that there is often more demand for governance and democracy indicators than traditional socio-economic indicators – as shown by the high public and media turnout at events to announce findings in the countries under study (Madagascar, Mali, Peru, etc.). Furthermore, by providing food for thought for public debate on policies and the major development issues, this type of survey helps strengthen democracy, reveal the wishes of the public and empower ‘voiceless’ sectors of the population.

4. This first survey conducted in 1995 immediately gave rise to in-depth analyses whose findings were swiftly and widely disseminated to answer topical questions of the moment (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 1996).

4. Some Illustrative Examples of Findings

Following these methodological considerations, some empirical examples are presented to illustrate the merits of the approach. A few examples have been chosen from each of the three modules. A more detailed analysis can be found in the regional survey report (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005b) and in each of the national reports.

4.1 Subjective poverty or the consideration of the different factors influencing the perception of poverty

The multifaceted nature of poverty is now unanimously acknowledged. Driven in particular by Amartya Sen, the definition of poverty, initially based solely on the monetary criterion, has gradually been extended to take in different concepts such as a lack of capabilities (e.g. opportunities to access education and health), vulnerability, a feeling of exclusion, and dignity. The 1-2-3 Survey module on the Multiple Dimensions of Poverty explores the individuals' points of view and their perception and assessment of their situation. We have looked at the notion of subjective poverty, with one of the approaches being based on the classic concept of satisfaction of basic needs as a way of defining poverty⁵. Unlike the indicators usually used, which are normally based on objective criteria, we ask the population to define what they consider to be basic needs and to express their level of satisfaction as regards these needs.

Although the minimum basket of needs (the top seven⁶ of 26 suggested items) for a decent standard of living is on the whole the same regardless of the country studied, the classification of these needs and percentage of the population considering them important varies from one country to the next. Bamako and Ouagadougou stand out in particular for the extremely low proportion (less than half) of inhabitants who view access to electricity as essential (Figure 2). Similarly, less than two-thirds of the population in Bamako and Niamey deem it vital to "be able to send their children to school". These findings can be explained in part by the phenomenon of attrition of preferences or self-adjusted aspirations in view of their limited supply in the most underprivileged countries. For example, Bamako and Ouagadougou are the least well-equipped capitals in terms of access to electricity (only some 40% of the households are connected to the network). Given that they are used to the absence of electricity in their homes (and their neighbours' homes), a large proportion of these towns' inhabitants do not see electricity as an absolute necessity.

5. See Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2001) for more details on the different poverty approaches and the links between them.

6. The seven are: receiving treatment in the event of illness, access to water, and access to electricity, having decent housing, being able to take three meals a day, being able to send children to school, and having a stable job. We subsequently only refer to the first six items, given that we have no information about household satisfaction in terms of the integration of all of its members into the labour market.


The survey compares individuals' levels of satisfaction with the level of importance placed on a given scale of hardship. Lome and Antananarivo stand out from the other cities with generally extremely low levels of satisfaction, especially when compared with the population's aspirations (Diagram 2). Bamako and Niamey are striking for their small gaps between the population's aspirations and perceptions of actual living conditions in terms of the main basic needs identified. Although the satisfaction indices are fairly low (less than or barely over 60% for certain items), the levels for each of the corresponding items near if not top the percentages of those who consider them essential.

In general, dissatisfaction with the health supply is striking in all the cities studied. As already mentioned earlier, the satisfaction indices are extremely low for Lome and Antananarivo (29% and 39%). They are also less than 50% for Ougadougou and Cotonou (at 46% and 49% respectively). They come to barely 60% in the three other cities (56% for Abidjan, 57% for Dakar and 61% for Bamako). Consequently, over one-third of the population in all the cities is dissatisfied with the existing health services.

Another more general approach to subjective poverty is to look at the household's general perception of its well-being (subjective well-being or "*happiness*"). The first analyses of this factor date back to the 1970s and the pioneering work by Easterlin (1974). This issue lies at the core of a new wave of research today with the recent tie-in made with the notion of poverty, now viewed in its broadest sense. Yet this approach based on well-being is rarely used for analyses of developing countries. Nevertheless, it sheds new and ground-breaking light on the way in which individuals perceive their living conditions.

