CHAPTER 3
Conflict prevention and resolution, and peacebuilding strategies

This chapter focuses on key issues relating to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. It draws on the conflict risk factors and triggers identified in Chapter 1. Conflict resolution refers to the mechanisms for ending conflict, and peacebuilding to measures aimed at consolidating the peace after a violent conflict. Civil wars — whose distinctive feature is that they are executed by a rebel movement — can be ended militarily or by a peace deal, or a combination of the two. The few cases of decisive military victory in Africa include the National Resistance Movement's victory over the Government of Uganda in 1986, and the Government of Angola's defeat of UNITA in 2002. Sometimes, however, even when the rebel movement defeats the government and assumes power, a role reversal occurs, with the ousted government waging a rebellion. This happened in Rwanda following the Rwanda Patriotic Front defeat of the extremist Hutu regime in 1994. Negotiated settlements tend to be common. Examples include Sierra Leone (between the Revolutionary United Front and the government in 1999), Côte d'Ivoire (between the government and the rebel "New Forces" in 2003 and 2007), and Burundi (under the aegis of the Arusha peace process). This chapter proposes measures to address the root causes of violent conflict. It also examines conflict resolution and peacebuilding tools.

Conflict prevention

Economic growth and development

Many conflict risk factors in Africa seem to be related to the region's relative economic deprivation. Hence, policies that succeed in increasing income and education levels, stimulate economic diversification, and strengthen a middle class that derives income and political influence from its human and financial capital, are likely to aid conflict prevention in the long run. Broad-based economic growth, in particular, will eventually raise incomes and make recourse to violence a less attractive option for the young men and women who participate in violent conflict. Economic growth must be equitable to ensure that it benefits the poor, and the young men and women who are likely to participate in violent conflict.

Equitable economic growth is also likely to increase the effectiveness and stability of democratic institutions. Dahl (1989, p252) argues that democracy only succeeds in a 'modern dynamic pluralist society', characterized by 'a dispersion of: (i) political resources, such as money, knowledge, status, and access to organizations; (ii) strategic locations, particularly in economic, scientific, educational, and cultural affairs;

and (iii) bargaining positions, both overt and latent, in economic affairs, science, communications, education, and elsewhere'. Extremely poor people do not have any bargaining positions.

Only when the citizenry possess something they can use to hurt the income of elites in political positions can they succeed in keeping elites to the contract implied by a democratic political system. Such dispersion of resources and positions are closely associated with high average income.

Natural resource management

Case study evidence shows that natural resources have fuelled recent civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, DRC, and Liberia. In some of these countries, mismanagement of natural resources also aided state collapse that culminated in civil war. Sound management of natural resources therefore lies at the heart of building a viable and secure state in these countries. In some countries, the cause of conflict is the distribution of revenues from resources: Resource-producing regions are sometimes marginalized, resulting in regional inequalities, which could lead to violent conflict. In such circumstances, the appropriate policy would entail implementing a more equitable distribution of the revenues. The agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army to end the long-drawn civil war in Southern Sudan is a good example. The agreement stipulated that revenues from oil — located in the south — would be split equally between the region and the central government. Chapter 4 recommends some policies in the post-conflict context.

Democratization and the social contract

Violent conflict is unlikely to take hold if a country has a framework of widely-agreed rules, formal and informal, that govern the allocation of resources and the peaceful settlement of grievances. The idea of a social contract as the basis of the modern state can be traced back to political philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. A social contract does not refer to an explicit contract, but to a degree of government by consent, in return for, minimally, the provision of security. Within a society, social contracts can be vertical, if they are authoritarian in the sense of Thomas Hobbes, or horizontal, if fashioned by a greater degree of consent, as advocated by John Locke.

What does a good social contract entail? Kant's (1795)[1] essay on the 'Perpetual Peace' provides us with fundamental clues. First, the expression 'perpetual', implies permanence as opposed to a transient truce. In contemporary language, the expression "self-enforcing" may be used to signify that there are no incentives to deviate from the 'peace'. Second, and most crucially, Kant refers to a 'republican' constitution. By this he means the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. The independence of the judiciary may be added. Good government lies at the heart of the idea of a social contract. Our

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[1] Although Kant speaks about a perpetual peace between nations, his argument can be extended to groups within a nation state.

contemporary understanding of good governance can include a host of other factors beyond the separation of powers, such as decentralized decision making powers. Third, the stability of the peace depends on the source of Conflict prevention and resolution, and peace building strategies 25 sovereignty or legitimate power within the nation. Kant points out that good governance provided by dictators or absolute monarchs is inherently unstable as they or their successors face temptations to deviate from it. The assurance of good governance is therefore more reliable in a representative system of government, implying some degree of democracy.

The preceding discussion makes the case for democracy as the basis of the social contract. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, democratic institutions are sometimes unable to reduce the risk of conflict onset in African countries. This may undermine the case for democracy as the basis of the social contract.

The recent trend toward multi-party electoral regimes is strong and is unlikely to be stemmed. Democratic institutions seem to somewhat constrain behavior within war, reducing the lethality of conflicts, even though they are ineffective in preventing them. Reversing this trend is neither desirable nor feasible. Autocratic regimes, after all, tend to only provide the 'peace of the zoo' (peace by repression) (Hegre et al., 2001). Thus, the relevant question is how to create or increase synergies among the democratization process, peace, and development in Africa.

Democratic institutions are chains of delegation from a principal (the body of voters) to agents at various levels — party leaders, MPs, heads of states, and the public service. Elections provide the means to formally delegate authority to politicians and to reassess their performance at regular intervals, but they do not provide a means to monitor the agent between elections. Without monitoring devices, the agent can abuse the delegated authority. Moreover, elected officials are put in positions where they can both manipulate the outcome of the next election and be empowered to remove the electoral institution. Thus, elections alone are not sufficient to ensure a democratic delegation chain.

