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South Sudan Economic Outlook

Recent macroeconomic developments
The economy remains vulnerable due to oil dependence, fragility, and rising humanitarian pressures. Real GDP growth rebounded to 4.0% in 2024/25 from a 27.6% contraction in 2023/24, supported by the resumption of oil exports and improved agricultural output. Oil production increased to 156,000 barrels per day from 61,000. On the demand side, growth was driven by private consumption and oil-related investment. In 2025, inflation declined to 22.2% from 65.5% in 2024, reflecting improved domestic food production and stable food prices in the region. The exchange rate depreciated to SSP4,500 per US dollar from SSP3,900, driven by deficit financing and declining foreign exchange reserves. The fiscal surplus is estimated to have narrowed to 2.0% of GDP in 2024/25 from 5.8% in 2023/24, reflecting tax and customs reforms, improved compliance, and reduced leakages. The current account shifted from a surplus of 3.3% of GDP in 2023/24 to a deficit of 6.5% of GDP in 2024/25, driven by higher imports. The banking sector faced a liquidity crisis from late 2024, as cash hoarding and weak public confidence constrained withdrawals. The central bank reduced the policy rate from 15% to 13% in mid-2025 to ease liquidity pressures, while asset quality improved, with non-performing loans declining from 0.8% in June 2025 to 1.4% in December.
Social developments
Social indicators have deteriorated, with about 92% of the population living below the national poverty line in 2025. Unemployment remains elevated (12.5%), with higher youth unemployment (18.5%). Health outcomes are poor, with high infant mortality. Inequality remains high, while over half the population faces acute food insecurity.
Outlook and risks
The economic outlook is cautiously optimistic due to internal and external risks. Real GDP is projected to expand by 22.0% in 2025/26 and 6.8% in 2026/27, on account of increasing oil exports. Inflation is projected to decline to 21.8% in 2025/26 and 16.8% in 2026/27 as domestic food production improves. The fiscal surplus is projected to be 1.6% of GDP in 2025/26 and further improve to 3.0% in 2026/27, due to expected increase in oil revenue. The current account deficit is projected at 0.4% of GDP in 2025/26 and 1.5% in 2026/27, reflecting increase in imports. Key downside risks to growth include the spillover from Sudan conflict and internal political instability, which could disrupt oil exports and slow economic reforms. Cessation of hostilities and inclusive political dialogue are key to restoring stability.
Mobilizing development financing at scale in a fragmented world
The ability to mobilize large-scale development financing is constrained by weak domestic resource mobilization, driven by a large informal economy, limited diversification, and shallow financial markets. Alternative financing instruments, including equity and bond markets and institutional investors, are largely absent, while external financing remains costly. Global financial fragmentation, trade disruptions, and geopolitical tensions have further increased borrowing costs, limited access to capital markets, and heightened uncertainty of external inflows. Persistent macroeconomic instability and political fragility have elevated risk perceptions, discouraging investment and constraining access to long-term capital.
Addressing these constraints requires building an integrated financial system by tackling low market penetration, limited capitalization, and structural barriers. Priority reforms should include strengthening financial regulation and capital market infrastructure, enhancing domestic resource mobilization, improving fiscal discipline and public debt management, and combating illicit financial flows in line with anti–money laundering and counterterrorism standards.
Mobilizing development finance at scale will depend on three high-impact actions: advancing macroeconomic stability and governance reforms, strengthening the financial sector and payment systems, and crowding in private capital through well-structured public–private partnerships, guarantees, and blended finance. These measures would reinforce the financial architecture and enable development finance institutions to scale up support for transformative national programs.