Households' overall assessment of their well-being varies considerably from one country to the next. The proportion of those who state that they find it "hard to make ends meet" – and who can therefore be classed as poor from a subjective point of view – ranges from 25% in Bamako to 57% in Lome. The survey indeed finds a close correlation between the level of satisfaction regarding the needs previously identified as being basic and the perception of subjective well-being (Figure 1).


Figure 1: Level of satisfaction with needs deemed as basic



Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Multiple Dimensions of Poverty module, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

The inhabitants of Abidjan are an exception in this regard in that they have a fairly negative perception of their well-being (44% deem that they find it hard to make ends meet) despite a relatively high satisfaction index for the needs viewed as basic (less than 30% are dissatisfied with more than six items⁷ as opposed to an average of 36% for the eight capitals; 57% for Lome and 49% for Antananarivo; Figure 2). Abidjan is hence ranked in sixth place if the population's subjective well-being alone is considered, but is in third place based on its level of satisfaction with needs identified as basic.

Figure 2: Assessment of well-being and level of satisfaction with basic needs



Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Multiple Dimensions of Poverty module, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

These findings make a case for the use of different approaches to analyse poverty, especially subjective approaches that consider the population's points of view. A number of different factors can influence individuals' perceptions of their living conditions. These constituent elements of well-being are not necessarily taken into account when just one approach is used or when just the most classic and normative approaches are used.

7. To measure the overall feeling of dissatisfaction, we set the threshold as being dissatisfied with six or more items (at least six needs not satisfied) of the top ten items ranked by the population as being the most essential.


4.2 Indicators for monitoring governance

Of the analytical findings obtained using the data from the module on governance, we use mainly those regarding corruption here. This phenomenon is seen as one of the main obstacles to the efficiency of the administration and is measured by a range of indicators as part of the public service reforms. On the whole, and regardless of the city, the vast majority (over 90%) of the population believes that corruption is a major problem. Relatively fewer mention the harmful effect of the administration's politicisation (85%), absenteeism (78%) and incompetence among civil servants (69%).

Corruption is reduced by improving civil servants' wages and an active anti-corruption policy

The availability of a long time-series of data (covering nearly ten years) for the Madagascan capital means that the development of corruption can be tracked and a first assessment made of the impact of public policies addressing corruption (Figure 3). The findings reveal a steady, sharp downturn in petty corruption from 1995 to 2001 (from 42% to 10%). These figures are based on an objective indicator: the percentage of individuals who fell victim to corruption in the year preceding the survey. The empirical observation highlights a strong negative correlation between the level of corruption and civil servants' wages, which rose 50% in real terms over the 1995-2001 period (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2003a). Although this relationship cannot be formally tested since the series is not long enough and other factors may also have affected the level of corruption (such as inflation and political stability), it does corroborate the presumption that the administration's performance depends positively on civil servants' wages. By way of an illustration, we observed that multiple job-holding also decreased over the same period. This finding provides food for thought for the controversial theoretical debate regarding the influence of civil servants' wage levels on corruption. It contradicts the findings of multinational cross-cutting analyses that generally find no significant link between the perception of corruption and civil servants' wages. If found to hold using larger samples, this correlation would have major implications for the reform of public services in the developing countries. This observation could partially explain the virtually systematic failure of the first generation of civil service reforms when drastic cuts were made to civil servants' wages.

Figure 3: Civil servants' wages and effect on corruption in Madagascar from 1995 to 2004



Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, phase 1 (Labour Force) 1995-2004, MADIO, DIAL/ INSTAT, our own calculations.

Note: The corruption “module” was not included in the survey in 1996, 1997 and 1999.

The corruption figures are derived from an objective indicator (percentage of victims of corruption during the previous year).