Elections must be combined with constraints on the executive. Policies that encourage elections without safe-guarding constraints are not likely to have a conflict-reducing effect, and may even increase the risk of conflict. That armed conflicts often break out during or after elections bears witness to the enormous value of elected office to prospective candidates. Effective constraints on representatives reduce this value and create an environment for healthy political competition with considerably lower risks of violence. In mature democracies, the legislature functions as an institutional constraint. But members of parliament could also abuse their authority. An elected parliament alone is not a guarantee of scrutiny.

Both democratic and non-democratic executives can be constrained by strengthening the following practices and institutions:

• Transparency of public budgets and accounts

- General auditors capable of evaluating the state budget and accounts.
- Subjecting public investment projects to competitive bidding
- Independent judiciaries
- Independent central banks
- Rigid constitutions — requirements of super-majority or referenda to change them
- Independent electoral commissions.
- Decentralization of economic and political governance to enable widespread participation and foster ownership of the governance process. Decentralization may also help defuse secessionist pressures.

These constraining institutions are not only likely to decrease the incentives for violent competition for elected (and non-elected) office, but should also help put in place growth-promoting policies that in turn strengthen the functioning of democratic institutions in the long run.

The application of western-type democracy may pose special problems in ethnically polarized societies like Rwanda and Burundi. In such societies, additional measures are needed to protect minority rights. In the absence of such guarantees, democracy may lead to abuse and marginalization of the minority. If the minority is in power, it would be reluctant to allow a democratization process, out of such fears.

Strengthening neighborhoods

The payoffs to preventing conflicts may be much larger than immediately apparent since violent conflict in one country sometimes spreads to neighboring countries. The evidence reviewed in Chapter 1 also highlights the importance of good neighborhoods: The risk of armed conflict onset is lower where the neighborhood is relatively rich, democratic, and peaceful. The policy implication for international actors aiming to reduce the incidence of conflict is not to divert all resources to the most risk-prone states, but to support the countries that have the best policies, the highest growth levels, and the best-functioning political systems. The stability and relative wealth of countries such as South Africa and Botswana have a potential to 'spill over' to neighboring countries, if not in a fashion as direct as the spread of conflict. Steadfast support of the islands of success may be as important as addressing the crises that appear.

Regional integration

Violent conflicts in Africa often spill over into neighboring countries. Furthermore, some countries in Africa have supported, or been accused of supporting, rebellion in neighboring countries. Regional integration would promote peace and security by eliminating or minimizing these sources of conflict. It would also reduce mutual suspicions among countries, thereby reducing the tendency for regional arms races. Membership incentives could also help prevent or end conflict. For example, the resolution of ongoing conflict was a precondition set by the East African Community for Burundi's accession to the regional body.

Conflict resolution and peacebuilding tools

The following are some of the political and security interventions that have been implemented over the years as conflict resolution and peacebuilding measures.

Political interventions

Power-sharing

Power sharing is a tool for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace-building. As a conflict resolution tool, it is usually part of a peace deal. Power sharing can serve as a carrot for parties opposing a government to agree and respect a peace deal: Every side has a stake in the peace in terms of the fruits of office, and may therefore have some incentive to not deviate from it. Success or failure will depend on the individual parties' commitment to the stipulations and mechanisms of power sharing — the rules of the game — and the presence of external mediation and guarantees.

In the longer term, by being inclusive, power sharing may be a preferable form of democracy to a winner-take-all majoritarian system. Power sharing is not only inclusive, as all minorities are part of government, but it may dampen harmful and potentially conflict-producing elite competition. Power sharing, based on a proportional representation electoral system, could be considered superior to the more traditional Westminster-style majoritarian system, as the majority has to accommodate the minority. This is certainly relevant to Africa with its high degree of ethnic diversity. Even in certain Westminster-style governments in former British colonies, power sharing has involved sharing ministerial positions among groups delineated along regional, ethnic, and other identity-based lines. Several factors tend to undermine power sharing in a post-conflict context. First is asymmetric information: Parties to the peace treaty may have private information about their own strengths and intentions. Some groups or militias may retain an outside option of returning to war by only partially disarming. Second, commitment to the treaty may be incomplete, due to weak domestic and international anchors. Third, external assistance may be inadequate, thus constraining reconstruction given the low revenue base in post-conflict societies. The quality of external assistance also matters. Power sharing may also break down if external guarantors are biased, or perceived as such. Finally, the power sharing deal may be incomplete and not include all relevant groups.

Jarstad (2006) argues that power sharing may not be a panacea as far as sustaining peace treaties or promoting democratic development is concerned. First, when there are valuable resource rents at stake, or territories over which some groups have control, power sharing may be an insufficient incentive for some parties to hold to the peace. A group may opportunistically sign the peace treaty and then find an excuse to revert to war. This has been painfully demonstrated in Angola. Second, power sharing may not prevent the formation of splinter groups acting as spoilers in the peace process. Certain opportunistic elements may break away from the peace process, hoping to gain

more in the future by a return to conflict. Third, power sharing formulas tend to reward those enamoured of violence, and to marginalize moderate voices. This not only endangers the peace accord, but may also retard the future evolution of democracy. Fourth, power sharing may perpetuate ethnic polarities in the long term. Fifth, power-sharing could be costly in terms of economic resources. Post-electoral violence in Kenya in early 2008 led to the formation of a Grand Coalition Cabinet. This involved the creation of an additional nine ministries, bringing the total to 40, equally split between the two leading parties in the December 2007 election. In addition, there are about fifty assistant ministers. Substantial financial resources will be required to run such a large power-sharing government.

