Decentralization in Guinea-Bissau

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1 Introduction

Guinea-Bissau is a small country with a population of 1.7 million along the West African coast. Since gaining its independence from Portugal in 1974, the country has witnessed recurrent political upheavals, with four successful coups d’état, 15 coup attempts, and a short civil war in 1998–99. In 1994, the country opened itself to “multipartyism,” with hopes of political stabilization. Under the new and more democratic Constitution, revised in 1996, decentralization was put forth as an explicit political requirement, based on the belief that full democracy could not be achieved without local elections and empowerment. Twenty years later, this has not been put to test. Local governance remains a distant goal.

Effective decentralization needs to embody political, fiscal, and administrative aspects. A vast array of literature exists on the merits and pitfalls of decentralization, with authors broadly agreeing that, ultimately, it is a process embedded in political, historical, and societal contexts (Connerley, Eaton, Smoke 2010; Martinez-Vazquez and Vaillancourt 2011; Local Development International, LLC 2013). In other words, history, politics, economics, as well as geographic, cultural, and demographic aspects come into play. Interestingly, studies are inconclusive when it comes to the links between decentralization and government effectiveness, or decentralization and equity, or even stability (Bird and Ebel 2007). This does not mean that there are no benefits to decentralization, but rather that the way that it is approached (across the aforementioned aspects) greatly matters. It thus remains that if properly tackled, according to the specific country context, decentralization could yield benefits.

With this in mind, in the current paper, I delve into the three dimensions of decentralization in the context of Guinea-Bissau, namely administrative, political, and fiscal. I analyze the current situation across the dimensions and discuss approaches that authorities could take in conducting decentralization. With a forward looking stance, I discuss the key ingredients for implementing decentralization. In Section II of the paper, we look at decentralization as a policy objective in Guinea-Bissau. In Section III, we look at political decentralization, while in Sections IV and V I delve into political and fiscal decentralization, respectively. In Section V, the approaches to decentralization are discussed, and conclusions are presented in Section VI.

2 Decentralization as a policy objective in Guinea-Bissau

There are many motivations for decentralization. First, decentralization can in theory bring about efficiency gains.2 In this case, decentralization is part of a broader state reform aimed at improving service delivery and accountability. This “New Public Management” approach posits that by being closer to the users, efficiency gains are obtained. On the political front, decentralization can be necessary to improve state–society interaction and accountability. This view somewhat posits that there is a link between decentralization and democratization, and that the lesser the gap between government and citizens, the greater the political participation—in particular, of the poorest (Turner 1999). In some countries,

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2 Tiebout argued that the decentralization of public goods provision allowed governments to better respond to individual needs (Brueckner 2000). Similarly, Oates (1972) theorized about the inefficiencies stemming from a uniform spatial provision of public goods and services.
decentralization is driven by pragmatic considerations, such as pressure exerted by urban growth and ensuing policy planning challenges it presents across sectors (health, education, waste management, etc.).

In the case of Guinea-Bissau, decentralization is a long-standing policy objective. It is embedded in the Constitution—as far as political decentralization is concerned, through the organization of local elections. It is on this basis that a project law (projeto de código da administração autárquica) has been drafted in order to equip subnational entities with administrative prerogatives that go along with the political devolution. It also responds to a key developmental issues for the country: spatial inequalities—since the city of Bissau hosts most public services and parts of the country are excluded from key social service provision (Arvanitis, Andrianarison, and Le 2016). Decentralization is highlighted in the country’s most recent national development plan “Terra Ranka,” presented to the international community in March 2015. According to the plan, decentralization has the following objectives (and by extension, perceived benefits): (1) improved service delivery throughout the territory, (2) greater political participation, and (3) fostering of local economic development.

While these motives are aligned with perceived benefits of decentralization cited herein, literature is awash with potential risks and, thus, negative effects to be incurred while pursuing decentralization. These can, for instance, include increased pressure on already weak central governments that need to share resources with subnational entities, local elite capture, or even conflicting legitimacies among others (Smith 1993; Turner 1999; Bird and Ebel 2007). Thus, the question becomes one of planning and pitfall avoidance for Guinea-Bissau. There have been no clear attempts at decentralization reform in the country thus far. It is, therefore, not possible to examine “successes and failures.” What is possible, however, is to analyze the current institutional set-up to gauge the gap between what should be there and what is there. This is done in the following sections, with a careful analysis of legislation and institutional set-up across the three dimensions of decentralization, leading to a discussion of the potential way forward.