The second point worth raising concerns the period following the political crisis in Madagascar in 2001-2002 and shows that active policies substantially reduce the amount of corruption. The level of corruption rose again in 2002 following the political crisis and the economic downturn. When the new administration came into power, the authorities placed the emphasis on transparency. The *Conseil Supérieur de Lutte Contre la Corruption* (CSLCC) was set up in 2003 to build awareness and implement specific strategies. The *Bureau Indépendant Anti-corruption* (BIANCO) was established in 2004 to monitor and apply concrete measures. The positive effect of these initiatives can already be seen. The population feels that the corruption levels has definitely gone down (the balance of opinion was +49 points in 2004 as opposed to +39 in 2003 for petty corruption; and +50 in 2004 compared with +36 in 2003 for major corruption). This perception by the capital's inhabitants is borne out by the analysis of objective indicators, which shows that the rate of corruption fell from 16% in 2003 to 8% in 2004. The weight of corruption in household budgets also fell from 3.3% in 2003 to just 1.2% of households' annual incomes in 2004.

How much can we trust the experts' opinion on corruption?

Corruption and, more broadly, governance indicators are based mainly on experts' assessments. When these experts' opinions are compared with the population's point of view and experience using the *mirror survey* (see above), it is found that the experts systematically overestimate the level of corruption suffered by the citizens (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2005d). Whereas an average of 13% of the population in the eight cities said that they had been direct victims of acts of corruption over the past year⁸, the experts estimated this rate at 54%. Likewise, barely 5% of the population considers accepting a bribe in the exercise of their duties to be acceptable behaviour (Figure 4). The experts reckon this proportion to be 32%. On the whole, the experts have a much more negative view of the situation than the population.


This huge overestimation of actual corruption levels would be a lesser evil if it were consistent across the board. Yet major disparities in the relative ranking of the countries show that this is far from being the case. For example, the relatively positive image that the experts have of Burkina Faso (*the country of honest men*) – with the lowest occurrence of petty corruption in the *mirror survey* and the lowest percentage of experts deeming corruption to be a major problem in the country – is belied by the population's own perception and actual experiences. Conversely, Togo has a significantly lower level of daily corruption than the regional average, but is ranked the worst offender by the experts.

In fact, there is no correlation between the two variables measuring the rate of corruption (the first estimated by the experts and the second based on population surveys): the correlation coefficient, albeit not significant, is even negative (-0.19). However, the mirror survey findings are correlated with the indicators published in the international databases. For example, the correlation between the frequency of corruption as based on the mirror survey and the "control of corruption" indicator built by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (KKZ) for 2002 is -0.52. This makes for a positive link, since this indicator falls as corruption rises.⁹ On the other hand, the correlation between the real rate of corruption and the KKZ indicator is 0.48 (and therefore in the wrong direction), but not significant.

8. See Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2004) for a detailed analysis of the profile of victims of corruption.

9. The calculation of the Spearman coefficient of rank correlation produces similar findings: 0.02 between the mirror survey data and the population survey data; -0.50 between the findings of the mirror survey and the indicator from the base by Kaufmann et al. (2005).

Figure 4: Deviations between the real frequency of petty corruption and the experts' perceptions in French-speaking Africa



Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Governance module, 2001/2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL (35,594 persons interviewed; 4,500 on average in each country); Mirror survey (246 experts surveyed; 30 experts on average in each country), DIAL, our own calculations.

These observations raise doubts about the reliability of the expert-based data, which are nevertheless widely used by donors to allocate official development assistance in particular. Admittedly, this finding is limited to petty corruption and the eight countries studied. It could reasonably be argued that it is precisely in these countries lacking in information that the perception indices should be furthest from the reality. Yet the question clearly stands as to what exactly the perception indicators based on these surveys measure. Our findings in no way undermine the relevance of these types of indicators since they reflect a fairly commonly held perception of corruption, even if this perception does not reflect reality. This said, if corruption phenomena are to be understood in all their complexity, these indicators should be combined with a new generation of indicators based on objective measurements.

Creating broad-based coalitions to reform the administration: a massive consensus for an incentive/sanctions system

A string of reforms has been implemented to solve the public administration's structural dysfunctions, but to little avail despite the population's clear and largely shared message to improve the supply of public services. The reforms should operate on two fronts at once and comprise two types of measures: measures to increase government officials' productivity

and measures to raise the number of civil servants to cover basic needs better.