For all these reasons, power sharing formulas need to be carefully designed. One option is to have temporary power sharing mechanisms that are dismantled later as democracy takes root. This was the idea behind the Arusha peace accords for Burundi: initially parties were to share power and later the constitution apportioned Hutu and Tutsi representation; and Sierra Leone, where the RUF were initially part of the government after the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord. Second, a decentralized system of government, with several layers of political and economic decision making, may aid a power-sharing arrangement by allowing a greater role for minority groups and groups outside of the central government. In this regard, a federalist system, with provinces or states, rather than a unitary system, may be more desirable. Furthermore, a bicameral rather than a unicameral legislature would be superior, as in the United States, with the Senate elected on a different basis to the lower chamber: Each state, however large or small, sends two senators, while the House of Representatives is elected on the basis of population. Third, the electoral system, whether proportional or majoritarian, should succeed in returning representatives of different ethnicities. Fourth, care must be taken to ensure that moderate elements are represented. It should be noted that a future democratic system may have to take on a different configuration to an immediate post-war power-sharing agreement. Finally, constraints on executive power — notably through an independent judiciary — are all important in the long-run. Including all of these elements in any one power-sharing package is virtually impossible, and the relative weight placed on the various factors has to be judged on a case-by-case basis.

Transitional justice

A number of judicial processes are often instituted at the end of a conflict. Typical interventions include international tribunals, criminal prosecutions, and reparations for victims. Africa has hosted a number of initiatives of this kind, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the gacaca process (community courts) in Rwanda, and the first indictments of the International Criminal Court (ICC) against leaders of armed groups in Uganda.

In 2002, the ICC was set up in The Hague, the Netherlands, to try crimes

against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression (although the latter is not yet under the court's jurisdiction). The ICC emerged from a UN General Assembly conference in Rome in 1998. At present, it has 106 full member states. The court cannot exercise jurisdiction unless the accused is a national of a fully fledged member state; it is meant to complement existing national systems of justice in handling war crimes. The court's jurisdiction is unclear when national reconciliation processes grant amnesties to perpetrators of war crimes. To date, the court's activities have been exclusively focussed on Africa: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and Sudan (Darfur). In Uganda, action was brought by the government against the rebel leader (Joseph Kony) and associates of the Lord's Resistance Army operating in the north. Kony and others continue to demand immunity from these trials in return for peace. Critics argue that the writ of the ICC does not run universally to cover more powerful nations, citing the fact that the United States seeks immunity for its citizens, despite being a non-member.

The gacaca process in Rwanda involves a system of community courts. Faced with the enormity of the genocide, and the large number of alleged perpetrators — some estimate that it would take the ordinary judicial system 150 years to try all the accused and the international court in Arusha could only try a 100 or so prominent suspects — the Rwandese authorities delegated part of the system of justice to the indigenous, community based 'gacaca' method of traditional conflict resolution (see Graybill and Lanegran, 2004). These were argued to have three major advantages. First, this system lightens penalties for those who confess by halving their sentences. This has led to speedier procedures and disposal of cases. Second, apologies are central to the proceedings. Last, and not the least, affordable reparations through contributions to a community fund and/or community service is a cornerstone of 'gacaca'. Arguably, this system is far more likely to achieve the long-term reconciliation necessary for lasting peace due to the explicit acknowledgement of the need for apologies and reparation, and not least because it is a home grown solution to a domestic problem.

Fears have been raised, however, that transitional justice can undermine peace: The real or perceived threat of prosecution can discourage rebel leaders from agreeing to and honouring a peace deal, or ex-combatants from participating in a DDR programme. In contrast, supporters say that without justice and the end of impunity, reconciliation would be impossible. The demands for justice would have to be balanced against the risk of prolonged warfare, as the case of the Lord's Resistance Army suggests.

Truth and reconciliation commissions

The role of truth and reconciliation commissions can be traced back to the influential work of John Paul Lederach (2003). Lederach advocates the pursuit of 'conflict transformation', as opposed to 'conflict resolution' or 'conflict management'. Conflict transformation differs from the other two concepts because it

reflects an alternative understanding of the nature of conflict itself. Conflict resolution implies that conflict is harmful — hence it is something that should be ended. It also assumes that conflict is a short-term phenomenon that can be resolved permanently through mediation or other intervention processes.

Conflict management assumes that conflicts are long-term processes that often cannot be quickly resolved, but the notion of 'management' suggests that people can be directed or controlled as though they were physical objects. Also, the notion of management suggests that the goal is to reduce or control the violence, rather than to deal with the real source of the problem. Conflict transformation, according to Lederach, 'is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structure, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships' (Lederach 2003: 14). Reconciliation is therefore part and parcel of conflict transformation. It is a long-term process, which needs to be broad and inclusive of individuals and communities if success is to be achieved, and its path can be associated with ups and downs instead of following a linear progression (see van der Mark, 2007).

Lederach apparently views justice as a central element of reconciliation and truth as an important ingredient in achieving justice. Reparation is another important input; otherwise, the principle of justice may not be served. The reconciliation process occurs across several dimensions: legal, psychological, religious, social, political, and economic. Truth and reconciliation commissions are a mechanism for achieving justice and, therefore, reconciliation. To be successful, the mechanism has to be across the aforementioned dimensions and has to work at the individual as well as community level in addition to functioning at the national level.

Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) are increasingly being used to promote reconciliation following violent conflict in many parts of Africa, most famously in South Africa, but also in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, Ghana, Morocco, and Nigeria. TRCs provoke some thorny issues. Should they be part of the judicial process, or should they only serve as a reconciliation mechanism? Also, should they be combined with other processes such as war crimes trials?