3 | Administrative decentralization

Administrative decentralization primarily refers to transfers related to decision-making, responsibility, and human resources for public services delivery. Decentralized entities delivery on behalf of the central government, and this entails a division of labor within the public sector. In this section, we begin by looking over the territorial configuration of the country, which is a key variable in determining administrative decentralization, before analyzing service delivery.

Territorial configuration

Guinea-Bissau is a diverse country with over 20 ethnic groups and long-standing religious cohabitation. The 1996 constitutional revision reviewed the previous territorial grouping, which had divided the country into three regions (North, South, and East) to introduce eight administrative regions, in addition to the “autonomous sector of Bissau.” Below the regions are 37 sectors/districts (Republica da Guiné-Bissau. 1997, Decreto-Lei 04/974/97). This essentially forms the current administrative territorial organization in the country. Regions, which are headed by governors designated by the central government, have direct administrative oversight over districts, as well as cities, towns, and villages (tabancas in the local Creole). While, by law, cities are municipalities and are supposed to be ruled by elected bodies, districts are not endowed with a mechanism for political representation, and they are solely administrative divisions, each placed under the responsibility of an administrador de sector. More specifically, districts are currently being managed by the Ministry of Territory and Local Power through the General Direction of Administrative Decentralization. Population is rather unevenly distributed, with Bissau having the highest number of citizens, together with the central and eastern regions (Oio, Bafatà, Gabu), as compared to the more sparsely populated coastal regions and the Bolama region (Bijagos islands) (Maps 1 and 2).

According to the legal framework, municipalities should have a high degree of autonomy. They also are the centerpiece of planned reforms outlined in a project law (projeto de código da administração autárquica) in terms of decentralization, for which a series of competency transfers are scheduled in the fields of education, culture, civil protection, policing, health, and rural/urban equipment, among others. Such reforms are brought together under a project code for territorial administration (Programa Nacional da Decentralização, PND) elaborated with assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It embodies and clarifies past legislation on decentralization, forming a plan of what decentralization should look like as opposed to current realities. The plan is, however, yet to be approved, as of mid-2017.

Administrative decentralization and service delivery

Spatial inequalities in the country are some of the identified drivers of fragility in the country (AfDB 2015a). With respect to population, 25 percent is located in the city of Bissau, which accounts for 0.25 percent of territory. Density reaches 4,711 inhabitants per km2 in the city, while regions like Quinara or Bolama (Bijagos) stand at 19.4 and 12.4 inhabitants/km2, respectively. Administratively, some services are highly centralized. For instance, the renewal of passports is only done at the center. The most statistically dominant ethnic groups among the entire population of Guinea-Bissau are: Balanta, 30 percent; Fula, 20 percent; Mandinka, 13 percent; and Papel, 7 percent.

3 The most statistically dominant ethnic groups among the entire population of Guinea-Bissau are: Balanta, 30 percent; Fula, 20 percent; Mandinka, 14 percent; Mandika, 13 percent; and Papel, 7 percent.
4 Contrary to the other regions, Bissau is not led by a governor, but directly by its mayor. Both Governors and the mayor are appointed.
5 The creation of a municipality theoretically responds to certain criteria set in the project code for local administration, such as a population of 1,500 within the urban settlement, or 3,000 in the wider agglomeration (encompassing tabancas), the existence of a health center, a pharmacy, and other key public services.
the capital, and while pension payments can be received in regions, paperwork to set up payments is only submitted in Bissau. Weaknesses and bottlenecks in the prevention and treatment of diseases, such as AIDS or tuberculosis, are highly constrained by geographic inaccessibility of health care centers (Arvanitis 2014). In the 2014–16, strikes in the public sector occurred because of delays and arrears in the payments of salary top-ups (incentivos) granted to health and education workers working in remote areas. These issues are compounded by the generalized lack of qualified administrative staff in regions, compared to the center, as well as high absenteeism among the staff. According to the Government, no decentralized civil servant has a university degree, and 27 percent are considered illiterate (DGDA 2015).