There is a real consensus to set up an incentive/sanctions system (Table 5). An average of 93% of each city's inhabitants are in favour of merit-based remuneration or performance pay. They even go further when it comes to coercive measures since 82% would like to see penalties introduced for civil servants who do not do their job properly, without ruling out the possibility of their being dismissed in the event of serious misconduct. In addition, over four in five individuals (82%) support the idea of promoting decentralisation to make the administration more user-friendly for the taxpayer. Note that decentralisation does not just affect administrative governance, but can also have political virtues in terms of local democracy.

This consensus prevails in all the cities, with certain marginal local particularities. In Dakar, there is support for each of the three measures with an approval rate of over nine in ten inhabitants. About 98% inhabitants approve the principle of performance pay. Although there is general support overall for the promotion of the merit-based principle, the desire to see strict sanctions applied (dismissal) in the event of serious misconduct is less uniform. Interestingly enough, there is most doubt in this regard in the countries with the most authoritarian regimes (Togo and, to a lesser extent, Burkina Faso). The citizens of these countries may be scared of seeing what is deemed a fair principle diverted in practice from its original intent by misuse and possibly political use.

Support for decentralisation also varies from one country to the next. Paradoxically, support is weakest in Niger and especially in Mali where the process is one of the most advanced. It is as if the demand for decentralisation were extremely strong across the board, yet, in the countries where steps had been taken to introduce decentralisation and its negative effects had started to come to light, support for this type of reform was becoming more circumspect (while remaining largely positive).

Table 5: Measures to improve the administration's efficiency by country

%	West Africa							Mada	Total
	Cotonou	Ouagadougou	Abidjan	Bamako	Niamey	Dakar	Lome		
Think that the following measures could improve public service quality/efficiency								Antananarivo	
1.- Performance pay	85.0	91.6	96.2	89.5	94.0	98.2	95.7	92.5	92.9
2.- Dismiss civil servants for misconduct	83.7	74.6	82.6	84.5	82.5	93.0	68.9	87.7	82.2
3.- Promote decentralisation	87.6	78.3	96.7	67.7	64.4	90.5	87.6	80.8	81.8

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Governance module, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

Although there is nothing new about these reforms, what is worth noting here is the massive

support of all social groups for their principles (Table 6). For example, there is nothing to distinguish the poor from the other groups when it comes to the measures to be taken to make the civil service more efficient. What is even more interesting is the fact that almost as many civil servants support such measures themselves. They are almost as positive about some of the most repressive measures. “Only” 80% (as opposed to 82% for the population as a whole) are in favour of severe sanctions and even dismissal for unscrupulous civil servants, while 89% (compared with 93%) support performance-based wages. The civil servants, who would normally be expected to be the most hostile to this type of reform, and those with the most to lose (union members, seniors and the least skilled) are barely less convinced of the merits of these measures.

These findings show that civil servants, who are often suspected of refusing change by adamantly maintaining their positions and holding onto their acquired advantages, should not hinder the administration’s reform. More broadly speaking, the survey shows the possibility of forming coalitions comprising the vast majority of the population in favour of measures reputed to be hard to implement.

Table 6: Support for measures to improve the administration’s efficiency by income levels

Think that the following measures could improve public service quality/efficiency	Total	Civil servants	Per capital income quartiles			
			1st quartile	2nd quartile	3rd quartile	4th quartile
1.- Performance pay	92.9	89.2	93.1	92.5	93.1	92.8
2.- Sanction/dismiss civil servants for misconduct	82.2	80.4	81.2	82.3	82.1	83.1
3.- Promote decentralisation	81.8	87.3	81.6	80.7	80.4	84.6

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Governance module, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

4.3 Democracy: an evaluation of how well it works and the population’s aspirations

The 1-2-3 Surveys Democracy module provides some extremely useful information for the consolidation of the process embarked upon in many of the continent’s countries at the beginning of the 1990s. In particular, the findings show that Africans, and especially the poor, have massively embraced the principles of democracy contrary to preconceived ideas and despite the huge and varying national breaches in the respect of certain civil and political rights – freedom of speech, transparent elections and especially equality before the law.