Even though reconciliation should in principle occur at broad levels, it works mainly on individuals. Healing can help achieve national reconciliation, which underpins power sharing and long-term democratisation, both of which could be stepping stones in peace building. Achieving a common national position on the events of the past may be helpful, where all sides assume responsibility for errors and crimes. Some believe that healing, or reconciliation, cannot be achieved without justice, which in turn requires some punishment (or at least the acknowledgement by those granted amnesties of crimes committed) and restitution. Restitution has an important economic dimension — the livelihoods of both perpetrators and victims

need to be guaranteed. Otherwise, forgiveness may not occur and old wounds will remain festering. Broad-based post-conflict economic recovery is essential.

Peacekeeping

United Nations peacekeeping

The United Nations defines peacekeeping as "a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace" (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/). Peace-keeping can achieve this objective by providing the means to police a peace agreement, build trust among belligerents, and provide technical and logistical support for key transition activities like disarmament, demobilization and integration of combat-ants, and elections. Peace agreements between warring parties are normally not self-enforcing. Peacekeeping provides a monitoring and enforcement mechanism. The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948 to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since then, there have been 63 UN peacekeeping operations around the world.

Over the years, efforts have been made to adapt UN peacekeeping operations to cope with the evolution of conflicts and the global political landscape. Born at the time when Cold War rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council, UN peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, so that political solutions to conflict could be pursued. UN peacekeeping missions consisted of military observers and lightly armed troops with monitoring,

reporting, and confidence-building roles in support of ceasefires and limited peace agreements. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new context for UN peace-keeping operations. Accordingly, the UN shifted and expanded its field operations from "traditional" missions involving strictly military tasks, to complex "multidimensional" enterprises designed to ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the foundations for sustainable peace. Today's peacekeepers undertake a wide variety of complex tasks, from helping build sustainable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring, to security sector reform, to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/).

Originally developed to deal with inter-state conflict, UN peacekeeping has been increasingly applied to intra-state conflicts and civil wars in recent years. Although the military remain the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping personnel now include administrators and economists, police officers and legal experts, deminers and electoral observers, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, humanitarian workers and experts in communications and public information (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/).

In 2005, nearly 77 percent of all UN peacekeeping forces (or 50,000 out of a total of 65,000) were located in Africa. In terms of finance, African missions accounted for close to 75 percent of the UN's peace-keeping budget (US$2.9 billion out of US$3.9 billion in 2004–05 (United Nations

Department of Public Information). Furthermore, there have been 54 peace-keeping missions in Africa since 1948. This makes the African continent the most important region for UN peacekeeping at this time.

Multinational peacekeeping missions, including those under the aegis of the United Nations, reflect the principle that peace is a global public good. This means that peace in distant lands is of benefit to the citizenry of the rest of the world. The motivations behind the missions may be altruistic, but strategic factors such as refugee spillovers and the costs of meeting complex humanitarian disasters such as famines may make peacekeeping serve not only as a palliative, but also as a preventive exercise. But the international community's willingness to pay for such operations in Africa, mostly by Western tax payers, may be limited. Peacekeeping missions in Africa buttress peace accords, but these missions are often inadequately funded and manned.

UN peacekeeping has met with varied outcomes in Africa. The UN and the United States intervened in Somalia in 1994 in what proved to be a disastrous mission. The U.S. forces withdrew in late 1993, after a botched military operation left 18 U.S. troops dead. A second UN mission withdrew in 1995. In Rwanda, UN peacekeepers were unable to prevent the genocide in 1994 that claimed 800000 lives. In Sierra Leone, UN peacekeepers were overrun by the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who used the peacekeepers' weapons to try to march on the capital in 2000. However, following British intervention, the UN peacekeepers later helped maintain the peace and conduct elections in 2002. In Darfur, the UN mission has been hampered by lack of logistics to cover an area the size of France and Sudanese Government objections that it prefers an African Union force. UN peacekeepers helped conduct elections in Liberia in 2005 and in the DRC in 2006.

Several issues confront peacekeeping as a tool for conflict resolution and peace-building. The first is funding and logistics, and the often restrictive mandates that circumscribe the role of peacekeepers. Second, the presence of UN peacekeepers is normally subject to the consent of the host country government. This means that whenever a government does not approve, peacekeeping effectively ceases to be an option for resolving a conflict. Third, peacekeeping pre-supposes that a peace exists that should be kept. Thus, peace-keeping by itself does not resolve a conflict. It can only be used when some sort of peace deal has been struck. Fourth, the appro-priate time horizon for peacekeepers to stay in a country is debatable. Over the long term, peacekeepers may come to be perceived as an occupying force. Fifth, peacekeeping usually occurs in large-scale conflicts that assume a national dimension. Peacekeeping operations have not been associated with lower intensity, localized conflicts.

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) is one of the few empirical studies on peacekeeping. The authors use a dataset of 124 post-world war II civil wars and find that "multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference". However, the results of empirical studies on conflict issues tend to

be fragile and highly contested. Further work is therefore needed to provide an empirical basis for policy conclusions and recommendations.