The city of Bissau hosts most options related to health and education. Outside the city, it is estimated that 40 percent of the population lives further than 5 km away from a health center. In Bissau, only 3 percent of citizens live further than a 60-minute walk from a school, but this rate jumps to 20 percent in the rest of the country. Estimates from the World Bank (2015) highlight endemic levels of both monetary and non-monetary poverty across most regions. While Bissau is the least poor, the regions of Gabu (which is inland and borders Senegal and Guinea) and Biombo both have important spatial variation in poverty rates, but Quinara has low spatial variation and is the country’s poorest region (World Bank 2015).

Subnational governments have little input into service provision. In the health sector, the country is divided into 114 health areas, for which the directorates in each region are tasked with providing technical support and coordination. Regions do not engage in management or policymaking with respect to sanitary areas within their territorial boundaries. Policies, strategies, recruitments, and regulations come from the center. In the education sector, a similar administrative scheme prevails, although regional deconcentrated administrations are involved in planning and staffing. This creates an important issue regarding staffing which is undertaken at regional level. With a notable lack of coordination between the regional and central authorities and the absence of a clear human resource plan and of control over hiring procedures, staffing tends to outgrow what is budgeted, leading to ballooning wage bills and liabilities, but also discontent when the state cannot respond to its obligations.

4 | Political decentralization

Political decentralization is about creating the space for local entities and tiers of government to understand and act according to the wishes of their constituents. In this section, we first look at accountability structures in place at regional and local levels before delving into the actual transfers of power and authority to government tiers and citizens.

Accountability at regional and local levels

The 1996 constitutional revisions that introduced decentralization explicitly mentioned elections. A series of subsequent laws in 1996/97 referred to elections at the municipality level, but did not address the appointment of governors, who thus continue to be state appointees that act as nearly equivalents of préfets under the Francophone system. As per the legislation, local elections are supposed to designate municipal councils and council president (mayor equivalent), but have never taken place. This is due to the fact that political upheavals and lack of funding have not allowed for their organization (DGDA 2015).

In theory, the government’s system and structure is based on a layer of elected officials at the municipality level with downward accountability to their local electorate. Accountability also theoretically flows upward, to the extent that governors have legal/administrative oversight to ensure that local policies and actions are in line with centrally set legal and policy frameworks. Guinea-Bissau presents a hierarchical system of local governance (Figure 1). At the fiscal level, regional courts of accounts should have oversight over the financial aspects of municipalities. These bodies are, however, nonexistent.
Transferring authority to government tiers and handing over power to citizens

As previously noted, political decentralization involves the creation of space for local entities and tiers of government to understand and act according to their constituents’ needs. To this end, elections have an important role to play. They are, however, not a sufficient condition for effective decentralization, or for accountability and autonomy, all of which are necessary for effective local governance. Experience on the African continent shows that decentralization (and democratic local governance) is effected solely by the transfer of power to a local government, but also to the people (Kauzya 2007). “Vote” also requires “voice.”

As far as elections are concerned, provisions have been made in the Constitution, and laws created for them to take place. They have, however, not materialized so far. Although they were planned to occur before 2018, by successive governments, since the return to Constitutional order in 2014, the national political situation (as well as budgetary shortfalls for their organization) has been the main reason put forth by authorities to explain the lack of progress on that front.

Regarding “voice,” it should be noted that legislation gives civil society and traditional chiefs some room to manoeuvre. Concerning the latter, however, although identified by the government as key stakeholders that can have a specific function in municipal committees (DGDA 2015), Law 6/96 on the electoral code considers traditional authorities ineligible for elected local governance positions. Such laws drafted when “multipartyism” was allowed and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo-Verde (PAIGC) hegemony over politics could not be challenged, these laws technically limit the emergence of local counterpowers (see Box 1). This fits with the idea whereby incentives and rules in local elections can be made in a way to allow incumbent national politicians to push for their candidates, rather than allowing new actors to emerge (Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke 2011). As far as civil society organizations (CSOs) are concerned, although they are important stakeholders, they are considered to be generally politically weak, have capacity shortfalls, and suffer from a degree of politicization (de Barros 2014).

Democratic local governance is also determined by whether there is locally elected politicians can be held accountable.