Democracy is massively embraced by rich and poor alike

When asked if they support democracy, an average 87% of each city’s inhabitants say they are in favour of this type of political system. Nearly half (49%) say they are “very much in

favour of democracy” while 38% are simply “in favour of democracy”. This leaves less than 15% against democracy. This general finding holds true for each country. Togo, an outpost, is worth highlighting from this point of view given the country’s current political situation. It is among the inhabitants of Lome that the highest percentage of people expressing an unreserved hankering for democracy is found, with over 63% “very much in favour of democracy”.

Not only does support for democracy is in general, loud and clear, but this type of political system is more appreciated by far than any other form of government (Table 7). Three other types of political systems in addition to democracy were put forward for the population’s consideration: they were all largely rejected. The people showed themselves to be fundamentally opposed to any form of authoritarian regime, whether headed by a “strong man” or by the army. Less than one in five adults saw these regimes in a positive light (18% for the “strong man” hypothesis and 14% for a military regime). Neither did the cities’ inhabitants want experts, rather than a democratically elected government, to decide what is right for the country. Although 35% were prepared to accept this type of leadership, this choice came far behind democracy, which picked up over 86% of the votes.

Table 7: Assessment of the different forms of political system by income levels

	Total	Per capita income quartiles			
		1st quartile	2nd quartile	3rd quartile	4th quartile
Opinion of the different political systems:					
A. Have a strong man as leader	18.2	19.6	18.9	18.0	16.3
B. The army governs the country	14.4	13.7	15.6	15.2	12.3
C. The experts decide what is good for the country	34.7	35.6	33.9	35.8	33.2
D. Have a democratic political system	86.2	87.5	85.7	86.3	87.2
The shortcomings of democracy:					
A. The economy does not work well in a democracy	31.3	32.9	32.5	34.5	28.3
B. Democracies are unable to maintain order	34.3	35.2	35.4	47.3	32.1
C. Democracies find it hard to make decisions	47.2	47.0	47.9	80.0	47.1
D. Democracy is better than the other forms of government	80.9	81.3	80.1		82.4

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Democracy module, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

This massive support for democracy does not mean that the population sees it through rose-coloured glasses. The people also acknowledge that it has a certain number of shortcomings. For example, 31% state that the economic system does not work well in a democracy. Over one-third thinks that democracies have problems maintaining order. And nearly half consider that democracies find it hard to make decisions due to conflicts of interest that can arise between different social classes and lobby groups without being able to be solved in an authoritarian manner. Yet at the end of the day, these shortcomings are minor compared with the advantages that democracy can bring. Four in five people are convinced that, all things considered, compared with other types of political systems, democracy – understood as a political process for appointing leaders via the ballot box – is the best system of government.

These reservations about the democratic system are found a little more among the poorest populations. Some 20% and 14% respectively of people in the 1st quartile would not be against the army or a strong man having the power, as opposed to 16% and 12% for the richest quartile. A total of 35% of the poorest individuals, as opposed to 32% of the richest, feel that democracy is unable to maintain order. Yet the deviations are small and statistically insignificant, and the poorest individuals, like the rest of the population, massively prefer democracy despite its drawbacks. The poor even score higher than average (88% versus 86%) in preferring a democratic system. The poor's support for democratisation is borne out by detailed econometric analyses (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2003b and 2005a). These findings contradict the theory that the poor's own values and economic situation make them recalcitrant about the establishment of democratic regimes.

Is democracy a Western concept?


What hides behind the word “democracy”? This question is key in that an entire school of thought based on culturalist theories considers that democracy is a Western value and that it means something different in other historical and cultural contexts. So a definition is needed here as to what “democracy” means to the people of the region. This necessitated giving the survey respondents a list of features traditionally associated with democracy and asking them if they considered them to be integral to this notion.

The finding was unequivocal: the region's populations have the same idea of democracy as that which prevails in historical democracies. This suggests that there is a Universalist concept of democracy in both Africa and the North. Approximately 95% of the respondents considered all six of the elements on the list to be essential. They felt that a democracy should essentially guarantee the holding of "free and transparent elections", "freedom of speech and the press" and "political freedom (choice of political party)" as well as "equality before the law", "freedom of worship" and "freedom to travel". If all six of the characteristics are put together, 86% of the population felt that they are all essential to democracy. This consensus regarding the definition of democracy was borne out in all the cities regardless of the groups' standards of living (poor or rich). Over 85% of the population everywhere and in all the per capita income quartiles considered that each of the six properties was fundamental for democracy.