Peacekeeping by African institutions

African organisations have also been involved in managing the continent's security crises in recent years (see Boxes 3.1 and 3.2). On behalf of the Southern African Development Community, former President Mbeki of South Africa mediated between the Government of Zimbabwe and the opposition to resolve the country's political and economic crises. The African Union and the UN are deploying a joint peacekeeping mission to Darfur, Sudan. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent peacekeeping or

peace enforcement troops to Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, lack of finance and logistics have often hampered regional peacekeeping operations.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is an early step in the transition from war to peace. The overall objective is to prevent the resumption of armed conflict by dismantling rebel forces' fighting capacity, and helping combatants to return to "normal" civilian life and to earn a living by peaceful means instead of war. DDR consists of three closely-related phases. Disarmament, the first phase, is primarily a military operation concerned with managing arms and ammunition. It involves the collection, control, and disposal of arms and weapons. Disarmament offers physical evidence of the warring parties'

Box 3.1: Lessons from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The fifteen-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been spearheading conflict resolution efforts in the region. Nigeria has been the key player. Finance has been a major challenge, with Nigeria meeting the bulk of the costs. Final estimates for the cost of Nigerian participation in the intervention in Liberia were between 4 and 10 billion US dollars.

A key lesson from ECOWAS conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts is that there is need to collaborate with other stakeholders, notably, the UN. The synergy of ECOWAS and UN efforts has generated considerable dividends with the strength of each institution fully exploited while its constraints are mitigated. Thus, ECOWAS capacity for rapid troop deployment is utilized in situations where the UN on its own would not be able to act quickly due to the time involved in obtaining the requisite mandate. Once the mandate has been obtained, the UN then reinforces the initial ECOWAS troop deployment which otherwise might not be sustainable due to ECOWAS limited resources. Such collaboration was instrumental in the interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire.

One weakness of ECOWAS is that it has not built its capability to address the root causes of conflict in its member states. Even though its early warning system could forecast potential crisis in member states, ECOWAS capability to confront and resolve the root causes of these crises is severely limited.

Box 3.2: Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region

The Great Lakes Region comprising the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda, has seen a number of prolonged conflicts, prompting several peace efforts. The Arusha Peace Agreement for Rwanda, signed in 1993, was mediated by Tanzania, in conjunction with the then Organization of African Unity (now African Union) and France, Belgium and the United States. However, the Accord was unable to prevent the outbreak of violence in Rwanda in 1994.

Regional and international peace efforts have also been undertaken for the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 1999, the country and neighbouring countries signed the Lusaka Peace Agreement, an initiative by President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, acting on behalf of the then Organization of African Unity (African Union) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, the agreement did not bring peace to all parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Subsequently, the government negotiated other peace deals with rebel groups with the help of the international community. The UN has now deployed its 23000-strong largest ever peacekeeping mission in the country.

Burundi is a good example of international cooperation in conflict resolution. The late Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania at the time, and then Nelson Mandela, were the main mediators in the country's peace process in the 1990s and early 2000s. Subsequently, regional member countries — with the support of the African Union and the UN — set up a Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi. The Regional Initiative led to a peace accord with the government and the main rebel groups, and the holding of elections in 2005. The international community — UN, EU and bilateral donors — financed the peace process and provided peacekeepers. The African Union provided the African Union Mission for Burundi (MIAB) with a large South African contingent. This was followed by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The UN Peacebuilding Commission, set up in 2005 to support peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict, has chosen Burundi (together with Sierra Leone) as its first two countries to support.

The peace process in the Great Lakes Region offers many lessons, notably, the need for a regional approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, given the porosity of national borders, and the inter-connections of conflicts in the region. Another important lesson is the need for coordination of external efforts. Ambassador Ould Abdallah, the UN Special Envoy in the Great Lakes Region, 1993–95, claimed that the proliferation of mediators, of which 13 existed during his tenure in Burundi, contributed to delaying agreement among the protagonists (Daley, 2006).

submission to a political process. Confidence building is essential to disarmament. Throughout the 1990s, for example, the Governments of Niger and Mali invested in symbolic post-conflict disarmament interventions such as weapons destruction ceremonies. Likewise, the creation of verification mechanisms as part of DDR interventions — including the public destruction of arms — helps build confidence between former warring parties and civil society, and rebuild government legitimacy. Small arms collection and destruction — as pursued by Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, and other countries across Africa — seemed to offer an important symbolic commitment to peace. Notably, in Côte d'Ivoire in 2004 Prime Minister Seydou Diarra handed over his arms as part of the DDR process. Arms destruction also serves to prevent recirculation. In Mozambique and Namibia, arms continued to be purchased on the black market and turned up in violent crime in South Africa (Dzinesa 2007). The porousness of national boundaries imposes a need for regional coordination to minimize spill over effects: Disarmament could stimulate cross-border trade and trafficking.

Demobilization, the second phase, is a short-term process designed to reduce the size of the armed forces and to dismantle other informal groups through downsizing and complete disbandment. It ordinarily involves assembly, quartering, administration, and some form of discharge package.

Reintegration, the final phase, is designed to assist former combatants and their dependants resettle. It may include reinsertion (cash) payments, household material, land allocation, training, inputs, school fees, counselling, advisory support, credit schemes, job placements, and health support and referral services.

Challenges of reintegration

The challenges accompanying reintegration into state security structures and productive civilian livelihoods are formidable. Security services are often in dire need of reform — they may have been politicized and polarized during wartime. In the absence of reform, ex-combatants may find reintegration into the security forces especially difficult. With or without reform, integrated ex-combatants are often disillusioned with their new role and dissatisfied with their attributed rank.

Likewise, the social and economic absorptive capacities of cities, villages, and farming areas to which ex-combatants return may also be seriously eroded by decades of conflict. The lack of adequate physical and human capital to successfully reintegrate is likely to induce frustration and dissatisfaction, and raise the risk of resorting to alternative (violent) means to secure livelihoods. Another issue is potential tensions when target groups receive assistance but the local communities into which they are being reintegrated (who are also often needy) do not. In some cases, recognition of this problem has led to efforts to provide benefits to receiving communities as well as to reintegrees.