6 Specifically Law 6/96 of September 16, 1996, on electoral capacity; law 9/96 of November on electoral census; and law 5/97 of December 2 on the creation of municipalities.
7 Préfets, under the French/Francophone administrative system, are representatives of the (central) state in regions or departments. The préfet acts as the interface between the state and local governments and has important security-related functions.
8 Hierarchical systems focus on the relations between central and intermediate tiers of government. Their advantage is greater cohesion and coherence, as intermediate levels coordinate inputs under their jurisdiction. The alternative is so-called bifurcated systems in which the central level is responsible for deciding on revenue/expenditure assignments and transfers. This sort of “centralized decision-making” can be considered an advantage to ensure uniform rules across the national territory. However, considering the multitude of parallel vertical relations it entails, coordination is a challenge. Considering the weaknesses of central government in Guinea-Bissau, a hierarchical system seems more appropriate.
This entails a degree of administrative and fiscal decentralization (although on the taxation side, tax-sharing agreements between central and subnational players are mostly in place, favoring upwards transfers). As previously noted, regulation gives space for such powers. Yet realities are clearly disconnected from the law. On the fiscal side, tax-sharing agreements are not enforced. On the administrative side, the fact that local elections have never been held entails direct control from the center, or in some instances, via deconcentrated administrations (UNDP 2015). The current situation is such that, in the absence of elections, deconcentrated departments of the central state make up local governments. These are accountable only to the center and have no formal links to constituents (Figure 2).

Figure 2 De facto hierarchical system of local governance

There is no local government link to the intermediate (regional) level

Central government is represented by governors

Central government

Region 1 (Governor)

Region 2 (Governor)

Population

5 | Fiscal decentralization

Financial autonomy and tax sharing

Law 02/96 on the creation of local authorities stipulates that a municipality cannot be created unless there is assurance that it can mobilize the funding necessary to fulfill its attributions. Subsequent legislation give municipalities space for their own decision-making by granting them a corporate identity, some tax-raising authority, and space for policy decisions in accordance with the subsidiarity principle (DGDA 2015).9

In the current set-up, regions are expected to be funded through transfers from the state, as well as via tax-sharing agreements. Regions do not have any fiscal prerogatives. The reality is that transfers are seldom undertaken, and tax-sharing agreements are not respected. Regarding the latter, an example is the 1998 Law 5/98 on land use (Lei da Terra), which distributes property taxes as follows: 60 percent for the Central Treasury, 20 percent for local communities (tabancas), 10 percent for regional and local administrations (municipalities), and 10 percent for a land commission. This is, however, not applied, as the center commands the resources, and the state’s dire fiscal position drags all available resources centrally (DGDA 2015; IMF 2015). More generally, fees collected in the regions by deconcentrated authorities (e.g., forests, customs, geology and mines, fisheries, ports, tourism, etc.) are shared with their centralized structures.

Regarding transfers, similar realities apply. Although specific lines exist in the budget, local administrations have not received support from the central government in terms of transfers. Since 2012, only one transfer has taken place, for an amount six times less than that approved by the budget law (World Bank 2016).10 As far as the city of Bissau is concerned, it manages to collect rather substantial amounts of money, unlike the regions, most notably through market fees.11 These collections are, however, barely enough to cover minimal investment spending.

The treasury does not have deconcentrated services across the country, leaving important gaps in financial management. As such, many transactions are made in cash, which leads to

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9 The local government code stipulates in Chapter II, Article 3 that: “1. Local authorities intervene in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity regarding their duties in the state. 2. The transfer of duties and powers shall be made to the local authority best placed to proceed, taking into account the extent of the transfer and the nature of the task as well as requirements of efficiency and economy.” (Author’s translation from Portuguese).

10 As well as email exchange with the Ministry of Territorial administration.

11 According to its accounts, the city of Bissau’s revenues for 2015 amount to 1.79 billion FCFA, of which 364 million FCFA is derived from a one-off grant from the EU. Discounting this grant, about one-third of revenues stem from market fees (about 500 million FCFA). Current expenditure was of 1.15 billion FCFA or the equivalent of 80 percent of total spending (of which 54 percent is set for personnel wages). In 2015, total expenditure for the municipality amounted to 1.49 billion FCFA. Unfortunately, detailed budgets from regions could not be obtained.
forgone revenues in the presence of “red tape” and lack of receipt systems. The absence of bank branches in many parts of the country and the poor usage of banking systems, in general, add to this problem.