An assessment of the effort required to consolidate democracy

A comparison of the more or less fundamental nature of each of the six properties selected with whether they are respected provides an idea of the main weaknesses of the democratic set-up in each country. This information can be gleaned by comparing the proportion of those who consider them all to be essential with the proportion of those who consider them all to be respected (Figure 5). The ratio is obviously the lowest in Togo and highest in Senegal, with the other countries showing fairly similar opinions from this point of view.

Figure 5: Respect for the basic principles of democracy by country




Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Democracy module, 2001/2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

Another way of measuring and displaying the gap between the population's aspirations and whether the six essential characteristics of democracy are respected is to place them on the same diagram and compare two hexagons (Figure 6):¹⁰ one measuring the percentage of the population that considers each of the six properties of democracy to be fundamental (the surface area of this hexagon represents the "area of aspirations" or demand) and the other measuring the percentages of the population who consider that these aspects are respected in the country (the surface area of this hexagon could be called the "actual area of democracy" or respect for democracy). Togo again reveals the same findings as before, being in a critical situation on the democratic front and standing out clearly from all the other countries. Conversely, Senegal comes out as the highest performer in terms of democratic freedoms, even if they are far from perfectly respected. This exercise hence measures how far the different countries have yet to go to consolidate democracy and points to possibilities for reforms to be undertaken.

10. Here we adopt an identical approach to that previously applied to measure subjective poverty. This approach consists of comparing the importance of a need with the households' level of satisfaction.

Figure 6: Perception of how well democracy works compared with aspirations



Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Democracy module, 2001/2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

4.4 Advanced indicators to prevent socio-political crises: the case of Côte d'Ivoire and Togo

Given that the survey looks at opinions covering a large range of societal issues, it shows the state of unrest that could threaten the country's social and political stability. Côte d'Ivoire and Togo are emblematic examples of this. The population in Togo is glaringly dissatisfied with all the areas covered (Table 8). Lome lags behind in last position for both governance and, worse still, democracy. Togo appears as an incongruity in the region, explaining the Lome inhabitants' thirst for political change. The results for Côte d'Ivoire are more paradoxical (Roubaud, 2003b). At first glance, the inhabitants of Abidjan are not particularly pessimistic about the way in which they are governed. In fact, on certain points, Abidjan is among the leaders for "good governance" (authorities' will to reform, taking the population's aspirations into consideration, and growth in corruption).


Table 8: Perception of the administration's main problems by country

%	Abidjan	Cotonou	Ouagadougou	Bamako	Niamey	Dakar	Antananarivo	Lome
Democracy works well	57.4	70.5	45.8	55.8	47.9	77.4	72.7	9.8
The administration runs well	53.0	46.4	52.0	52.2	53.9	61.0	71.8	20.1
The will for reform is really there	75.3	39.0	44.1	47.8	54.3	-	90.5	11.7
The politicians take the population's aspirations into consideration	51.9	18.4	26.7	33.1	33.7	39.8	72.1	6.5
GROWTH (balance of opinion)								
The running of democracy has improved since 1990	+39 pts	+17 pts	+44 pts	+22 pts	+24 pts	+69 pts	+51 pts	-59 pts
The running of the administration has improved since 2001	+10 pts	-8 pts	-3 pts	+8 pts	+2 pts	+30 pts	+55 pts	-38 pts
Corruption has increased since 2001	+6 pts	-64 pts	-59 pts	-28 pts	-45 pts	-	+36 pts	-28 pts

Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys, Governance and Democracy modules, 2001/2003, National Statistics Institutes, AFRISTAT, DIAL, our own calculations.

Yet a closer look reveals a much more worrying diagnosis. When the findings are disaggregated based on the ethnic or religious dividing line used in the most extremist political assertions, between the "people of the North" and those of the South, the split definitely finds popular expression in Abidjan (Figure 7). The "people of the North" are extremely distrustful of the official institutions and national authorities. Moreover, they believe that the situation is getting worse, despite the official appeasement of the conflict. The survey clearly reveals a deeply divided population, wherein ethnic group is the key criterion for the focus of public opinion. The concept of Ivoirité has taken shape among the common citizens, giving rise to an internal split in the social body along dividing lines based on cultural identity tensions.