DDR planners and practitioners in Africa face a host of bureaucratic challenges. These relate in large part to the appropriate sequencing of interventions and the creation of ex post linkages to ongoing post-conflict

recovery and development programmes. Administrative and financial hurdles some-times accompany large-scale regional DDR programmes. The sheer number of international and national stakeholders involved in DDR programmes can frustrate a coherent and coordinated approach and over-burden African governments with institutional matters like reporting require-ments. Likewise, enormous logistical challenges arise in disbursing reinsertion benefits through local banks, tracking beneficiaries, and measuring effectiveness.

The pursuit of economic reform could also raise tensions with a DDR programme. In Ethiopia, the transition from the com-munist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam to a market economy led to widespread retrenchment in the public sector and to a dampening of labour market opportunities. This took place at a time when newly demobilized ex-combatants were entering the labor market — reducing the prospects for success (Ayalew et al 1999). In certain cases, the UN and the World Bank have supported Quick Impact Projects to ease the transition from DDR to longer-term development, but these are seldom more than 'stop-gap' measures.

There are also fiscal challenges. Peace agreements often provide for integration of rebels into the national army, leading to a potential trade-off between two balances: fiscal balance and peace achieved through power balance.

For conflicts resolved by negotiation, a strong peace agreement with firm com-mitment to its terms is required to facilitate DDR. When the peace agreement is weak, or commitment to its terms uneven, former combatants, particularly those still remain-ing in their existing command structures, can assume a spoiler function, as dem-onstrated repeatedly during Sierra Leone's halting peace process. Also, theknowledge that demobilization reduces or eliminates its capacity to fight may induce non-cooperative behaviour on the part of the rebel movement.

When former combatants are too hastily demobilised, as occurred immediately following Angola's civil war, they can also trigger new waves of violence in commun-ities of return. Combined with an uneven commitment to the terms of the peace agreement, poorly constructed demobilisa-tion efforts twice contributed to the resumption of armed violence between the MPLA and UNITA in the 1990s. Unless adequate provisions for meaningful reinte-gration are established at the outset — even before DDR is initiated — premature and poorly implemented demobilisation can prove counter-productive, even dangerous. A hasty demobilization process may leave command and control structures intact while cantonment itself can reinforce command structures.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration outcomes

A growing body of evidence suggests that DDR is less effective at minimising armed violence or promoting sustainable reintegration than expected (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Blattman and Annan, 2008; Pugel, (2008); and Paris, (2004). Box 3.1 highlights a study on Sierra Leone. It has also been recognised that some disarmament processes tend to be partial, reducing the

Box 3.3: DDR in Sierra Leone: successful reintegration?

The international community showered Sierra Leone with plaudits for a successful DDR programme that paved the way for a stable post-war political order following a brutal civil war that lasted from 1991 to 2002. However, there is some empirical evidence that the reintegration component of the DDR programme may not have been that successful. Drawing on data from a survey of 1,043 combatants from the five warring factions in Sierra Leone's civil war, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) sought to identify the impacts of DDR, particularly in relation to 'effective' reintegration. Their strategy was to compare reintegration success rates between those that entered and those that did not enter the DDR programme. Four distinct outcome measures were used to test the different 'dimensions' of reintegration: (i) access to employment, (ii) the extent to which fighters maintain ties with their factions, (iii) trust in democratic processes, and (iv) the combatants' belief that they are accepted by family and community members. The study found no discernible evidence that participation in DDR programmes actually facilitated reintegration.

Source: Humphreys and Weinstein (2007)

overall stock of illegal arms in circulation only marginally (Small Arms Survey 2005).

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Northern Uganda is an unusual but important place to evaluate the impact of child and youth soldiering and the meaning of reintegration. Tens of thousands of civilians were forcibly recruited by the rebel Lord's Resistance Army, LRA, during more than two decades of war — two-thirds of them children under the age of 18. A modest number of early LRA recruits were volunteers (many of whom became senior commanders in the force) and only a handful of them returned from the bush.

Box 3.4: DDR for children: the Uganda case

Northern Uganda is an unusual but important place to evaluate the impact of child and youth soldiering and the meaning of reintegration. Tens of thousands of civilians were forcibly recruited by the rebel Lord's Resistance Army, LRA, during more than two decades of war — two-thirds of them children under the age of 18. A modest number of early LRA recruits were volunteers (many of whom became senior commanders in the force) and only a handful of them returned from the bush. Thus, virtually all ex-combatants in this region are former abductees, and DDR programmes have focused on the reception and return of children and youth escaping from abduction.

To investigate the effectiveness of DDR for children, Blattman and Annan (2008) conducted a large-scale representative survey of nearly 1,000 households, including nearly 500 former abductees. The findings suggest the need for a shift in conventional understanding of the impacts of war on children and youth and a change in the approach to their post-conflict reintegration. In contrast to the predominant focus among NGOs on reuniting families and providing 'psychosocial' care — activities to minimize mental 'traumatisation' and social dislocation — the evidence suggests comparatively little broad-based psychological traumatisation or aggression among former abductees, child or adult. Rather, indications of disabling symptoms of distress are concentrated in a relative minority, especially those that experienced the most severe violence and those who returned to the least supportive family environments. The main impact of war appears to be substantially lower education, diminished productivity, and increased poverty and inequality, largely due to time away rather than to trauma. The impacts are greatest for children, who are more likely to have had schooling interrupted.

