



# PPP and Risk Mitigation: Lessons Learnt from RVR

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




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## **KRC & URC Railway Systems**



**❖**Total length of network:

✓ Kenya: 2,210 km
✓ Uganda: 1,241 km
✓ Total: 3,451 km

**❖**Total length of concessioned network:

✓ Kenya: 1,920 km✓ Uganda: 431 km✓ Total: 2,351 km

- Opening of Financial Proposals: 2005
- Preferred bidder: Sheltam Railway Company Ltd.
- Concessions signed in January 2006 effective in April 2006 (Commercial Close)
- ❖ Financial Close reached on 31 October 2006



## **Pre-Concession Performance**

	Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC)	Uganda Railways Corporation (URC)	
Total length of network (km)	2,210	1,241	
Total freight volume (million tonnes/yr)	2.3	0.9	
Main commodities	Containers, soda ash & wheat	Containers, wheat & fuel.	
Revenues (US\$ million/yr)	<b>53</b>	19.5	
Number of wagons	6,000	1,433	
Number of locomotives	175	44	
% wagon in operation	41	89	
% of locomotive in operation	20	73	



## **PPP Project Identification & Selection**

#### Kenya

- ✓ Concessioning of KRC undertaken as part of the Public Enterprises Reform Programme.
- ✓ In 2000, the Government approved concessioning of KRC.
- ✓ In 2002 IFC Advisory Services engaged as TA.

#### Uganda

- ✓ In 1999 URC identified as a candidate for privatisation
- ✓ Management contract followed by a concession (20 30 years)
- ✓ Cabinet approved direct concessioning in 2001
- ✓ In 2002 Canarail engaged as TA
- ✓ Key challenge: entirely dependent on Kenya rail network
- MoU for Joint Concession in 2004
  - ✓ To avoid Malawi/Mozambique experience



#### **Key Objectives**

- Enhancing the role of the private sector in the economy.
- Reducing the demand of the Public Enterprises on the Exchequer so as to improve the use of scarce resources.
- Reduce the role and rationalise the operations of public enterprises.
- Improve the regulatory environment.
- Broaden the base of ownership and enhance the development of capital markets.



## **PPP Feasibility Analysis**

- Need for new long-term investment \$300 million
- Double freight traffic in the first 5 years to 6 million tonnes/yr.
- ❖ Reduce railway transport costs by US\$20 30 million/yr.
- Concessionaire's revenue to increase to US\$200 million/yr. in Yr. 5 with a project of US\$250 million/yr. in Yr. 25.
- Reduce deterioration of roads and reduce road maintenance by US\$10
  20 million/yr.
- Other benefits: reduced congestion and pollution, improved safety and lower energy consumption.



#### **Governance Standards for PPPs**

- UN definition—"...the processes in government actions and how things are to be done and not just what is done"
- Efficiency—using resources without waste delay or corruption and without burdening future generations
- Transparency—clarity and openness is decision-making
- Decency—development of rules without harming people or the environment
- Participation of all stakeholders
- ❖ A PPP framework to ensure that the governance standards are applied in the implementation of the project




#### Kenya Legal and Regulatory Framework

- Government of Kenya, Policy Statement on PPPs, November 2011.
- Public Private Partnership Act, 2013.
- Public Private Partnership Regulations, 2014.
- Public Private Partnership (Petition) Regulations (Draft), 2014.
- County Government Regulations (Draft), 2014.
- The Public Finance Management (Road Annuity Fund) Regulation (Draft), 2014.
- Public Private Partnership (Project Facilitation Fund) Regulations, 2015.
- Guidelines for the Assessment and Management of Fiscal Commitments and Contingent Liabilities (FCCL) in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in Kenya and FCCL Technical Guidance Manual, August 2015
- Kenya Public Private Partnership Manual (still under preparation)



#### **Kenya Institutional Framework**






#### Legal, Regulatory and Institutional Framework - RVR

- Privatisation Law Divestiture
- Concession PPP Law
  - ✓ Limited "usufructory rights"
  - ✓ Limited guarantees
  - Credit enhancement mechanisms (minimum traffic/demand guarantee, VGF, etc.)
- Railways Act of Uganda amended in 2004 and the Kenya Railway Corporation Act in 2005.
- KRC and URC became Public Asset Holding Companies able to enter into concession agreements
- ❖ Interface Agreement signed on 7<sup>th</sup> April 2006.