Figure 7: Indices of satisfaction with the administration and democracy by ethnic group



Sources: 1-2-3 Surveys 2002, Governance and Democracy modules, INS, Côte d'Ivoire, our own calculations.

Note: Dynamics: balance of opinion. Krou: President Gbagbo's ethnic group. Northern Mandes: ethnic group in the North of Côte d'Ivoire.

In both cases, the survey is a powerful tool for informing policies: firstly, to improve the understanding of the nature of conflicts at grass-roots level, beneath the voice of the “visible” players (warlords, politicians, journalists, etc.); secondly, and consequently, by providing the possibility to track changes in the situation in real time. These “early warning indicators” offer the means to take action before tensions degenerate into open conflict.

5. Conclusions

The experiment conducted in Africa to append modules to the household surveys shows that such an approach is not only justified from the point of view of the current main development policy guidelines, but that it can also be implemented in practice in the wide variety of political and institutional contexts found in the developing countries. These modules have technical properties that satisfy the conditions required to be incorporated into an efficient national statistical data collection system: reliability of the information provided, pertinence of the indicators for policy definition and monitoring, and ownership of the tool by the local institutions. There are hence two advantages to tracking governance, democracy and citizen

participation indicators. Public policies, such as those designed to make the public institutions more efficient and reduce the frequency of corruption, can be monitored and assessed. Secondly, time series can be built to address the causal relations between phenomena and consequently identify the most efficient policy instruments, as illustrated by the Madagascan case in terms of the reforms to be introduced to reduce corruption.

This pilot experiment opens up a number of important prospects. In the very short term, it builds on the existing databases by producing a certain number of analyses: the main findings of the surveys designed to be widely disseminated on the ground (at national level, but also at regional level when the survey results so permit); in-depth policy-oriented analyses looking at the definition, monitoring and evaluation of policies, and also academic analyses. In the medium term, the aim is to improve and consolidate the method. Firstly, the survey should be repeated in other geographic areas (inclusion of new countries) and especially carried out over time. The launch of time series (already underway in Madagascar and Mali) will lay the foundations for a fully-fledged system to track governance and democracy indicators. It will also test the robustness of the indicators. Secondly, in terms of policy processes, the methods for institutionalising this mechanism within the official statistical data systems should be improved. Such a programme should give rise to these types of surveys and indicators being systematically included in the national development strategy monitoring and assessment systems. In general, it will enable international recommendations to be formulated for measuring governance and democracy through surveys, especially as part of National Strategies for the development of Statistics promoted by PARIS21 (2004) and backed by the United Nations.

In addition to their specific interest for each country and the possibilities of South-South cooperation, such statistical surveys on governance and democracy finally make it reasonably feasible, for the first time, to hope that methodological transfers will not take the traditional road from North to South, but will travel from South to North. To date, only a few NSIs in the developed countries have taken steps down this road. Granted, a certain number of innovative surveys have been conducted in this field (see, for example, the French NSI recent work on the multiple dimensions of poverty, social exclusion, electoral participation and political choices; INSEE, 1997 and 2005). Yet the official statistical information mechanisms are still holding their traditional course, focusing mainly on economic and social statistics. Nonetheless, the reasons for and merits of the approach presented here are no less relevant to

the North than the South. A good example of the judiciousness of this subject can be found by looking at the recent debate surrounding the referendum on the European Constitution, which covered a combination of economic policy lines, governance, human rights and democracy – in short, different aspects involving society's choices. These are all good reasons for progressing down this road, wherein the expertise acquired by statisticians in the developing countries could be usefully harnessed by their counterparts in the North.¹¹

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11. By way of comparison, a parallel could be drawn with the measurement of the informal sector. Although the methodologies (two-phase surveys) were first developed in the South, as were the modules presented here, the possibilities of applying them in the North remain limited in that the weight of the informal sector is marginal (except maybe in certain French overseas départements and territories). This is clearly not the case when it comes to the issues of governance and democracy.

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