The consequences of these human capital losses for post-conflict redevelopment are substantial. With so many young people affected, and since lost education and experience take time to re-accumulate, if ever, the level and growth rate of income in northern Uganda will be depressed for decades to come. Such evidence suggests a shift in reintegration programming towards closing the education and economic gap. For aid policy, the main lesson learned is the need to shift to a more targeted approach to psychosocial support for the most affected, and an increased investment in programmes that promote secondary schooling, enterprise development, and adult learning. For the Government of Uganda, the evidence supports continued emphasis on broad post-conflict youth programmes, but caution regarding the late and potentially damaging roll-out of the official DDR program.

Source: Blattman and Annan (2008)

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The Nigerian Government has launched a number of disarmament efforts in the country over the last several decades. Many of these have taken place in the Delta region — a conflict involving non-state actors — but none has proven particularly successful. Between 1997 and 1999, for example, the Delta State Government initiated a disarmament programme for the warring ethnic factions from the Ijaw, Urhobo, and Itsekiri ethnic groups, while the governor of Warri offered cash, short-term training and employment to militant youths to give up their weapons. These initiatives failed to significantly reduce the number of arms in circulation or to yield measurable reductions in violence.

In July 2004, the governor of Rivers State initiated a disarmament programme to address the escalating violence in the Niger Delta. This programme never took hold and renewed fighting between heavily armed militant groups led to the intervention of the Federal Government. By October 2004, then President Olusegun Obasanjo negotiated a

Box 3.5: Disarmament without gainful employment in the Niger Delta

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  The failure of this process left many armed groups distrustful of the government and of its motives and apprehensive about any future disarmament initiatives. This shadow continues to hang over ongoing government efforts to resolve the crisis in the Delta. Even so, most armed group members have expressed a willingness to leave militia activities if they are provided with employment opportunities and security is restored to the region. This reveals positive prospects for future disarmament campaigns, but participation will be heavily dependent on improving credible community stability and creating viable economic alternatives to earning a living through violence.

Source: Hazen (2007)

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with employment opportunities and security is restored to the region. This reveals positive prospects for future disarmament campaigns, but participation will be heavily dependent on improving credible community stability and creating viable economic alternatives to earning a living through violence.

Small arms control

Small arms are the preferred weapons of gangs, individual criminals, and armed groups opposing the state. A modest number of small arms in the hands of small numbers of people can yield devastating outcomes. Consequently, small arms control

programs are usually organized at the end of a violent conflict with the objective of retrieving arms and ammunition — often through the use of a combination of voluntary and forcible measures. In order to support 'local ownership' of such processes, specially-created national DDR or disarmament commissions and 'national focal points' are sometimes established to see the process through. The emphasis has sometimes been on demonstrating rapid and visible results. Thus, carefully arranged rows of hardware and cantoned ex-combatants are sometimes regarded as more convincing expressions of progress than demonstrated reductions in real and perceived insecurity.

The narrow spectrum approach to addressing arms availability and armed groups remains dominant. The emphasis of peace-support operations and of African governments on containing cross-border arms trafficking and on forcible disarmament is well-documented (Small Arms Survey 2005). It is also widely recognised that (targeted) arms embargoes, sanctions, and border patrols, while all visible expressions of action, can only partially contain the vast surplus of weaponry already in circulation. Despite growing attention on security sector reforms, small arms and munitions continued to be frequently leaked from poorly safeguarded state armouries and security forces, as has been documented in Uganda, Congo, and Angola (See, for example, Nichols and Muggah, 2007, and Muggah, 2004, for a review of DDR programmes in the Republic of Congo). Thus, even when the tap is turned off through reductions in imports and enhanced border patrols, the

sink is still brimming with legal and illegal weaponry.

Arms and ammunition are not only produced and transferred from western and eastern countries to the Global South. Since the end of the Cold War, manufacturing capacities have expanded to more than 90 countries (Small Arms Survey 2007, 2006). While considerable transfers from North America, Western, and Eastern Europe, and Asia persist, military- and civilian-grade weapons are being produced in Africa for domestic consumption (Small Arms Survey 2007, 2006). Several North African countries, together with South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda, harbour arms and ammunition production capacities. Containing arms availability increasingly has as much to do with regulating and reducing domestic production and circulation, as with dealing with the international trade. Increasingly, weapons are made in Africa.

The circulation of foreign-produced arms encompasses more than an international black market run by nefarious arms dealers. Arms are transferred in many ways, including through legal inter-state trade, illegal and covert international transfers, shipments between states and armed groups, illegal cross-border and domestic trafficking, transfers between armed groups and civilian recirculation in local informal markets. Throughout the process, a host of intermediaries — from arms dealers, shipping companies, and corrupt officials are implicated with weapons traveling by air, road and sea. Factors that appear to statistically shape illegal arms markets include the extent of

trade barriers, the porosity of international borders, and domestic policing capacities (Killicoat 2007).

Small arms control has become a priority for some post-conflict African governments. Since the mid-1990s, considerable diplomatic energy has been devoted to elaborating international and regional frameworks to control small arms proliferation and trafficking across Africa. These initiatives were motivated by rising international concern with the transnational implications of arms circulation — particularly from developed countries to Africa. They were also inspired by attempts to contain spiralling rates of conflict and crime across the continent. By investing in enhanced information-sharing, forensics gathering, and practical cooperation across the continent, it was expected that arms trafficking could be curbed. African institutions such as the Organisation of African States (now the African Union), the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) elaborated practical export and import control and collection initiatives alongside the EU, the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the League of Arab States, and many other organizations.