#### Joint Concession Institutional Structure/Agreements





#### **Transaction Implementation**

- 25 years concession term
- Both concessions to be signed simultaneously
- All rehabilitation investments to be made by the private party
- All new investments to be owned by the Asset Holding Companies
- Passenger service in Kenya for 7 years
- \* Target performance: allow minimum speeds of 60km/hr. for freight and 80km/hr. for passengers within the first 5 years
- Possible termination if volume targets are not met in Year 10
- Lead investor to hold 35% ownership of each project company



## Transaction Implementation (cont.)

- Requirement to achieve minimum local ownership levels of 20% in each country by Year 5
- Minimum Net worth of \$35 million for the Lead Investor
- Lead Investor must be a railway operator with experience of carrying 100 million tonnes/yr. of freight and operate network of not less that 300km.



## **Transaction Implementation (cont.)**

#### Financials:

- ✓ A fixed upfront concession fee of \$3 million to GoK and \$2 million to GoU to be used to pay the costs of preparing and tendering the project.
- ✓ A variable annual fee to be paid to each government:
  - Years 1 5 = 5% of annual gross revenues.
  - Years 6 25= 7% of annual gross revenues.
- ✓ A fixed annual concession fee to be paid to each govt (to be proposed by bidders).
- ✓ Fixed concession fee for Passenger Service in Kenya (to be proposed by bidders).



## **Financial Bids for KRC**

	RITES/MAGADI	SHELTAM	
FREIGHT REVENUE	BID PERCENTAGE OF	BID PERCENTAGE OF	
BANDS, USD	GROSS REVENUE	GROSS REVENUE	
MILLION			
0-70	6.01%	11.1%	
>70-100	6.02%	11.1%	
>100-130	6.03%	11.1%	
>130	6.04%	11.1%	
UPFRONT FEES	USD 3.0 million	USD 3.0 million	
PERSENGER	USD Minus 6.0 million	USD 1.0 million	
SERVICES	(Subsidy)		



#### **Financial Bids for URC** RITES/MAGADI **SHELTAM** FREIGHT REVENUE **BID PERCENTAGE BID PERCENTAGE** BANDS, USD **OF GROSS OF GROSS MILLION REVENUE REVENUE** 0-276.01% 11.1% >27-38 6.02% 11.1% 6.03% >38-50 11.1% 6.04% 11.1% >50 **UPFRONT FEES** USD 2.0 million USD 2.0 million **PASSENGER** Not Applicable Not Applicable **SERVICES**



## **Concession Performance**

Pre-C	Post Concession Performance			
	Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC)	Uganda Railways Corporation (URC)	Total	Rift Valley Railways (RVR)
Total length of network (km)	2,210	1,241	3,451	1,333
Total freight volume (million tonnes/yr)	2.3	0.9	3.2	1.3
	Containers, soda ash &	Containers, wheat &		
Main Commodities	wheat	fuel		Containers, grain, cement, fuel & steel
Revenues (US \$ million/yr)	53	19.5	73	76.3
Number of wagons	6,000	1,433	7,433	4,014
Number of locomotives	175	44	219	128
% wagon in operation	41	89	50	36
% of locomotive in operation	20	73	30	44



#### **Concession Performance**





## Impact of SGR on RVR

- New parallel railway systems
- SGR Investment
  - ✓ Mombasa Nairobi: US\$3.6bn (or \$7.6 million/km)
  - ✓ Nairobi Naivasha: US\$ 1.5 bn (or \$12 million/km)
  - ✓ Total for Mombasa Kampala: approx. \$8 10bn.
- One way trip Mombasa Kampala on RVR currently at 3.5 days
- Advantages of RVR:
  - Cost effectiveness
  - ✓ Familiarity with customers
- Likely to operate side by side Japan, Australia, South America.



#### **Lessons Learnt**

- PPPs in railways should be structured and offered on a regional, system-wide basis;
- Governments should only pursue PPPs for the"right" reasons;
- Overly optimistic feasibility analyses must be questioned;
- ❖ A Concessionaire should be allowed to select the size and timing of the inputs, especially new investments;
- Appropriate legal, regulatory and institutional framework for PPP;
- Procurement process must ensure that a concession is not awarded to the "wrong guy";
- Clear risk-sharing by the Governments is essential:
  - ✓ Provision of some or all of the long-term financing needed for infrastructure renewal.
  - ✓ Credit enhancement mechanisms to lower cost of debt; e.g. demand/traffic guarantees.
- Unrealistic high concession fees requirements must be avoided.