On the fiscal side, Guinea-Bissau faces an important constraint related to the transposition of regional directives from the West African Monetary Union (WAEMU). However, Directive 01/2011/CM/UEMOA on the fiscal regime of local government entities in the WAEMU zone is essentially tailored on the francophone system of territorial and economic governance: it is strict in the institutional set-up required for effectiveness and is based on accounting practices that do not take into account more recent evolutions on balance sheets presentations, management for results, or accrual accounting (World Bank 2016). Guinea-Bissau has not adopted the directive, in spite of the fact that it should have done so by the end of 2012, at the latest. Considering the capacity gaps in terms of economic and financial management in the country, even if adopted, its effectiveness would present an important challenge for subnational governments.

6 | How to approach decentralization in Guinea-Bissau

Considering the neopatrimonial and elite-centered nature of the state, and an overall weakness of civil society organization, as well as little administrative capacity, high poverty rates (over 69 per cent of the population is considered as poor), and a narrow fiscal base, future decentralization efforts require a political economy approach in order to avoid the pitfalls of decentralization (Box 2).

A key consideration for reducing poverty in Guinea-Bissau lies in the reduction of fragility drivers, which often lead the country to instability (AfDB 2015a). Spatial inequalities are an important bottleneck, not only in terms of basic service delivery, but also to the extent that they cannot allow effective and complete state building. Against this background, setting a normative decentralization agenda has the potential (on paper, at least) to lead to substantial poverty reduction through its theoretical (although empirically inconclusive according to Bird and Ebel [2007]) benefits such, as greater service allocation efficiencies (due to closeness to users), political stability, etc. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, however, a more suitable approach is one recognizing the importance of context (Weingast 2014). In practice, it means that decentralization by the book cannot take place.

In theory, poverty reduction can be achieved through decentralization focusing on the expansion of state services across the country. This is the approach taken by some donors, such as the World Bank and its Rural Community-driven Development Project (RCDDP), working directly at the tabanca level to fund micro-projects based on community-crafted development plans and on social service delivery. Although yielding important positive results, the efforts are not nested in a wider decentralization effort and ignore the superior administrative layers (municipalities and regions), not least because government tiers and administrations are not equipped to perform their roles as decentralized entities. This presents an important challenge going forward: delinking the local developmental plans from the political/administrative/ fiscal decentralization agenda may well reinforce the distrust and lack of expectations that populations have for state structures. At the same time, it allows for the delivery of services at the local level, while building a local know-how on service delivery that can be helpful in the future when effective decentralization does occur. Conversely, what is needed is a broader spatial approach to put the State back on the map.12 Meanwhile, the UNDP is looking at a project to enhance capacity at municipality level and pave the way for local elections.

While local representation is needed, so is the strengthening of the central state. This may appear paradoxical in the context of the discussion of decentralization, but it is a necessary condition. Experience from other developing countries has put forth the necessity of having a minimally capable central state to conduct decentralization (Gomez, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sepúlveda 2011)—this includes efforts in public financial management, human resource policies, etc. For instance on the fiscal side, many assessments by partners have revealed shortcomings in the court of accounts or in tax administration at the central level (AfDB 2015b). If the core is not functioning, it is unlikely that the periphery can, considering human resource shortcomings outside Bissau and communications issues—and all this is likely to undermine regional courts of accounts and local tax collection.

Accounting for local realities, local taxation should encompass certain key characteristics. First, it should focus on immobile factors.13 Considering the high informality of economic activities, especially outside Bissau, this would allow for tax authorities to be in a better position to collect revenue. In addition, it should be broad enough to provide revenues without resorting to high rates. These two issues greatly affect perceptibility of taxation, which is paramount in the context

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Box 2 Decentralization traps