Many international instruments and agreements relating to arms control are available to help shape dialogue with national partners, and facilitate coordinated and responsible action (see Table 3.1). These measures have established important precedents for, inter alia, weapons manufacturing controls, regulation of civilian possession, stockpile management and security, transfer controls, marking and

Table 3.1: Some small arms control instruments	
Global	**Africa**
UN Firearms Protocol (2001)	ECOWAS Moratorium (1998, 1999)
UN Programme of Action (2001)	Bamako Declaration (2000)
Wassenaar Arrangement (2004; 2002)	SADC Firearms Protocol (2001)
Ottawa Treaty on Landmines (1997)	Nairobi Protocol (2004)

record-keeping and tracing (See www.smallarmsurvey.org for a review of international and regional measures and corresponding texts). While many commitments are not legally-binding per se, they do offer vital entry-points for enhancing international and regional cooperation to support stability and security.

Increasingly, regional initiatives are being adopted to stem the flow of new arms to and within Africa. These included efforts by ECOWAS, initiated by Mali in 1993. Other initiatives include the SADC Protocol to control arms. In 2004, eleven countries in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa also signed the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons — the first such binding agreement in the region. Together, these efforts seek to promote the prevention of criminal and conflict violence by eliminating civilian ownership of automatic and semi-automatic rifles, introducing sanctions for unlicensed possession and promoting

controls on manufacturing, import, export, transit and transfer of arms.

Operation Rachel was launched in 1995 as a joint operation by the police forces of South Africa and Mozambique to prevent and reduce criminal violence. The primary objective was to target arms — particularly military-style weapons — availability across several Southern African countries. Since 1996, the police forces of South Africa and Mozambique worked together to identify and destroy arms caches still buried in Mozambique following the country's civil war (Dzinesa, 2007, and Chachua, 1999).

Operation Rachel specifically aimed to prevent weaponry from falling into the hands of smugglers/ traffickers who direct them to lucrative underground markets, where they are used to perpetrate violent crime. It also included initiatives to remove and destroy unstable explosive devices and material from these caches, thereby preventing injury to innocent civilians (women and children) in the vicinity.

The intervention was a stunning success. Operation Rachel collected and destroyed some 21,600 firearms, 1,610 anti-personnel landmines, and 5.1 million rounds of

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Box 3.6: Operation Rachel: successful regional arms control in Southern Africa?

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The intervention was a stunning success. Operation Rachel collected and destroyed some 21,600 firearms, 1,610 anti-personnel landmines, and 5.1 million rounds of ammunition between 1995 and 2005. In 2006, more than 3,060 small arms and light weapons, 105 missiles, 75,000 firearm magazines, and 300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were gathered with more than 95 per cent in good working condition. South Africa's 2005 report to the 11th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice stated that "Operation Rachel has had a positive impact on the stability of South Africa, Mozambique and the Southern African region".

Operation Rachel's success is attributed in part to a high degree of co-operation and intelligence-sharing between states and a culture of learning and adaptation that occurred between the Mozambique and South African police forces over successive operations. This translated into consistently well-planned and executed interventions. Other SADC member states that are strong candidates for similar initiatives are Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (given their recent peace processes and the number of arms caches that are presumed to be located in these two countries), as well as Tanzania and Zambia.

Source: Stott and van der Merwe (2007).

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Recommendations

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and small arms control are closely related activities. The following measures are recommended to enhance their effectiveness:

Adopt people-centered benchmarks of DDR and small arms control 'success': Until comparatively recently, conventional DDR and small arms control programs emphasized measurable output indicators such as the number of arms collected, combatants demobilized and funds disbursed. As important as these metrics are, they are not the same as effectiveness outcomes or impacts. Development policy makers and practitioners should be encouraged to develop more effective 'success' benchmarks, including indicators tailored to measuring changes in real and perceived safety and security.

Ensure adequate human and capital investment in DDR, particularly reintegration: While considerable attention is devoted to disarmament and demobilization, there needs to be renewed engagement with 'reintegration'. There is a pressing need to move beyond a narrow interpretation of reintegration as consisting of economic wellbeing to one that takes into account its political, social, and psychological dimensions. Likewise, there is a critical need for African governments and donors to invest in longer-term reintegration. Too often, support tails off shortly after reinsertion benefits are provided to ex-combatants and their dependents. Likewise, reintegration efforts are not effectively linked with parallel reconstruction processes. Ensuring that the development sectors effectively aligns interventions with 'reintegration' priorities is an important, if challenging, enterprise.

Enhance linkages between DDR and security sector reforms: There is an obvious need for more cooperation in the planning and implementation of synergies between DDR and SSR. DDR is unlikely to be effective without an accountable and functional security sector. In the absence of security

guarantees or of legitimate security entities, it is unlikely that combatants or civilians will lay down their arms. Moreover, without an effective SSR strategy, there will be few options for qualified ex-combatants to play a role in new security institutions.

Adopt regional and localized approaches to DDR, SSR and arms control: While African governments should be able and willing to play a central role in overseeing DDR, SSR, and arms control at the national level, it is important to focus on both the regional and local dimensions of security.

Conclusion

The prevention of violent conflict in Africa remains an important challenge, given the prevalence of conflict risk factors. The challenge requires a range of measures relating to economic management, political participation, and regional integration. Equitable economic growth is needed to empower the poor and raise living standards. Care should be taken to ensure that communities in which natural resources are located are the primary beneficiaries of the exploitation of the resources. Regional integration will reduce regional tensions and arms races.

Conflict resolution and peace building also face numerous challenges that often involve costs and trade-offs. The relative merits of the various measures have to be carefully analyzed and balanced, taking individual context into account. As with conflict prevention, the need for a regional approach is paramount. However, the decline in violent conflict in Africa in recent years suggests that conflict resolution efforts are achieving some measure of success. This needs to be consolidated to end the remaining conflicts in Africa. Furthermore, the decline reinforces the need for peacebuilding to ensure that the gains are not reversed.