Fuhr (2011) sets out seven traps of decentralization: 1. policy trap, 2. coordination trap, 3. fiscal trap, 4. debt trap, 5. capturing trap, 6. inequality trap, and 7. capacity trap. On the policy front, dialogue and foresight are key, as is the clarity of assignments and responsibilities. On the coordination front, rules for intergovernmental collaboration should be set, whether they are formal or ad-hoc. The fiscal trap refers to macro-imbalances if tax bases are inappropriately assigned. Then follows a debt trap with issues related to subnational-level borrowing. This, however, is not applicable to Guinea-Bissau at this stage. The capturing trap refers to the potential lack of accountability and the constraints to citizen participation, which can allow elite capture and corruption. The inequality trap is very much linked to the type of fiscal decentralization that has been chosen and the level of horizontal transfers to ensure that there are no spatial inequities. Lastly, institutional capacity—or lack thereof—is the last trap to avoid, as a lack of it prevents decentralization from effectively taking hold.
of Guinea-Bissau. Such characteristics point to property taxation as a source of local income. The issues it brings up are, however, manifold. First, property taxation would involve issues of land valuation. Second, Guinea-Bissau has a notable issue with land registry, and land laws that are yet to be approved and implemented. Changes in local fiscal regime should not be detached from reforms in the law of land, as well as capacity building to improve local tax collection.

On the political side, holding local elections at the municipal level is an important first step forward. This will create the interlocutors, who should, together with governors, better address spatial inequalities in planning and responding to local demands, which highlight service delivery gaps. Concurrently, work must be undertaken in order to build the “voices,” which should accompany “votes” to build accountability.14

Planning such decentralization is not an easy task. Sequencing political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization is a complex task, as it touches upon the distribution of political, fiscal, and administrative power. As suggested above, the prevailing party system dominated by the PAIGC and its institutionalization favors party control (Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke 2011), which can bring about a transfer, for instance, of political patronage to lower tiers of government. Decentralization is also a process that generates new actors (e.g., mayors, etc.) who then have a stake and can influence initial reform plans. To tackle these issues, it is important that decentralization reforms find political champions to carry them.

7 | Conclusions

In a first instance, in the paper, we set out to delve into the territorial organization of political power in Guinea-Bissau. By paying attention to its jurisdictional levels, the extent of power devolved to local and intermediate levels of government was highlighted. Findings suggest that, de jure, local levels of government should hold important powers. De facto, however, power is still centralized. Local elections have never been held, and the intermediate and regional levels of government are but an extension of the central government. Municipalities, which are expected to play a central role in local governance, are not functional. Deconcentrated administrations suffer from a lack of means, and fiscal set-ups for lower tiers of government are ineffective. Local entities have neither policy-making nor budget and financial independence required for an effective subnational autonomy. Combining the status of local democratic governance with territorial organization and fiscal arrangements, the analysis highlighted important spatial inequalities and bottlenecks that have not been met with effective mechanisms for local service delivery. Poverty reduction through decentralization has not taken place. Looking forward, there is a wide scope for poverty reduction through decentralization, which can be achieved by turning the de jure situation described here into a de facto one, focusing on the role granted by the Constitution to municipalities and strengthening the “voices” that will form the required counterpowers to enforce accountability.

When decentralization reforms are planned, questions arise about the nature of local support that should be given in the absence of formal institutional state structures. Such support is undoubtedly necessary, so partners should ensure that projects and programs, over time, build local know-how on service delivery that can help when effective decentralization is enacted. When looking at current deconcentrated administrations, the issue of capacity and shortcomings in coordination are clear. Against this background, then, further decentralization must be accompanied by a strengthening of accountability and a culture of coordination.

Supporting decentralization will, however, not be an easy task. Bearing in mind the current weaknesses of the state, party, and political structures, but also its infrastructure, the building of a reform plan will require much flexibility and effort to avoid the negative returns to decentralization.

12 Just as the state is defined as having the monopoly on legitimate violence, it is here defined by extension as having the monopoly on the provision of public goods such as health, education, and security. It is interesting to note that the colonial past explains, to a large extent, spatial gaps in Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, uneasy access to remote areas increased the difficulty for the state to exercise its powers. From an administrative viewpoint, the colonial state did not have trusted representatives across the countries, and its policing functions were not strong enough, nor were its judiciary prerogatives. However, this did not mean that the colonial state did nothing. For instance, tax collection could take place with the help of strong police/armed forces—yet, this is hardly akin to having a hierarchy of control over local communities (Forrest 2003).

13 That is, on economic factors (land, labor, capital) that cannot be easily moved from one constituency to another.

14 De Barros (2014) proposes a set of strategies to that end.
References


